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1 ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines how the three Baltic countries constructed their internal and external 
sovereign statehood in the interwar period and the post Cold War era.  Twice in one century, 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were namely confronted with strongly divided multiethnic 
societies, requiring a bold and wide-ranging ethnic policy.  In 1918 all three Baltic countries 
promised their minorities cultural autonomy.  Whereas Estonian and Latvian politicians were 
deeply influenced by the theories of  Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, the Lithuanians fe"ll back on 
the historic Jewish self-government in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.  Many 
politicians were convinced that the principle of  equality of  nationalities was one of  the 
cornerstones ofthe new international order, embodied by the League of  Nations.  The 
minority protection system of  the League was, however, not established to serve humanitarian 
aims.  It only sought to ensure international peace.  The League's minority rights catalogue 
was shaped by the Western European conception of  the nation state of  which cultural 
autonomy was not a part.  Next to this, the minority protection system of  the League created 
an institutionalisation of  inequality between East and West.  This lack of  a general minority 
protection system was one of  many discussion points in the negotiations of  the Estonian and 
Latvian minority declarations.  Although Lithuania signed a much more detailed minority 
declaration, its internal political situation rapidly deteriorated.  Estonia, on the other hand, 
established full cultural autonomy with corporations of  public law.  Although a wide-ranging 
school autonomy was already established in 1919, Latvia never established cultural·self-
government.  The Second World War and the subsequent Soviet occupation led to the 
replacement of  the small historically rooted minority groups by large groups of  Russian-
speaking settlers.  The restoration in 1991 of  the pre 1940 political community meant that 
these groups were deprived of  political rights.  In trying to cope with this situation, Estonia 
and Latvia focused much more on linguistic integration than on collective rights.  Early 
attempts to pursue a decolonisation policy, as proposed by some leading Estonian and Latvian 
policymakers, were blocked by the 'official Europe' which followed a policy analogous to the 
League of  Nations.  Only when the policy of  normative pressure of  the High Commissioner 
on National Minorities was supported by the European Union's conditionality policy, some 
modifications to the restorationist policies were made. 
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5 INTRODUCTION 
Research questions 
Twice in the past 100 years (from 1918-1940 and since 1991), representatives of  Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania have faced the challenge of  constructing independent state institutions 
and national identities on the basis of  societies that are (deeply) multi  ethnic in character and 
of  negotiating a place within the institutional architecture of  a 'New Europe'.  This thesis 
examines how these three nations have tackled the construction of  sovereign statehood during 
these two eras, with particular reference to the provisions made for national minorities. 
There are two levels to this analysis.  The first examines issues of  domestic sovereignty, that 
is to say how the Baltic states organised and regulated the relationship between state and 
constituent national groups.  The second level looks at their relationship with the principal 
European International Organisations of  the day (the League of  Nations and the European 
Union respectively), and assesses what implications this had for their Westphalian 
sovereignty.  The thesis will compare and contrast the approach taken by the three nations 
during each of  the two eras, and will also look at issues of  continuity and change between the 
two eras. 
Sovereignty has indeed both an internal and an external dimension (Keating (2003:194)). 
Sovereignty is the assumption that a government of  a state is both supreme and independent. 
It means "a State's general independence from and legal impermeability in relation to foreign 
powers, and the State's exclusive jurisdiction and supremacy of  governmental powers over 
the State's territory and inhabitants" (Steinberger (1987:404)). 
The famous legal scholar Oppenheim taught that the sovereignty of  a state comprises 
territorial authority over all persons and things within its borders territory (territorial-
authority), authority over its citizens at home and abroad (personal authority) and 
independence from any external authority (Oppenheim (1905: 1  0 1)). 
6 Regarding insiders, sovereignty is disclosed by the supremacy of a governing authority over 
everybody who lives in its territorial jurisdiction and is subject to its laws and politics. 
Internal sovereignty is a fundamental authority relation within states between rulers "and ruled 
which is usually defined by a state's constitution (Jackson (1999: 11 )).  Domestic sovereignty 
then has to do with the organisation of  public authority within a state.  For example, public 
authority may be concentrated in the hands of  one individual or divided among different 
institutions.  There can be federal or unitary structures (Krasner (1999: 11 )). 
In my thesis, I examine the role of  minorities as collective entities in the public authority 
structures of  Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  More specifically, I examine whether and what 
kind of  autonomy Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania established for their minorities and highlight 
the differences between them, both in the inter-war period and in the contemporary era. 
External or Westphalian sovereignty is a fundamental authority relation between states which 
is defined by international law (Jackson: 11).  Westphalian sovereignty refers to the exclusion 
of  external actors from the domestic authority structures of  a state (Krasner (1999:20-25)). 
When the way in which a state treats persons (either individuals or groups) within its 
boundaries is challenged by other states or by an international organisation, the Westphalian 
sovereignty of  this state is violated (Krasner (1995:233)). 
In my thesis, I examine the relationship between the Baltic countries with the League of 
Nations with regard to their earlier minority policies and compare it with the interaction that 
Estonia and Latvia had with the contemporary European institutions in this field. 
As I will demonstrate in several parts of  my work, domestic and Westphalian sovereignty are 
of  course inextricably intertwined both in the inter-war period and today. 
As well as presenting many commonalities, a comparison of  the two eras also makes for an 
interesting exercise in contrasts as far as the Baltic case is concerned.  For example, in the 
inter-war period, all three countries adopted legislation based on the principle of  non-
territorial cultural autonomy.  One key goal of  the thesis is to examine why these la~s were 
adopted in the Baltic context (especially given the deep residual tensions between Estonians, 
Latvians and Germans, and fear that Germany might seek to fonnent irredentism in the Baltic 
states), the character they had, the reactions of  minorities to them and, last but not least, their 
implications for the sovereignty of  the state.  The Baltic governments of  the 1920s, and 
7 certainly Estonia, could argue with some justification that their own provisions went far 
beyond the rather minimalist framework for minority protection established by the League of 
Nations.  Indeed, the Estonian law on cultural autonomy was seized upon by minority 
lobbyists who saw it as a model for a European-wide guarantee of  minority rights.  However, 
the dominant (Western European) forces within the League refused to countenance this 
principle, seeing this as undermining the sanctity of  the unitary and sovereign nation-state. 
The Baltic states that were restored to being in 1991  after 50 years of  Soviet occupation faced 
a radically changed situation as far as the minorities question was concerned.  Against the 
background oflarge-scale Soviet-era immigration by Russians and other Russian-speaking 
elements, Estonia and Latvia in particular adopted state-building strategies that have been 
regarded as the epitome of  'nationalising' statehood.  The decision by these countries to 
exclude the large, Soviet-era settler population from the right to automatic citizenship elicited 
huge political and academic attention internationally.  For many, it raises the question of  how 
these two recent ED entrants have been able to reconcile this citizenship policy with the ED 
Copenhagen criteria relating to democracy and respect for and protection of  minorities.  What 
does this fact tell us about the minority policies of  the ED and other European and Euro-
Atlantic international organisations, and how do these policies differ from those adopted by 
the League of  Nations in an earlier era?  These and other questions are addressed by the 
thesis. 
There is already a quite considerable body of  literature on the Baltic national question that 
deals separately with each of  the two eras. 
On the cultural and school autonomy of  inter-war Estonia and Latvia, one can first of  all cite 
the important study of  Michael Garleff (Deutschbaltische Politik zwischen den Weltkriegen. 
Die parlamentarische Tatigkeit der deutsch-baltischen Parteien in Lettland und Estland, 
1976).  Eugen Maddison (Die nationalen Minderheiten Estlands und ihre Rechte, 1931) 
provides an essentially legal analysis of  the Estonian Law on cultural autonomy and its 
implementation by the German and Jewish minority.  In his work Minderheitenpolitik in 
Estland. Rechtsentwicklung und Rechtswirklichkeit 1918-1995 (1996), Cornelius Hasselblatt 
discusses the Estonian minority policy in the inter-war period in detail.  The studies of 
Brandenburg (Die Rechtsstellung der deutschen Minderheit in Lettland, 1932) and Engelmann 
(Das Recht der nationalen Minderheiten in Lettland, 1930) are (short) legal studies about the 
8 system of school autonomy in Latvia.  The issue of  cultural autonomy in Lithuania is 
thoroughly examined by Liekis in a recent doctoral study ("A state within a state?" "Jewish 
autonomy in Lithuania 1918-1925, 2003). 
There is a sizeable amount of  literature on the minority protection system of  the League of 
Nations.  The impact of  the League's system on the sovereignty of  the states concerned is 
analysed in an excellent way by T.H. Bagley (General principles and  problems in the 
international protection of  minorities, 1950) and C.A. Macartney (National states and 
national minorities, 1934).  The history of  the negotiations of  the Estonian and Latvian 
minority declarations and some legal issues is extensively treated by Louis Villecourt (La 
protection des minorites dans les pays baltiques et la Societe des Nations, 1925). 
Numerous authors have treated the citizenship and language issues in contemporary Estonia 
and Latvia. From a legal point of  view, Andreas Graudin provides the best comparison of  the 
different systems with regard to minority protection in the three countries (Die Stellung der 
nationalen Minderheiten in den Velfassungen der baltischen Staaten und ihre 
einfachgesetzliche Umsetzung, 1997). 
The volume of literature on the activities of  contemporary European institutions in the field of 
minority protection is equally abundant.  An excellent summary is given by Gaetano 
Pentassuglia (Minorities in International Law. An Introductory Study (2002».  Several works 
cover the relationship between European institutions and the Baltic states.  In my view, both 
the influence from contemporary European institutions on the ethnic policies of  Estonia and 
Latvia and the mutual interaction between these organisations is best explained by Judith 
Kelley (The power of  norms and incentives. Ethnic politics in Europe, 2004).  David 
Galbreath provides a more descriptive study (Nation-building and minority politics in post-
socialist states. Interests,  influence and identities in Estonia and Latvia, ) 
Thus far, few authors have, however, undertaken the kind of  comprehensive and detailed 
comparative analysis of  the three Baltic countries that is attempted here while the English 
language literature on the inter-war period at least remains comparatively sparse.  Most 
significantly of  all, there is still no systematic comparison of  the two eras of Baltic 
independence that looks at issues of statehood and sovereignty.  In her interesting work 
National Minorities and the European Nation-States System (1998), Jennifer Jackson Preece 
9 has explored the interplay between sovereignty, statehood and minority protection.  Her study, 
however, does not contain much specific detail on the Baltic states and only goes so far as 
1995, thus leaving out the crucial endgame of  EU enlargement.  Rogers Brubaker's 
Nationalism Reframed (1996) offers a useful framework for comparative analysis of  the 
relationship between states, national minorities and 'external national homelands'.  However, 
there are many criticisms that can be levelled at Brubaker.  One relates to its essentialism and 
assumption of  perennial instability and conflict in Central and Eastern Europe (this certainly 
does not capture the Baltic experience of  the 1920s, for instance).  More important is 
Brubaker's complete disregard of  the role played by external international organisations, 
which in both eras have constituted a crucial 'fourth pillar' to the nexus linking states, 
minorities and external homelands.  This thesis will help to provide a fuller appreciation of 
this role. 
In filling these several gaps in the literature, the thesis draws primarily upon an extensive 
review of  relevant secondary literature in several languages.  Next to this, debates in 'the 
Council of  the League of  Nations and in the European Parliament are analysed by way of 
original material.  The thesis also brings to bear significant new empirical material, most 
notably a series of  interviews with political actors, academics and with representatives of  the 
European Commission and the European Parliament who had dealings with the three 
countries. 
Structure 
In the first chapter of  Part One (The creation of  independent Baltic states 1917-1920), I 
examine the internal and international circumstances of  the creation of  the Baltic states in the 
period 1917-1920, and try to explain why they adopted their distinctive approach in trying to 
solve their nationality problem.  The central question in this chapter is: what were the internal 
and international factors influencing the Baltic states' distinctive thinking on domestic 
sovereignty? 
In the second chapter (The League's vision on statehood and minority rights), I examine the 
vision of  the Great Powers on statehood and minority rights.  The League of  Nations was an 
10 association of states dominated by a few Western Great Powers.  Their view shaped and 
dominated the League's minority protection system.  The central question is thus whether the 
Great Powers had the same view as the Baltic states on domestic sovereignty.  Did they also 
consider cultural or personal autonomy as the most advisable solution for the nationalities 
question? 
In chapter three (The minority declarations and Westphalian sovereignty), I analyse the terms 
of  the entry of  the Baltic states into the League of  Nations and the nature of  the minority 
declarations.  During the long negotiations of  the Estonian and Latvian minority declarations 
of 1923, very interesting issues regarding minority protection and sovereignty were raised by 
the Estonian and Latvian representative.  The central question and issue in this chapter is the 
impact of  these declarations on the Westphalian sovereignty of  the Baltic states. 
In chapter four (The practical operation of  personal autonomy in the Baltic states), I examine 
why cultural autonomy was eventually adopted in Estonia and wide-ranging school autonomy 
retained in Latvia.  Central in this chapter is of  course the analysis of  what was distinctive 
about these laws with regard to domestic sovereignty.  What ramifications did these laws 
carry for the states concerned in political terms?  Did these laws create 'states within states' or 
did they actually make an important contribution to the emergence of  an integrated state 
community?  I also discuss the evolution of  the implementation of  the promised autonomy in 
Lithuania. 
In chapter five (The restoration of  Baltic statehood) (Part Two), I examine the implications of 
the process of state-building in the Baltic states after the end of  the Soviet occupation for 
minority rights and the institutional position of  minorities in the public authority structure of 
these states.  Are cultural autonomy or school autonomy still relevant solutions for the de 
facto binational states of  Estonia and Latvia?  What mechanisms did the Estonian, Latvian 
and Lithuanian state introduce to try to solve this entirely new nationalities issue? 
In chapter six (lGOs and minority rights), I discuss the nature of  the three different European 
institutions (EU, OSCE and CE), their general thinking on minority rights and their specific 
view on the Baltic issue, drawing explicit comparisons and contrasts with the League of 
Nations and the inter-war period.  Central question is of  course: what are the differences and 
11 similarities between the approaches of  the contemporary institutions with the earlier position 
ofthe League of  Nations? 
Chapter seven is a case study of  the relationship of  Estonia and Latvia with the EU, the OSCE 
and the CE in the field of language and citizenship policy.  What was the precise impact of 
these organisations on the mentioned policies of  these countries? 
In the conclusion, I recap the main issues and arguments and draw out the main similiarities 
and contrasts between the two eras. 
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12 PART ONE:  THE BALTIC STATES IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD 
Chapter one:  The creation of independent Baltic states in the period 1917-1920. 
The Russian revolution of 1905 as a turning point 
As Georg Ruttenberg observes, the road to the independence of  Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
was marked by three crucial stages.  These were the 1904-1905 revolution, the beginning of 
the First World War in 1914 and the Russian revolutions of  February and October 1917 
(Ruttenberg (1928:3)). 
Before the revolution of 1904-1905, the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian national 
movements were primarily directed towards the protection of  culture and language (White 
(1994:21-25)).  In the nineteenth century, the Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian languages 
were peasant languages.  Social mobility and education always meant the adoption of  German 
(Estonia and Latvia) or Polish (Lithuania).  The national movements challenged this old 
relation between language and social estate and tried to make education possible in the 
Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian language.  These languages were also to be considered as 
national languages. 
According to this early national discourse, a nation which could express itself in its own 
national language and have the possibility of  getting education in that language was sovereign 
(Lehti (1999:63)).  As Marko Lehti notes, as late as the beginning of  the twentieth century, a 
nation was being defined in Estonia mainly as a cultural unit, or was understood as cultural 
individuality.  In 1904, the largest political party in Latvia, the Social Democrats, stated that 
national self-determination implied that each national group should have the right to maintain 
its own culture and that the language of  each national group should be used in schools, local 
administrative institutions and local courts (Lehti:64). 
The Russian revolution of 1905, however, proved to be a real turning-point.  The national 
movements altered their cultural demands and demanded for the first time self-government, 
13 next to social and cultural reforms.  Thus, their demands became political in nature 
(Ruttenberg:3-4; White:30).  Separatism was, however, still absent.  National self-
determination implied for these national movements that the Baltic administrative divisions 
were reformed according to ethnic borders and that these national units were given autonomy 
(Lehti:65). 
With these demands, the national movements in the Baltic were completely in line with the 
demands of  the other minority nations in the Russian empire.  Roshwald observes that the 
dominant modes of  political thought among nationally conscious minority intellectuals 
closely reflected the thinking among the Russian oppositional intelligentsia.  The left of  center 
Constitutional Democratic Party (Kadets) stated that it was absolutely essential that ethnic 
minorities were actively included in the future civic development of  multinational Russia. 
Next to the revocation of  discriminatory and repressive legislation against groups as the Jews, 
the Kadets pleaded for the granting of  cultural autonomy to all non-Russian nationalities and 
regional self-rule for Poland and Finland.  Russia's largest left-wing populist movement, the 
Socialist Revolutionary Party even endorsed the principle of  political as well as cultural 
autonomy for all the major ethnic groups.  The Russian Social Democratic Workers Party (or 
Social Democrats) adhered to a more rigidly Marxist, internationalist understanding of  class 
struggle.  It understood, however, that paying lip-service to the principle of  national self-
determination did have some revolutionary potential (Roshwald (2001:50-51».  The Kadets 
and the Socialist Revolutionary Party were strongly influenced by the views of  the Austro-
marxists Karl Renner and Otto Bauer. 
The theories of  Renner and Bauer also had a very strong appeal to the representatives of  the 
minority nations.  One of  the central challenges for these groups was namely the reconcilation 
of  the particular with the universal, the synthesis of  ethno-cultural identity with 
internationalist solidarity.  Many representatives of  these ethnic minorities realised that they 
would fail to mobilise their ethnic group for the internationalist cause, unless they appealed to 
particularist sentiments.  This tension was resolved by the combination of socialism with 
nationalism.  "By bringing about true economic and  political equality among human beings, 
socialist revolution would also bring about equality among ethnic groups.  (  ... )  By the same 
token,  asserting one IS own (exploited and oppressed) ethnic group  IS particular rights and 
interests could only serve to advance the cause of  socialist revolution for the empire as a 
whole." (Roshwald:55). 
14 The theories of Karl Renner and Otto Bauer 
The concept of  cultural autonomy, in its advanced form, was devised on the Austrian territory 
at the tum of  the twentieth century.  There were several explanations for this.  First, the Dual 
Monarchy had a total population of  fifty-three million people, made up of  more than fifteen 
different national groups.  Second, contrary to the multi  ethnic Russian empire, in the Dual 
Monarchy there prevailed a relative freedom of  thought. 
The basic idea of  cultural autonomy had already been incorporated in the Austrian 
Constitution.  Contrary to the Hungarian Constitution, in which the subject of  the law was the 
individual, the Austrian Constitution namely recognised a community as a collective legal 
entity (Galantai (1992:48-49)).  Article 19 stated:  "All the races of  the state shall have equal 
rights, and each race shall have the inviolable right of  maintaining and cultivating its 
nationality and language.  The state recognises the equality of  the various languages in the 
schools, public offices, and in public life.  In the countries populated by several races,  the 
instruction of  public instruction shall be so organised that each race may receive the 
necessary instruction in its own language, without being obliged to learn a second 
language. ".  Oliver Zimmer observes that a number of  crucial questions remained 
unanswered: What constituted a nation?  What did national equality mean in practice?  And 
finally, who was responsible for the implementation and enforcement of  these rights (Zimmer 
(2003:56-57)). 
The Austrian socialists were the first to study in depth the relationship between the social and 
national questions.  The socialist movement in the Dual Monarchy was namely deeply 
affected by the national divisions.  It was threatened by ethnic and national disintegration. 
For example, Czech socialists resented the high profile of  the Germans within the party and 
demanded the establishment of  their own trade union commission.  Therefore, the socialist 
leadership was forced to tackle the national question. 
The resolution of  this issue was done first within the framework of  the Socialist Party, and 
subsequently by proposals that attempted to maintain the unity of  the Austrian state while 
giving maximum institutional, political, and cultural recognition to national and ethnic 
diversity (Nimni (2000)). 
15 In 1897, a biennial congress of  the party was held in the Wimberg hotel in Vienna.  Following 
Czech demands, the party decided to transform itself into a federative organisation of six 
national parties (Ukranian, Czech, Polish, German, Italian and Slovene) with a common 
executive committee (Nimni; Meissner (2001: 137)).  At their party congress in the Moravian 
city of Brno (Brunn) at 24-29 September 1899, the Austrian socialists urged the trans-
formation of  the Austro-Hungarian monarchy into a democratic Nationalitatenbundesstaat. 
Their 'nationalities program' (Nationalitatenprogramm) foresaw self-governing bodies of 
public law (Selbstverwaltungskorper) for each nation.  The legislation of  these bodie.s would 
be implemented by 'chambers of  nationalities' (Nationalitatenkammern) (Sandner (2002:3)). 
The general thesis of  the Austrian socialists was that the inequality and the lack of  freedom of 
the different nations hindered the social and political freedom and equality of  all individuals. 
The slowly emerging industrialisation in many places of  the empire indeed required 
considerable displacement of  the workers from their traditional homesteads.  Workers in 
search for jobs could not benefit from freedom iflanguage formed the basis of  territorial 
borders, when the available jobs were found in other territories.  Culture and territory should 
therefore be independent from each other (Eide (1998:266-267)). 
The theories of  Karl Renner (1870) and Otto Bauer (1880-1938) must be seen and understood 
against this historical and political background. 
Karl Renner, a Moravian lawyer, tried to create a balance of  power between national 
communities and central state institutions.  Renner's central idea was to reorganise the Austro-
Hungarian empire into a democratic, federal state based on a dual principle, namely a 
territorial and a cultural principle.  Renner saw a nation as a cultural community (Kultur-
gemeinschaft).  According to him, nation and state are different concepts and do not 
necessarily overlap.  While a culture creates a nation, it does not create a state.  Renner 
regretted that, unlike the churches, nations did not exist as legal entities within the Dual 
Monarchy.  He rejected the atomic-centralist doctrine according to which subjects related to 
the state as isolated individuals.  Instead he adopted a collective-federalist view according to 
which the individual was a member of  a nation.  Only through his membership of  the nation 
was the individual subjected to the state.  Thus, the nation stands between the individual and 
the state.  This internal organisation and building up of  the different nations (kulturautonome 
Nationalitaten) was decided on the basis of  population density.  Renner proposed to' divide the 
Austro-Hungarian empire into a number of  provinces corresponding as closely as possible to 
16 ethnic boundaries, within which the dominant national groups would take precedence over the 
others in matters of language.  Co-nationals in a local diocese or constituency would form a 
national commune, i.e. a corporation governed by public and private law with the right to 
issue decrees and raise taxes, and endowed with funds of  its own.  A certain number of 
communes linked by territory and culture would form a national district with corresponding 
corporate rights.  The sum total of  these national districts would then constitute the nation, 
which would also be a body governed by public and private law.  The state constituted by the 
sum ofthe various nations would then be a Nationalitatenbundesstaat. 
In Renner's view, nations were established as public law corporations on the basis of  a 
nationality register in which individuals declare their affiliation.  Renner derived the 
'personality principle' from the work of  the leading German historian Friedrich Meinecke. 
This principle referred to the widest personal choice of its members to partake in a particular 
national association (Nimni). 
These nations were then represented at the state level in separate national councils, elected on 
the basis of  this register.  These councils had the power to legislate in matters of  cultural 
policy and education and to tax their co-nationals in order to finance separate schools, 
universitities, theatres and museums (Kulturautonomie).  On the other hand, the state 
maintained its authority in economic and social affairs and in the field of  internal and external 
security. 
The nationality register served as a means of  creating new territorial administrative units.  In a 
mononational unit, the language of  the majority was the only language of  public institutions, 
but the (linguistic) minority had the right to legal aid from its national council.  In binational 
units, public institutions were bilingual and the regional councils of  each nation had to agree 
on policy decisions concerning both communities (Baubock (2001 :29)).  Minorities in a 
certain unit could organise themselves as national associations of  individuals enjoying 'extra-
territorial personal cultural autonomy'.  This idea had already been put forward in 1899 at the 
Brno Congress by a Slovene, Kristian Etbin.  In 1918, Renner, having become the first 
Chancellor of  the Austrian Republic, instructed the lawyer Hans Kelsen to draw up a 
constitution based on these principles.  However, the project was never followed up· 
(Plasseraud (5/2000)). 
17 To summarise: in Renner's view, autonomous institutions based on the cultural identity of 
individuals were to be established.  These cultural institutions would form a separate branch 
of state power, supplementing the territorial organisation of  the state.  Within the territorial 
borders of  the federal state, there would be two sets of  boundaries, one territorial and one 
cultural.  The units organised according to the ethnic principle would deal exclusively with 
national-cultural matters.  The rest would be dealt with by authorities of  territorially organised 
units.  Such territorial units would comprise persons from different cultural communities. 
Any given cultural community would have members in several of  the territorial units. 
Cultural identity would thus be independent of  territorial residence.  The different ethnic 
groups would have full representation in their territorial government and form a federal 
advisory council to the Chancellor.  Cultural autonomy freed from territorial boundaries was 
intended to strengthen the conditions for the maintenance of  personal identity, particularly in 
the field of  language and would allow free movement of  the workers. 
Renner's definition of  nations on strictly linguistic grounds was rejected by the sociologist 
Otto Bauer.  In his work The nationalities question and social democracy (1907), Otto Bauer 
defined the nation as "the totality of  men bound together through a common destiny into a 
community of  character".  All those who share national educational and national cultural 
values, whose character is shaped by the destiny of  the nation which determines the content of 
these values, constitute the nation (Bauer (1995: 183)).  In Bauer's view, the development of 
the nation reflects the history of  the mode of  production.  In the period of  'primitive 
communism' and nomadic agriculture, there was a unitary nation as a community of  descent. 
After the transition to settled agriculture and the development of  private property, the old 
nation was divided into the common culture of  the ruling classes on one side, and the peasants 
and the small farmers on the other.  The latter were confined to narrow local regions produced 
by the disintegration of  the old nation.  With the development of  the capitalist mode of  social 
production, the working classes were still excluded.  They were still not fully incorporated in 
the developing system of  education.  Gradually this growing education system would 
integrate and unite all the popular masses and local groups into a national whole, in the 
unitary socialist nation (Bauer:184-185).  With the concept 'cultural-national autonomy', 
Bauer advocated an 'extraterritorial' constitution ofthe nation.  Autonomy would no't be 
granted to a Czech Republic on the basis that Czechs comprise the majority nation residing in 
a specific region of  the Austro-Hungarian empire.  Rather, autonomy would be granted to 
individual Czechs irrespective of  territory, no matter which area of  the Habsburg empire they 
18 might inhabit.  This in tum required that Czechs, Serbs, Germans, Magyars; etc., insofar as 
they were scattered throughout the empire, be administratively organised into separate 
'nations', which would then form components of  the Habsburg state.  Membership of  a nation 
was for Bauer not essentially connected with territory; it functioned as the essential -
component of  an individual's identity (Lewis (8/9/2000)). 
Bauer demanded the transformation ofthe Austro-Hungarian Empire into a two-track 
democratic federation of  territories and ethnic groups, the latter under the principle of 
personal autonomy.  An essential aspect of  Bauer's model was that the ethnic groups, which 
instituted the cultural autonomy in each place, should have an independent power of income 
taxation to cover the costs of  their education and other institutions, in addition to a 
proportional part of  the other taxes.  National minorities were to be organised into corporate 
bodies with autonomous rights to handle their 'ethno-national' affairs (Eide:267-268). 
As indicated above, the theories of  Renner and Bauer shaped the thoughts of  many democratic 
parties and movements in the Russian empire.  They also had an enormous influence on the 
representatives of  the national movements in the Baltic states (Meissner (2001:138-139); Aun 
(1951:17-18)). 
The long-standing corporate-style autonomy for the Germans and Jews in the western 
borderlands of the Russian Empire 
The arrival of  the ideas and theories described above must be seen within the context of  long-
standing corporate-style autonomy for the Germans in the western borderlands of  the Russian 
Empire and the far-reaching autonomy enjoyed by the Jews in the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth. 
The Germans in Estonia and Latvia 
In 1920, Germans in Latvia only formed 3.2 per cent (45,315 people) of  a total population of 
1,408,081.  In Estonia, they only formed 1,66 per cent (18,319 people) of  a total population of 
1,107,059 in 1922 (Royal Institute ofInternational Affairs (1938:30-38); Hiden and Salmon 
(1991:46); Junghann (1932:41-46)). 
19 Sheer numbers alone however do not give an accurate picture.  For seven hundred years, the 
Baltic Germans ruled over the native population as colonisers and dominated the political, 
cultural and economic life of  Estonia and Latvia.  Together with a land-owning German 
aristocracy, a German merchant class flourished in the main cities.  The indigenous  . 
populations were subjected as serfs and did not participate in all these developments. 
After the collapse of  the German knights, first Sweden (1561-1721), and then Russia (after 
the Great Northern War (1700-1721»  became the rulers.  Although the Swedes restricted the 
political privileges of  the German landowners, they did not alter their economic power (Van 
Den Heuvel (1997:609».  The Russian Tsar Peter the Great reconfirmed the privileges of  the 
German landowners and merchants (Thea (1995:31). 
In the Tsarist Empire, Lithuania remained under the influence of  a Polonised aristocracy 
while the Germans continued to rule over Estonia, Livonia and Courland as a proxy for the 
Tsars (Hiden and Salmon: 13).  From Peter the Great until Alexander III, the Russian Tsars 
fully respected the political and cultural particularities of  the Baltic provinces and the 
privileges of  the Baltic Germans (Von zur Muhlen (1994:65-88».  From a cultural point of 
view, this had enormous consequences.  Estonia and Latvia remained a part of  the German 
cultural space and the world of  protestantism (Interview with Jiiri Jegorov, former Professor 
of  History of Law, University of  Tartu, Tartu, July 1996). 
The Baltic German nobility (or Ritterschaften) ruled over the area independently 
German was the language of  education, justice and administration (Von Staden (1993 :654); 
Hiden and Salmon: 14).  In theory, the Russian administration exercised control over the 
Baltic Germans through the governors.  In practice, it never interfered (Seton-Watson 
(1954:32».  After the creation of  the German empire in 1870, the Tsar began to mistrust the 
loyalty of  the Baltic Germans (Thea:32).  When he acceded to the throne in 1881, Tsar 
Alexander III did not confirm the privileges given to the Germans in 1721.  Thereafter, 
Russian was introduced as the compulsory language of government and administration.  The 
Russians controlled the local police and justice and became the administrators (Hiden and 
Salmon: 15; Seton-Watson (1954:144».  After the spread of  the revolutionary ideas in the 
beginning of  the twentieth century, the Tsar and the Baltic Germans again joined forces.  In 
return for the preservation of  the existing social and political order, many privileges were 
restored.  Many German educational institutions were reopened.  Some German landowners 
20 were even allowed by the Russians to buy additional land and to populate these estates with 
German farmers from other parts of  the Russian Empire (Seton-Watson (1954:273-274)). 
The Jews in Lithuania 
Because of  the growing menace of  Ivan the Terrible, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania formally 
united with the Kingdom of  Poland in 1569 with the Treaty of  Lublin (Van Den Heuvel 
(1986:13)).  In this Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Jewish community enjoyed a 
unique and far-reaching autonomy. 
In the fourteenth century, most Jewish communities had yet to develop.  Even the largest 
among them numbered no more than a few dozen families.  Therefore, there was no need for 
them to have advanced communal autonomy institutions (Cygielman (1997:20)).  During the 
first quarter ofthe sixteenth century, the Jewish communities in Poland (mainly Krakow, 
Poznan and the smaller communities in their environs) were strengthened by continous Jewish 
emigration from Moravia, Bohemia, Germany and Austria.  This significantly accelerated 
their demographic, economic and social development.  In the 1640s, the number of  Jews in 
Poland-Lithuania approached 600,000 (Cygielman:8). 
As Cygielman observes, the considerable number of  the Jewish population in the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth, the importance of  this community in the economic life of  the 
country, next to the distinctive character of  the Jewish society, were the ideal conditions for 
the crystallisation and the development of  autonomous administrative units with their 
electoral methods and decision-making procedures (Cygielman:31). 
The local governments of  the Jewish communities in Lithuania, Poland and Russia ~ere 
called 'Kahal', meaning 'assembly' or 'community'.  This term denoted both the community 
and the autonomous communal administration, the two concepts being identical (in 'Council 
of  Four Lands', 'Kahal').  At the head of  the communities stood the elected aldermen, the 
parnasim (community leaders), tovei ha'ir (leading citizens) or Kesherim (those consideied 
worthy).  These aldermen dealt with day-to-day affairs, represented the community before the 
authorities, prepared the annual budget, collected taxes, and preserved public order. 
21 The judicial system of  the community created the normative foundations that regulated Jewish 
public life in every field.  It consisted of several sub-systems.  The first was made up of  a 
group or groups of  dayyanim (Jewish judges), operating within the framework of  the 
traditional Jewish law based on the rulings of  Halachic (Jewish law) authorities.  The second 
sub-system consisted of leaders of  the kahal who dealt with problems which the Halacha was 
unable to solve, like for example problems arising in relations between Jewish individuals and 
the Jewish public bodies, and the state or the church etc.  The third sub-system was working 
in collaboration with both the parnasim and the rabbis, handling problems whose solution 
required a broad consensus of  opinion among the many public sectors such as ritual slaughter, 
ransoming of  prisoners, financial support for pilgrims etc (Cygielman:36). 
The central institution of  the Jewish self-government was the Council of  Lithuania which 
operated on four levels (Greenbaum (1995:71-73». 
First, it dealt with the gentile authorities.  More specifically, it collected all sorts of  taxes, 
protected Jewish economic rights and defended Jews against the blood libel, accusations of 
desecration of  the host and other calumnies. 
Second, the Council functioned as an arbiter in disagreements and disputes within the Jewish 
community. 
Third, it administered Jewish public works, buildings and courts, and appointed rabbis, 
judges, teachers and community functionaries.  The Council was also responsible for yeshivot 
and hadarim (schools for young boys), printing and purchase of  books, and the welfare of 
underfinanced schools.  The Jewish school system was not completely autonomous.  The 
Czacki-draft (1788-1791) aimed at the attribution of school autonomy to the Jews.  Because 
of  the dismemberment of  the Polish state, this draft remained dead letter (Veiter (1938 :207». 
Fourth, the Council monitored the religious, moral and ethical behaviour of  Lithuanian Jews 
in all  areas of  life: synagogue, business, family affairs, even relations between neighbours. 
To enforce its ordinances and rulings, the Council invoked excommunication, which was 
decreed at the fairs and announced in the synagogues. 
The chief  officials of  the Council were the head of  the council (parnas) and the presiding 
officer at the assemblies, who were responsible for both internal and external affairs: The 
second level of  the hierarchy was occupied by the trustee, who handled financial matters and 
acted as both treasurer and chief secretary.  There was also an interceder, a governmental 
22 lobbyist (shtadlan).  He defended Jewish interests vis-a.-vis the government, the royal court, 
and the Sejm (Greenbaum:54). 
The Lithuanian Council continued to exist officially until it was dissolved by the Sejm and the 
king in 1764.  Unofficially, it continued to meet until the first partition of  Poland in  ~ 772. 
Cygielman argues that the system of  Jewish autonomy was not merely exceptional because of 
the powers, granted to the Jewish self-government, but primarily because of  the fact that 
Lithuanian and Polish authorities accepted and ratified the validity of  a judicial system, not 
known to them, both in nature and in substance.  The Jews were indeed exempted from 
subordination to the municipal authorities, the church and the legal systems of  the nobles 
(various tribunals, representatives' gatherings) (Cygielman: 14-15). 
Under Russian rule, restrictions on Jewish self-government increased, until finally in the 
1840s self-government for Jewish townsfolk was abolished (Rowell, Criskaite and Rudis 
(2002:31)). 
Liekis argues that although the scheme of  the Lithuanian zionists (the main proponents and 
supporters of  Jewish non-territorial autonomy in Lithuania) corresponded closely to that of 
the Austrian socialists, they proceeded mainly on the basis of  this earlier system of  Jewish 
autonomy.  In fact, they sought to use these 'old resources' to create a revived autonomous 
structure.  Very important to note is that the writings of  people in charge of  autonomist 
ideology and its implementation in Lithuania were completely devoid of  reference to 'socialist 
inventions' (Liekis (2003 :97)). 
The outbreak of the First World War and the Russian revolutions of March and 
October 1917 
The outbreak of  the First World War created the international and internal conditions for the 
independence of  the Baltic states.  In February 1917, the Russian Tsar Nicholas II abdicated 
and the provisional government took power in Russia.  Although the constitutional cementing 
force of  the Russian empire ceased to exist, there was still no separatist movement in the 
23 Baltic provinces.  The Baltic peoples only demanded self-government within the framework 
of  a federative republican Russia (Bilmanis (1946: 132)). 
In April 1917, the newly established Russian provisional government granted Estonia the 
Zemstvo self-government which had already existed in Russia since 1864. 
The Latvians applied for a similar kind of  autonomy in the following month but the-
provisional government rejected this.  First, half of  ethnic Latvia was occupied by Germany. 
Second, the provisional government would no longer approve the founding of new units 
because this would weaken Russia too much (Lehti:79-80). 
The national movements in Estonia and Latvia were not satisfied with a limited form of self-
government.  In this regard, Olavi Arens notes that the provisional government did not fully 
understand the new force of  nationalism.  It dealt with the demands of  the national 
movements not in a framework of  nationality policy, but in an older limited framework of 
local self-government (Arens (1978:21)). 
The All-Latvian political conference, which assembled in Riga on 30 July 1917, demanded 
that all districts inhabited by a majority of  Latvians be united in an autonomous Latvian state 
(within a democratic and federal Russian republic) whose form should be decided by a freely-
elected Constituent Assembly (Ruttenberg:8).  The same demands were voiced in Estonia and 
in German-occupied Lithuania (Bilmanis (1946: 132-133)). 
At the end of September 1917, the Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians - together with 
representatives of  other minority nations - took part in a conference in Kiev.  During this 
conference, it was argued that the minority nations, which made up half of  the inhabitants of 
Russia, had to take the fate of  Russia into their own hands.  The representatives demanded the 
recognition of  freedom and sovereignty to all minority nations.  Only then could a new Russia 
be established according to the federal principle (Lehti:80).  The Kiev Congress decided that 
each people had a right of  national and personal autonomy.  This would convert the different 
nations into political and legal corporations.  According to the Congress resolutions, the 
different minorities in Russia were also to be allowed to use their own language in their 
contact with governmental and local official institutions (Aun: 17 -18).  The Russian-
provisional government however refused to meet these demands. 
24 Only after the Bolsheviks seized power in October 1917 and after it was clear that Russia 
could no longer fend off an unavoidable German occupation of  entire Estonia and Latvia, the 
former strategy of  autonomy was abandoned.  The Estonians and Latvians simply had no 
alternative (Lehti:89).  The struggle for autonomy was no longer an internal question of 
Russia.  Raising this struggle at the international level - through the declarations of 
independence - was necessary (Lehti:86). 
How did the Baltic political leaders construct their new states in the very first years of 
independence?  What role did they envisage for the minorities in their public authority 
structures? 
Estonia 
The founding documents 
On 19 February 1918, a Salvation Committee was established.  The decision to establish this 
committee only mentioned 'Estonia' and not the 'Estonian people' in an ethnical sense 
(Maddison (1928:417».  On 24 February 1918, on the eve of  the German occupation, this 
committee proclaimed the independence of  Estonia.  Together with a formal constitutional 
programme, a provisional government under the premiership of  Konstantin Pats was created. 
Also the Manifesto of24 February 1918 was adressed to "all the peoples of  Estonia".  The 
Estonian political leadership enacted the principle of  equality of  all Estonian citizens (my 
emphasis) before the law, irrespective oftheir ethnicity.  It further promised minority groups 
cultural autonomy.  Under the heading 'For all nationalities in Estonia' it was stated: 
"National minorities living within the state boundaries - Russians, Germans, Swedes, Jews 
and other nationalities are guaranteed with their rights to cultural autonomy.".  The 
Salvation Committee also foresaw a German, a Swedish and a Russian minister in the 
government.  When the provisional government met again on 11  November 1918, it informed 
"all the peoples of  Estonia" of  this meeting.  On 16 November 1918, it informed "all the 
citizens of  the free state of  Estonia" that the Constituent Assembly would define the rights of 
the national minorities.  In order to prevent national tensions, the government also announced 
immediate minority protection measures and also indicated that it would protect the minority 
languages in the courts and establish schools on a national basis (Maddison (1930:3-4». 
25 Minority ministries were further created within the provisional government of 1918.  One 
Baltic German (Koch), one Russian (Sorokin) and one Swede (P6hl) were given a post. 
Why did the Estonian leaders adopt this very liberal approach towards minorities and include 
the principle of  cultural autonomy into the founding documents of  their state? 
Evidently, the provisional government strongly needed the support from all (minority) groups 
to win the fight against Soviet Russia and the Bolsheviks (Alenius (2003); Alenius (2004:35); 
Smith D J (2005:217)).  There were, however, also more fundamental reasons. 
The Estonians wanted to show the outside world that they were a civilised democrati.c nation 
and that their state was ready for recognition.  In the immediate aftermath of  the First World 
War, liberal and democratic ideas and minority rights were consistent with the then European 
spirit and, as such, with the quest of  many states for recognition of  their statehood (Smith D J 
(2005:216-217)).  In 1917 the Association for a Durable Peace issued a draft international 
treaty on the rights of  national minorities, calling for civil and political equality, control over 
educational and religious institutions, proportional representation in government and 
supervision of  the measures by an international commission (Housden (2005:230)). Various 
Jewish groups were very active in demanding cultural autonomy.  Cultural autonomy was 
most of  all popularised by the influential German Professor Rudolf Laun, who presented a 
memorandum on this subject to the 1919 League Conference in Bern and the St.-Germain 
conference.  He elaborated his Draft on a Treaty on the International Protection of  Minorities 
on the basis of  the Nationalitdtenprogramm of  the Austrian socialists (Aun:55).  The lawyer 
translated their theories into concrete proposals.  Articles 17 and 18 of  the draft treated the 
question of  national autonomy (nationale Autonomie) while articles 11  til 16 were about the 
national register.  In cases where a national minority existed in a municipality or other 
administrative entity, persons belonging to that minority could enrol themselves in a national 
register.  All the enrolled persons would then constitute a public corporation 
(Nationalgemeinde).  This corporation was authorised to possess and administer its own 
properties; to establish schools and other educational institutions, in which pupils would be 
instructed in their mother tongue by teachers appointed by the Nationalgemeinde; to create its 
own cultural organisations; to hold public meetings and (cultural) events and to establish its 
own social, economic, consumer organisations and theatres and museums.  To fulfil all these 
needs and objectives, it could levy direct taxes.  In cases where an enrolled person would not 
pay voluntarily, the Nationalgemeinde would be authorised to execute the payment by way of 
26 coercive measures (Draft on an international treaty regarding the protection of  minorities, in: 
Bordihn (1921 :68-78)).  Against this background, many of  Estonia's leaders genuinely 
believed that equality of  national groups was the axiom of  a new era in international relations, 
an era in which the boundaries between the domestic and external spheres would be blurred 
(Alenius (2003:331)). 
In line with this, like other democratic parties in Russia, the Estonian politicians were strongly 
influenced by the ideas of  the Austrian socialists, and more specifically by the theories of  Karl 
Renner and Otto Bauer.  The concept of  cultural autonomy was thus very familiar to the 
Estonians.  For example, Karl Eenpalu, termed by Kari Alenius as one of  the true fathers of 
the cultural autonomy law, expressed support for the basic premises of autonomy in his 1918 
work Oiguslik Rlik (Smith D J (2005:216)).  All parties, but predominantly the left and 
socialist parties, stressed the need for future minority protection and integration (Hasselblatt C 
(1996:30-31); Hasselblatt C (1996:40)).  The Estonian elite agreed that the Estonians could 
not construct their state by way of  brute force, without listening to the demands of  the 
minorities.  From their own experience, the Estonians knew very well what it was to be an 
oppressed minority.  They knew that the minority question needed a solution and were 
convinced that the only solution was a peaceful and democratic one (Briiggemann (1996:20); 
Alenius (2003); Alenius (2004:34); Hasselblatt C (1996:39-40)). 
The Estonians' policy towards the minorities was most tolerant in the first months of 
independence.  As the political and military position of  the Estonian government grew 
stronger, the Estonians' need to accomodate the minorities diminished (Alenius (2004:35)). 
This change became obvious in the late spring of 1919, when the Constituent Assembly 
started its work. 
Koch, P5hl and Sorokin were relieved from their posts when the temporary Constitution of  4 
June 1919 established so-called People's Secretariats.  From then onwards, all Estonian 
government seats were held by ethnic Estonians (Von Rauch (1974:137)).  These Secretaries 
were employed as heads of  departments in the Ministry of  Education and constituted for a 
long time the only representation ofthe minorities in the government.  They were empowered 
to act within all the matters that affected their minority group (Garleff (1976: 15)). 
27 In line with the earlier documents, the Provisional Constitution of  4 June 1919 (text in: 
Graham (1928: 271  and 653-659)) declared Estonia as "an independent democratic Republic" 
(article 1) in which the supreme power belongs to 'the people':  "The Constituent Assembly 
elected by the people exercises this power in the name of  the nation.".  Although the Estonian 
language was the state language, the use of  a minority language was permitted in the contact 
with local governments in those areas where the minority constituted a majority.  Further, 
citizens belonging to 'local ethnic minorities' were given the right to present their requests to 
the organs of  the central administration in their own language, provided they did so in writing. 
The use of  the language of  ethnic minorities before the courts and before the local organs of 
the central authority was to be determined by a special law.  Germans, Swedes and Latvians 
were considered as local ethnic minorities (article 3).  The Provisional Constitution also 
enacted the principle of  equality of  all Estonian citizens (article 4). 
The Constitution of  15 June 1920 
Eugen Maddison argues that all these documents showed that the Estonian leadership did not 
intend to create a state exclusively for the Estonians.  It wanted to transform the 'territory of 
Estonia' into an independent democratic state, in which there was room for both the Estonians 
and the minorities (Maddison (1928:418)).  However, contrary to the promises made in 1918, 
the Provisional Constitution did not guarantee the right to cultural autonomy.  It merely stated 
that"  cultural departments will be established within the authority of  the Ministry of 
Education to protect the interests of  local national minorities".  The Estonians were afraid 
that autonomy for minorities would endanger the sovereignty of  their young state (Alenius 
(2004:36)). 
In the Constituent Assembly, the German faction had affirmed its support for an independent 
Estonia.  However, it had also demanded guarantees for its survival.  In an extraordinary 
declaration of  29 August 1919, German deputy Max Bock demanded autonomy in cultural, 
religious and educational affairs, guarantees for the use of  the German language both before 
official institutions as well as in the media, all personal liberties, equality between all 
Estonian citizens, also with regard to the free admission to the public office and the freedom 
of  property (Garleff (1976: 16)).  The fact that cultural autonomy was not included in the 
Provisional Constitution was strongly criticised by Russian, Swedish and German deputies 
28 and other politicians.  The Germans declared that the promises to establish cultural 
departments for the minorities were only a 'travesty' of  the promised cultural autonomy 
(Alenius (2004:36)). 
Naturally, German demands for autonomy resounded even more loudly after the enaCtment of 
the expropriation law of 10 October 1919.  The victory over the Landeswehr and the 
implementation of  the land reform signified a military, political and economic triumph over 
the former German masters.  After these events, the Estonians no longer needed a new settling 
of  accounts with the Germans (Alenius (2004:37)).  The conservative representatives and the 
deputies of  the centre strove for a compensation for the German minority in the form of 
cultural autonomy.  Next to this, the external situation of  the young state was still very 
precarious.  Estonia was still not recognised by the Western powers, let alone admitted into 
the League of  Nations (Vasara (1995:481)). 
On 28 May 1920, the Asutav Kogu treated the constitutional draft in a first reading.  In this 
first draft, minorities were only given the right to establish associations to protect their 
cultural interests.  The adoption of  this draft would have implied the dissolution of  the 
People's Secretariats.  The German deputy Koch rejected the draft because the right to 
establish associations was already part of  the general civil rights.  The Germans strove for a 
cultural autonomy with the right of  self-taxation (Vasara:482). 
The majority of  the Estonian politicians were prepared to enact the principle of  cultural 
autonomy in the Constitution.  On the other hand, they were opposed to self-taxation because 
that would create, in their view, a "state within a state".  In this regard, representative Lui 
Olesk argued that there is a centrifugal tendency within each community and that it was not in 
the interest of  the Estonian state to strengthen this tendency.  The leading Estonian 
newspaper, the Paewaleht strongly rejected self-taxation because this would create very 
powerful entities within Estonia, with which the Estonian state had to reckon (Vasara:483). 
The definite text of  article 21  of  the Constitution provided that the members of  minorities had 
the right to establish autonomous institutions for the preservation and development of  their 
national culture and welfare, so far as it was compatible with the interests of  the state 
(Graham (1928:678)).  Thus, the right of self-taxation, in fact a necessary condition for an 
effective cultural autonomy, was not included.  Both the wording ("members of  minority 
29 nationalities") of  the provision and its insertion into the section of  the fundamental rights of 
Estonian citizens made it clear that not the minority as a group but the members of  the 
minority were entitled to cultural autonomy (Erler (1931 :278)).  The provision could be 
qualified as a guarantee of  establishment of  cultural autonomy (Einrichtungsgarantie) 
(Schmidt (1993: 15)). 
In its third reading, this article was only adopted with 21  votes to 20 and with 50 abstentions 
(Garleff (1976: 102)).  On the one hand, the Baltic German drafts helped to ensure that cultural 
autonomy was enshrined as a principle in the Constitution (Hiden (1987:51)).  On the other 
hand, given the majority-minority proportions in the Constituent Assembly (116 against 4), it 
was clear that the enactment of  the concept of  cultural autonomy in the Constitution was an 
act of  accomodation from the Estonians, a compensation for the earlier radical agrarian 
reforms (Hasselblatt C (1996:41)).  In the parliamentary debate, Konstantin Pats, the later 
president, revealed himself as a strong advocate of self-government for minorities.  Because 
minorities develop their own culture and support their own educational and social institutions, 
they fulfil, in his view, important tasks of  the state (my emphasis) (Maddison (1930:14-15)). 
In Graham's view, the extension of  this cultural protection was 'most noteworthy':  "It (the 
Estonian Constitution) recognizes that the sole way to disarm minor nationalities and not 
make them irreconcilable adversaries of  an existing political regime is to grant them the 
maximum cultural autonomous compatible with the existence of  the state" (Graham 
(1928:295)). 
The Constitution did also contain other provisions that were favourable for minorities. 
Article 1 of  the Constitution of 15 June 1920 (discussion and text in: Graham (1928:292-305 
and 675-686)) described Estonia as "an independent autonomous republic in which the power 
of  the state is in hands of  the people", that is to say, the whole population of  Estonia 
(Maddison (1928:420)). 
The second section of  the Constitution dealt with the fundamental rights of  the Estonian 
citizens, declaring all citizens (my emphasis) equal before the law and outlawing any public 
privileges or prejudices derived from birth, religion, sex, rank or nationality, as well as titles, 
decorations or class divisions (article 6).  Eugen Maddison argues that the outlawing of  public 
priveleges also showed that Estonia was not a genuine nation state (Maddison (1928:420)). 
Although Estonian was the state language (article 5), minorities were guaranteed education in 
their mother tongue (article 12).  Further, in those parts of  the country where the majority of 
30 the inhabitants belonged to a minority, the 'working language' in the local self-government 
institutions might be the language of  that minority.  On the other hand, the local self-, 
government institutions in which the language of  the minority was used, had to use the state 
language in their contact with state institutions and with other local self-government 
institutions where the language of  that minority was not used (article 22).  Citizens of 
German, Russian and Swedish ethnicity had the right to address themselves to the state 
institutions in their own language, provided they did so in writing.  A special law would 
regulate the use of  the language of  these citizens in court, as also in the institutions of  self-
government (article 22). 
Article 20 provided that every Estonian citizen was free to determine his or her membership 
of  a nation.  This was the enactment of  the personal principle, which was central to Renner's 
and Bauer's thinking on the national question.  This principle implies that each individual is 
free to determine his or her own national membership (Smith D J (2004». 
As mentioned above, the drafters of  the Constitution were strongly influenced by the, views of 
Professor Rudolf Laun.  The articles 12, 20, 21, 22 and 23 of  the Estonian Constitution were 
almost identical with the articles 38 (12), 3 (20),17-18 (21) and 32-33 (23) of  the famous 
draft of  Rudolf Laun (Aun:55; Bordihn:68-78). 
In general, the Estonian Constitution was very democratic.  Next to the extensive section of 
basic rights, it provided for popular referendum along Swiss Eidgenossenschafi lines.  The 
Estonian parliament was supreme and the government was in fact a permanent parliamentary 
commission.  The head of  government (Riigivanem) had no veto right over parliament, which 
could only be dissolved by way of  popular referendum (Smith D J (2002:14); Hope 
(1994:49); Graham (1928:293». 
On 7 May 1920, the Constituent Assembly also adopted a Law on the public primary schools, 
allowing for primary school education to be carried out in the child's mother tongue, 
(Maddison (1930:6». 
31 Latvia 
The Council of  State versus the Baltic Germans 
For several years, Latvia was divided into two parts.  Courland, and later Riga, were occupied 
by the German armies, while the greater part of Livonia and Latgale remained under Russian 
domination.  In 1917, a political bloc was formed in Riga by the political parties and societies. 
In Livonia and Latgale, the Latvian National Council was formed at the same time.  Both 
organisations supported the independence of Latvia. 
Less than a week after the armistice of 11  November 1918 had silenced the guns in the west, 
the Latvian National Council and the Riga bloc met in Riga to form the Latvian Council of 
State. 
On 17 November 1918, the Council of State issued the so-called Political Platform, a kind of 
government programme (Mintz (1927: 11 0; Plettner (1927:95)).  This document promised the 
convocation of  a constituent assembly, to be elected by the Latvian citizens of  both sexes on 
the basis of  general, equal, direct, secret and proportional vote.  Pending the convocation of 
this assembly, legislative powers were to be exercised by the Council of State, to which the 
provisional government, as the executive, was responsible.  The Platform also assured 
minorities of  equal political rights and respect for their cultural identity.  More specifically, 
national minorities were to be represented in proportion to their number in the Constituent 
Assembly and in the legislative institutions.  All national minorities taking part in the State 
Council would also take part in the provisional government.  Third, the cultural and national 
rights of 'national groups' were to be guaranteed by the fundamental laws (Graham (1928:688-
690)).  On the following day, on 18 November 1918, the Council of  State proclaimed the 
independence of  the State of  Latvia at a ceremonial meeting.  In his speech, Prime minister 
Karlis Ulmanis confirmed the future participation of  the minorities in the institutions of  the 
state (Dribins:280).  This participation was considered as a simple application of  the principle 
of  proportionality, a principle inherent to the new democratic state.  The Latvians offered the 
minorities political power commensurate with their numerical and electoral strength. 
32 Reactions from the outside world played evidently a role for the very vulnerable Latvian 
entity, in great need of  international recognition.  Like in Estonia, also many Latvian 
politicians, however, strongly believed that a multi-ethnic solution would offer the only 
guarantee of  their state's future viability (Hiden (2004:42)).  On 14 November 1918, Mikelis 
Walters, the representative of  the Latvian Farmers Union, published in the Baltische Zeitung 
the article 'The nation of  Latvia', in which he called upon the Baltic Germans to unite with the 
Latvian national forces and to strive together for a Latvian state.  On 16 November 1918, the 
lawyer Karlis Ducmanis argued in the influential news paper Janunakas Zinas (,The Latvian 
Nation') that a Latvian state had to be established by the ethnic Latvians but that on the other 
hand, the state nation had to be multi-ethnic (Dribins (1996:279)). 
The Baltic German National Committee (Baltische Deutsche Nationalausschuss) however 
rejected the principle of  proportionality.  It wanted special treatment for the German.,speaking 
population of  Latvia.  This institution was established in the beginning of  November 1918.  It 
was not a new political party, but an umbrella organisation, a binding element between the 
existing parties and other organisations.  As an "expression of  the political will" of  the Baltic 
Germans, it united the Ritterschaften, both Rigasche Gilden, the Baltic German Teacher's 
Association, the Rigasche Deutsche Stadtische Beamtenverband and the German Baltenbund, 
the Demokratische Partei, the National-Liberale Partei and the Progressive Party 
(Fortschrittliche Partei) (Garleff (1976:20-21 )).  Already on a meeting of  the common 
Landesrat of  Livonia, Estonia, Riga and Osel of 6 November 1918, the Baltic German 
aristocracy and the civil elite had pronounced themselves in favour of a unitary Baltic state 
(Estonia and Latvia) in which the German language would remain the dominant language. 
This state would join the German empire.  On 9 November 1918, a kind of German 
government (Regentschaftsrat) had met in the castle of  Riga.  This group rejected the 
democratic Latvian state controlled by the majority nation.  They held on to the old feudal 
order in which they were the privileged group.  During the negotiations between the National 
Committee and the Council of State (22-24 November 1918), the Baltic German 
representatives refused to recognise the Political Platform and the proclamation of  the Latvian 
state.  They argued that the national minorities had not been involved in the elaboration of 
these documents.  As a condition for full co-operation, they demanded that all parties which 
supported the provisional government in maintaining the internal order and the external 
security, could send representatives to the Council of  State.  They pleaded for a better 
reflection of  the cultural and economic position of  the Baltic German minority in this Council, 
33 demanding 15 of  the 100 seats.  Furthermore, they asked the enactment of  the following rights 
in the Constitution: political amnesty for the past, protection of  property, autonomy for 
schools and churches, protection of  minority languages, certainly the historic German 
language.  The Latvian representatives replied that only those parties which fully recognised 
the Political Platform had a right of  representation in the Council of State.  The number of 
German representatives had to be commensurate with the share of  the German community in 
the total population.  The functions of  state controller and two ministerial deputies (one in the 
Ministry of  Education) were foreseen for the German minority.  The Latvians saw in the 
German demands an attempt to create a kind of  bicameral system - one chamber for the 
Latvians and one for the minorities - after which they could change the composition of  the 
government (Garleff (1976:22)). 
The policy of  the National Committee made future reconciliation much more difficult. 
Many Baltic Germans however rejected this policy and supported a state, controlled by the 
majority nation.  One of  them was Paul Schiemann, who can be considered as one of  the 
most important theorists of  the minorities movement between the two world wars.  In the 
summer of 1919, he re-established the German Balt Democratic Party as its president and 
became editor-in-chief of  the Rigasche Rundschau (the most widely read German newspaper 
in Eastern Europe) in August 1919.  Between 1920 and 1925, he sat in the Riga City Council 
and was a member of  the Constitutional Assembly.  Next to this, he was also the chairman of 
the 'German Party' in the Latvian parliament, the Saeima.  Actually, that party was the 
Committee of German-Balt parties (Ausschuss der deutschbaltischen Parteien) in the Saeima. 
Due to their excellent co-operation and Schiemann's extraordinary leadership, the Latvians 
even called it 'Schiemann's Party'.  The Rigasche Rundschau became the organ of  that party. 
From 1925, as the representative of  the German minorities in Europe, he was the vice-
president of  the Minorities Congress in Geneva.  There he was regarded as the leading 
minority-theorist, possessing an extraordinary influence.  Schiemann believed that the Baltic 
Germans could only survive as a cultural community if  they co-operated with the other 
minority groups and the Latvian majority nation to construct and to consolidate a new Latvian 
democractic state (Hiden (1999:218)).  The Baltic Germans had to acknowledge the 
essentially Latvian nature of  the newly independent state.  On the other hand, the rights of  the 
Baltic Germans, as well as the other minorities in Latvia, had to be fully respected. 
Schiemann tried to persuade the Latvians to embrace the concept of  cultural autonomy.  This 
implied that minorities could constitute themselves as public law corporations.  These 
34 corporations would then manage the educational and cultural affairs of  the minority 
concerned.  The Latvian state would fund these activities to a level commensurate with a 
minority's percentage of  the total population (Hiden (1999:220)).  Paul Schiemann also 
prompted the European Minorities Congress to endorse 'cultural autonomy' as its European-
wide goal. 
Central to Schiemann's thinking on the relationship between nation and state was the parallel 
that he drew between religious and cultural freedom of  choice (Schiemann (1927:25-27)).  In 
his opening speech to the Minorities Congress at Geneva in 1925, Schiemann reflected on the 
Thirty Years War of  the sixteenth century.  The principle that the ruler decided religion (eius 
regia, eius religia) had led to religious wars.  After these wars, states relinquished the choice 
of  confession to their citizens.  A few centuries later, peace was again threatened by the 
principle of  euius regia,  eius natia, namely the imposition of  a national state culture (Bathelt). 
This constituted a menace for the choice of  national origin by an individual.  Thus, in 
Schiemann's view, belonging to a nation was directly comparable with belonging to a 
religion.  The idea of  a euius regia eius natia had to be rejected in order to abolish the idea of 
national state culture.  Just like religion, membership of  a nation was a purely private affair. 
The state had no right to interfere.  It had to become 'anational' (Hiden (1999:224)). 
Paul Schiemann qualified the nation (Valksgemeinsehaft) as a 'spiritual community', 'a 
community of sense and feelings' (Gemeinsehaft rein geistiger Art), which can never have the 
same powers as the state, which is the 'territorial community of  fact', a community of  facts' 
(territariale Tatsaehengemeinsehaft) (Schiemann:31-32; Bathelt).  The 'rational state' was a 
state which confined itself to the tasks and the management of  the general economic well 
being and the security of  its citizens.  In Schiemann's view, the state had no right to interfere 
in the cultural life of  its minorities (Hiden (1999:223)).  Matters of  the national community 
and the state community must be necessarily distinguished from each other.  This applied both 
to the majority nations and the minority groups.  Also the cultural needs of  the majority 
nations would no longer be fulfilled by the state but only by the national community.  The 
state would become 'anational'.  Schiemann was thus consistent when he argued that the 
construction of  the 'anational state' was also possible for cultural homogenous states 
(Grundmann (1977:344-345)).  In order to ensure free development of  cultural life, cultural 
autonomy should be guaranteed.  Just as it was normal for citizens to combine their 
obligations to their faith with those to their states, citizens had obligations to both the national 
35 community of  which they were a member and towards the state as a whole.  The nations and 
the state itself functioned next to another as equal entities, each with other tasks. 
On 30 November 1918, the Progressive Party announced its acceptance of  the Political 
Platform and the other Latvian conditions.  Already on 2 December 1918, five representatives 
of  this party took part in the meeting of  the Council of  State.  The following day, three Baltic 
German politicians became member of  the Latvian government.  Baron Von Rosenberg 
became state controller, Von Klot Englhardtshofbecame deputy of  the Minister for Trade and 
Industry and Karl Keller became deputy of  the Minister of  Education.  Whereas the Deutsche 
Baltenbund, the Deutsche Volksbund in Kurland and the National-Liberale Partei remained 
unwilling to participate in the Latvian institutions, the Progressive Party started separate 
negotiations with the Council of State.  Also the Jungbaltenbund in Lettland assured the 
Latvian government unconditional support.  In December 1918, the Deutsch-Baltische 
Demokratische Partei separated from the National Committee.  One has to note that these 
groupings only had a few supporters.  They mainly represented the liberal-democratic and left 
wing democratic tendency within the Baltic German minority. 
Because of  the advance of  the Bolshevik troops, the government was evacuated from Riga in 
the beginning of  January 1919.  In February 1919, the Baltic German representatives in 
Liepaja again formulated their demands, which were practically the same as those of 
November 1918.  In fourteen points they demanded the complete and full protection of  private 
property, the equal treatment of  the Latvian and German language in all administrative 
domains and in the courts of  law, cultural autonomy and the formation of a civil service, 
consisting of  the representatives of  all the minorities.  By this, the Baltic Germans tried to 
create a binational - Latvian and German - republic.  The Germans were supported by the 
other minorities (Dribins:284; Garleff (1976:24)). 
On 16 April 1919, a military putsch led by Baron Hans Von Manteuffel drove the Ulmanis 
government from power.  The military putchists tried to create a binational state.  The official 
Baltic German-Latvian government of  Niedra was in reality a Baltic German dictatorship, 
supported by a few Latvians.  At the battle of Cesis (19-22 June 1919), the Germans were 
defeated by the Estonian army of General Johan Laidoner.  The Great Powers forced Ulmanis 
to take up representatives of  all minorities, including the Germans, in the Council of  State.  In 
the coalition government, the Baltic Germans Edwin Magnus and Robert Erhardt became 
36 respectively Minister of  Justice and Minister of  Finance.  The Jewish lawyer Mintz became 
state controller.  The Great Powers questioned the ability of  the Latvian politicians to build up 
a viable state.  The Latvian people were seen as an unreliable proletarian mass.  In short, the 
Baltic Germans were expected to provide for law and order (Dribins:286; Garleff (1976:23-
25».  The Latvian military victory against the German-Russian army of  Bermondt-Avalov in 
October and November 1919 strengthened Latvian nationalism.  In the beginning of 
December 1919, Edwin Magnus was removed from his function.  Robert Erhardt was 
permitted to stay until March 1920 (Garleff (1976:28)). 
The draft on cultural autonomy from the Jewish Union 
In December 1918, a nationalities commission was set up by the Latvians to implement the 
national and cultural rights, promised in the Political Platform.  This commission had to 
discuss a draft on general cultural autonomy, submitted by the Jewish Union.  This Jewish 
proposal was based on the theories of  Karl Renner and went out from a complete separation 
between the cultural and other tasks of  the state (Hiden (2004:53)).  The fairly detailed 
proposal of  the Jewish Council was not supported by the German faction because of  tactical 
considerations.  Paul Schiemann advised his community to show above all its solidarity with 
the Latvian co-citizens and its loyalty to the Latvian state.  He did not find it expedi~nt to 
support proposals for autonomous minority organisations in the newly established vulnerable 
state.  On the other hand, he proposed to the Latvians to adopt German and Russian as second 
languages.  Schiemann was right.  The Jewish draft was never adopted.  The Latvian 
Education minister Kaspersons resisted it because it would create a 'state within a state' 
(Hiden (2004:54)).  Whereas the first attempt to establish a general cultural autonomy failed, 
school autonomy was adopted in the same year. 
The adoption of  the Law on school autonomy 
From the very beginning, the Baltic German leaders considered the establishment of  a 
German educational system as their main task.  The starting point was the Political Platform 
of 17 November 1918 and the promise from Prime minister Ulmanis of 19 Novemb~r  1918 to 
attach a Baltic German deputy to the Education minister (Garleff (1976:83)).  On the basis of 
37 the Political Platform, the German minority strove for a special law on school autonomy.  The 
National Committee ordered the German Balt Teacher's Association (Deutsch-Baltische 
Lehrerverband) to elaborate a document.  The draft of  Friedrich Demme of  April 1918 
departed from a system of  territorial autonomy.  As part of  the German empire, the Baltic 
states would have their own Education ministry and civil service.  The second draft of  the 
Teacher's Association of  November 1918 rested on the principle of  personal autonomy.  This 
proposal granted a Baltic German Nationalrat considerable competences and its own civil 
service.  On 3 December 1918, Karl Keller was appointed as deputy of  the Education minister 
and head of  the future German educational system. 
After the Bolshevik occupation from 3 January until 22 May 1919, Ulmanis promised on 15 
July 1919 to look after the cultural needs of  the minorities.  In this way, the earlier promise 
was confirmed.  On the same day, the new chairman of the Teacher's Association Wulffius 
submitted new proposals to Ulmanis.  After this preparatory phase, the proposal took a 
definitive shape.  In the beginning of  August 1919, a detailed German draft was presented to 
the Education ministry.  According to this proposal, an autonomous German educational 
system would be led and supervised by a Baltic German deputy minister.  This person would 
fall directly under the Education minister but on the other hand receive his tasks from the 
generally elected Nationalrat.  The deputy would only be answerable to the NationaJrat and 
the government (Garleff (1976:85)).  The proposal, however, ran up against Latvian 
resistance.  According to the Latvian press, the Nationalrat practically acquired state powers. 
The Latvians regarded the Nationalrat and the former National Committee as similar 
organisations.  Many Latvian politicians were also not familiar with the concept of cultural 
autonomy.  In any case, for the Latvian Education minister Kaspersons, the conception of 
autonomy in the German proposal went too far. 
On 20 August 1919, the Latvian government established a special working group for this 
question, consisting of  the Ministers of  education, internal affairs, finance, justice, trade and 
the state controller.  The minorities were represented by Justice minister Magnus, Finance 
minister Erhardt and the Jewish state controller Mintz.  The task of  the working group was to 
reconcile the German proposal with the demands of  the other minorities and to elaborate 
further proposals.  The Jewish and Russian proposals proved to be decisive.  Accorqing to the 
Rigasche Rundschau, the proposal of  Education minister Kaspersons resembled the self-
government in Tsarist Russia.  It was rejected by the representatives of  all minorities (Garleff 
38 (1976:86)).  On the other hand, the minorities disagreed regarding the proposal of  the 
government to elaborate a general minority law instead of  a special law for the German 
minority.  On 22 August 1919, the government submitted a proposal for a general minority 
law to the Education ministry and the Council of State (Garleff (1976:87)).  The Rigasche 
Rundschau considered the proposal of  the government as a compromise between Education 
minister Kaspersons and the minority representatives.  The former Baltic German proposal 
had been modified on certain fundamental issues.  The institution of  the Nationalrat was 
dropped (Garleff (1976:88)).  After the discussion of  the draft in the relevant commission, the 
Law on School Autonomy (LSA) was approved by the Council of State on 8 December 1919, 
together with the Education law. 
In line with Wolfgang Wachtsmuth, Michael Garleff argues that the main reason to enact the 
law was that the Latvians strove for membership of  the League of  Nations and were therefore 
subjected to the linked condition of  minority protection (Garleff (1976:90)).  Wachtsmuth also 
claims that the Latvians were concerned to discourage the Landeswehr from taking part in the 
abortive attack on Riga that General Bermondt-A  valov's White Russian and renegate troups 
launched in October.  On the other hand, John Hiden observes that this episode actually 
provoked fresh-anti German hostility and was thus scarcely helpful to the negotiations over 
schooling.  As mentioned above, in this period of  rising self-confidence the German ministers 
were removed by Ulmanis.  This clearly indicated the readiness of  the Latvian government to 
contemplate a multinational future despite the conflict with the Baltic Germans (Hiden 
(2004:56)). 
Lithuania 
The origin of  the system of  Jewish autonomy in inter-war Lithuania lay in the period of  the 
emergence of  Lithuania as an independent state.  To anticipate the consequences of  the 
Russian February revolution and to weaken Polish influence in the region, the Germans made 
concessions to Lithuanian demands for self-determination.  With the permission of  the 
German occupants, the Lithuanian national movement met in Vilnius at 18-22 September 
1917.  The resolutions of  the Vilnius Conference began the process which led to Lithuanian 
independence.  The delegates called for an independent state within ethnographic boundaries, 
a guarantee of  the cultural rights of  the minorities, and the election of  a constituent assembly. 
39 A National Councilor Taryba of20 persons was chosen as the executive body (Lane 
(2002:4)). 
On 16 February 1918, the Lithuanian Taryba published its Declaration ofIndependence.  On 
15 October 1918, Prince Max Von Baden, German Chancellor, announced that countries 
occupied by Germany had the right to self-government.  On 20 October 1918, the Lithuanian 
representatives received permission to take over the administration of  their country and by 2 
November 1918, a provisional constitution had been adopted.  The Taryba became the State 
Council with legislative powers, and a three-man Presidency led by Antanas Smetona was 
established.  A Constituent Assembly would elaborate a permanent Constitution (Lane:5-6). 
It was only on 27 November 1918 that six Belarussians were admitted into the Taryba 
(Liekis:74).  After the Lithuanians had promised to implement Jewish autonomy, the Jews 
also agreed to enter the Taryba for the 'genuine representation' of  the peoples of Lithuania. 
Three Jewish politicians received positions in the cabinet of  Vol demar  as: Simon Rosenbaum 
became deputy Minister for foreign affairs, Nachman Rachmilevich, deputy Minister of  trade 
and industry and Jacob Wygodski, Minister for Jewish affairs (Liekis:78). 
The Lithuanians were far from comfortable with these concessions.  However, they had no 
choice.  As they sought to counter Polish pretensions, the loyalty of  the Jewish and 
Belarussian minorities was of  immense importance for them (Dohrn (2004: 158)). 
For the Taryba, it was indeed imperative to reject the claim of  the Poles that it represented 
only ethnic Lithuanians, and to get an additional argument against Poland in the struggle over 
eastern borderlands as the true representative of  a 'historical Lithuania' (Liekis:20-21). 
Therefore, the Lithuanians already committed themselves at the Paris Peace Conference to 
give the Jewish community far-reaching rights.  The so-called Paris Declaration of 5 August 
1919 reinvigorated the autonomy movement. 
By way of  this declaration, the Lithuanian delegation committed itself to give the Jews the 
same civil and political rights as the other Lithuanian citizens.  They would have a  . 
proportional representation in all legislative bodies and take fully part in the governmental 
and judicial institutions.  A special Ministry for Jewish affairs would be created.  The Jews 
were given the right to use their own language in public assemblies, in the press, in theatres, 
40 in the schools, in the courts and in the relations with the government.  On the other hand, the 
Lithuanian language was recognised as the state language.  All public authorities - with the 
exception of  the autonomous minority organisation - would be obliged to correspond only in 
Lithuanian.  The learning of  the Lithuanian language was obligatory in all primary and 
higher-grade schools and Jewish schools.  The right of  the Jews to observe the Sabbath would 
not be in any way restricted.  However, this exempted in no way the Jews from such 
obligations which were binding upon all Lithuanian citizens for reasons of  military service, 
national defence or the preservation of  public order.  Rabbis were assured the same legal 
status as clergymen of  other religions.  Furthennore, the Jews were promised complete 
autonomy in their internal affairs such as religion, education, charity, social assistance, and 
generally in the sphere of spiritual culture.  The limits of  the jurisdiction of  national autonomy 
would be fixed by laws and guaranteed by constitutional laws.  The institutions of  Jewish 
national autonomy would be the local communities and the communal union.  The procedure 
for establishing communities and their union, and the fonns of  their representation would be 
fixed by a specific law.  The bodies of  Jewish autonomy would be territorial communities and 
their councils.  These bodies were considered to be government bodies and they would have 
the right to issue the laws, binding on their co-nationals.  They would have the right to tax 
their members to cover their expenses.  These Jewish communities would have the rights of  a 
juridical body.  They would also have the right to accept donations and gifts from people and 
their estates, and receive subsidies from the state, if similar subsidies were given to other 
national groups.  The subsidies would have to be distributed among all national groups 
(Liekis:124-126; Wintgens (1930:276-277)).  Asides from representation in the national 
governing bodies, a superordinate council for the Jewish community and a national council 
(Natzional Rath) were to be created as the major supervisory institutions for the various 
agencies of  autonomy.  The councils were empowered to issue ordinances binding upon both 
Jews and governmental agencies (Greenbaum:231). 
This declaration, which was sent to the Committee of  the Jewish delegations, served mainly 
as propaganda and also achieved this objective.  It immediately raised Lithuania's popularity 
at the conference (Liekis: 126-127). 
Meanwhile, the organisation of  the office of  the Minister of  Jewish affairs had begun on 2 
June 1919.  On 23 June 1919, the government ratified the draft of  a 'Provisional Law to 
support the Minister for Jewish Affairs'.  This draft considered the Jewish minister to be the 
41 official representative of  the Jewish people in the government.  The ministry was to prepare 
all laws regarding Jews.  Its main task would be to implement Jewish personal autonomy, and 
later to supervise its functioning and mediate between the institutions of  the goveIl1ll}ent and 
the Jewish self-government (Liekis: 118-119). 
The Jewish ministry indeed concentrated its activities on the foundation of  a superstructure 
for the Jewish kehillot.  On 6 July 1919, the Jewish ministry informed the Jewish National 
Council that it would be empowered to handle all cultural affairs and to levy taxes.  Although 
this had not yet been enacted into law, the Jewish faction in the Seimas hoped that the 
forthcoming nationwide elections for Jewish Community Councils, scheduled for 3 October 
1919, would force the government to incorporate this right, as well as the principle of 
proportional representation, into the Constitution.  On 2 October 1919, the Slezevicius 
government resigned and a new government headed by Galvanauskas took office without the 
participation of  the Social Democrats and the Populists.  The Nationalists received 38 
delegates out of  a total of 78 in the Seimas, the elected legislature that replaced the unelected 
Taryba.  The two minorities' ministers (Jewish and Belarussian) were invited to join .the new 
government (Greenbaum:233). 
78 communities had already been founded by the time the First Congress of  kehillot took 
place in Kaunas in January 1920.  134 delegates, representing 74 communities, participated in 
this congress (Liekis:128-129).  In one of  the Congress resolutions, the Congress of  Jewish 
communities (or Jewish National Assembly) was first confirmed as the supreme Jewish body 
in Lithuania.  This congress would elect a Jewish National Council of  34 persons, which in 
tum could elect an Executive Committee.  This resolution also stipulated that the Minister of 
Jewish affairs had to co-operate closely with the National Council, which would have the 
right of  legislative initiative and the right of  veto.  Third, the Jewish National Council would 
select a candidate for the post of  Minister of  Jewish affairs in the government.  This minister 
would be accountable to the Congress and had to provide it with reports of  his activities. 
Fourth, the Jewish Congress would be obliged by the Minister for Jewish affairs to present to 
the government a draft of  a new law regarding confirmation of  the council and of  the Jewish 
National Council, and to set the parameters for the functions and the competency of  the 
Congress and the Jewish National Council.  Fifth, it was stated that the chairman of  the 
Jewish National Council could not be at the same time a member of  the government 
(Liekis: 130).  A National Council was indeed elected.  On this occasion, Prime minister 
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(Liekis:XI). 
On 1 °  January 1920, the representatives of  the Jewish minority joined the Lithuanian Council 
of  State and the President issued a declaration on national autonomy (Liekis:XI). 
On the same day, the government adopted a Provisional Law on Taxation of  Jewish citizens. 
This law stipulated that all Jews residing in a separate area, make up a local Jewish 
community (kehilla).  Each community takes care of  its religious matters, charity, social 
assistance, schools, and all matters of spiritual character, and has the right to elect the councils 
(vaads) of  the communities (kehillot).  The Jews of  a certain area could form a community by 
combining population with their nearest localities if  their numbers were small.  The Minister 
without portfolio for Jewish affairs would issue regulations for elections and confinn and 
register the councils elected according to these regulations.  The councils approved by this 
ministry had the right to tax Jewish citizens with special taxes for community needs  .. The 
amount of  system of  collection of  taxes would be determined by every council (vaad) and had 
to be approved by the ministry.  The amount of special taxes taken from a citizen in a 
particular year may not be larger than the combined amount of state and municipal taxes. 
These taxes had to be collected according to the rules of  tax collection, and were to be paid 
into the State Treasury by the communities.  The state taxes were to be paid before the 
community taxes (Liekis:131-132; Greenbaum:236-237). 
This provisional law formed the underlying basis of  the system of  Jewish autonomy.  It 
created the conditions under which the community councils, as the most important 
instruments of  that autonomy, might function.  Next to this, the Jewish ministry and his office 
were after the law officially responsible for the management of  the entire apparatus of  Jewish 
self-government (Greenbaum:237). 
On 29 March 1920, the Minister without portfolio for Jewish affairs issued detailed 
instructions for the implementation of  the provisional law (Liekis: 133-135).  On 20 May 
1920, an ordinance to implement the provisional kehillot law was passed.  It defined the 
kehilla as a legal entity empowered to impose taxes, issue bylaws in matters of  religion, 
education and social welfare, and register births, marriages and divorces.  Community 
Council elections were to be conducted democratically, according to the principle of 
43 proportional representation.  Every citizen registered as a Jew in public documents ~as 
deemed a member of  the kehilla.  To dissociate oneself from the Jewish community, one had 
to undergo religious conversion or prove that the registration in the personal register was 
inaccurate (Greenbaum:238).  Along with this ordinance, two statements were gazetted in 
Vyriaustybes Zinias (Government News, Nr. 32).  First, the Lithuanian Prime minister stated 
that the kehillat law had been enacted, not because it was in Lithuania's interest but because 
the Jews themselves had requested it.  The law was amendable only in accordance with the 
community's wishes.  The second statement was made by the Minister for Jewish affairs.  It 
limited the number of  Jewish communities in any given locality to one and designated the 
Community Council as the legal representative of  the local Jewish population.  The statement 
also affirmed that the kehilla was the historic form of  Jewish national life (Greenbaum:239). 
It is truly remarkable that by 1920 various provisions for minorities had been inserted into the 
founding documents ofthe Baltic states and that a full-fledged system of school autonomy 
had been adopted in Latvia.  This was perhaps especially so in Estonia and Latvia given the 
bitter animosity that still clouded Estonians and Latvians' relations with the Baltic Germans. 
As far as the representatives of  the titular majority is concerned, these measures were adopted 
out of  a combination of  principle and expediency.  Once the land laws had settled accounts 
with the Baltic nobility and secured the basis for Estonian and Latvian predominance within 
the state, there was recognition of  the need to accomodate German interests.  From the 
German side, two trends were still at work.  A conservative fraction found it hard to come to 
terms with the loss of its dominant position, but there was also a dedicated liberal grouping 
(e.g. Paul Schiemann in Latvia) which made a big contribution to realising the early minority 
provisions.  The tension between the two factions would remain apparent during the 1920s 
when the Baltic Germans and other minorities still faced an uphill struggle to implement the 
constitutional provisions and build their own autonomous institutions (see chapter four).  In 
the immediate term, the Baltic states still faced the task of gaining recognition from the 
League of  Nations and the Western powers.  The Baltic governments had enacted their 
minority policies at least partly in the belief that a new international order based on equality 
of  nationalities was in the making.  However, as the next chapter shows, the provisions made 
in the founding documents of  the Baltic states and in certain laws actually went way beyond 
the very basic framework which the League ultimately adopted in relation to this question. 
44 Chapter two:  The League's vision of statehood and minority rights. 
The League of Nations and sovereignty 
The basic idea behind the League of  Nations was that in place of  military and political blocs 
and power-based hegemony, all countries should work with one another.  The League was a 
wide-reaching international organisation, set up to reach various global goals and to preserve 
international peace. 
The way in which the Peace Conference was directed by the Great Powers caused great 
dissatisfaction among many European and non-European states.  It became clear that many 
states would not enter into an organisation which did not respect the legal equality and 
sovereignty of  the states.  In such case, the Covenant would only be 'accepted' by the states 
which were forced to sign the peace and minority treaties of  which the Covenant formed a 
part.  The drafters of  the Covenant therefore created an organisation which combined the 
realities of  international politics - the unavoidable privileged position of  the Great Powers-
with the respect of  the equality and sovereignty of  all member states (Korowicz (1961 :91-
100». 
The Assembly was envisaged as a periodic conference of  all members and this on the model 
of  the successive Peace Conferences of  Den Haag of 1899 and 1907.  The Assembly was the 
plenary representative organ in which - in line with the doctrine of  the equality of  states-
every member had an equal voice.  It had the following powers:  the admission of  new 
members by two-thirds majority vote, the selection of  the non-permanent members of  the 
Council and the approval of  increases of  the membership of  that body, the approval of  any 
appointment to the office of  Secretary-General after the original appointment, the advising of 
reconsideration of  treaties that had become inapplicable and the consideration of  international 
conditions which might endanger the peace.  The Assembly was also endowed with a general 
capacity to deal "with any matter within the sphere of  action of  the League or affecting the 
peace of  the world'.  Moreover, each member of  the League had the right to bring to the 
attention of  either the Assembly or the Council any circumstances whatsoever threatening 
peace or good understanding.  The Council could also, and at the request of  any party made 
45 within 14 days, was obliged to, remit any dispute referred to it to the Assembly, whereupon 
that body stood in the place of  the Council. 
In practice, the Assembly emerged as something more prominent than had been expected.  To 
begin with, it decided at once to meet annually.  The Assembly also slowly arrogated to itself 
exclusive power to decide how the expenses of  the League should be borne by the members. 
It further assumed a competence at least to discuss matters in which the Council had powers 
of  decision, such as the formulation of  disarmament plans and the control of  the mandates 
system.  Last but not least, the Assembly inaugurated the practice of  conducting an annual 
debate, in which the proceedings of  the Council and the general political scene were reviewed 
(Parry (1987: 195-196)). 
While the Assembly was essentially the Conference of  the members of  the League, the 
Council could be described as the Executive of  the League (Oppenheim (1951 :347-349)). It 
was a limited organ where in deference to their power and interests, the Great Powers had a 
preferential position, at least in the sense that they were permanent members of  that organ. 
The intention of  the drafters was to make the Council the successor to the earlier meetings 
between the Great Powers, of  the Conferences of  Ambassadors in which the Great Powers, 
and they alone, took the important political decisions.  The Anglo-American suggestion of  an 
exclusively Great Power Council was however unacceptable to the small and medium powers, 
who were backed by France and Italy (Sharp (1991 :56)).  The compromise was that the 
Council would consist of  permanent members - the 'principal Allied and Associated Powers' 
- and non-permanent members, who were freely elected by the Assembly.  Finally, the 
number of  non-permanent members was eleven in 1936. 
Like the Assembly, the Council could deal at its meetings with "any matter within the sphere 
of  action of  the League or affecting the peace of  the world' which was not by the Covenant 
expressly reserved for the sphere of  action of  the Assembly.  The Covenant had thus 
established a parallel authority of  Council and Assembly to deal with any subject within the 
field of  competence of  the League.  According to Jean Siotis, the only explanation for this is 
"partly ( ...  ) the recognition of  the need  for public debate on issues of  general concern, and 
partly ( ...  ) the needfor greater efficiency in settling specific disputes and other matters 
requiring action via a body of  limited composition - in which the Great Powers would have 
had a more decisive voice" (Siotis (1983 :23)). 
46 Despite the rule of  parallel authority, the Covenant gave the Council the key role relative to 
the settlement of  disputes and collective security matters.  It was also charged with the 
formulation of  armament reduction plans, with the surveillance of  the administration of  the 
mandates and with the aid of  the international bureaux.  In addition to the functions resulting 
from the Covenant itself, the Council was charged with a very important task, directly 
connected with the peace settlement after the First World War, namely the international 
guarantee of  the 'minority clauses'. 
Decisions at any meeting of  the Assembly or of  the Council required in principle thy 
agreement of  all members of  the League represented at the meeting.  The unanimity rule was 
one of  the most fundamental organisational principles of  the League and a natural 
consequence of  the respect for state equality and the sovereignty of  its member states.  In 
principle, the majority vote was only applied to matters of  procedure (Andrassy (1937 :692); 
Schucking and Wehberg (1931 :507-522». 
The fact that the more important Council was a limited organ, did not violate the principle of 
legal equality and sovereignty of  the member states of  the League.  As mentioned above, first 
of  all the Council functioned on the basis of  equality of  its members.  The non-permanent 
members had an equal vote and because of  the unanimity rule, nothing could be decided 
against their will.  Second, article 4, paragraph 5 of  the Covenant provided that any member 
ofthe League not represented in the Council, was invited to send a representative to sit as a 
member of  any meeting of  the Council during the consideration of  matters specially affecting 
the interests of  that member.  Walters emphasises that this provision was a concession to the 
mistrust felt by the neutral countries and small(er) states for the Great Powers (Walters 
(1952:46». 
Further, article 15, paragraph 8 of  the Covenant protected the member states of  the League 
against an intervention by the League in their internal affairs in connection with an 
international dispute.  This provision stated:  "If  a dispute between the parties is claimed by 
one of  them, and is found by the Council, to arise out of  a matter which by international law 
is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of  that party, the Council shall so report, and shall 
make no recommendation as to its settlement.". 
47 Korowicz argues that the term 'domestic jurisdiction' does not mean anything else than "the 
term sovereignty in the sense of  the supreme power of  the state over its territory and 
inhabitants in the framework of  international law binding upon that state".  In theory, this 
provision could be seen as a considerable restriction of  the sovereignty of  the member states. 
The Council namely decided exclusively whether or not a certain dispute arose out of  a matter 
which by international law was solely within the domestic jurisdiction of  that state.  In 
practice, states which claimed their domestic jurisdiction in disputes before the Council were 
not overruled by the Council, except (my emphasis) in specific matters regarding th~ 
international protection of  minorities (Korowicz (1959:157-164)). 
The ultimate embodiment of sovereignty was enacted in the articles 1, paragraph 3 and 26 of 
the Covenant, according to which a member state could freely withdraw from the League 
(Andrassy:680-682). 
Brierly correctly describes the League as "an association of  independent but co-operating 
states, (whose) institutions were intended as means for making it as easy as possible for these 
states to work together.  The members retained their sovereignty but they had all agreed to do 
and not to do certain things in the exercise of  their sovereign rights.  Thus,  the Covenant did 
not contain even the beginnings of  a system of  international government in the strict sense of 
the word." (Brierly (1955: 1  03)).  The principle of  state equality was safeguarded in the two 
main institutions of  the League.  Both in the Council and in the Assembly, decision~ were 
taken unanimously and, accordingly, had to conform with the interests of all the states 
concerned (Brial (2001 :52)). 
As Paul Reuters notes, the institutional structure of  the League did not enable the Great 
Powers to manipulate and steer international affairs autonomously (Reuters (1967:236)).  It 
became however increasingly clear that the League did not replace the earlier system of 
international relations and the policy of  balance of  power.  The international system became 
characterised by parallel institutions and relations.  France had no confidence in the collective 
security system and built up its own cordon sanitaire against Germany, thereby continuing the 
old alliance system of  the nineteenth century.  The matter of the German reparation payments 
was mediated by the United States, who remained outside the League.  Important boundary 
arrangements were made by the Great Powers at the Conference of  Locarno (1925), 
completely outside the League's framework (Van Ginneken (1999:39-40)).  Important 
48 international questions were discussed and decided both inside and outside the League and the 
Council was but one among several parallel channels of  relations between the Great Powers. 
The League's minority protection system 
The institutionalisation of  the inequality between East and West 
Although the Allied Powers had announced that national self-determination would be the 
guiding principle of  the Peace Conference of  Paris, it was only applied when and where it was 
politically convenient to do so and chiefly where it was to the disadvantage of  the Central 
Powers (Claude (1955: 12); Zacher (2001 :219)).  The number of  minorities in Central and 
Eastern Europe was reduced by one-half.  Whereas one-half of  the population of  Eastern 
Europe were 'minorities' in 1914, only one-quarter were in 1919.  Almost 30 million people 
were still members of  minorities (Pearson (1983: 136)).  However, the problem of  minorities 
itselfwas at the same time exacerbated by the triumph of  nationalism and the only partial 
application of  the principle of  self-determination.  About a third of  Rumania's population, 35 
per cent of  Czechoslovakia's population and 30 per cent of  Poland's population consisted of 
minorities.  Next to the Jews, the Poles of  German Upper Silesia and the Macedonians, who 
continued to be minorities in states dominated by other ethnic groups, more than seven 
million Germans, almost three million Hungarians and more than one million Bulgarians were 
newly created minorities.  As Jennifer Jackson Preece observes, these Germans and 
Hungarians were members of  the former imperial ruling elites.  In the successor states of  the 
Dual Monarchy, they resented their loss of  power and privilege to their former mostly Slav 
subjects.  On the other hand, these Slav people now found large numbers of  their former 
masters handed over to them, and the temptation to act vengefully was strong (Jackson Preece 
(1998a:68)). 
Some way had to be found which would prohibit national minorities from seeking union with 
their respective nation-states, but which would nevertheless affirm that complete cultural 
development of  such groups was still possible.  Also the corresponding kin-states - the states 
where minority groups formed the majority - would then not be provoked to interfere in the 
internal affairs of  other states.  The idea was that if  the linguistic, cultural and religious 
attributes of  national minorities were adequately protected, their union with their respective 
49 nation-state would no longer be necessary (Musgrave (1997:38-39)).  Thus, minority 
protection was an attempt to reconcile certain minorities with the fact that their claim to self-
determination was not satisfied (Henrard (2000:4); Seton-Watson (1946:269)).  It was a 
supplement for those cases where self-determination was deemed either not possible or not 
desirable (Musgrave:40).  Minority protection would safeguard both the domestic tranquility 
and stability of  the newly independent states and the international peace.  The minority 
protection system thus pursued not a humanitarian but a purely political aim (Fenet 
(1995:87)). 
The Committee on New States and the Protection of  Minorities returned to the tradition of  the 
nineteenth century and drafted a series of  treaties, linking the recognition of  the new and 
enlarged states to an obligation to protect minorities.  Five Minorities Treaties were concluded 
in 1919-1920 between Poland, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Yugoslavia and Greece, 
respectively, on the one hand, and the 'Principal Allied and Associated Powers' on the other 
hand.  In the Peace Treaties with Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, special chapters 
concerning minority protection were inserted.  The system of  the League further consisted of 
two treaties (German-Polish Convention on Upper Silesia of 15 May 1922 (Part III) and the 
Convention concerning the Memel territory between the Principal Allied and Associated 
Powers and Lithuania of 8 May 1924) and declarations made by Albania, Estonia, Finland, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Iraq to the Council. 
The stimulus for the establishment ofthis minority protection system came from the activity 
of  Jewish organisations.  Jozsef Galantai observes that given the circumstances, effective 
representation of  minority rights at the Peace Conference, actively involving the minorities 
themselves, was not possible in any other way.  Many ethnic groups had become majority 
nations under the new arrangement and enjoyed the status of 'winners'.  They were no longer 
interested in the protection of  minorities.  As for the new minorities, they were either regarded 
as 'enemies' (the Germans, Hungarians, Bulgarians and Turks) not even represented at the 
Conference, or suffered the consequences of  being associated with revolutionary Russia (the 
Russians, Belarussians, and Ukranians).  Thus, for many minorities of  Eastern Europe, the 
Jewish organisations meant the only prospect of  representation at the Conference. 
Sizeable Jewish communities could be found in Poland, the eastern part of Czechoslovakia 
and in Rumania.  The organisations representing these communities were able to send 
50 delegates to Paris.  These organisations and the American Jewish Committee formed a joint 
group, called the 'Comiti des delegations Juives'.  In early April 1919, this committee 
established contact with Miller, the minorities expert in the United States delegation.  This 
contact provided the 'channel' through which the Comiti's requests and programme could 
effectively be communicated to the Conference.  Although the Comiti initially served to 
represent those Jewish communities of  Eastern Europe which possessed separate 
characteristics, it soon came to speak out for the protection of  all the region's national 
minorities (Galantai (1992:42-43); Bagley (1950:72-73)).  When it was clear that Wilson's 
proposal to insert minority provisions into the League Covenant was politically impracticable, 
the Comite pressed for the inclusion of  Jewish rights in the territorial treaties. 
The delegations of  the states, facing the prospect of  having their minorities placed under 
international guarantee, strongly objected.  The representatives of  Rumania, Poland and 
Yugoslavia not only protested against the imposition of  these obligations but also stressed that 
international minority protection would split rather than unify their state.  Further, they 
complained that the fact that minority obligations applied only to certain states relegated them 
to second-class status (the argument of  non-reciprocity and the equality principle) and that 
this constituted an unwarranted infringement of  their sovereignty.  The Yugoslav delegation 
(Trumbic and Pasic) repeatedly proposed to extend the minority protection system to all 
former areas of  the Austria-Hungarian empire, including Italy (Sandor-Szalay (2001 :22)). 
The president of  the Peace Conference, the Frenchman Clemenceau, responded that there was 
no intention of  humiliating countries or encroaching on the sovereign rights of  the newly 
independent states.  He argued that the minority protection system of  the League was a neutral 
and objective system which fundamentally corrected the earlier situation when the guarantee 
lay with the Great Powers individually or in concert, wherein room was left for intervention 
for political ends.  Bratianu, the Rumanian representative, said the League system was fiction: 
only the Great Powers were treaty parties and they alone controlled the minority protection 
system in the new states (Viefuaus (1960:191)).  The Great Powers brushed aside these 
objections.  They made it very clear that their authority to enforce minority obligations, if 
necessary, was evident and indisputable. 
The official explanation of  the historical, political, economic and social justification for the 
minorities system was given in the famous 'Clemenceau letter' (according to the American 
Miller, the letter was drafted by the Briton Headlam-Morley (Bagley:74)) which accompanied 
51 the delivery of  the Polish minority treaty.  The letter stated that:  "It has for long been the 
established procedure of  the public law of  Europe that,  when a State is created, or even when 
large accessions of  territory are made to an established State,  the joint and  formal 
recognition by the Great Powers should be accompanied by the requirement that such State 
should,  in the form of  a binding international convention, undertake to comply with certain 
principles of  government.  This principle, for which there are numerous other precedents, 
received its most explicit sanction when,  at the last great assembly of  European powers - the 
Congress of  Berlin - the sovereignty and independence of  Serbia,  Montenegro and Rumania 
werre recognised ...  The Principal Allied and Associated Powers are of  the opinion that they 
would be false to the responsibility which rests upon them if  on this occasion they departed 
from what has become an established tradition.".  Furthermore, the fundamental difference 
with the earlier system was underlined (De Azcarete (1945:165-167». 
Macartney strongly criticised this explanation.  If  the minorities treaties were a general 
principle of  public law in Europe, why then had the Great Powers not asked for minority 
guarantees when Italy was constituted, when Germany took Alsace and Lorraine or when 
Norway separated from Sweden?  Also the Great Powers would then have to exempt Austria, 
Hungary, Bulgary and Turkey from such guarantees, since these were not new states. 
Belgium (which had acquired the German territories of  Eupen and Malmedy), Italy (which 
had acquired South Tyrol and Slovene territories), France and Denmark (which respectively 
had regained Alsace, Lorraine and Schleswig) were all exempted from international minority 
guarantees.  Macartney uses the geographical term 'Western Europe' (" ( ... ) evading the 
whole issue of  inequality; since the Powers were not attempting to apply that 'established 
procedure'to themselves, nor to  Western Europe at all") (Macartney (1934:288-290».  This 
was indeed the heart of  the matter: the international protection system of  the League 
constituted an "institutionalisation of  inequality between East and West" (Burgess (1998:51 ». 
Macartney, Bagley and many others defended this 'inequality' because of  the 'special quality' 
of  Eastern Europe.  In their view, the minority protection system of  the League was 
specifically designed to meet a minority problem that only existed in Eastern and not in 
Western Europe.  In Macartney's words:  "The primary purpose of  the Minorities Trealies-
insurance against international friction - did not arise at all in the case of  old-established 
states in which a feeling of  political nationality already existed.  The minorities in the new 
States and transferred territories were in a quite pecular position." (Macartney (1934: 190»). 
52 Also a contemporary historian like Marc Mazower argues that this argument of 'special 
quality' had some truth:  "it was easier for Welsh or Catalan children to make careers in the 
professions or the civil service than it was,  say, for Ukranians in Poland or Hungarians in 
Rumania were hatreds were more recent.  Breton children might suffer at school; they did not 
have their homes and villages burned down.  Thus the minorities treaties were a way of 
educating less civilised nations in international deportment" (Mazower (1999:56-57)). 
The last sentence - and more specifically the passage "educating less civilised nations in 
international deportment" is questionable.  The assimilation policy of Germany before the 
war was for example notorious (MichaYlovitch (1933 :91-92); Musgrave: 1  0). 
Louis Le Fur is very critical towards the argument of  moral deficiency.  If  it is really a matter 
of  civilisation, the Frenchman wonders, why do the so-called old states not give a good 
example?  The Jews in France are refused the same treatment as the Jews in Rumania or in 
Poland.  Le Fur notes that a few years before the war, Breton preachers were suspended for 
preaching in Breton, despite the fact that many children only understood that language.  And 
ifthe protection of  minorities would already create political problems in such politically 
united countries, he wonders, what would then be the consequences of such protection in 
countries which were not yet politically unified and which had many more minorities? (Le 
Fur (1931 :423)). 
The fundamental dilemma - actually it was more a kind of  a paradox - of  this minority 
protection system was that while the treaties were established and imposed in order to meet 
specific problems of a specific region, the guarantor was a universal organisation, which was 
based upon the principles of  sovereignty and equality of  its member states (Bartsch (1993:43); 
Bagley:97  -98).  This painful argument was nicely formulated by Colonel Beck of  Poland, 
when he justified his practical denunciation of  the Polish minority treaty in the fourth plenary 
meeting of  the 15th Assembly on 13 September 1934:  "The paradoxical situation of  an 
exceptional regime grafted on to the League organisation, which derives its political 
justification from its very universality and  from the democratic principle of  equality at public 
law,  cannot last without doing irreparable harm to the moral foundations upon which the 
League was erected in 1919." (Bagley:99-101). 
53 The stipulations in the treaties 
The stipulations in these international instruments pursued a double aim, namely the 
prohibition of  discrimination of  citizens belonging to racial, religious and linguistic minorities 
and the protection of  the separate characteristics of  those minorities (Permanent Court of 
International Justice (1935: 17». 
Each treaty contained in the first place a general provision, ensuring the full and complete 
protection of life, liberty and free exercise of  religion or belief for all inhabitants of  a state 
without distinction as to citizenship, religion, ethnic origin or language.  According to Tore 
Modeen, this general human right established a minimum standard, also accorded to aliens in 
a state (Modeen (1969:54».  The treaties further guaranteed citizens belonging to minorities, 
equal civil and political rights, equality before the law and an equal right of  admission to 
public functions and other professions.  Citizens belonging to minorities also had an equal 
right to establish, manage and control charitable, religious and social institutions, and schools 
and other educational institutions at their own expense and the right to use their own language 
and to practise their own religion freely within them.  Signatory states could not restrict the 
use of  any minority language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press, or 
in publications or public meetings of  any kind (Jackson Preece (1998a:75).  Next to these 
provisions, guaranteeing negative equality, the treaties also ensured positive equality.  First, 
the treaty-bound states agreed to provide to minorities adequate facilities for the use of  their 
own language before the courts.  Second, in towns and districts with a considerable proportion 
of  citizens whose mother tongue was not the official language, adequate facilities were to be 
provided to ensure that in the primary schools, instructions would be given to the children in 
their own language.  In such towns or districts, the state also had to provide minority citizens 
with an equitable share in the enjoyment and application of  sums, provided out of  municipal 
or other budgets for educational, religious, or charitable purposes (Thornberry (1991 :42-43». 
Each of  the treaties also contained stipulations regulating the acquisition of  citizenship (Sibert 
(1951:497-498».  The aim of  these citizenship clauses was to protect individuals against 
denationalisation and to ensure respect for the elementary rights of  populations inhabiting the 
territories allocated to the new states.  By granting citizenship automatically to foreigners 
absorbed into the new states, the treaties ensured that these people enjoyed the civil, cultural 
and political rights of  the treaties (Wolfrum (1993:157».  This was coupled with the right of 
54 such people to opt for another citizenship.  In such a case, people were obliged to transfer 
their home, within a period oftwelve months, to the state for whose citizenship they had 
opted. 
The international guarantee and sovereignty: to guarantee or not to guarantee? 
To ensure the observance of  the minority clauses, the treaties and declarations foresaw both 
an internal and an international guarantee. 
Internally, the obligated state recognised the principal clauses as 'fundamental laws' and 
undertook that no law, regulation or official action would conflict or interfere with them. 
The only real guarantee, however, was the international guarantee.  By virtue of  the 
international guarantee, the signatory countries agreed that the stipulations concerned 
constituted obligations of international concern and were placed under the guarantee of  the 
League of  Nations.  The minority provisions could not be modified without the assent of  the 
majority of  the members of  the Council of  the League.  Any member of  the Council further 
had the right to bring to the attention of  the Council any infraction or any danger of infraction 
and could thereupon take such action or give such directions it deemed proper. 
The second organ charged with the international guarantee was the Permanent Court of 
International Justice.  "Any difference of  opinion as to questions of  law or  fact arising out of 
these articles" could be brought before the court by any single member of  the Council, even 
without the consent of  the state concerned (this consent was automatically granted in the 
guarantee clause), without any agreement with the other members of  the Councilor any 
previous consideration by the Council, and without any preliminary diplomatic negotiations 
between the parties.  Moreover, unlike international justice, where a state must claim violation 
of  its rights or those of its nationals, minorities cases could be brought on behalf of  a third 
party (the minorities) even if  the intervening state had no legal interest of  its own.  The 
argument was that the Council members would be acting in the general interests of 
international peace (Korowicz: 113-120)).  In case of a judgment in such a contentious 
procedure, the matter would be settled immediately by the Council.  The Court could also 
give advisory opinions upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Councilor by the 
Assembly.  These opinions became then the basis of further negotiations between the Council 
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minorities states had recourse to the Court for a decision in contentious proceedings.  On the 
other hand, only the Council as such could ask for advisory opinions. 
Also the Assembly had certain powers in the field of  minority protection.  This was namely 
clearly a matter within the sphere of  action of  the League, affecting the peace of  the world 
(article 3, paragraph 3 of  the Covenant of  the League).  While the Council had the exclusive 
power in individual petition procedures, the Assembly could evaluate the efficiency and 
activity of  the general procedures, discuss fundamental questions regarding minority 
protection - like the question of  the mutual obligations and duties of states and their 
minorities and proposals for a generalisation of  the system - and take organisational 
measures.  Each year, the Assembly discussed the minority question in its plenary session on 
the basis of  the yearly activity report of  the League (Burton (1941 :220-225); Goppert 
(1938:586». 
The treaties and declarations did not prescribe the procedure to be followed in the execution 
of  the guarantee of  the League.  The Council therefore established a minority protection 
procedure, adopted by way of  several resolutions in the period between 1920 and 1929 
(Caportorti: 22-23).  As a result of  these successive resolutions, the minority protection 
procedure could be summarised as follows (Veatch (1983:369-383); De Azcarate: 191-200; 
Jackson Preece (1998a:82-83).  The Minorities Section of  the League's Secretariat received, 
from any source - be it a state, an organisation, or minority group - petitions alleging the 
mistreatment of minorities and then determined the receivability.  When a petition had been 
found receivable, it was sent to the government complained against, which could then make 
observations within two months.  The petition and the government's observations were then 
communicated simultaneously to each member of  the Council for purely informational 
purposes, and to the Committee of  Three.  A Committee of  Three consisted of  the President of 
the Council and two members appointed by him.  Through the creation of  this organ, no 
member of  the Council could ever be placed in the delicate position of  having to take the 
initiative in accusing a government before the Council of  a violation of  its minority 
obligations.  Through 'collectivising' the initiative and placing the responsibility for it 
conjointly on three members of  the Council, the way was open for the actual treatment of 
minority questions by the League.  The Minority Committee studied the problem with the 
assistance of  the Minorities Section, and either dismissed the charge as an unfounded 
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Council as a whole, or secured remedial action through informal negotiation with th"e accused 
state.  In the great majority of  the cases, the Committee began a dialogue with the government 
concerned, seeking additional information, and also often trying to obtain from the 
government agreement to reverse policies or actions, or to pay compensation for damages 
done.  Unofficial minutes of  the Minorities Committee meetings for the years 1923-1932 
indicate that only 35 per cent of  the complaints were disposed of  by a decision of  the 
Committee at its first meeting not to pursue the matter further (Veatch: 3  75).  Altogether, only 
fourteen minorities questions were referred to the Council by minorities committees, out of  a 
total of  about 325 taken up by the committees (Bagley:89-90).  In the case that the Minority 
Committee decided that the problem had to be dealt with by the Council, the Council 
examined the complaint in conjunction with a representative of  the state concerned which 
took a seat at the Council (according to article 4, paragraph 5 of  the Covenant).  Since the 
Council could not reach a decision without a concurring vote from the state, it was forced to 
achieve a settlement through compromise. 
Although the relationship between the states concerned and their minorities was 
internationalised by the international guarantee and thus was no longer a purely domestic 
affair, the minority protection procedure itself was essentially a political procedure, in which 
state sovereignty was scrupuously respected and safeguarded. 
The minorities did not possess locus standi before the Council.  Petitions submitted on their 
behalf, whether by individual minority members, minority organisations, or interested states, 
did not have the effect of  making either the minority or the particular petitioner party to the 
proceedings before the Council.  A petition merely brought to the attention of  the Council 
certain information concerning the treatment of  a minority.  It was for the Council to decide 
whether or not to pursue the matter.  Minorities were not permitted to appear before the 
Councilor the Permanent Court of  International Justice.  The League namely wanted to avoid 
confrontation between states and their minorities.  Granting locus standi to the minQrities, it 
was thought, would create the appearance of  a state within a state, and would only exacerbate 
the minorities states' sense of grievance regarding their sovereignty (Musgrave:45).  Once he 
had submitted his petition, the petitioner was left wholly out of  the procedure. 
The minorities committees were instituted to determine which cases merited being placed on 
the Council agenda.  Typically, at such committee meetings, the Director of  the Minorities 
Section recommended a specific course of action to the committee, for example that it close 
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certain actions to the government.  If  the committee agreed with the recommendations, as it 
usually did, it then authorised the Minorities Section to write on its behalf to the government 
concerned or to discuss the problem unofficially with the government's Geneva 
representative, to obtain additional information or policy statements.  As a result of  these 
discussions, some mutually acceptable solution to the problem would eventually evolve. 
Either the government would accept the Committee's view of  which actions were necessary, 
or the Committee, advised by the Minorities Section, would agree to settle for something less 
than initially seemed desirable because the government would go no further.  Respect for state 
sovereignty was even more accentuated when the question came before the full Council.  To 
avoid any indication that the petitionaries were parties in a case against the state concerned, 
the petitioner was not invited to take part in the discussions in the Council.  The Council's 
powers were in theory quite extensive.  These powers were, however, fundamentally altered 
by the right of  the state concerned to sit as a member of  the Council, with the right to vote, 
and by the unanimity rule.  Since there was no possibility of  adapting a decision which was 
unacceptable to that state, the process before the Council was one of  negotiation and pressure, 
and aimed at finding some mutually satisfactory solution, just at it had been at the committee 
stage.  In these negotiations and settlements, the Council not only occupied itself largely with 
extra-legal considerations but also limited its considerations largely to the government's side 
only.  Whenever it did settle a question, it couched its resolution in the most conciliatory 
terms and only rarely provided for any supervision of  the execution of  the settlement. 
Bagley defends this system, by arguing that the world of  the League of  Nations was a world 
of sovereign states, concerned about their independence.  The League was in no way a 
supranational authority.  The international minority protection system, the argument went on, 
had to adjust itself to the limits imposed by this political reality and pursue a policy of 
"limited objectives".  In his view, "The minorities' interests were better protected by the 
friendly Council-government co-operation, which led to voluntary and sincere compromise 
concessions on the part of  the governments, than by more perfect  judicially imposed solutions 
which would create bad  feeling and resentment on the part of  the government and probably 
for that reason not even be carried out.  There was no authority, moreover, which could 
prevent the government from taking subsequent steps of  reprisal against the minorities, which 
might in the long run cause them far more misery and suffering than that involved in the 
original complaint." (Bagley: 1  08). 
58 Minority rights and sovereignTy:  the repudiation of  the concept of  collectivity 
Regarding the nature of  the rights in the treaties, minorities themselves were not recognised as 
collective entities, as groups possessing legal personality (Bokatola (1992:50)).  The state 
representatives in Paris considered that the recognition of  minorities per se would have 
violated the concept of state sovereignty ('a state within a state') (Claude:20).  Most of  the 
treaty provisions contained individual rights, given specifically to members of  minorities. 
These were not group rights, given to minorities as groups or legal persons (Rouland, Pierre-
Caps and Poumarede (1996:191)). 
Evidently, the treaty drafters in Paris could not totally neglect the 'group dimension' of  the 
minority problem. 
Certain treaties and declarations contained references to agencies of  minority communities. 
For example, the Polish Minority Treaty stipulated that educational committees appointed 
locally by Jewish communities not only provided for the distribution of  the proportional share 
of  public funds allocated to Jewish schools but also for the organisation and management of 
these schools (article 10 of  the Polish minority treaty, repeated by article 7 of  the Lithuanian 
minority declaration).  But even by granting rights like the right to establish institutions and 
the right to receive sums provided out of  public funds, the treaties only envisaged "the 
arithmetical sum of  minority citizens and not the unity constituted by their collectivity" 
(Friedman (1927:133-134)). 
Real exceptions to the repudiation of  the concept of  collectivity were the provisions 
concerning proportional representation of  minorities in elective bodies contained in the 
treaties concluded in Sievres with Greece, Armenia and especially Turkey (Mandelstam 
(1925:436).  Also certain minorities were given autonomy.  The Szeklers and Saxons in 
Transylvania and the Vlachs of  Pindus in Greece were given local autonomy in religious and 
educational matters.  Also the Ruthenians in Czechoslovakia were guaranteed, at least in 
theory, a far-reaching autonomy (Jackson Preece (1998a:76-78).  In fact, Czechoslovakia 
wrote this autonomy in its constitution but ensured that this system was never implemented 
(Laponce (1960:40).  The treaty of Sievres with Turkey contained far-reaching provisions 
regarding territorial autonomy for those regions dominated by 'the Kurdish component' and 
for Smyrna (Mandelstam:438-439).  These were cases of  territorial autonomy.  Several 
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communities, were expressions of  personal autonomy.  The Greek treaty, the treaty with the 
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes and the Albanian declaration provided that family 
law applicable to Muslims had to be in accordance with traditional Muslim usage.  These 
states were further obliged to ensure the protection of  mosques, cemeteries, and other Muslim 
establishments.  Jennifer Jackson Preece notes that Muslims in fact formed a substantial 
majority (70 per cent) of  Albania's population.  No special provisions were however made for 
Christian communities (20 per cent Orthodox Christian and 10 per cent Roman Catholic) 
which were genuine minorities.  She speculates that those responsible for the Albanian 
minority declaration were ignorant of  the exact demographic composition of  this country 
(Jackson Preece (1998a:77-78).  The treaty concluded with Turkey in Sievres enabled the 
Greek and Armenian patriarchates to become real political communities (Mandelstam:440). 
The Treaty of  Sievres was imposed by the Allied powers on the Turkish sultan.  It was 
replaced by the Treaty of Lausanne, which guaranteed, again in theory, the non-Muslim 
communities in Turkey the same rights as those enjoyed by Muslims in Greece and 
Yugoslavia.  The earlier political element in the system of  autonomy was however eliminated 
(Mandelstam:442). 
A last expression of  the 'group dimension' was that minority groups could authorise 
associations to exercise the right of  petition (Sibert:498).  Already on 12 November 1921, the 
question of  the German minority in Poland was brought under the attention of  the League by 
the German association for the protection of  minorities in Poland.  As this right of  petition did 
however not confer locus standi on the petitioner, it cannot be said that it amounted to a 
recognition of group rights (Musgrave:44). 
In general, provisions concerning personal or cultural autonomy were very rare exceptions. 
Macartney terms the linguistic and scholastic provisions of  the treaties as 'very weak' 
(Macartney (1934:282).  The committee which had drafted the treaties, consisted mainly of 
members of  western majority nations (Galantai:46).  These took of course as their model the 
minorities of  which they had personal experience, such as the Welsh or the non-nationalist 
West-European Jews.  Most ofthe Western minorities in 1919 were small communities, 
economically, politically and socially less advanced than the majorities with whom they lived. 
According to Macartney, these people did not strive for a strongly differentiated, self-
contained national existence.  They naturally and willingly adopted the language and 
mentality of  the majorities.  The (Western) treaty drafters therefore considered it sufficient 
60 that the language of  the (Eastern) minorities was tolerated in their private life and that their 
children received their first instruction in a language which they understood and from which 
they could profit. 
The Western states departed from the principle that "a single national culture should  prevail 
in each state, and that the members of  minorities should be as fully subject to the will of  the 
political majority as members of  the national majority were also subject to it.  Any idea of 
giving the members of  minorities such a special organisation as would at all emancipate them 
from the general controle of  the state was repugnant to them.  The minorities must not be 
allowed to become a 'State within a State'  ( ...  )  The principle of 'cultural autonomy' ( ...  ) 
seemed to them dangerous, as creating such an external rival to the one legitimate authority 
of  the state.  Their own states had long since forgotten the medieval conceptions which 
recognised the national community as an intermediate link between the individual and the 
state, and they did not think any such link necessary, or indeed, desirable.  ( ...  )  Their whole 
work reveals the modern political conception under which the state exercises exclusive and 
direct control over the individuals composing it;  no such intermediate organisation as the 
national community was recognised to exist." (Macartney:283). 
Illustrative for this Western European attitude towards cultural autonomy was the 
memorandum of  the British Foreign Office of26 February 1929 in response to the demands 
of  the European Nationalities Congress.  In this document, the British Foreign Office argued 
that it had not been the aim of  the minority treaties to create "autonomous and alien political 
communities in the new states" whereby the minorities in these states would "remain 
permanently alooffrom and hostile to the new states to which they were assigned'. 'Such a 
situation would be created by a European-wide introduction and implementation of  cultural 
autonomy, modelled on the Estonian Law on Cultural Autonomy (Bamberger-Stemmann 
(2000:353-354». 
In general, the Allied Powers went out from the concept of  the indivisible state nation as it 
was formulated by the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau.  The nation consisted of 
the community of  all the citizens of  the sovereign state.  Only when all groups equally 
participated with the majority nation in the central state institutions, a strong national and 
democratic state could be built (Schot (1988: 18-19». 
61 In sum, the League's system established the primacy of  the West over the East.  First, 
minority supervision was not to have universal force, it was only to be directed towards the 
East.  Moreover, the Western model of  the unitary nation-state was now hailed as a panacea 
for the national question in Central and Eastern Europe.  This was the system within which 
the Baltic states would struggle to make their voices heard.  It is to this struggle that we now 
tum. 
62 Chapter three:  The Baltic minority declarations and Westphalian sovereignty 
The entrance of the Baltic states into the League of Nations 
Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia had proclaimed their independence on respectively 16 February 
1918,24 February 1918 and 18 November 1918 and sent delegations to the Peace Conference 
in Paris (Ruyssen (1923 :290-293)).  These delegations asked for recognition and urged that 
their countries be admitted to the future League of  Nations (Graham (1933: 9-11  and 51)). 
The Great Powers, however, hoped for the restoration of  a non-Bolshevik - but also 
democratic and federated Russia.  Especially the French wanted a restored Russia capable of 
resuming payment of  the large debt to the French government.  The Russian Political 
Conference, meeting in Paris on 9 March 1919, urged that a de  iure recognition had to be 
indefinitely postponed.  The definite status of  the Baltic states could only be determined after 
the restoration of a unified, indivisible and conservative Russia.  At the same time, the Baltic 
German Committee in Paris, purporting to represent the minorities in the Baltic states, 
claimed that 'agrarian radicalism' was already undermining the social order in Latvia 
(Bilmanis (1951 :317-318)).  The offensive to obtain recognition at the Peace Conference was 
unsuccesful.  Also the subsequent effort to obtain League membership from the Supreme 
Council of  the Allied forces failed (Graham (1933:11)). 
After the establishment of  the League, the Baltic states again applied for membership. 
The Estonian government applied for membership, respectively on 19 April and 8 September 
1920.  Estonia had only been recognised de iure by Bolshevik Russia, Finland and the 
Vatican.  Latvia submitted its first request on 14 May 1920 and its second on 26 October 
1920.  It had only been recognised de iure by Bolshevik Russia.  Lithuania applied for 
membership on 12 October 1920.  This state had been recognised de iure by Bolshevik Russia 
and Germany (Graham (1933:60-62; Schiicking and Wehberg:310-313). 
On 2 December 1920, Subcommittee Va of  the Fifth Committee of  the Assembly reported on 
these requests.  The report contained a brief factual background and mildly favourable 
observations regarding governmental stability, constitutional features, international intentions 
and armaments.  On the other hand, it was doubted whether states not recognised de iure by 
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Va, 233). 
In the Fifth Committee, which had taken up the report on 4 December 1920 and discussed it 
in its sixth and seventh session on 4 and 9 December 1920, speakers like Benes 
(Czechoslovakia), Lord Robert Cecil (South Africa), Van Kamebeek (the Netherlands) and 
Rowell (Canada) referred to the unstable situation of  these countries, resulting from the 
proximity of Soviet Russia.  But also the dangers of  an outright refusal were underlined 
(Actes de la premiere Assemblee, 185-189).  In the compromise that the Subcommittee Va 
had to find, the proposal of  Benes was accepted.  The Czech had already in the earlier meeting 
of  the Fifth Committee proposed to allow Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to participate in some 
of  the technical organisations of  the League in case of  non-admission.  The motion of  Van 
Kamebeek - formalising the view of Benes - was accepted by the Fifth Committee on 9 
December 1920 (Actes de la premiere Assemblee, Seances des Commissions, 238-240).  The 
Committee advised the Assembly to inform the Baltic states that they - together with 
Armenia and Georgia - could not be admitted at once into the League but could be permitted 
to appoint delegates to the technical organisations of  the League, and this on the ground "that 
the circumstances (were) such as to preclude the Assembly from arriving at a definite 
decision" . 
The recommendation of  the Committee was endorsed by the First Assembly in its session of 
16 December 1920.  The admission requests were rejected but Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
were permitted to participate in the work of  the technical organisations of  the League.  Some 
delegates argued that it was impossible for the League (members) to guarantee the territorial 
integrity of  these states against a possible attack from the Soviet state.  Exemplary is a 
fragment of  the speech of  the Swedish delegate Branting:  "Further, at this moment when the 
general situation is so confused, when neither Esthonia, Latvia nor Lithuania have as yet 
been recognised by any of  the Great Powers, it would be, for those states which desire to 
fulfill their engagements, a risk which we could not lightly incur,  to admit into the League of 
Nations states, which by their geographical situation are unfortunately open to attacks from a 
power whose intentions no one can measure, a power which perhaps one day will be 
transformed into a conquering power menacing the freedom of  Europe." (League of  Nations 
(1920:622)).  On the other hand, the representatives of  Colombia, Italy, Paraguay, Persia and 
64 Portugal argued that it was actually the task ofthe League to defend these states against a 
possible Soviet invasion. 
Neither the lack of  de  iure recogition nor the possibility of a Soviet attack were however the 
real reasons of  the refusal to admit the Baltic states into the League. 
Rita Peters argues that the real issue lay in the uncertain future of  Russia.  Great Powers like 
the United States and France still hoped for a restored Russia to re-emerge.  In the meantime, 
all decisions regarding the territories of  the (former) Russian empire had to be held in 
abeyance.  The American Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, observed that Woodrow 
Wilson's policy regarding the Russian empire reduced the self-determination principle to a 
"mere phrase" (Peters (1983: 130)).  Also Lilita Zemite indicates that the complete 
uncertainty of  what was going to happen in Russia, and, by extension, in the entire region, 
was the main reason why the great majority of states was not eager to admit the Baltic states: 
"Should the Russian Empire re-emerge, delegates said, the League of  Nations would  face a 
number of  very difficult problems of  having accepted territories from the former empire into 
its ranks." (Zemite (2002:8); in the same sense: Ruttenberg: 1 15; Zile (2001:368)). 
In this regard, it was not surprising that the proposal of Lord Robert Cecil in the 
Subcommittee Va of  admitting these states without giving them the collective defence 
guarantee of  article 10, was rejected (Peters (1983: 131 )). 
The Assembly thus left the door open for future membership once the overall situation in 
Eastern Europe had become clearer. 
The situation in the former Russian empire indeed changed.  The White Russian army was 
finally defeated.  The Western powers no longer insisted on the indivibility of  Russia.  After 
the recognition by the Supreme Council of  the Allied Powers in 1  anuary 1921, other countries 
followed suit and in August and September 1921, the Baltic states renewed their admission 
requests (Schlicking and Wehberg:311-313; 10 (1921 :984-988)).  On 22 September 1922, the 
Assembly of  the League voted in favour for their admission (League of  Nations (1921 :317-
320)).  That the former argument of  non-recognition was only a formal excuse, was proven by 
the fact that also Lithuania - which was not recognised by the Great Powers - was admitted 
into the League.  Because of  the particular problems surrounding the city of  Vilnius; the de 
iure recognition of Lithuania was delayed until 26 December 1922 (Meissner (1987:331 )). 
65 The Lithuanian minority declaration 
The negotiations between Lithuania and the Council soon led to an agreement between the 
two parties.  Consequently, the draft resolution which was proposed by Da Gama - Da Gama 
had succeeded Da Cunha as rapporteur on minority questions - in his report of 12 May 1922 
on the protection of  minorities in Lithuania (10 (1922:584-588)), was signed on the same day 
by the Lithuanian representative Sidzikauskas. 
The collaboration - or better, acquiescence - by Lithuania possibly related to the fact that at 
the same time, the Council also discussed the Polish-Lithuanian border dispute concerning the 
territory of  Vi Ina.  According to Samuel Friedman, the Lithuanian government simply could 
not risk a new conflict with the Council on the minority issue (Friedman:81). 
Like the earlier treaties, the Lithuanian minority declaration was clearly modelled on the 
Polish minority treaty, containing the same stipulations and the international guarantee. 
It is both interesting and revealing to compare the declaration with earlier proposals of  the 
Lithuanian government, the attitude of  the Council in that regard and to place it finally in the 
light of  the general minority protection system. 
The initial draft submitted to the Council by the Lithuanian government - a draft elaborated 
by the minister of  Jewish affairs, Soloveitchik and the minister of  Belarussian affairs, 
Semachko - went substantially further than the final declaration.  The Lithuanian draft 
contained provisions concerning the right to use minority languages in the parliament and in 
those institutions in the state, "where the minorities constituted a considerable proportion of 
the population" (article 5).  Further, the draft stipulated the right of  minority educational 
establishments to receive a ''proportional part of  the sums provided by the state budget" 
(article 4) instead of  the vague expression 'equitable part' as foreseen in the treaties. 
These explicit intentions of  the Lithuanian government were not only far-reaching regarding 
individual rights but - even more remarkable - also contrasted fundamentally with the general 
refusal of  the (Western) treaty drafters to insert clauses concerning personal or territorial 
autonomy in the treaties. 
The Council therefore made abstraction of  these explicit intentions of  the Lithuanian 
government and settled with much more limited obligations on the part of Lithuania.  The 
only article related to the 'group dimension' is article 7 of  the declaration (repeating article 10 
66 of  the Polish minority treaty).  This provision established the right of  educational committees 
appointed by the Jewish communities, to provide for the distribution of  funds allocated to 
Jewish schools and to organise and manage these schools. 
This not only illustrated the Council's view on the extent of  the international guarantee in 
general but also reflected the routine procedure - actually a kind of  mechanical process -
which governed the minority protection system (Friedman:8l). 
In this regard, reference can be made to the forementioned report of 12 May 1922, in which 
Da Gama stressed that the declaration should correspond as much as possible to the minority 
treaties (JO (1922:585)).  Da Gama took note of  the Lithuanian declaration, submitted at the 
Peace Conference, but nevertheless emphasised that the final minority declaration should only 
contain the same stipulations concerning the protection of  Jews as included in the Polish 
minority treaty (by way of  a letter of  30 December 1921, the Committee of  Jewish affairs had 
informed the Council about this declaration).  In his report, Da Gama simply recommended to 
adopt the relevant Polish stipulations, which were then inserted in the articles 7 and 8 of  the 
declaration. 
As mentioned above, the Lithuanian declaration was modelled on the Polish minority treaty. 
Contrary to the views of  Erdstein (Erdstein (1932:57) and Mandelstam (Mandelstam:450), 
they were however not identical.  As the short comparison of  Herbert Kraus (Kraus 
(1927: 125-126)) already demonstrates, they differed on the acquisition of  citizenship. 
The Polish minority treaty and the other treaties contain detailed stipulations regarding the 
acquisition of  citizenship and the right of  option.  Exactly these stipulations were however not 
enacted in the Lithuanian declaration.  The only 'citizenship article' (article 3), was only 
applicable to persons born within Lithuania subsequent to the date of  the declaration of 12 
May 1922.  Samuel Friedman argues that this restriction makes the provision 'absurd' 
because the citizenship question practically only mattered to persons born on Lithuanian 
territory before the date of  the declaration (Friedman: 118-119).  Another fundamental 
difference was that the declaration did not regulate in any way the acquisition of  citizenship 
and the right of  option.  It only requested the Lithuanian government to inform the Council of 
all constitutional and legislative stipulations regarding the acquisition of citizenship. 
The omission of  the right of  option was brought up by Askenazy, the Polish representative in 
a letter of 10 May 1922.  He argued that this right was granted to the Lithuanian people in 
67 Poland and that it therefore should also apply to the Polish population in Lithuania (10 
(1922:589)). 
At the subsequent meeting of  the Council meeting where these observations were discussed, 
the Lithuanian representatives, Sidzikauskas and Jonynas, replied that the option clause was 
already included in the peace treaty between Lithuania and Russia and that, consequently, this 
question could also be treated in the negotiations, leading to a general peace treaty between 
Lithuania and Poland.  Thereupon, the Council closed the discussion, expressing the hope that 
the two countries would sign such a treaty (10 (1922:524)). 
After the signature of  the declaration, the Council had decided that its stipulations would be 
placed under the guarantee of  the League from the date of  its ratification by the Lithuanian 
government.  In the same resolution of 15 May 1922, the Lithuanian government was also 
requested to inform the Secretary-General of  this ratification (JO (1922:536-537)). 
The Lithuanian government however constantly delayed the ratification of  this declaration by 
invoking several reasons like parliamentary recess, the dissolution of  the Seimas or the fact 
that it was discussing more urgent matters (Friedman:82; also report of  rapporteur Rio 
Branco, in JO (1923:1373)).  Evidently, the representative of  Poland, the eternal foe of 
Lithuania, brought this to the attention of  the Council by way of  a letter of  3 July 1923, 
stressing that "the Lithuanian declaration of  12 May 1922 was not yer ratified and that, 
consequently, the minority protection in Lithuania was not subjected to any international 
guarantee" (JO (1923:923)). 
Although the Council insisted on receiving notification ofthe ratification in order to inform 
the Fourth Assembly (10 (1923:1269-1270)), the Secretariat did not receive any official 
information.  Finally, on the Council meeting of 11  December 1923, the Lithuanian 
representative Galvanauskas informed the Council about the Resolution of  the Seimas 
'concerning the Declaration on the Rights of  Racial and Religious Minorities in Lithuania' of 
4 December 1923, according to which  "The Seimas, having been apprised by the Lithuanian 
declaration concerning the rights of  racial and religious minorities, takes note of  it and 
decides that,  in view of  Article 30 of  the Constitution, ratification is unnecessary.". 'Article 30 
ofthe Lithuanian Constitution read as follows: "The Seimas ratified the following State 
treaties concluded by the Government: peace treaties, treaties concerning the acquiring, 
relinguishing or ceding of  State territory, commercial treaties with other States, foreign 
loans,  treaties entirely or partially abrogating or modifYing existing legislation, treaties 
imposing obligations upon Lithuanian citizens, treaties involving monopoly rights,  direct or 
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considered that the declaration in question did not fall within the category of  those  . 
international acts for which the constitutional law requires ratification, and that the Lithuanian 
government alone was competent to bind Lithuania in the matter (10 (1924:332-333)). 
Interesting and relevant to note is that the Seimas resolution however was not undisputed. 
The Jewish, German and Polish members of  the Seimas and the Social-Democrats strongly 
objected to the said interpretation of  article 30 of  the Constitution, which, in their eyes, 
constituted a violation of  the Lithuanian obligations vis-a.-vis the League.  In the 
forementioned parliamentary session of  4 December 1923, this powerful group - they 
possessed half minus two of  the total amount of  seats - voted in favour of  the ratification and 
accused the government of  the intention of  taking restrictive measures against minorities in 
the future (Friedman:84). 
The members of  the Council did not discuss - let alone criticise - the decision of  the Seimas. 
They only took note of  the declaration ofthe Lithuanian representative, in which - together 
with the communication of  the decision of  the Seimas- the obligations of  Lithuania under the 
declaration of 12 May 1922 were confirmed.  A purely formal statement thus sufficed for the 
Council.  Only Lord Robert Cecil observed that all treaties which imposed obligations upon 
Lithuanian citizens had to be submitted for ratification to the Seimas.  However,  "since the 
Lithuanian Government, which had evidently undertaken a serious examination of  the 
question from the point of  view of  the Lithuanian Constitution, was of  opinion that the 
declaration in question did not require ratification", he did not object.  This was illustrative 
for the respect for state sovereignty. 
As a result, the Council took note of  the communication of  the Lithuanian representative and 
"(agreed) with the Lithuanian Government to regard this declaration as having come into 
force,  and (decided) that the provisions of  this declaration,  in so far as they affect persons 
belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, shall be placed under the guarantee of 
the League of  Nations" (this discussion in JO (1924:333)). 
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Already in the admission request of 1 September 1921, the Latvian foreign minister, 
Meierovics, underlined that minorities in Latvia already enjoyed the widest educational and 
religious autonomy and that this was in perfect harmony with the principles, embodied in the 
minority treaties (JO (1922:984-985)). 
On the eve of  the Council session of 11  January 1922 - where the question was discussed for 
the first time - the Latvian representative Walters submitted to the Secretary-General an 
extensive memorandum regarding minority protection in his country (JO (1922:248-252)).  In 
two following notes of 18 and 20 March 1922, Walters completed his earlier memorandum. 
In the first note, Walters made it clear to the Council that his government considered the 
question of  naturalisation as a matter which entirely belonged to the sovereignty of  the 
Latvian state.  Issues of  naturalisation could therefore not be subjected to the League.  The 
fact that certain treaties - placed under the control of  the League - contained stipulations 
about naturalisationjustified no intervention by the League.  According to Walters, the 
League was only an executive organ of  the states.  Only the states had concluded the relevant 
treaties.  The stipulations of  these treaties were not binding for non-signatory countries (JO 
(1922:479-481 )).  This note was only a forerunner for the one of 20 March 1922 which 
constituted a real political and legal attack against the minority protection system of  the 
League in general and, more specifically, the proposals of  the Council towards Latvia. 
Walters emphasised that both the Latvian constitution and the actual governmental policy 
ensured an absolute equality between the Latvian majority and persons, belonging to 
minorities.  Moreover, through those future measures like the right to create autonomous 
organisations of  public law, these minority groups would acquire a status which went beyond 
the principle of  equal treatment of  citizens prescribed.  Consequently, Walters concluded that 
minorities were better protected in Latvia than in most other countries. 
Walters further argued that the minority and peace treaties were not genuine international 
treaties because of  the lack of  reciprocity.  Unilateral declarations would violate even more 
this fundamental principle.  Since there were no universally recognised principles concerning 
minority protection, these declarations would also violate the principle of generality. 
While (the idea of) international co-operation was gaining ground, political realities however 
necessitated respect for national laws and national jurisdiction.  Walters observed that the 
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to judging only certain disputes between the members of  the League, leaving intact the 
sovereignty of  the states. 
Laws regarding the protection of  minorities were practically untouched by international 
regulation and the matter was treated very differently in different countries.  Given these 
circumstances, the argument went on, it would be unjust to impose on certain states, 
unilaterally and without any reciprocity on the part of  other member states, modifications of 
their domestic law, thereby infringing their sovereignty.  Such an imposition would make of 
such countries half-sovereign states, while the principle of  equality of states was one of  the 
pillars of  the League. 
Since the states retained full liberty in their national legislation under the Covenant and since 
there were no general principles regarding minority protection, Walters qualified the 
resolution of  the Assembly of 15 December 1920 as a simple request or wish.  In his view, the 
minority question could only be regulated by way of  reciprocal international treaties on civil 
and political rights for minorities or by way of a revision of  the Covenant of  the League 
through an amendment of  the Assembly.  Thereby, the Latvian representative reminded the 
Council that the argument of  reciprocity had already been put forward by the Federal Council 
of  the Helvetic Republic (note of  4 August 1919 with regard to the accession of Switzerland 
to the League ofNations).On the basis of  these arguments, Walters requested that the Council 
consider henceforth the protection of  minorities in Latvia as an internal matter and to 
formalise this by way of  a declaration, as the Council had done before with Finland (10 
(1922:481-483)). 
The question came up again on 12 May 1922.  Because of  the submission of  a new Latvian 
memorandum, the complexity of  the problem and the absence of  the reporter, it was 
adjourned to the next Council session (Erdstein:58). 
In a new memorandum of 11  May 1922 (10 (1922:733)), Walters not only returned to his 
former arguments but also analysed the stipulations of  the most important treaties.  The 
comparison of  these treaties with the legislation of  his country led him to conclude that the 
Latvian legislation was at least as far-reaching and liberal as the forementioned treaties. 
Walters further referred to the Warsaw Convention of  8 March 1922 (this Convention 
however never entered into force because Finland did not ratify this agreement) and observed 
that his country would always be willing to conclude a similar reciprocal agreement with 
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binding for every member of  the League. 
On the same session, Da Gama presented a preliminary report to the representatives of 
Estonia and Latvia.  Walters responded to this report - which was neither submitted to the 
members of  the Council nor made public - on 17 and 31  July 1922 and Pusta on 9 August 
1922.  Because these notes tried to refute the thesis of  Da Gama, one has a good insight into 
the argumentation put forward by the reporter.  The arguments of  Walters and Pusta did 
however not alter the views of  Da Gama.  On 1 September 1922, he produced practically the 
same report (on Estonia) with only a few modifications (Villecourt (1925:37)). 
In his letter of 17 July 1922 (10 (1922:1035-1036)), Walters pointed out a fundamental 
difference between Latvia and the signatories of  the treaties.  The latter had been directly 
affected by the Treaty of  Versailles with regard to the legal definition of  their frontiers and 
many other aspects of  public law.  Latvia, on the other hand, had not only autonomously 
gained its independence but had also been constituted without external legal influences.  The 
signatory states had accepted articles 86 and 93 of  the Treaty of  Versailles agreeing "to 
embody in a treaty with the Allied Powers such provisions as may be deemed necessary by the 
said Powers to protect the interests of  the inhabitants who differ from the mqjority of  the 
population in race,  language or religion".  The independence of Latvia, on the other hand, 
had been unconditionally recognised de iure by the Supreme Council of  the Allied Powers 
and afterwards by other countries.  Latvia had never signed a minority treaty and could 
therefore not be subjected to the same obligations as the signatory states.  In line with this 
argument, Walters emphasised that the Assembly - by its resolution of 15 December 1920 -
had not formulated an accession condition but only a request.  Latvia had accepted this 
request but this only implied a commitment to approach the Council in order to discuss the 
protection of  minorities and not to accept blindly whatever the Council proposed.  In Walters' 
view, the recommendation of  the Assembly was based on the principle that the rights of  the 
minorities must remain within the jurisdiction of  the state concerned.  It merely appealed to 
the goodwill of  the state to see that these rights are established.  The Assembly did not require 
the creation of  any international or supernational law regarding the protection of minorities 
and did not authorise the Council to draw up such laws.  Pending a universal minority 
protection system encompassing all countries, Latvia remained entirely sovereign in this 
matter. 
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could create indirectly for each state a right of  intervention in Latvia.  Even in the event of  the 
League ceasing to exist, minority rights, declared as obligations of  international concern, 
would - like the right of  intervention - continue to exist. 
In his subsequent letter of  31  July 1922, Walters argued that the instruction of  minorities in 
their own language is the most objective and pertinent criterion to measure the liberal nature 
of  the minority protection system of a country and submitted in that regard official statistics 
about the secondary schools in Latvia.  He further contended that any further demands upon 
the Latvian people were apt to weaken the unity of  the Latvian state and encourage 
denationalising influences which the Latvian people would not tolerate (10 (1922: 1  092-
1094».  Meanwhile, Walters had also launched a campaign for generalisation of  minority 
rights in the Assembly. 
On 3 July 1922, the report to the Third Assembly on the work of  the Council and on the 
measures taken to execute the decisions of  the Assembly was filed.  Chapter 9 of  this report 
concerned the protection of  minorities.  At the fourth plenary meeting on 5 September 1922, 
Professor Gilbert Murray of South Africa stated that the questions dealt with in sections A, B, 
C and D of  chapter 9 be referred to a Committee of  the Assembly with a request to report 
back (Records of  the Third Assembly (1922:37-38».  On the following day, at the fifth 
plenary meeting Walters made a proposal which enlarged the scope of  the preceding one: 
"That the questions dealt with in Chapter 9, Sections A,  B,  C and D of  the General Report to 
the Assembly on the Work of  the Council, as well as the general questions arising out of  the 
protection of  minorities for all the members of  the League of  Nations,  be referred to a 
Committee of  the Assembly, with the request to report thereon to the Assembly in order that 
the latter may have the opportunity of  expressing its considered view on these questions, and 
of  laying down the main lines for the general protection of  minorities in the state members of 
the League of  Nations." (Records of  the Third Assembly (1922:48».  Both motions were 
referred to the Sixth Committee, which discussed the minority question at five meetings.  The 
Committee asked both Professor Murray and Walters to take part in its discussions. 
Walters asserted that "the absence of  provisions concerning the rights of  minorities 
constituted one of  the defects of  the Covenant" and challenged the Committee to "turn its 
attention to discovering what were, at present, the positive rights of  minorities, and,  these 
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principles governing the protection of  minorities which might be politically and  practically 
realisable.".  He went on to explain Latvia's position on the question of  the present 
intemationallaw foundations for the protection of  minorities and its determination to establish 
a system of  general protection based on reciprocity (" Without such reciprocity a second class 
of  States could eventually be created, in contradiction to the spirit of  the Covenant. "). 
Walters concluded on a mildly defiant note:  "In view of  the foregoing considerations, and, 
further,  in view of  the fact that the negotiations with the Council are not completed and that 
the Committee can only discuss the work of  the Council and cannot, of  course, enter. upon the 
legislative domain reserved in the present case for the sovereignty of  the Latvian state, the 
Latvian delegation declares that,  as regards minorities in Latvia, it refuses to regard itself  as 
bound by any decision or opinion which the Committee may express in the matter so long as 
such opinions or decisions are not  founded upon the Covenant of  the League of  Nations. 
Subject to this single reservation, the Latvian delegation, which urgently desires a just and 
universally applicable solution of  the minorities question, will assist with all of  its resources 
and all its goodwill in the task of  the Committee." (Records of  the Third Assembly, committee 
meetings, (1922: 11)). 
Professor Murray agreed with Walters that an exhaustive discussion of  the minorities question 
was desirable but stressed that Latvia was bound by a formal declaration in this field.  He was 
surprised that Latvia regarded itself free from any engagement until a general conference had 
been held or the Covenant amended.  His own five draft resolutions aimed at the 
establishment of good relations between minorities and their governments (Report to be 
presented to the Assembly by the Sixth Committee (A83.1922.I:2)). 
During the subsequent discussions in the Sixth Committee, representatives of  the states bound 
by the treaties were generally sliding with Walters' push for generalisation.  On the other 
hand, the unaffected states preferred Professor Murray's harmless tinkering with the status 
quo. 
The Finnish delegate proposed that the Assembly should request the Council to appoint a 
committee to investigate the question of  the protection of  minorities in general and to submit a 
report to the next Assembly.  This proposal was supported by the Estonian delegate, but was 
withdrawn owing to the consideration that the resolutions already adopted by the Committee 
already provided for a searching inquiry by the Council and the Secretariat into minorities 
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expenses (A83.1922.I:3; Toynbee (1925:213-220)). 
The Committee subsequently adopted several declarations.  Amongst others it expressed "the 
hope that the States which were not bound by any legal obligations to the League with respect 
to minorities will nevertheless observe in the treatment of  their own racial, religious or 
linguistic minorities at least as high a standard of  justice and toleration as is required by any 
of  the Treaties and by the regular action of  the Council". 
After some discussion, the Assembly passed all the (five) resolutions on 21  September 1922 
(League of  Nations (1922: 170-186)). 
Professor Murray noted that these resolutions - and more specifically the forementioned 
resolution - represented the farthest the Sixth Committee could go towards generalisation, and 
that he could only hope that the Great Powers would even be willing to go that far (League of 
Nations (1922:11-12 and 61)). 
Michallovitch observed that Estonia and Latvia fully understood the limited bearing 
(,'platonic value") of  the resolution, and that they, consequently, did not change their stance in 
the negotiations (Michallovitch: 144). 
On 26 September 1922, Da Gama submitted to the Council his report on the protection of 
minorities in Latvia (10 (1922: 1419-1424)).  In his view, Latvia should sign a declaration 
"whose content would as much as possible conform to the Minority Treaties and whose text is 
identical to the one of  the declaration accepted by Lithuania", with the exception of  the 
articles 7 and 8 regarding the Jewish population in Lithuania.  Da Gama argued that there was 
no need to treat the question of  a general minority protection system,  Through the declaration 
of 14 September 1921, the Latvian government had placed itself in the same position as the 
signatory states.  Only the exact extent and the details regarding the application of  the 
international obligations therefore had to be clarified.  That the existing legislation in Latvia 
corresponded to the principles contained in the treaties was in his view an additional argument 
to sign such a declaration.  It would not pose any problem to insert already existing (national) 
stipulations in a formal declaration. 
Zigurds Zile correctly observes that Da Gama failed to exploit a major chink in Walters's 
defence.  In his memorandum of 10 May 1922, Walters had namely argued that the draft of 
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whole second part of  the draft - containing several articles directly adressing the interests of 
minorities - had, however, been rejected by the Constituent Assembly.  The result was that 
the final constitution was a truncated document, certainly compared to the Estonian 
constitution of 1920 (Zile (1980: 11  and 19)). 
Pending an official response of  the Latvian government, Walters gave his personal view in a 
note of 15 November 1922 to Da Gama (J 0  (1923: 111-112)), "tearing into the supranational 
pretensions implicit in the articles 1 and 9 o/the Draft Declaration" (Zile (1980:20)), as 
included in Da Gama's report.  Article 1 of  the draft - which recognised the stipulations of  the 
declaration as fundamental laws of  Latvia - in Walters' view clearly constituted a violation of 
the Latvian constitution which subjected each new fundamental law to a defined procedure, 
prescribing, among other things, a discussion in three readings and the acceptance by a 
majority of  at least two thirds ofthe members of  the Latvian parliament.  The international 
guarantee stipulated in article 9 of  the draft restricted even more the powers of  the sovereign 
Latvian people to establish and to modify its constitution.  Walters argued that a second 
supreme organ next to the Latvian people was created, an organ not foreseen by the 
constitution.  Procedural arguments, again strongly related to the issue of  sovereignty, thus 
complemented the former discussion regarding the principles of  the minority protection 
system of  the League.  Walters also wrote that his own observations were not meant to 
encroach in any way upon the decision which the Latvian government might take as a result 
ofDa Gama's report.  This was a veiled threat that, if  badgered, Latvia would withdraw from 
the search for an acceptable compromise. 
In a cable of22 January 1923, Meierovics informed the Secretary-General of  the League that 
the then Latvian government had resigned and that, consequently, no decision regarding Da 
Gama's draft declaration could be taken.  He asked the Council to put off  the further 
discussion of  matter of  minorities in Latvia until a new government had been formed.  Da 
Gama placed this request before the Council on 30 January 1923, and the Council postponed 
the examination of  this question to the next session (JO (1923:277-278)).  While the 
negotiations had resumed after the formation of  the successor government, they had failed to 
produce anything substantial by the April meeting of  the Council.  In March 1923, Walters 
suggested to the Minorities Section that the question of  the interpretation of  the Assembly 
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(Peters (1988:288». 
Meanwhile, the representative of  Great Britain, Lord Balfour, had proposed to bring the case 
of  Estonia before the Assembly in the event of  an agreement not being reached.  This had a 
considerable influence on the negotiations with Latvia which evidently recoiled from having 
its 'case' also being brought before the Assembly. 
At the meeting of  the Council held on 7 July 1923, Walters made the following statement: 
"Considering that the regulation of  the question of  minorities in Latvia must take into account 
the constitution and sovereign rights of  the Latvian State, as well as of  its social necessities, 
and in view of  the fact,  as I have already explained to the Council in my various memoranda, 
that Latvia has of  its own free will taken adequate measures to protect its minorities, and 
further,  in view of  the fact that different aspects of  the question of  protection of  the minorities 
in Latvia are still being examined by the Latvian Government, I have the honour to propose 
that the negotiations between the Latvian Government and the Council of  the League should 
now be terminated.  The Council will,  nevertheless, have the right to take up the question 
anew and to reopen the negotiations if  the situation of  the minorities in Latvia does not 
appear to it to correspond to the general principles laid down in the various so-called 
Minorities Treaties.  The Latvian Government can on its side also demand that negotiations 
should be reopened.  Ifurther propose that those petitions which may from this date be 
adressed to the League of  Nations concerning the situation of  persons  belonging to racial, 
linguistic or religious minorities in Latvia be transmitted to the Latvian Government for its 
observations.  It is obvious that the Secretariat of  the League of  Nations will be careful to put 
aside those petitions who come from anonymous or unauthenticated sources, or which are 
couched in violent language.  Petitions which are recognised as being admissible, together 
with such observations as the Latvian Government may desire to prevent, will be 
communicatedfor information by the Secretary-General to the Members of  the Council. 
The Latvian Government accepts in principle from this date the obligations to furnish the 
Council with any information which it may desire,  should one of  its Members bring before it 
any question relating to the situation of  persons belonging to racial, linguistic or religious 
minorities in Latvia. 
In case of  a difference of  opinion on questions of  law or of  fact concerning the present 
declaration, the Latvian Government reserves the right to aks that differences of  opinion be 
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clearly understood that the Council will also have the right to ask  for the question to be 
referred to the Court." (League of  Nations (1927:32)). 
As Walters reserved the proposal for the approval of  this government, the Council adopted on 
7 July 1923 the following resolution: 
"The Council of  the League of  Nations takes note of  the declaration made by the 
representative of  Latvia and is ready to accept the proposals contained therein, provided that 
the Latvian Government informs it before the next session of  the Council that it approves the 
declaration of  its representative. 
The Secretary-General shall communicate this decision to the Assembly of  the League of 
Nations for its information." (JO (1923:933)). 
In a telegram of  28 July 1923, the Latvian government declared that it approved the statement 
made by its representative Walters.  Thereupon, the Council adopted on 1 September 1923 the 
following resolution:  "The Council of  the League of  Nations takes note of  the approval of  the 
Latvian government of  the declaration made by the Latvian representative to the Council on 7 
July 1923 regarding the protection of  minorities in that country." (JO (1923: 1275)). 
The history of the adoption of the Estonian minority declaration 
The Estonian representative, Pusta, also started the actual negotiations with an informative 
note regarding the minority protection in his country.  He emphasised that already shortly 
after its independence, Estonia had freely established a minority protection system without 
external conditions.  The Estonian delegation had therefore spontanenously accepted the 
resolution of 15 December 1920.  Consequently, Estonia did not need to be subjected to 
special minority obligations (JO (1922:483-485)). 
In response to Da Gama's preliminary report of  May 1922, Pusta underlined that the 
resolution of 15 December 1920 constituted nothing more than a request to the states 
concerned to take all the necessary measures to ensure the protection of  minorities in their 
countries.  In that regard, Estonia differed from other countries because the number of  persons 
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resolution was formulated.  Thus, it was sufficient as in the case of  Finland that the Council 
took note of  the Estonian legislation, all the more so because the constitutional guarantees in 
Estonia went further than those of  the minority and peace treaties. 
Pusta argued further that those treaties were either imposed on defeated powers or constituted 
the charter of  recognition of  new or territorially enlarged states (like Rumania and the State of 
Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia).  Estonia, on the other hand, had gained its independence 
without external aid.  Afterwards, the Great Powers had neither fixed its boundaries nor 
linked its recognition with certain conditions. 
Pusta also observed that Estonia had freely adopted constitutional minority guarantees.  A 
declaration placing the Estonian constitution under the guarantee of  the League, could, in his 
view, not be approved without the consultation of  the Estonian people.  The Estonian 
constitution namely recognised only "general principles of  international law which were 
universally recognised' as part of  the Estonian legal order, and such principles did not yet 
exist in the field of  minority protection. 
Pusta continued with a critical discussion of several articles of  the proposed declaration. 
Article 1 of  the declaration required the recognition of  its stipulations as fundamental laws of 
Estonia.  The acceptance of  that provision required, in Pusta's view, a revision of  the 
Constitution.  This could only be done by way of  a plebiscite and not through a mere 
declaration of  the government.  The Estonian representative further stressed that article 6 of 
the declaration - which, in his view, foresaw financial assistance to religious minority 
organisations - violated the constitutional principle of  separation between church and state. 
According to this principle, the state could never provide such institutions with financial 
assistance (JO (1922:1235-1236)). 
In his report of 1 September 1922, reporter Da Gama argued that the declaration of 13 
September 1921 implied an acceptance by Estonia to adopt stipulations in conformity with 
those of  the peace and minority treaties.  Since Albania and Lithuania had also committed 
themselves to similar obligations as the signatory states, Da Gama insisted that Estonia should 
also sign a declaration "whose content had to conform as much as possible to the 
fore  mentioned treaties" and whose text had to be identical to the one earlier signed by 
Lithuania (with the exception of  the articles 7 and 8 regarding the Jewish population in 
Lithuania) (JO (1922: 1231-1234)).  In order to enable the Council members to take note ofDa 
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(10 (1922: 1174)). 
The discussion was launched again at a private Council session of  20 September 1922.  In a 
new report (10 (1922:1237-1238)), Da Gama again argued that the Estonian declaration of 13 
September 1921 was meant to define the international obligations of  Estonia in the field of 
minority protection, and not to conclude whether the internal legislation of  Estonia provided 
an adequate treatment for minorities.  In his view, the said declaration was clearly connected 
with the minority treaties because it referred to the resolution of  the Assembly of 15 
December 1920, which expressly had mentioned these treaties.  The Estonian government had 
thereby agreed to apply the principles of  these treaties and it was on that basis that the 
negotiations had to be pursued.  To Pusta's observations regarding the relationship between 
the Estonian constitution and the international guarantee, Da Gama replied that only the 
stipulations of  the declaration, and not the Estonian constitution, would be placed under the 
League's guarantee.  With regard to Pusta's reference to Finland, Da Gama replied that 
Finland had not signed a similar declaration as Estonia had done on 13  September 1921  and 
also that it was not perceived as a new state.  Moreover, Finland had accepted the League's 
guarantee for the minorities living on the Aland Islands.  To Pusta's observations that the 
acceptance of  the declaration required a plebiscite, Da Gama simply replied that the Council 
would welcome all suggestions made by the Estonian government in order to ensure the 
compliance of  the declaration with the Estonian constitution.  With regard to the principle of 
separation between church and state, Da Gama stated that the relevant provision (article 6) did 
not foresee any financial assistance to minority institutions, with the exception of  the case 
where such funds were provided for institutions of  the population in general. 
At the private Council meeting, Pusta reiterated that the resolution of 15 December 1920 
formulated only a request and did not institute an obligation.  He reminded the members of 
the Council of  the discussions in the Fifth Committee of  the First Assembly.  During these 
discussions, Lord Robert Cecil had argued that a distinction had to be made between states 
born out of  the dismemberment of  the Austrian-Hungarian empire and states -like Estonia-
which had acquired their independence without external aid.  The Estonian representative 
again underlined the similarity between the Estonian and the Finnish situation and claimed for 
his country the same legal regime.  More specifically, he insisted that the Council would take 
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15 December 1920. 
At the Council session of2 February 1923, Rapporteur Da Gama admitted that the 
stipulations of  the Estonian constitution were far more liberal and detailed than the minority 
treaties.  He therefore envisaged the possibility that the Council might subscribe to the view 
of  the Estonian representative and "take note of  the stipulations contained in The Estonian 
constitution, chapter IL  articles 6 to 26,  to the extent where the stipulations of  these articles 
affect persons belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities".  On the other hand, he 
insisted that it was necessary to define the legal extent and nature of  such a declaration and to 
ensure that the relevant guarantees were permanently assured.  That is why in his view, the 
League had to be given the right of  intervention in the case that modification proposals would 
prejudice minorities (10 (1923:379-382)). 
Pusta agreed that in the event of  a deterioration of  the situation of  the minorities, the Council 
should have the right to take up the question again.  On the other hand, he strongly opposed a 
declaration which would give the Council an outward intervention right in case of  an 
infringement of  the minority protection clauses (10 (1923:382-383) and 10 (1923:233-234)). 
The scholar Mair noted that this argument was not logical.  Pusta admitted the possibility of 
intervention by the League, with no treaty or declaration to justify it, in the same breath with 
the refusal to grant the same right by a formal declaration.  Moreover, as also rapporteur Da 
Gama observed (10 (1923:380)), this would give the Council no power to act if  the Estonian 
Constitution was not modified but merely disregarded (Mair (1928:54)). 
At this session, the British representative Lord Balfour, the Secretary-General and Colban, 
Director of  the Minorities Section, stressed that Estonia and Finland were different cases. 
Rapporteur Adatci observed that a special treatment of  Estonia would discriminate the treaty 
states and create a dangerous precedent.  The Council President noted that the present 
situation would put the Council in a very difficult situation in case of  a petition.  The Council 
was obliged not to accept such petitions in order not to violate 'the national dignity' of 
Estonia.  In case the Council would accept such a petition, the Estonian government would 
reject it because it violated its national sovereignty.  Consequently, he demanded to refer this 
fundamental question to the Assembly.  The discussion was indeed closed by the proposal of 
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the reporter should not arrive at an agreement (10 (1923:233-234». 
As mentioned above, this proposal led to a breakthrough in the negotiations between the 
Council and Latvia.  The resulting agreement in its turn influenced the negotiations between 
the Council and Estonia.  As a result of  the resolution of2 February 1923, which was 
confirmed by the Council in July 1923 (JO (1923 :881 », the question was enscribed on the last 
session of  the Council, just before it would be treated in the Assembly. 
Just before the discussion in the Council on 31  August 1923, Pusta explained for the last time 
his government's view on the obligations of  Estonia vis-a.-vis the League and the kind of 
agreement that had to be reached. 
In his view, the adherence to the demand of  the Assembly of 15 December 1920 through the 
declaration of 13  September 1921  solely obliged Estonia to take the necessary measures to 
ensure the application of  the general principles embedded in the minority treaties and to reach 
an agreement with the Council on the details of  that application. 
The Estonian representative noted that the Estonian constitutional and other legal provisions 
went further than the minority guarantees of  the peace and minority treaties.  He further 
argued that Estonia was under no legal obligation to sign a declaration, modelled on the 
minority treaties.  The imposition of  national minority guarantees by the Great Powers upon 
new or territorially enlarged states was state practice and indeed a 'principle of  public law'. 
Such impositions were, however, the exception to the rule.  According to Pusta, the basic rule 
in public international law was that each state freely determines the rights and obligations of 
minorities.  Pusta reminded the members of  the Council that Estonia was not born out of  any 
treaty and had acquired its independence without aid of  the Great Powers.  Consequently, the 
commitments of  Estonia vis-a-vis the League were the same as those of other (non-signatory) 
states in the light of  the resolution of  21  September 1922 in which the Assembly expressed 
the hope that:  "the states which are not bound by any legal obligation concerning minorities, 
nevertheless respect in the treatment of  their racial, religious or linguistic minorities, at least, 
the same degree of  justice and tolerance as required by the treaties and actions of  the 
Council" (article 4). 
Given a possible treatment of  the question by the Assembly, the Estonian government was 
however anxious to reach an agreement.  Although in the last part of  his memorandum (JO 
(1923:1361-1373», Pusta again underlined the similarity between Estonia and Finland, he 
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why the Estonian government finally was willing to reserve the League of  Nations the right to 
take up the question in the event of  a deterioration of  the situation of  the minorities in Estonia. 
At the Council session of  31  August 1923, a procedure was established whereby Pusta 
together with the new rapporteur De Rio-Branco, and the representatives of France, Great-
Britain and Sweden, would examine whether the propositions in the memorandum of  28 
August 1923 could not be modelled on the declaration made by the Latvian government on 17 
July 1923 (JO (1923:1269)). 
As a result of  these discussions, on 18 September 1923, rapporteur De Rio Branco made the 
following statement: 
"In conformity with the decision taken at the meeting of  the Council on August 31st,  the 
Estonian representative considered, in collaboration with certain members of  the Council, 
viz.,  the representatives of  France,  British Empire, Sweden and the reporter, the proposals 
contained in the memorandum of  the Estonian representative dated August 28th.  1923. 
Following upon these observations, Mr.  Pusta asked his government for fresh instructions. 
Later I again discussed the question with Mr.  Pusta, and I now have the honour to submit to 
you the following draft resolution, to which will be annexed a declaration which Mr.  Pusta 
proposes to make before the Council. 
The resolution reads as follows: 
I  The Council of  the League of  Nations notes the information on the status of  racial, 
linguistic and religious minorities in Estonia, which has been furnished by the 
Estonian representative in his report of  August 28th,  1923, in accordance with which 
the protection of  minorities is at present guaranteed under the Estonian Constitution 
in a manner which conforms to the general principle governing the protection of 
minorities. 
II  The Council will be entitled to consider afresh the status of  minorities in Estonia, 
should the latter cease to enforce those general principles, according to the 
recommendations of  the Assembly of  the League of  Nations, dated December 15th, 
1920.  For this purpose the Council may request the Estonian Government to supply it 
with the information which it may require on any question regarding the conditions of 
persons belonging to racial, linguistic or religious minorities which may be submitted 
to it by one of  its Members. 
83 III  In the event of  any difference of  opinion on questions of  law or of  fact in regard to this 
resolution, such difference of  opinion may be referred to the Permanent Court of 
International Justice for an advisory opinion. 
IV  This resolution shall be communicated  for the information of  the Assembly. " 
Pusta made the following declaration: 
"I have the honour, on behalf  of  my Government, to accept the text of  the resolution, 
submitted to the Council, regarding the protection of  minorities in Estonia. 
It is understood that the Council will not ask the Estonian Government for information 
regarding the conditions of  persons belonging to racial, linguistic or religious minorities, 
unless the question has been submitted to the Council by one of  its Members. 
Furthermore, the Estonian Government desires to make it clear that any information 
forwarded to the League of  Nations must,  in the first instance, be communicated to it by the 
Secretariat, except in the case of  any communication couched in violent terms or emanating 
from an anonymous or unauthenticated source (especially if  there is reason to suppose that 
these communications come from a country other than Estonia).  In such cases they must 
simply be disregarded by the Secretariat.  Only those communications which are recognised 
as acceptable, together with any observations which the Estonian Government may consider 
it desirable to make,  will be forwarded  for the information of  the Members of  the Council.  In 
addition, it must be clearly understood that this Declaration forms,  together with the 
resolution submitted to the Council, an indivisible whole which must not,  however, be 
regarded as constituting a Minorities Treaty.". 
Illustratively, this declaration - which accepted the rapporteur's resolution - stressed the 
rights and prerogatives of  the Estonian government more than those of  the Council. 
Thereupon, De Rio Branco proposed the Council to adopt this resolution, to take note of  the 
declaration ofPusta and to accept the proposals contained therein.  The rapporteur's proposals 
were adopted and the negotiations finally closed (10 (1923:1311-1312)). 
84 Analysis of the arguments put forward in the negotiations and evaluation of the 
Estonian and Latvian minority declarations 
1.  On the one hand, both Pusta and Walters maintained that their countries had to be 
subjected to the same international legal regime as Finland because of  their putatively similar 
situation.  On the other hand, they also continously stressed that their countries differed 
fundamentally from the treaty states. 
On the request of  Lord Robert Cecil, the Finnish representative, Enckell, had declared in a 
letter that the stipulations concerning the religious, racial and linguistic minorities in Finland 
conformed to the principles of  the minority treaties.  He also committed himself to intervene 
before his government in the event that "the Council, after a thorough examination of  the 
relevant Finnish laws,  would conclude that these laws differed from the forementioned 
principles" (Erdstein:53). 
The rapporteur of  the Fifth Committee concluded that Finland had fulfilled all the necessary 
conditions.  Already on 20 November 1920, the Secretary-General informed the Finnish 
representative on the admission of  his country into the League.  He notified the Finnish 
representative of  the request of  the Assembly and asked him whether he wanted to present 
observations in that regard.  By way of  an oral declaration, the Finnish representative 
committed himself before the Assembly to modify, if  necessary, the laws concerning minority 
protection. 
After its admission into the League of  Nations, Finland had to inform the Council about the 
treatment of  its minorities and this in the light of  the Assembly resolution.  The commitments 
of  Finland in the field of  minority protection were related to the territorial rights for the 
inhabitants of  the Aland Islands and the protection of  Finnish citizens belonging to minorities 
in Finland.  On 16 and 28 June 1921, Enckell submitted to the Secretary-General a 
memorandum and several documents on the constitutional and legislative protection of 
minorities in his country.  The Council charged the representative of Great-Britain, Fischer, 
with the study of  these documents.  In his report, Fischer concluded that the Finnish laws 
were in accordance with the relevant stipulations of  the treaties and further proposed "to take 
note of  the informations that had been submitted to him about the situation of  the minorities in 
Finland'.  The proposed resolution of  Fischer was adopted by the Council without discussion 
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Assembly.  With regard to the Aland Islands, Finland signed a detailed agreement through 
which the inhabitants were granted territorial autonomy.  This regulation was adopted by the 
Council on 27 June 1921  (10 (1921:1165-1165)). 
Leaving aside the regime of  the Aland Islands - which was indeed placed under the 
international guarantee of  the League - Finland thus maintained a wide-ranging independence 
in the field of  minority protection.  There was neither question of  minority stipulations nor of 
an international guarantee. 
The members of  the Council namely considered Finland as a special case, as an 'old friend' 
whom they could trust.  Finland simply was not perceived by the Great Powers as a new 
(unpredictable) state.  This argument was for example used by rapporteur Da Gama in his 
report on Estonia, submitted to the Council in its session of  20 September 1922:  "(  ...  ) II faut 
aussi se rappeler que la Finlande n 'etait pas un fitat nouveau." (10 (1922: 1237)). 
But, on the other hand, Poland was not a new state either.  Thus, in the light of  what is 
explained above, it could well be argued that Finland was treated differently because it is a 
Northern European and not an Eastern European state. 
2.  The representatives of  the Great Powers observed that the policy of  minority protection 
went back to the Congress of  Berlin (10 (1923:1269)) and that all the new states had to 
treated equally.  In their view, an exceptional treatment of  the Baltic states would create a 
dangerous precedent (10 (1923:233)). 
Walters and Pusta replied that their states were not born out of  the peace and minority treaties 
and that they had acquired their independence without external help.  Pusta stressed that in 
contrast with the 'treaty states', which had been forced to insert minority clauses in their 
constitutions, Estonia had freely adopted a constitution with far-reaching minority clauses. 
The two representatives further emphasised that their states were unconditionally recognised 
de iure by the Supreme Council of  the Allied Forces, long after their establishment as new 
states, and long after their frontiers had been fixed. 
These were indeed strong arguments.  As Macartney notes, this unconditional recognition 
contradicted the famous Clemenceau letter (Macartney:288).  In this regard, in the earlier 
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Lord Robert Cecil as an additional barrier to membership.  In his view, the Great Powers had 
to refuse to recognise the Baltic states until they had given minority guarantees:  "Why could 
not the Powers decline to give recognition de iure to the new Governments until those 
Governments entered into some such obligations as those referred to in the motion." (Actes 
de la premiere Assembh~e, seances des commissions:203).  This is also Samuel Friedman's 
view (Friedman:72). 
3.  Very important was the interpretation of  the resolution of  the Assembly of 15 December 
1920 and their declarations of 13 and 14 September 1921. 
In the negotiations, the rapporteurs noted that the representatives of  the Baltic states had 
signed declarations.  By this, they had accepted the resolution of  the Assembly of 15 
December 1920 and had placed themselves in the same position as the treaty states. 
Evidently, these declarations constituted international obligations for the Baltic states.  In the 
reports of  the Fifth Committee on the admission of  the Baltic states, each of  the five 
admission conditions were discussed.  With regard to the last condition, namely the question 
with regard to the acts and declarations of  the government concerned with regard to its 
international obligations, reference was made to the resolution of 15 December 1920 and to 
the resolutions of 13 and 14 September 1921  (League of  Nations (1921 :334-340)).  The strict 
observation or promise of  observation of  the resolution of 15 December 1920 was thus 
undeniably an admission condition. 
Crucially, therefore, is the extent of  the international obligations of  Estonia and Latvia, 
resulting from the declarations of 13 and 14 September 1921:  "The Estonian/Latvian/ 
Lithuanian Government declares its willing adhesion to the request expressed by the 
Assembly of  the League of  Nations on December 15th, 1920, and is prepared to enter into 
negotiations with the Council of  the League of  Nations for the purpose of  determining the 
scope and details of  the application of  its international obligations for the Protection of 
Minorities. ". 
According to the rappOlieurs and the Secretariat, the declarations obliged Estonia and Latvia 
to adopt the minority clauses contained in the treaties.  On the other hand, Walters and Pusta 
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in order to discuss the protection of  minorities in their countries and to search together for an 
agreement. 
As Villecourt indicates, a literal reading of  these declarations supports the thesis of  Pusta and 
Walters (Villecourt: 1  00).  According to the latter, there were no general international 
obligations in the field of  minority protection.  Furthermore, the minority stipulations in the 
treaties were only binding for the signatory states.  This thesis is sustained by Alfred 
Verdross.  In his view, the minority protection system never became a part of  general public 
international law, because only the treaty states were obliged to give their minorities certain 
rights (Verdross (1955:479». 
In connection with this, the Estonian and Latvian representative pleaded for a general 
minority protection system that would encompass all countries.  They made it very clear that, 
pending such a regime, they remained entirely sovereign in this matter.  This argument of  the 
equality of  the states was a very strong argument from a legal point of  view.  This was 
probably the most decisive argument with which Pusta and Walters rebuffed the Council (this 
plea was also sustained by Mandelstam:452).  Therefore, I cannot agree with Henn-JUri 
Uibopuu who writes that, when the Baltic states applied for membership of  the League, they 
were asked to make provisions for the protection of  minorities contained in the Treaties of 
1919-1920:  "They subsequently adopted the required declarations, which guaranteed the 
presence of  representatives of  minorities in their legislative bodies.  Estonia and Lithuania 
incorporated the relevant provisions in their Constitutions." (Uibopuu (1992: 1  09». 
Contrary to Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia refused to accept the proposed declarations with the 
therein contained minority stipulations of  the treaties.  Estonia - which had already 
established an elaborated constitutional protection system - and Latvia contended with 
success that they had already established an adequate internal minority protection system, that 
there was no universal minority protection system, and that pending such regime, they 
remained sovereign in the matter.  The League acquiesced in the interpretation of  Estonia and 
Latvia and, formally, just as much met their demands as the other way round. 
88 The Estonian and Latvian 'independence declarations': to guarantee or not to 
guarantee? 
As Ito observed, political pre-occupations and long negotiations indeed produced a formula 
which satisfied the League of  Nations, without hurting the sensitivities of  Estonia and Latvia 
(Ito (1931 :34)).  In Zemite's words, the Estonian and Latvian minority declarations were in 
fact 'independence declarations', in which the principles for protecting minority rights were 
enacted (Zemite:45). 
Formally, Estonia and Latvia obtained an entirely unique legal position in the minority 
protection system of  the League.  Contrary to the Lithuanian declaration and the minority 
treaties, their obligations were not concretised in explicit stipulations.  The declarations also 
carefully avoided the term 'guarantee'.  Whereas under the minority treaties, the Council had 
the explicit right to "take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper and 
effective in the circumstances" (article 12 Polish Minority Treaty (Thomberry:402)), it did not 
have this right under the Estonian and Latvian minority declaration (Aun:45).  In this regard, 
one can also point to the Albanian declaration, under which the Council had the right to give 
binding directives to the Albanian government (article 45 of  the Albanian declaration 
(Kressner (1933: 21  and 86-88)).  Moreover, unlike the treaty states, Estonia and Latvia were 
not subjected to the compulsory jurisdiction of  the Permanent Court of  International Justice. 
As mentioned above, the Permanent Court was empowered by the treaties to give a 
compulsory award if  a dispute was referred to it.  Under the Estonian and Latvian declaration, 
it could only give an advisory opinion (Aun:46: Wolff (1941: 10)). 
According to Ito, the Estonian and Latvian declaration started from a certain presumption, 
namely that the treatment of  minorities in their countries conformed to the general principles 
of  the minority treaties.  On the basis of  this presumption, Estonia and Latvia assumed the 
international obligation not to modify this actual situation in a way that was detrimental to 
their minorities.  From the very beginning of  their existence as states, Estonia and Latvia 
freely pursued a policy which aimed at the protection of  minorities.  Through their 
declaration, Estonia and Latvia committed themselves internationally to continue these 
policies (lto:34-35).  Ito referred to a similar case, namely the Kingdom of  the Netherlands of 
1814-1815.  This kingdom was established by the Great Powers as a buffer against France. 
The Eight Articles of 1814, regarding the unification of Belgium and Holland, contained 
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of21 July 1814 with Holland imposed an internationalisation of  the already existing 
constitutional guarantees.  The Constitution of  Holland already contained stipulations with 
regard to the prohibition of  discrimination on the basis of  religion.  Article 2 of  the treaty 
stipulated:  "Nothing shall be changed in the articles of  this constitution, which assures to all 
religions equal protection and  privileges and guarantees the admission of  all citizens, 
whatever their religious convictions, to all public posts and offices. ".  The treaty thus froze 
some of  the articles of  the anterior constitution (Laponce: 27 and 39; Fouques Duparc 
(1922:82)). 
However, contrary to the agreement of 1814, the Estonian and Latvian declaration did in fact 
contain an international guarantee.  In the case that these countries, in the view of  the Council, 
would cease to ensure adequate minority protection (in the case of  Estonia:  "  ... cease to 
enforce those general principles"; in the case of  Latvia:  "  ... does not appear to correspond to 
the general principles laid down in the various so-called Minority Treaties"), the Council had 
the right "to consider afresh" (in the case of  Estonia) or "to take up the question anew and to 
reopen the negotiations" (in the case of Latvia).  These rights put the Council in exactly the 
same position which it held as guarantor of  the treaties.  The paragraphs referring to petitions 
simply accepted the procedure which had by that time been adopted by the Council (Mair:56). 
Although Estonia and Latvia had formally succeeded in preserving their sovereignty, they 
nevertheless had acceded to the right of  minorities to petition the League (Peters (1988:290)). 
In the League's system, these declarations had the same purpose as the treaties.  Since the 
treaties had inspired the declarations, the enforcement of  these declarations was identical to 
the way the treaties were executed (Moskov (1936:33)). 
Although the declarations did not contain any concrete minority stipulations, Estonia and 
Latvia were obliged to respect the 'general principles' laid down in the minority treaties. 
These 'general principles' were summarised by Pusta in his memorandum of28 August 1923, 
namely the full and complete protection of  life and liberty without distinction as to birth, 
nationality, language, race or religion, the acquisition of  citizenship of  the state concerned, the 
liberty of  conscience, the free use of  the mother tongue and the equality before the law (JO 
(1923: 1311  and 1363)).  According to Wolff, these 'general principles' imply that a state may 
not hinder its minorities in the exercise of  their specific activities and interests (freedom of 
education, language and property) and may not discriminate minority groups (principle of 
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enable minorities to establish, administer and control their own educational, social and 
religious institutions and to make possible that minorities are taught in their mother tongue in 
the primary schools (Wolff:9-1 0). 
The former director of  the Minorities Section of  the League's Secretariat, Pablo De Azcarate, 
notes that while the wording of  the Estonian and Latvian declaration differed completely from 
the treaties and other declarations, in practice the result was the same (De Azcarate:95). 
The minority petitions, sent in by Baltic barons, did, however, not result in any change of  the 
ethnic policy ofthe Baltic states, let alone that they had an impact on their state order. 
The minority petitions 
The land reforms in the Baltic states 
As Macartney notes, the political revolutions in the Baltic states inevitably had to be 
completed by a national-social one, involving first and foremost the dispossession of  the 
'alien' landlords (Macartney (1962:152)).  All three states were mainly agricultural. 
Agriculture provided employment for 79 per cent of  the Lithuanians, 66,2 per cent of  the 
Latvians, and 58,58 per cent of  the Estonian population (Von Rauch (1974:80)).  In Estonia 
and Latvia, the land was owned by Germans, in Lithuania mostly by Poles. 
In 1918 Estonia, the German landlords (less than two per cent of  the population) owned 58 
per cent of  all land.  The 1419 manors of  the Germans had an average area of  2, 113 hectares, 
compared with 20-30 hectares for a farmer's property (Yakemtchouk (1990:32)).  Two thirds 
of  the rural population (some half million people) owned no land.  In Latvia, 3,161,000 
hectares of  a total area of 6,570,000 hectares (48,1  per cent) were owned by the Gef!11an 
landlords (1338 manors).  In Lithuania, 40 per cent in the shape of  entailed estates (majorats) 
were acquired by 450 mainly Polish and Russian noble families, but also by a few Germans, 
French and Italians as a result of  service to the Tsar (Hope:48).  In general, some three 
thousand individuals possessed land of  more than 100 hectares, that is to say 26 per cent of 
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an average area ofless than 3 hectares (Yakemtchouk (1990:33)). 
Under the Estonian expropriation law of 10 October 1919, 1,065 estates (96,6 per cent of  all 
the estates in the country) were expropriated, together with their farms and summer villas. 
Although the vast majority of  these properties belonged to Baltic Germans, also 57 Estonians 
were affected by this law.  The expropriation was carried out over a two-year period, the 
question of  compensation being left over for settlement at a later date.  A law of 1 March 
1926 fixed the level of  compensation at 3 Estonian crowns per hectare, which was about 3 per 
cent of  the real value of  the estates.  No compensation was given in respect of  forest land. 
Instead of  compensating the expropriated owners in cash, the state in most cases issued 
debenture bonds.  These owners were later authorised to apply for the restitution of  up to 50 
hectares of land (Von Rauch (1974:88-89); in German: Von Rauch (1990:81 )). 
Under the Latvian expropriation law of 16 September 1920, 1,300 estate owners were 
dispossessed.  Contrary to the Estonians, the Latvians however decided that these owners 
should be allowed to retain up to 50 hectares, together with an appropriate amount of stock 
and equipment, for their private use.  Although no less than 1,887 persons benefited from this 
concession, the amount of  land involved was only 1,7 per cent of  the total confiscated.  In 
1924, the Latvian parliament decided by 50 votes to 35 that no compensation would be paid to 
the former estate owners (Von Rauch (1974:90); Von Rauch (1990:82)). 
Initially, the Lithuanians intended to expropriate the Russian lands and to reduce the 
economic predominance of  the other - chiefly Polish - estate owners by fixing 80 hectares as 
the maximum permitted size for any private holding.  Due to the moderating influence of  the 
Christian Democrats, the expropration law of  29 March 1922 was less draconian than its 
Estonian and Latvian counterparts.  The Russian lands and forests were still taken over by the 
state.  On the other hand, the non-Russian estate owners gained a great deal, because the 
maximum size for private agricultural holdings was to fixed at 150, and not 80, hectares.  In 
addition, the state paid a small compensation (Von Rauch (1974:90-91); Von Rauch 
(1990:83)). 
There were several motivations for these drastic agrarian reforms. 
First, there was the social motivation, namely the objective to redistribute the land on an 
equitable basis.  The previously landless peasants were provided with small properties of  their 
own, and the gross discrepancy between the German landlords and this Estonian class was 
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the rural proletariat against the Soviet propaganda.  The only effective way of  combating the 
social and economic policies, advocated by the Soviets, was to expropriate all agricultural 
land and to redistribute it in the form of smallholdings to the indigenous peasants.  The third 
motivation was of  nationalist-political nature, namely to end the political and economic 
dominance of of  the 'alien' landlords.  It was argued that, unless they were dispossessed, these 
landlords would undermine the independence ofthese states (Von Rauch (1974:87-88); Von 
Rauch (1990:80-81 )).  In August 1919, Aleksander Veiler, a representative of  the Estonian 
Labour Party, stated: "When you want to slaughter an animal you start by breaking the 
backbone.  The manors have been the backbone of  the barons." (Alenius (2004:36)). 
These laws had indeed the effect of  placing the titular majorities in safe control of  their 
respective states (Macartney (1962: 181)). 
Land reform also constituted a social revolution in these countries.  In the words of  Nicholas 
Hope, it "dispossessed an ethnically different landed aristocracy, and turned almost overnight 
afeudal peasantry into  'classless' nations of  propertied small farmers" (Hope:47).  For 
example, in Latvia, the figure of38,8 per cent landowners and 61,2 per cent landless in 1897 
was turned around by the census of 1925 to 70,9 per cent with land and 29,1 per cent without. 
This helps to explain why an active Latvian Communist Party mustered a mere six to seven 
per cent in the national elections of 1928 (Hope:48). 
The creation of smallholder farms indeed strengthened parliamentary republicanism and 
created a widespread aversion to communism. 
The minority petitions 
1.  Already on 13 November 1920, a petition on behalf of  the German landowners of  Kurland 
and the 'Kurldndisch-Piltenschen Ritterschaft' was submitted to the Council of  the League by 
Baron Alphons Heyking.  In this petition, Heyking explained that the abolition of  the 
Corporations of  Nobles of  Latvia as a result of  the law of  29 June 1920 had the express 
purpose of  enabling the Latvian state to appropriate the property belonging to that 
corporation.  Heyking also pointed at the effects of  the Latvian Agrarian Reform Law on the 
German minority.  In his reply of22 December 1920, the Secretary-General, Sir Eric 
93 Drummond, referred to the Assembly resolution of 15 December 1920 (Von Truhart 
(1931 :50-51); Heyking (1920:5)). 
In February 1921, Heyking presented a further petition to the League on behalf of  the Baltic 
barons in Estonia and Latvia.  It referred to the Assembly resolution of 15 December 1920. 
The petitioners argued that Estonia and Latvia could only be admitted to the League when 
they respected several legal principles, and requested the establishment of  a permanent 
minority commission of  the League (Grundmann:279). 
Vahur Made argues that Alphonse Heyking treated the issue of  landownership in ethnic terms 
rather than in terms of  individual property.  Heyking considered landownership as something 
typical for the German minority.  It was 'their traditional way of  living' (Interview with Dr. 
Vahur Made, Estonian School of  Diplomacy, Tallinn, 8 February 2005). 
Next to Baron Alphons Heyking, also Lord Robert Cecil intervened on behalf of  the German 
landowning class in Estonia which, in his view, was being "badly treated as a result of  the 
mistaken agrarian policy of  the Estonian government" (Peters (1988:292). 
These petitions did not result in any answer from the League. 
2.  In April 1925, W. Baron Fircks and Von Vegesack, two members of  the Latvian 
parliament, petitioned the League because of  the promulgation of  the agrarian reform law in 
the previous year. 
In their petition, the two Baltic Germans explained that 2,700,000 hectares - formerly 
possessed by persons belonging to the German minority - were expropriated without 
compensation.  In their view, the agrarian reform law clearly discriminated against the 
German minority.  Only their lands (noble lands) were expropriated, while the lands of  the 
Latvian majority (peasant lands) were not affected.  The minority representatives were 
excluded from the Central Agrarian Committee.  The petitioners thus raised issues like the 
discriminatory taking of  property, ethnicity-based exclusion from the benefits of  the reform 
and denial of  fair compensation for the property taken from them.  Accordingly, the Baltic 
Germans accused the Latvian government of  violating the principle of  equality before the law, 
as embodied in the Polish and other minority treaties. 
94 Since the Latvian declaration of 7 July 1923 stipulated that the issue of  minority treatment 
could be reopened, the petitioners requested a consideration of  their case by the League.  They 
asked the Council to request the Permanent Court of International Justice for an advisory 
opinion on the agrarian law and the different actions of  the Latvian government (Petition of  6 
April 1925 (C.675.1925.I)). 
The bulk of  the response of  the Latvian government consisted of a detailed analysis of  the 
Agrarian Reform law and other closely related laws and a factual assessment of  how these 
laws were implemented. 
The Latvian government argued t~at the land reform was not discriminatory and that it 
ensured domestic stability.  Latvia was an agrarian country and it was therefore essential that 
the former feudal system of  the latifundia - enormous estates owned by a few landlords - was 
abolished and that their lands were distributed among people who possessed nothing and 
small peasants.  The contemporary Latvian government and the civilian organisation 
('I 'organisation bourgeois') of  the state could only be sustained if  Latvia possessed a strong 
land-owning peasant class (C.675.1925.I:8).  Like in other countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, an agrarian reform in Latvia was a prerequisite for a stable organisation of  the state. 
Land reform was absolutely necessary to counter communist influences and to keep the Soviet 
Union at bay (C.675.1925.I:18).  The Latvian government further argued that every state had 
the right to pursue a certain social-economic policy, even if  certain ethnic groups were 
affected more than others by this policy.  Considerations and reasons of  public order, social 
necessity, economic development or internal stability not only allowed but also required a 
state to regulate and organise the crucial trade and industry sector, traditionally dominated by 
members of  minorities (C.675.1925.I:36-37). 
The Latvian government emphasised that members of  minorities had the right to challenge 
government acts before the Supreme Court.  An intervention by the League of  Nations in 
judicial decisions would violate the sovereignty of  the Latvian state and undermine the 
authority of  its courts of law, which was one of  the fundamental pillars of a state.  The League 
had no authority to reverse judicial decisions with regard to the interpretation of  the law or the 
assessment of  the facts (C.675.1925.I:18-19).  The Latvian government concluded that the 
land reform in Latvia was completely in accordance with Latvia's international obligations. 
More specifically, it served a social purpose, as enscribed in the minority declaration.  The 
establishment and preservation of  social peace in Latvia was also in the minorities' interest. 
95 The petition together with the Latvian observations, was examined by a Committee of  Three. 
This organ subsequently requested the Latvian government to explore the possibility of 
financial compensation (letter of  Colban of 15 March 1925). 
In his reply, the Latvian representative, Duzmans, began by repeating the former arguments of 
his government.  Every state has the right to adopt its own legislation, even if  certain laws 
affect members of  certain minority groups more than the majority nation.  Duzmans further 
asserted that there were no national or ethnic conflicts in Latvia.  He warned that any 
international intervention would not only disturb the national and social peace in his country 
but also create a real minority problem that did not exist before.  In his view, many so-called 
minority conflicts originated from the uneasy relationship between the domain of  international 
law and the domain of  the exclusive competence of  the national legislator.  The question of 
the financial compensation as a result of  the agrarian reform was a matter which belonged to 
the exclusive competence of  the Latvian law-maker.  It had nothing to do with the 
international protection of  minorities (Memorandum of  Duzmans (1926: 12 and 17)). 
On 8 June 1926, the Committee of  Three concluded its examination of  the question without 
recommending any action by the Council (Von Truhart:51; Grundmann:282). 
3.  A similar petition was submitted to the League in May 1926 by E. Von Bodisco and C. 
Baron Schilling on behalf of  the landlords in Estonia.  On 4 December 1926, the Estonian 
government submitted observations along the lines of  the arguments used by the Latvian 
government.  It explained that it had the right to confiscate the land that had historically been 
seized by the 13th century Germanic conquests.  The agrarian reform was a social and 
economic necessity.  It would lead to an enduring social peace between the former landless 
Estonian majority nation and the German landlords (Thiele (1999:81 )).  A procedural 
argument was also used.  The Estonian government namely argued that the petitioners should 
first have brought their case before the highest Estonian court on the legal basis that their 
constitutional rights had been violated.  Thus, it was possible for the Committee of  Three to 
advise the petitioners to use the domestic legal procedures without having to explore the case 
and to reply to the observations of  the Estonian government (Grundmann:283).  Nevertheless, 
the Committee of  Three took a decision on the material issues of  the case.  According to it, 
the petitioners had not proved that the land reform were specifically aimed at a certain ethnic 
96 minority.  A whole group oflandowners had been affected, irrespective of  their national 
origin (Grundmann:284).  So, the case was not referred to the Council (Von Truhart:50). 
The similar fate of  these minority petitions was not exceptional.  In fact, with regard to 
petitions against agrarian reform legislation, it was the rule.  De Azcarate observed: 
"Admittedly, it was obvious that in all these countries agrarian reform operated to the 
detriment of  minorities ( ...  ) and in favour of  the majority.  This,  however, was not necessarily 
the result of  a policy of  minority persecution on the part of  the respective governments ( ...  ), 
but rather of  the composition of  the population in those territories, where, for historic reasons 
which cannot be detailed here, large estates had been concentrated in the hands of  .'nations ' 
dominant up to the time of  the 1919 treaties, while the mass of  peasants consisted of  the 
populations of  the dominated 'nations '.  ( ...  ) If  it had been conceded that agrarian reform in 
Central European countries, since it generally expropriated the holdings of  members of 
national minorities and divided the land among members of  the majority, was contrary to the 
clause of  the Minorities Treaties guaranteeing equality before the law,  the absurd and 
inadmissible conclusion would have been reached that all agrarian reform was impossible 
under the treaties, although in reality there was not the slightest doubt that such reform was 
one of  the keys to the economic and social consolidation of  these countries." (De Azcarate:62-
63). 
T.H. Bagley argues along the same lines:  "In addition, to propose that they (the minorities 
states) be forced thereby to rescind acts and laws in the face of  the complaints of  a minor 
segment of  their own populations could hardly be justified  Agrarian reform carried out by 
Roumania, for instance,  inevitably hurt the large landholders more than the small peasants, 
but the fact that the Hungarian minority constituted the greater part of  the large landholders 
did not imply that,  because of  the terms of  the minority treaty,  this reform should be made 
impossible." (Bagley:72-73). 
In any case, 1926-1927 was the last year that a petition was directed towards Estonia and 
Latvia.  The Foreign Ministers of  Estonia and Germany met in Geneva and reached an 
agreement.  German Foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann, made it clear that he would no 
longer support the Baltic Germans.  The German minority was considered too small and too 
weak.  There were more important German groups in other parts of  Central and Eastern 
Europe (Interview with Dr. Vahur Made, Estonian School of  Diplomacy, Tallinn, 8 February 
2005; also: Made (2002:30)). 
97 4.  As Rita Putins Peters observes, it is ironic that Lithuania, which had signed the detailed 
declaration, had the most acrimonious confrontations with the Council over minority issues. 
Besides issues arising from land reform, the petitions against Lithuania also contained other 
important claims (Peters (1983: 132)). 
On 10 December 1921, the Polish government complained about the treatment of  Poles in 
Ponievesh and in 1922 about the treatment of  Polish prisoners in Kovno (Von Truhart: 1  06). 
On 10 June 1925, the Joint Jewish Committee petitioned the League concerning the general 
situation of  minority protection, linked to a Polish minority complaint (Von Truhart:87). 
In 1924 and 1925 there were a series of  petitions and communications from the Committee of 
exiled Poles.  The Council addressed these as a single case for examination by a Committee of 
Three.  In this interesting case, not only questions of language rights, cultural autonomy and 
the nationality choice of  persons were raised, but also, and foremost, the right of  petition.  The 
Polish petitioners namely asserted that Polish deputies in the Lithuanian Parliament were 
charged of  high treason because they had petitioned the League in 1921.  The Lithuanian 
representative Zanius replied that the charge had not been brought because of the petition but 
because the deputies had sent abroad declarations "which they knew to be false and  fictitious". 
The British representative Chamberlain expressed his concern.  In the view of  Unden, the 
Swedish representative, the Lithuanian interpretation would render the right of  petition 
illusory.  After many requests for information, which Lithuania supplied sparingly, and after 
several meetings of  the Council with inconclusive exchanges between its members and 
Lithuania, reporter De Mello-Franco simply advised the Council to take note of  the 
information, furnished by the Lithuanian government.  In his view, the "Council should rely 
upon the wisdom of  the Lithuanian Government and should express the hope" that it will 
dissipate any apprehension "which may still exist among the minorities in the country ... " (10 
(1925: 484-487, 581-590, 865-877,1339-1341; Secretariat de la Societe des Nations:61-64). 
On 2 November 1927, twenty-one Ukranians whose homes and land had been expropriated, 
petitioned the League on the grounds that they had been deprived of  their property solely 
because they belonged to a minority.  Lithuania contested the receivability of  the petition and 
refused to submit information.  According to the Lithuanian government, a minority "must 
belong to the country ...  by origin", and "must be sufficiently numerous to constitute an 
98 appreciable percentage of  the country's population" in order to be eligible for protection by 
the League.  The Council reporter rejected Lithuania's claims, on the grounds that no such 
criterion was found in its minority declaration and the Council found the petition receivable 
(JO (1928: 888-893, 957 and 1493)). 
In September 1930, the German government asserted that Lithuania violated the autonomy of 
the Memel territory.  But after an exchange of  written communications and some 
clarifications, the discussion was closed (JO (1930: 1516-1517, 1522-1525 and 1618-1640)). 
Lithuania and the concept of absolute sovereignty 
Besides its uncooperative stance with regard to minority petitions, Lithuania also attacked the 
procedure on which the minority protection by the League was based.  Before examining this, 
I first discuss the proposals made by Lithuania in 1925 on the generalisation of  the League's 
minority protection system. 
The Lithuanian proposals for a generalisation 
In the plenary Assembly session of 14 September 1925, the Lithuanian representative, 
Galvanauskas, again took up the generalisation issue.  He namely proposed to create a special 
commission, charged with the preparation of  a draft general convention binding all the 
member states of  the League and fixing their rights and duties towards minorities.  In his 
speech before the Assembly, Galvanauskas attacked the minority protection system of  the 
League.  In his view, this system violated the sovereignty of  certain states.  Galvanauskas 
agreed with the principle of minority protection and with the international guarantee but only 
if  all members of  the League were subjected to that control.  He asserted that:  "there would 
be no moral unity between the League members so long as the sovereignty of  some states 
were limited by a higher interest, while the freedom of  others was unlimited'.  The Lithuanian 
representative referred to the Assembly resolution of  21  September 1922 but stressed that 
public opinion demanded much more than a simple declaration.  Public opinion, as he saw it, 
demanded that the whole international community would be subjected to the same rights and 
99 duties.  In that regard, the Conference of  the Interparliamentary Union of 1923 had elaborated 
a declaration containing general principles and had called for a general convention between 
all the states of  the League on the basis of  these principles (Societe des Nations, (1931:62-
64)). 
The proposal of  Galvanauskas was referred to the Sixth Committee where it was discussed on 
16 September 1925 (JO (1925:12-21)).  The Lithuanian delegate repeated his arguments.  The 
League members were divided into two groups.  There were states which had certain 
obligations and states whose freedom of  action was unlimited.  Public opinion clearly 
demanded the establishment of  rules for all League members without distinction.  Further, the 
contemporary definition of  a minority was too vague and needed clarification.  This would be 
one of  the first tasks of  the Committee. 
Predictably, the British, French and Belgian representatives rejected the proposal, while the 
Rumanian delegate supported it.  The Frenchman De 10uvenel stated that there were no 
minorities in his country and that the Lithuanian proposal would create artificial minorities. 
He agreed with the need for a good definition but pointed to the dangers which a general 
convention would entail.  If  every state was obliged to sign such a convention, they all would 
be tempted to hamper an effective minority protection.  In his view, it was crucial to have 
independent states as guarantors of  minority obligations.  Lord Robert Cecil stressed that the 
extension of  the system to the whole world would inevitably lead to its collapse.  He 
underlined that the special status of  the Central and East European states entirely resulted 
from their special situation. 
In line with the argumentation of  French jurist Louis Le Fur, Ga1vanauskas argued that, from 
a legal point of  view, there were religious minorities in France who deserved protection. 
If  France was indeed a liberal country, as De 10uvenel stated, it should have no problems in 
signing a minority protection convention. 
Given these fundamentally different points of  view, the Czechoslovak representative Benes 
proposed a compromise.  The Committee would namely advise the Assembly to send the 
relevant Committee debates to the Council. 
100 Galvanauskas agreed and dropped his proposal.  However, he regretted that all the states were 
not yet ripe for such a general convention.  He stressed again that not only states were treated 
differently; also some minorities were better protected than others. 
With regard to the definition of  a minority, Galvanauskas argued that a distinction had to be 
drawn between immigrants and persons who by force of a treaty had been transferred into 
another state.  Giving a revealing insight into the Lithuanian view on sovereignty, 
Galvanauskas explicitly rejected the proposal of  the Hungarian Count Apponyi, which aimed 
at giving minorities legal personality.  This was unacceptable for the Lithuanian 
representative because it would disorganise the whole international community.  He stressed 
that international public law only recognised states as legal persons (10 (1925:21-22)). 
Following the Committee's proposal, the debates were sent by the Assembly to the Council 
(Societe des Nations (1931 :64-70)), which took note of  the relevant discussions in its session 
of  9 December 1925 (Societe des Nations (1931 :39-47). 
Lithuania and the reform of  the minority protection system 
In 1929, Canada, followed by Germany, proposed several changes in the minority protection 
procedure with the aim of  making the system more effective and transparent.  Like the other 
members of  the League, the Baltic states were invited to present their views on this matter. 
All three were opposed to the proposals of  the Canadian Danduran and the German 
Stresemann.  But, contrary to the ad hoc group of Czechoslovakia, Greece, Poland, Rumania 
and Yugoslavia which submitted identical texts, the Baltic states did not formulate ajoint 
response. 
The Estonian representative Lattik argued that the negotiations of  the Estonian minority 
declaration had already revealed that the Estonian constitution provided more extensive 
minority protection and more rights than the minority treaties.  This was recognised in the 
Council resolution of 17 September 1923.  Meanwhile, the argument went on, the protection 
of  minorities had even been improved by the adoption of  the Law on Cultural Autonomy of 
12 February 1925.  In view of  its liberal policy towards minorities, the Estonian government 
asserted that it "could not contemplate accepting obligations which would  prejudice the 
arrangements made in 1923 unless the intention is to frame a general statute for the 
protection of  minorities" (Societe des Nations (1931: 198-199). 
101 The Latvian government considered the existing procedure flexible and efficient and declared 
that it "(did) not see any necessity for introducing modifications in the system (either) in 
substance or procedure" (Societe des Nations (1931 :208». 
The Lithuanian government however adopted a completely different view.  According to 
Voldemaras, Lithuania was only subjected to the obligations of  its minority declaration of 12 
May 1922.  Any supplementary obligations required the consent of  the Lithuanian 
government.  The Council intended to pursue separate negotiations with the different 
countries to obtain their consent for the decision made.  Voldemaras argued that this 
procedure violated the Covenant because it allowed the Council to act as a contracting party 
and therefore as a legal person.  In such a case, the Council would constitute a superstate.  The 
Lithuanian representative contended that in all matters affecting the members of  the League, 
these states were temporary members of  the Council.  Voldemaras thus considered that it was 
the right and even duty of  Lithuania to be represented at the Council table. 
The Council replied that it was dealing with questions of 'general character'.  Article four, 
paragraph five, invoked by Voldemaras, provided only for states to participate in Council 
deliberations when questions of  direct concern to them were being considered.  The.matter 
was referred to a Committee of  Jurists. 
This Committee agreed with the Council.  It explained that the proposals of  Canada and 
Germany aimed to change the minority protection procedure, more specifically with regard to 
the examination of  the petitions.  Such Council decisions had a general character and 
regulated the functioning of  the League of  Nations in a specific area.  These were not 
decisions which 'specifically affected' a member of  the League, in the sense of  article four, 
paragraph five, of  the Covenant.  Lithuania therefore did not have the right to be represented 
at the Council table.  The Committee concluded that the proposals of  Canada and Germany 
required a consent between the Council and the 'minorities states'.  After the Council had 
taken a decision, this decision thus had to be communicated and accepted by all the states 
concerned. 
The Lithuanian representative Zanius rejected this thesis.  He asserted that only an individual 
state, and not other states or even the Council, was authorised to determine its specific 
interests.  The Council could only take note of  the statement of  the state concerned, that its 
interests were especially affected.  As Georg Andrassy notes, this thesis clearly reflected a 
102 view of  absolute sovereignty (Andrassy:690).  Moreover, Zanius contended that the minority 
clause in the treaties and declarations did not give the Council the power to determine 
autonomously the procedure without the collaboration of  the states concerned.  The 
Lithuanian observed that this thesis was also partly shared by the jurists who had st,!-ted in 
their report that a revision of  the procedure required the participation of  all the states affected. 
However, the Committee had, incorrectly, not deduced from this a right for every state to be 
represented at the Council table when its interests were affected.  The interpretation of  the 
Council president and the Committee of  Jurists implied that a state had only two choices, 
either to accept or to refuse a decision.  This was a highly uncomfortable situation for states 
which wanted to co-operate with the Council. 
While the Council president replied in legal terms to Zanius (interpretation of  term 
'particular' of  article 4, paragraph 5 of  the Covenant), the British representative Sir Austen 
Chamberlain asserted that an acceptance of  the Lithuanian thesis would completely 
undermine the authority of  the Council and would make it impossible for the Council to 
function properly.  In his view, the Council did not only have the right but also the duty to 
determine in each case whether the particular interests of  a certain state were affect~d (Societe 
des Nations (1931: 208-210 and 214-220). 
In the so-called 'Russian case', the Lithuanian government used similar arguments. 
In August 1928, a petition was submitted by 34 persons of  Russian origin whose lands had 
been confiscated.  Again the Lithuanian government refused to furnish any information either 
at the request of  the Secretary-General or the Committee of  Three. 
In this case, the Lithuanian government rejected the whole minority procedure as elaborated 
by the successive resolutions. 
According to Voldemaras, Lithuania was namely not obliged to furnish information because 
the Council had not been seized on the initiative of  one of  its members as required by article 9 
of  the declaration. 
The Lithuanian representative contended that only a Council member was authorised to 
'accuse' the Lithuanian state.  In this regard, he cited a report of  a Committee of  Jurists of 
1926 which stated that:  "the Council had not been seized by a plaint  from public or private 
persons, not having the particular responsibility which rested upon states and governments as 
an exercise of  their sovereignty".  Lithuania, the argument went on, was only subjected to the 
103 obligations of  the unilateral declaration of  May 1922 and could not in any way be bound by 
an earlier resolution, like the one of  25 October 1920. 
As mentioned above, without the successive resolutions and the institution of  the C9mmittee 
of  Three, petitions probably would never have been considered.  The Lithuanian attack on 
these committees was therefore an outright rejection of  the whole minority protection system 
of  the League. 
The Japanese representative Adatci was charged to write a report on the matter.  He repeated 
the arguments that were used by the Committee of  Jurists in 1929.  The establishment of  the 
Committees of  Three was part of  the category of decisions that the Council could take alone. 
Lithuania had implicitly accepted these committees and their activities from the moment that 
it co-operated with them.  Afterwards, the Lithuanian government had also explicitly given its 
consent through its approval of  a draft resolution of  22 September 1925, submitted by the 
Sixth Committee to the Assembly (Societe des Nations (1931 :221-228); JO (1929: 1031, 
1262-1263,1472-1474,1681-1682); JO (1930: 102 and 179-185)). 
Whereas Lithuania signed a minority declaration, modelled on the earlier treaties, Estonia and 
Latvia engaged in tough negotiations with the League.  The 'institutional inequality' between 
East and West was the main weakness of  the League's minority protection system and this 
was also brought forward by the negotiators of  Estonia and Latvia.  In the end, the Estonian 
and Latvian minority declarations were the perfect compromise.  Formally, these declarations 
were a diplomatic triumph for the two new nations.  But in fact, these declarations committed 
Estonia and Latvia to the same obligations imposed on the original treaty states.  But like in 
the other countries, the petitions sent in by the Baltic Germans did not result in any 
fundamental changes to the made decisions by these governments, let alone to their state 
orders.  Declining external pressure in the field of  minority rights had already become 
increasingly apparent over the early years of  the 1920s.  Minority rights were slipping down 
the League agenda, and in the Baltic this fact was readily seized upon by those political forces 
seeking to deny minorities the right to cultural autonomy.  Conversely, the task of  those who 
remained wedded to the autonomy principle was made all the more difficult as debates on this 
theme reached their decisive phase during the early to mid-1920s. 
104 Chapter four:  The practical operation of personal autonomy in the Baltic states. 
The evolution of Jewish autonomy in Lithuania 
The structure of  the initial system of  Jewish autonomy 
As explained above, characteristic for the Jewish autonomy was its construction from the 
bottom to the top, that is to say from the separate Jewish communities to the Assembly of 
Jewish Councils, and then to the National Council and the Ministry of  Jewish affairs.  This 
system strongly reflected the system of  Jewish autonomy in the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, which was also based on the separate communities, the kahal (Mintz: 103). 
The basis, the basic entity of  the whole Jewish autonomy was the local, territorially based 
kehilla and not the organised minority (as a public corporation) like in Estonia.  Every citizen, 
registered as a Jew in the register of  births, marriages in deaths in a given area, was an 
obligatory member of  the local kehilla.  To dissociate oneself from the Jewish community, 
one had to undergo religious conversion or prove that the registration in the personal register 
was inaccurate.  Thus, there was no need for a national register to determine who belonged to 
the Jewish minority.  This so-called 'negative option principle' was also better adapted to the 
specific position of  the Jewish minority and its relationship with other groups of  the state 
population (Erler:30l; Mintz: 103). 
The equalisation between 'religion' and 'nationality' resulted from the strong domination of  the 
'national Jewish minority concept' by the 'Israeli-religious minority concept'.  In Estonia and 
Latvia, there were Jews who had opted for the Russian or German cultural community 
because of  historical experiences.  There were also Jews who belonged to the majority nation. 
The Lithuanian government, on the other hand, realised an obligatory equalisation between 
the 'religious Jews' and the 'national Jews'.  This originated from the system of  personal 
autonomy in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.  In exchange for the levy of  taxes, the 
Jews not only possessed cultural autonomy but also certain other typical state prerogatives. 
This system not only ensured a strong community feeling among the Jews but also separated 
them from other population groups.  It ensured that a Lithuanian Jew maintained his or her 
own religion and would not convert into another religion.  Thus, for the Lithuanian Jew, the 
105 idea of  a change of  nationality was linked with a change of  religion and vice versa  -
(Erler:300).  For example, in 1923 the Jews made up 7,58 per cent of  the population (153,743 
people) by nationality and 7,65 per cent (155,125 people) by religion (Liekis:82). 
The Jewish communities (kehilla) were public agencies.  They were legal entities with the 
power to impose taxes, and issue by-laws in matters of  religion, education and social 
assistance.  They could also register births, marriages and divorces. 
The Community Council, the decision-making body of  the kehilla, was elected according to 
the principle of  proportional representation.  The Council managed the register of  births, 
marriages and deaths, drew up the yearly municipal budget and had a certain taxation right. 
The Council appointed the executive organ and composed the educational and taxation 
committees.  The educational committees consisted of  representatives of  the Community 
Council, the teaching staff and the parents.  They were the organisers of  the Jewish school 
system and handled the financial and social matters of  the educational institutions.  Moritz 
Mintz termed these communities as the actual institutions of  the Jewish school autonomy 
(Mintz: 104).  Important to note is that the Jewish schools were under the supervision of  the 
Ministry of  Education, not the Ministry of  Jewish affairs (Greenbaum:250). 
The Assembly of  Jewish Councils consisted of  representatives of  the different Jewish 
communities and the National Council.  It had the same competences as the Jewish Councils 
with the proviso that the interests of  all the communities were affected.  The Assembly 
elected the National Council (Mintz: 1  04-1 05). 
The National Council was the highest institution of  Jewish autonomy between the separate 
assemblies.  It was competent for all matters related to the Jewish autonomy (religion, 
welfare, education and other cultural affairs).  The National Council was the actual 
representative body of  the Jewish community.  More specifically, it presented bills regarding 
Jewish affairs to the government and the Assembly, carried out the decisions of  the Assembly 
and fixed its budget.  To cover its expenses, it could appeal to these communities.  Within the 
National Council, there were different sections.  The decisions of  the National Council were 
prepared and implemented by an executive committee (Mintz: 1  05). 
106 The Ministry without portfolio for Jewish affairs was appointed by the Lithuanian 
government upon recommendation by the Assembly of  Jewish Councils.  His task was to 
defend the Jewish interests within the government and to function as a kind of  link between 
the Jewish community and the Lithuanian government.  According to a statement of  the 
Lithuanian prime minister Galvanauskas, the Jewish ministry had to reconcile the interests of 
the Jews as minority with their position as Lithuanian citizens (Mintz: 1  06).  The function and 
position ofthe minister were equivocal.  On the one hand, he was a member of  the Lithuanian 
government.  On the other hand, he was the hierarchical head of  the Jewish self-government. 
He had to defend the Jewish interests in the government and, at the same time, supervise the 
Jewish self-government.  Next to his participation in the activity of  the central government, he 
had to protect the specific Jewish rights.  In the Jewish self-government, he could convene the 
National Council and participate in all meetings of  that institution.  Thus, one can claim that 
this institution completely encapsulated the system of  Jewish self-government in the 
Lithuanian state (Mintz: 1  05). 
On the other hand, this ministry was not part of  the system of  Jewish national autonomy.  It 
was a part of  the government, of  the cabinet of  ministers.  This cabinet was supported by a 
majority in the parliament.  The presence in the cabinet of  any 'alien' element not linked to the 
political majority was excluded.  The representatives of  the Jewish self-government did not 
represent any parliamentary faction and did not participate in the cabinet.  This was the very 
logic of  the functioning of  a parliamentary democracy.  Consequently, Liekis criticises these 
Jewish politicians of  the Jewish National Council who wanted the institution of  the ministry 
to become part of  the Jewish national autonomy:  "Such a demand might have been logical in 
a medieval corporate federation.  In a modern representative democracy, however, where the 
construction of  the state was based upon the principle of  territorial representation of  the 
entire nation, the demands peculiar to such a corporate federation were clearly misplaced. " 
(Liekis: 1  03).  Because of its equivocal position, the Jewish ministry was contested from its 
very establishment, both in Jewish and in Lithuanian circles. 
The evolution of  the system of  Jewish self-government in Lithuania 
The foregoing chapter referred to the Lithuanian refusal to ratify the minority declaration. 
This completely reflected the deteriorating situation for the minorities in Lithuania after the 
elections for a Constituent Assembly in April 1920. 
107 Representatives of  national minorities made up 8,1  per cent of  all elected Assembly members. 
The first session of  the Assembly took place on 17 April 1920.  The new government of 
Kazys Grinius was based on a consensus between the Peasants-Populists bloc and the 
Christian Democrats alliance.  Dr. Soloveichik again became the Minister without portfolio 
for Jewish affairs (Liekis: 145-148). 
From the beginning, the atmosphere in the Seimas already proved to be much less favourable 
for the Jewish minority.  The institution of  the Jewish ministry was for example strongly 
attacked by several deputies (Liekis: 148). 
After a proposal to the government for strengthening the legal basis of  Jewish autonomy had 
failed (Liekis:149-151), the Jewish faction in the Constituent Assembly tried to incorporate 
Jewish autonomy in the new Constitution.  The implementation of  the Jewish draft would 
have meant an 'autonomisation' on a personal basis for the larger minorities in Lithuania. 
Under the draft, only minorities which made up 5 per cent or more of  the whole population 
would qualify for autonomy.  This meant that only the Jews and the Poles qualified for the 
proposed rights. 
The proposal consisted of  seven paragraphs. 
First, every citizen would have a right to claim membership of  any national group in any 
registration document or correspondence of  a civil nature (article 77). 
Second, there would be censuses of  the citizens of  each national group (the national cadasters) 
(article 78).  Upon request, every citizen would have his or her name added to the list added to 
the list of  any national minority.  A person who was already listed would have the right to 
withdraw from any list by announcing it to the administrative body. 
Third, all the citizens registered in the national cadaster would make up the National Union, 
which would have the right to govern its internal affairs autonomously: its public education at 
all levels, charity, mutual assistance, and the fulfilment of  all national cultural aspects in 
general (article 79). 
Fourth, the National Union, consisting of  not less than five per cent of  all citizens living in 
Lithuania, would have the right to have a representative in the government, a minister for their 
particular affairs.  The relationship between these ministers and the administrative agencies of 
the National Union would be defined by a separate law (article 80). 
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from the budget proportional to the membership share.  The distribution of  these funds and 
their collection by national autonomy agencies would be defined in a separate law (article 81). 
Sixth, the agencies of  national autonomy would have the right to tax members of  the National 
Union with additional taxes for national union operations according to respective laws (article 
82). 
Seventh, the relevant national groups would have the right to freely use their language in the 
government and municipalities and to freely write applications and requests to all government 
offices (article 83) (Liekis: 152-153). 
The discussions of  the constitution's chapter on national minorities began on 5 April 1922. 
All the proposals aiming at 'constitutional autonomism', however, failed.  Article 80 was 
regarded as discriminating against less numerous national groups.  Again, the institution of 
the Minister without portfolio for Jewish affairs was strongly criticised.  That the minister was 
legally bound to the Jewish National Council seemed dubious to several Seimas members. 
Although it was not part of  the constitutional and parliamentarian order of  Lithuania, the 
Jewish National Council would, under the proposal, be able to influence the government. 
Liekis observes that, in general, the Jews' desire to 'separate' themselves institutionally caused 
much stronger resentment (Liekis: 154). 
The final text of  the Constitution of  6 August 1922 reduced the rights of  minorities to two 
articles in a special title. 
Article 73 provided that:  "National minorities that make up a considerable share of  the 
citizenry have the autonomous right to organise within their jurisdiction the affairs of  their 
national culture: public education, charity, mutual assistance, and to elect representative 
agencies for these functions. ". 
Article 74 continued by stating that:  "The national minorities mentioned in article 73 have 
the right to tax their members for support of  their national culture if  this support is not 
provided by common state and municipal institutions, and to use a proportional amount of  the 
money provided by the State and municipalities for education and charity. ". 
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'the people'.  Article 1, sentence two, stated:  "The sovereign government of  the State shall be 
vested in the people." (Graham (1928:720-735)).  The Constitution further provided that all 
Lithuanian citizens were equal before the law and banned any privileges or restrictions on the 
basis ofrace or national origin (article 10:  "All citizens of  Lithuania, men or women, are 
equal before the law.  No special privileges can be given to,  nor shall the rights of  citizens be 
restricted because of  race,  creed or nationality. "). 
The reference to later legislation implied that the 'cultural autonomy', implied in article 73, 
could only be considered as a promise, as a kind of general 'skeleton provision' (Garleff 
(1990:91 )), that needed implementation legislation.  Only the minorities, constituted as legal 
entities, were entitled to cultural autonomy (Erler:299). 
In addition to their proposals in the Constituent Assembly, the Jews tried to legalise and 
strengthen by all means possible the Jewish institutions established in 1919 and 1920.  Dr. 
Soloveichik attempted to persuade the Prime Minister's office to pass a law on the 
establishment of  a Jewish ministry.  This law would replace the post of  Minister without 
portfolio for Jewish affairs simply with a Minister for Jewish affairs.  The minister's office 
would be formally converted into a ministry.  All agreements, property, and liabilities would 
be transferred to the new institution.  The government however not only rejected this draft, 
but also the draft of  a separate law on the Jewish National Union (Liekis: 156). 
It was clear that the Lithuanian government was turning away from its earlier promises.  In 
this regard, it is important to note that the context of 1922 was completely different from that 
of 1918-1920.  First, the earlier Lithuanian concessions to the Jews were linked to the pro-
Lithuanian stand of  the Lithuanian Jews in the territorial dispute with Poland regarding the 
city of  Vilnius.  In 1920, Poland had namely occupied and annexed Vilnius.  This was 
recognised by the Conference of  Ambassadors in 1923.  Second, Lithuania had entered into 
the League of  Nations and was subsequently recognised de iure by a majority of states 
(Liekis: 157-159). 
In the following years, the existing Jewish institutions received a final blow. 
On 21  December 1923, the Seimas deleted from the state budget the funding of  the Jewish 
ministry.  The Seimas also forbade Jewish deputies to deliver speeches in Yiddish 
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Democrat government, formed on 24 June 1924 by Antanas Tumeans, did not have a Minister 
for Jewish affairs.  The files of  the Jewish ministry were taken over by the Jewish faction in 
the Seimas.  All property and inventory of  the ministry was taken over by a special 
commission formed by the government on 24 November 1924 (Liekis: 190). 
At the Jewish National Assembly in November 1923, a Jewish National Council was formed. 
After the abolition of  the Jewish ministry, all pro-autonomy Jewish politicians aimed to 
legalise this council.  The Jewish National Council sent a proposal to Prime minister 
Tumenas.  However, the Christian Democrats strongly opposed. 
Meanwhile, the whole institution of  Jewish autonomy was falling apart.  The Agudah, which 
actually controled the management of  religious property, ignored the secular kehillot, while 
the largest portion of  income was received through religious channels.  As a result, the income 
of  the institution of  Jewish autonomy started to drop substantially.  Moreover, in 1924 the 
police no longer helped to ensure the payment of  taxes (Liekis: 191).  According to Liekis, the 
legalisation remained, nevertheless, a viable option:  "Autonomy, supported by administrative 
means and imposed by the state, could have survived. " (Liekis: 193). 
Given the Christian Democrats' domination, a legalisation of  the Jewish National Council 
was, however, no longer possible. 
A congress of  Jewish representatives in local governments took place on 12-15 January 1925. 
The 70 representatives approved a political resolution which protested against the 
government's closure of  Jewish institutions and the lack of  respect for Jewish political 
interests and aspirations (Liekis: 195). 
In 1925, Jewish national personal autonomy was definitely ended.  After the Seimas majority 
had rejected on 1 March 1925 an initiative from the Jewish faction to legalise the kehillot, it 
passed on 31  March 1925, by a vote of24 to 19, the Law on the Jewish National 
Communities.  This law was drafted by the Christian Democrats and approved by the 
government.  It provided first that Lithuanian citizens of  Jewish nationality make up the 
national Jewish communities.  These communities would oversee cultural affairs, public 
education, charity, and mutual assistance.  The Jews of  any locality were able to establish one 
or more communities for these purposes.  The members of  every community would elect a 
community council.  Second, those Lithuanian citizens of  Jewish origin who had the right to 
participate in the elections of  the local government, could become members of  the local 
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members.  Fourth, the participation of  Lithuanian citizens of  Jewish nationality in the 
communities was not obligatory.  Every member of  the Jewish community could refuse to 
participate.  After such refusal, this person was no longer considered as a member.  Fifth, 
local Jewish communities were given the right to tax their members for the mentioned 
purposes.  The amount of  these taxes could however not exceed the amount of  state taxes paid 
that year.  The community collected these taxes from community members for the c.ommunity 
treasury.  The Interior minister approved the manner and level of  this taxation.  Sixth, the 
local Jewish communities had the right to call congresses of  their representatives.  The 
congress would elect the Central Council, which guided the work of  the communities.  The 
Central Council was elected for one year.  Seventh, the Jewish communities and their Central 
Council had the rights of  juridical persons.  Eight, the Interior ministry would issue the rules 
and regulations for the implementation of  the law.  The Provisional Law on the Right of  the 
Jewish communities to tax Jewish inhabitants was no longer valid (Liekis: 196-197). 
Thus, the law of 1925 replaced the earlier law of 10 January 1920.  In short, Jews were 
allowed to organise national societies in their places of  residence and designate those societies 
'communities' (kehillot).  Several communities could be located in each locality.  Fifty Jewish 
people could voluntarily make a community.  Those communities could have inter-communal 
congresses, which had the right to elect their own central councils.  The only difference 
between these 'Jewish national communities' and other societies organised freely by citizens 
was the term 'community'.  The kehillot came under the jurisdiction of  the Interior ministry 
(Greenbaum:252; Friedman: 180).  The Jews were no longer obliged to belong to a 
community.  It was no longer an obligation to define oneself as a Jew and to belong to the 
Jewish community.  This was in Liekis' view the most important consequence of  the new law 
(Liekis:198).  The law abolished the Jewish national personal autonomy.  National autonomy 
namely provided that people of  a certain category (Jews) would be incorporated into 
communal settings.  All these communities would then unite as corporate federations through 
the congresses of  communities.  A single Central Council would stand above.  To formulate it 
in Liekis' words:  "Thus, Jewish communities became just like all other organisations netwok 
in Lithuania, instead of  the centralised and obligatory organisation that encompassed all 
aspects of  life,  like a corporate body in the Middle Ages." (Liekis: 197). 
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efforts from the Interior ministry, not a single national community - in the sense of  the law of 
1925 - was established (Friedman: 180).  As a result, the Interior minister issued 
supplementary instructions for the liquidation of  the existing kehillot (Liekis: 199; Robinson 
(1943 :229».  At the Minorities Conference in Riga in 1926, the representatives of  Lithuania 
therefore' concluded that the situation in their country was the worst of  the three Baltic states. 
The Christian Democrats lost the elections of  8-9 May 1926 and a new government of 
Populists and Social Democrats was formed.  The Jewish faction in the parliament demanded 
the immediate abolition of  all laws, undermining Jewish autonomy, the urgent implementation 
of  the articles 73  and 74 of  the Constitution with legislation on autonomous educational, 
charitable, and mutual assistance functions of  the Jewish communities, as well as the 
establishment of  local and central institutions and the fulfillment of  the promises given by the 
Lithuanian government in its 1922 declaration (Liekis:202-203). 
On 17 December 1926, the Nationalists and Christian Democrats staged a coup d'etat. 
Voldemaras became Prime Minister, while the president of  the Lithuanian Nationalist Union, 
Antanas Smetona, became President.  On 12 April 1927, Smetona dissolved the Seimas 
(Liekis:209). 
The 1938 Constitution entirely eliminated the earlier minority provisions.  The only provision 
which indirectly dealt with minorities, was article 3, granting religious congregations the 
status of  juridical persons within defined limits (Robinson:229-230). 
The practical operation of cultural autonomy in Estonia 
The evolution of  the internal political situation in Estonia 
The Social Democrats and the Estonian People's Party of  Jaan Tonisson suffered a defeat in 
the elections of  January 1921.  The subsequent government of  Konstantin Pats (Peasant 
Union) consisted of  members of  the Peasant Union, the Labour Party, the Estonian People's 
Party and a small Christian party.  It was a weak and unstable government.  Parties disagreed 
113 on many Issues.  Depending on the proposal, a party belonged to the government or 
opposition.  In short, these were not the ideal circumstances for the establishment of  cultural 
autonomy (Vasara:485). 
Already in the beginning of 1921, the German deputies (deutschbaltische Parte  i) tried to 
establish cultural autonomy by way of  a unilateral declaration.  The Germans declared that 
they wanted to implement the constitution and regulate their cultural life through their own 
laws.  The Estonian government replied that constitutional articles and principles could only 
be implemented by way of legislation, which was the sole right of  the Estonian Parliament 
(Angelus (1951: 14)).  Furthermore, it observed that the effective implementation of  article 21 
of  the Constitution required an exact definition of  autonomy and the constitution of  minorities 
as legal persons (Garleff (1976: 1  06)).  Indeed, according to the critics of  this first draft, the 
declaration exceeded the borders of  cultural life.  It was so vaguely formulated as to leave the 
real scope of  autonomy entirely open to question (Smith D J (2005 :219)). 
As a response to these observations, the minorities deputies jointly introduced a bill in the 
Riigikogu.  The bill was defended in the plenary session and in the commissions primarily by 
the Baltic German delegates "on behalf  of  all minority pariiamentary parties" (Garleff 
(1978:90)).  It was sent to the Commission of General Affairs which in principle agreed with 
the need of  a quick establishment of cultural autonomy.  On 12 December 1921, the Labour 
Party, the Social Democrats and the German representative, Max Bock, adopted the bill in a 
first reading (Garleff (1976: 1  06)).  In March 1922, the draft was sent to a subcommission. 
Under the presidency of  Jaakson of the Estonian People's Party, this commission decided not 
to elaborate a definitive detailed law on autonomy yet but instead to work out a provisional 
skeleton law for the time being.  This draft would be elaborated by Jaakson, Interior minister 
Eenpalu (independent, later on Peasant Union) and Anderkopp (Labour Party) (Garleff 
(1976: 1  07)). 
The Pats government fell in November 1922 and was replaced by a new government under 
the leadership of  Juhan Kukk of  the Labour Party. 
The Kukk government presented its own amendments to the 'Cultural Autonomy 
Commission'.  It proposed to determine the amount of  resources given to the self-government 
according to the proportion of  the particular minority that actually supported the introduction 
of  autonomy.  This proposal lead to a fundamental disagreement over how to relate to those 
minority citizens who did not desire autonomy.  In Max Bock's view, this suggestion 
destroyed the foundations of  autonomy.  It was inconceivable to him that some German 
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Sorokin, Pats and Anderkopp.  The solution was found by applying a 50 % threshold.  If  a 
majority of  the particular minority supported cultural autonomy, then it could be installed, and 
all existing and future minority institutions would come under its control.  Division 'of 
material and human resources between institutions belonging to autonomy and those outside 
would have been a severe blow to this scheme, especially from the point of  view of 
numerically small minorities whose resources were already limited.  Division would have led 
to competition between the two sets of  institutions and could even have led to the formation 
of  two antagonistic camps.  In line with Karl Renner, Konstantin Pats declared that national 
origin was a basic element of  every person.  Each individual had to declare which group he or 
she wished to belong to.  The choice was free.  Neutrality was, however, not an option. 
Minority education and minority rights were only open to those who declared themselves as 
belonging to a particular minority.  This implied the need to register all the members of  a 
minority and to vote on the establishment of  cultural autonomy.  If  a majority of  a group 
voted against, then minority rights would be limited to those provisions, laid out in the 
constitution.  If  there was a majority for cultural minority, all the members of  the cultural self-
government would be subject to the terms of  autonomy and beholden to the institutions 
established.  Anyone not consenting to these terms, would relinguish their membership of  the 
minority and be considered a member of  the majority (Estonian) nation (Alenius (2003:325-
328)).  The Commission of  General Affairs unanimously adopted the bill on the provisional 
cultural and social self-government.  In name of  the minority fractions, Max Bock praised the 
work of  the commission.  On the other hand, he regretted that the draft had not enacted a 
compulsory national register.  In his view, membership of  the cultural self-government had to 
be obligatory after the declaration (Garleff (1976: 1  07)). 
In March 1923, the bill was passed to the Parliament for a first reading.  It was discussed in 
two sessions of 6 and 8 March 1923. 
The majority of  the left and the centre was very suspicious towards the proposed law, while 
the right was more prepared to meet the demands of  the minorities.  Both advocates and 
opponents of  the law referred to international developments and influences.  For example, 
according to Karl Ast of  the Labour Party, it was clear that minority rights were not an issue 
for the League of  Nations and the Great Powers.  Therefore, the Estonian parliament did not 
need to adopt a law that threatened the integrity of  the Estonian state (Alenius (2003:329)). 
Deputy Palwadre of  the Social Democrats, on the other hand, stated that the Riigikogu had to 
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that there was no international pressure to introduce autonomy and that Estonia was already 
regarded as one of  the most advanced countries in this regard.  Foreign minister Hellat 
clashed with former Foreign minister Piip over the exact implications of  the Estonian 
admission request to the League of  Nations.  Contrary to Piip, who argued that the minority 
provisions of  the Constitution would suffice, Hellat stressed that the Estonian admission 
request implied an obligation to enact the law.  He emphasised the need to counter the legal 
attacks of  Baron Alphons Heyking (Vasara:490-491). 
Several Estonian speakers like Mihkel Martna and Karl Ast referred to the German and 
Russian repression of  the past.  Ast argued that by way of  cultural autonomy, the Germans 
would build a Trojan horse.  Also the Russians could not be trusted (Vasara:488).  Although it 
had supported the skeleton law in the Commission, the Estonian People's Party of  Jaan 
Tonissonjoined the opponents of  the law.  In fact, Tonisson and his party proved to be the 
main opponents of  the law.  The change in Tonisson's attitude towards the minorities was very 
striking.  In 1919, he had shown great sympathy with the demands of  the minorities.  Four 
years later, he was amongst the fiercest opponents of  autonomy.  In the debates, Alex De 
Vries compared Tonisson with Bobrikov, the former Russian General Governor in Finland. 
Probable reasons for this dramatic change in attitude were a shift in the international climate, 
developments such as the Landeswehr war and the constant criticism from the minorities of 
the Estonian elite (AI en  ius (2003:333)).  According to Tonisson, the Germans were trying to 
create a German colony and would misuse the law to the detriment of  the Estonian state.  The 
Estonians had to resist foreign pressure (Alenius (2003:330-331); Vasara:489). 
Generally, minority representatives emphatically rejected the claims that the objective of  the 
law was to isolate minorities from the rest of  the society.  The aim of  the law was simply to 
defend the cultural rights of  the minorities.  Max Bock denied the charge that the law would 
create privileges for the German minority and create a 'state within a state'.  He reminded the 
Social Democrats of  the ideas of their ideological allies Karl Renner and Otto Bauer and of 
the position of  their party fellow members in the commission (Garleff (1976: 1  08)).  In an 
extraordinary joint declaration, the minority delegates condemned the intention ofthe People's 
Party and of some Social Democrats "to stoke the national contrasts in long speeches, the 
purpose a/which is to delay the bill" (Garleff(1976:109)).  Besides the minority 
representatives, also Konstantin Pats, Eenpaiu, Anderkopp and Foreign minister Hellat 
pleaded for the establishment of  cultural autonomy. 
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Eenpalu ruled that the draft should be returned to the commission and then submitted to the 
new Riigikogu.  General Laidoner was the only representative of  the Peasant Union who 
wanted to adopt the draft in a second reading.  As Estonian representative to the League, he 
was fully aware of  the external value of  the law (Garleff(1976:109)). 
In July 1923, German and Russian representatives submitted a new joint draft, which was 
almost identical with the earlier proposals.  Also, church matters were now included in the 
self-government proposals. 
The final phase of  the adoption of  the Law on cultural autonomy of  1925 
In October 1923, the Estonian People's Party tabled an entirely new bill, based on the 
principle that the institutions of  autonomy would be under the control of  local authorities 
without any central coordinating authority.  The Estonian People's Party and the Social 
Democrats argued that decentralisation would place decision-making power in the hands of 
those to whom autonomy was most applicable.  On 19 July 1923, Tonission had stated that 
minority members could not be granted privileges because this would violate the Constitution. 
On 30 November 1923, the Pats government presented its own bill, which the commission 
with a great majority adopted as the new point of departure.  For the first time in the history of 
the Parliament, Social Democrats and the Peasant Union agreed (Garleff (1976: 1  09-11 0)). 
But the Estonian People's Party continued to oppose the law.  After Tonisson had warned that 
he would submit the law to a referendum, it became very clear that without support of  the 
Estonian People's Party, the law would not be adopted.  The law would not have survived a 
referendum (Vasara:493). 
A decisive breakthrough occured on 18 March 1924 between Tonisson, Hasselblatt, Pantenius 
and Ammende.  Tonisson dropped demands for decentralisation in return for assurances that 
autonomy would only relate to cultural affairs and would not be used as a political vehicle. 
The Germans also agreed that some measure of  decision-making would be delegated to the 
local level, especially with regard to the organisation of schools.  Further, members of  the 
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(1976: II  0); Alenius (2003 :335-336); Vasara:494). 
On the basis of  this agreement, a new draft was submitted by Werner Hasselblatt.  It was 
approved at a first reading on 6 June 1924.  However, a second reading on 14 June 1924 
failed because there was not a sufficient quorum.  In the months that followed, the 
parliamentary majority proved reluctant to hasten the bill through a second and third reading. 
Further discussion was delayed until the autumn (Vasara:496-497). 
The Communist putsch of 1 December 1924 forced the final breakthrough.  The putsch was 
thwarted but showed the necessity of  future national cohesion to preserve the young Estonian 
republic (Smith D J (2002:16); Von Rauch (1976:141)).  The law would consolidate the 
Estonian state because it would tum the members of  a very small but still influential minority 
into loyal citizens (Hasselblatt C (1996:50)). The minority government of  Akel wasTeplaced 
by the Jaakson government, in which both the centre, the Peasant Union and the Social 
Democrats participated.  The government and the minorities made use of  the events to solve 
their differences (Vasara:497).  In January 1925, Riigiwanem Jaakson and Interior minister 
Eenpalu told the German deputies that a rapid establishment of  cultural autonomy was in the 
general interest of  the country.  Accordingly, the government treated the draft as 'an urgent 
matter'.  After welfare had been removed from the competence of  the cultural self-
government, the bill was adopted in a second reading on 27 and 28 January 1925 (Garleff 
(1976: 111 )).  On 5 February 1925, it was adopted in a third and final reading. 
Why did the Riigikogu grant the minorities cultural autonomy?  First, minorities constituted a 
relatively small number of  the total population (12 per cent).  Second, the law separated 
politics and culture and ensured that the government remained in control.  Third, a failure to 
implement article 21  of  the Constitution would have weakened the international image of 
Estonia.  As mentioned above, the Estonians wanted a peaceful and democratic solution for 
the minority question.  One must also mention the persistent efforts of  the German deputies 
(Vasara:498-500).  Although the Germans indeed played a key role, the law would however 
never have been adopted without the support and backing of several leading Estonian 
politicians like Konstantin Piits, Karl Eenpalu and Anderkopp.  Kari Alenius has certainly a 
point when he terms them as the 'true fathers' of  the law (AI en  ius (2003:335). 
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A law for 'strong minorities' 
The Law on the Cultural Autonomy of  the Ethnic Minorities of 12 February 1925 (LCA) 
(German translation in: Kraus: 191-208) was a provisional skeleton law, containing the 
general principles and lines of  action regarding cultural autonomy.  In the explanation of  the 
law, the Estonian legislator termed the law as an unique experiment which no state in the 
world had ever applied.  Some practical experience was therefore necessary before the 
enactment of  a detailed and definitive law (Kraus:20 1).  Karl Aun argues that, historically 
speaking, this is incorrect.  He refers to the Jewish autonomy in the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, the (temporary) Minority Law of 1918 in Ukraine and the national registers 
in Austria, for example in Moravia (1905).  On the other hand, he agrees that, between the 
two world wars, the Estonian Republic was the only country which adopted and developed the 
idea of  a personal minority alliance as a public corporation (Aun:58). 
The law was concretised by two governmental decrees: the Governmental Decree on the 
organisation of  cultural autonomy of  the ethnic minorities of  8 June 1925 and the 
Governmental decree on the keeping of  national registers of 8 June 1925. 
The law and the two decrees were an implementation of  article 21  of  the Constitution.  The 
Manifesto of  24 February 1918 promised all the minorities cultural autonomy.  Although the 
wording of  article 21  of  the Constitution did not exclude certain minority groups ("The 
members of  minority nationalities ... "), the Constitutional Assembly considered 'national 
minorities' those having strong historical ties with the country (Maddison (1930:10)).  As 
mentioned above, article 23 of  the Constitution guaranteed only citizens of  German, Russian 
and Swedish origin the right to address themselves to the state's central institutions in their 
own language. 
The many conditions and the whole system of  the CLA made it clear that cultural autonomy 
was not intended for every minority group but only for the so-called 'strong minorities', 
having both the 'will' and the 'ability' to express, maintain and develop their culture 
(Kraus: 199). 
119 Under article 8 of  the law, the Germans, Swedes and Russians as well as any other minority 
totalling more than three thousand persons in the entire state were legally entitled to cultural 
self-government.  They could constitute themselves as public corporations. 
The assessment of  the necessary number of  members of  a minority (three thousand) as well as 
the actual exercise of  the right of  cultural self-government depended on the voluntary 
registration of  the mentioned groups in a national register and the subsequent participation of 
these persons in the election of  the institutions of self-government. 
The procedure for obtaining cultural autonomy and the membership of  cultural self-
government 
If  a minority - through its parliamentary representatives or cultural organisations - wanted to 
establish cultural self-government (article 16), a minority electoral list (Wahlregister)-
consisting of  the Estonian minority citizens qualified to vote - was drawn up, on the basis of 
the already existing data and declarations of  citizens about their ethnicity (article 17). 
Each registered citizen had the right to ask for his or her removal from the minority electoral 
list within two months after the publication of  this list.  Citizens who had not done this, were 
automatically enrolled in the national register (article 18).  Thus, the first minority electoral 
list constituted the basis of  the first national register (Kraus:207). 
Ifless than half of  the citizens qualified to vote in the last census enrolled in the national 
register, no further steps were taken and no new application by the minority could be made for 
three years (article 19).  Otherwise, the next step was to hold elections for a Cultural Council, 
the convocation of  which required the votes of  at least half of  the people in the register (article 
25).  Subsequently, at least two-thirds of  the members of  the Cultural Council had to opt for 
cultural autonomy.  Otherwise, the Cultural Council was dissolved and no new application 
could be made for three years (article 27). 
Membership of  the cultural self-government was determined by the national register.  This 
register constituted the pillar of  the cultural self-government (Kiminich (1985: 192-193)). 
Only those Estonian citizens, belonging to a certain minority and registered in the national 
register, were members of  the cultural self-government.  Following Renner's and Bauer's 
'personal principle' and its subsequent enshrinment in the Estonian Constitution of 1920, 
registration was done by way of  an individual and voluntary declaration.  Adherence to the 
cultural self-government was voluntary and left to the person's own discretion.  As Karl Aun 
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membership of  the cultural self-government (of  that nation).  Not the membership of  the 
public corporation determined the membership of  a nation of  a certain individual.  Instead, 
membership of  a national group, expressed and shown by a free and voluntary declaration, 
was the condition for membership of  the cultural self-government (Aun:57-58). 
The Cultural Council was obliged to terminate its activities when the total number of  its 
members dropped under 3,000, according to the data in het national register or when the total 
number of  people on this register dropped below 50 per cent of  the total number of  citizens of 
that ethnic group, as indicated in the last census (article 15).  In such case, the Germans, 
Swedes and Russians remained national minorities in the sense of  the law but they were no 
longer organised in a cultural self-government.  Other ethnic groups would no longer be 
national minorities in the legal sense but converted into minorities in a sociological sense. 
There were thus three categories of  minorities in Estonia: first, minorities in the purely 
sociological sense, second, national minorities entitled to cultural autonomy (according to the 
law) and third, those national minorities belonging to a cultural self-government (Plettner 
(1927: 1  00-1 01 )). 
As soon as a certain minority had established its own cultural self-government, the Estonian 
state and the local governments were no longer obliged to establish separate minority schools 
in their educational system for those minority members who did not belong to the cultural 
self-government.  As Erler notes, the constitutional right of  minority members to education in 
their mother tongue, was fully covered by the LCA, regardless of  the fact that not all members 
of  a certain minority belonged to the cultural self-government of  that minority (Erler:288). 
That the Estonian government was no longer obligated to organise minority schools for these 
people was not only fully justifiable but also in accordance with the constitutional principle of 
equality (article 6, first sentence of  the Constitution: "All Estonian citizens are equal in the 
eyes of  the law. ").  The principle of  equality of  treatment of  all citizens namely only implied 
and required that citizens belonging to a minority group and having both the will and the 
capacity to maintain and develop their own cultural life, possessed the same means for 
achieving this as the majority nation.  The preservation of  the culture ofthe majority nation 
was already fully assured by the organs of  the state (Kraus: 199). 
121 One can indeed argue with Erler that by operation of  the LCA, the Estonian state offered 
people belonging to a minority the necessary means to maintain and foster their own culture. 
One can assume that those minority members who preferred not to register, did not feel the 
same need to enjoy education in their mother tongue in minority schools as the members of 
the cultural self-government.  The Estonian state was therefore under no legal obligation to 
offer those people special education in their mother tongue, outside the cultural self-
government (Erler:288-289). 
The organisation of  cultural self-government 
The autonomous minority institutions were corporations of  public law.  Their organisation, 
competences and relationship with the state were modelled on those of  the (territorial) self-
government institutions of  the districts.  Because of  their structure, their greater elasticity and 
territorial range, these were more appropriate for the organisation of  the cultural self-
government than for example the self-government of  the towns (Kraus:202).  All the laws and 
decrees regulating these self-government institutions were also applicable on the institutions 
of  cultural self-government (article 1).  While the organisation of  cultural self-government 
reflected the one of  the self-government of  the districts, there was of  course one fundamental 
distinction.  While the local self-governments were territorially based institutions, cultural 
self-government was based on the principle of  personal autonomy.  The 'district' of  cultural 
self-government was the whole territory of  the state, encompassing all the scattered 
communities. 
The actual subject and the central decision-making body of  the cultural self-government was 
the Cultural Council.  Although the law itself termed the cultural self-government as an 
organ of  cultural autonomy, cultural self-government actually only referred to the total group 
of  members of the cultural self-government and to the organisation as such.  That the Cultural 
Council was the actual subject of  cultural autonomy resulted from article 27 of  the law which 
stated that at least two-thirds of  the Cultural Council had to opt for cultural autonomy 
(Veiter:112-113)). This institution, with not less than twenty and not more than sixty members 
(article 22 of  the law and article 13 of  the governmental decree on the organisation of  cultural 
autonomy), was elected by all registered members (article 11  of  the law).  Georg Brunner 
terms this institution as "the democratically elected parliamentarian quorum" of  the cultural 
122 self-government (Brunner (1996: 138)).  The Cultural Council was elected for three years 
(article 13 ofthe decree) but could be dissolved earlier by decision of  the government (article 
14 of the law) 
The Cultural Council decided upon the creation and liquidation of  the cultural self-
government, issued binding regulations within the powers of  the cultural self-government, 
adopted the budget, imposed the taxes upon the members, instituted the cultural curatoria if 
such were needed, and gave general directions to and supervised the activities of  the cultural 
self-government.  The office of  a councillor was an honorary one, but the expenses incurred 
on behalf of  its office were refunded.  The Cultural Council convened once a year for an 
ordinary session. 
The Cultural Council appointed the members of  the executive organ, the Cultural 
Government, the President and his assistants (article 45 of  the decree).  The members of  the 
Cultural Government had a honorary position.  The Cultural Government further consisted of 
permanent appointed public servants, with a Secretary as their head (articles 48-54 of  the 
decree). 
Although the Cultural Council was the decision-making body, the Cultural Government had 
considerable power in the agenda-setting and in the preparation of  the work of  the Council. 
The Cultural Council could only decide a matter which was not foreseen in the agenda with 
the permission of  the Cultural Government.  In this way, the Cultural Government with its 
administrative routine and expertise, was always well informed about the strategies of  the 
Cultural Council.  The executive organ could either stimulate or block certain initiatives of the 
Council (articles 26-27 of  the decree; Erler:287).  The Cultural Government represented the 
cultural self-government in its dealings with the Estonian government, with the other self-
governing institutions in Estonia, with private persons, and in the courts (Angelus:28).  It 
managed the properties, operated or supervised the schools and other cultural activities of  the 
cultural self-government, and employed the personnel.  When the Cultural Council was 
dissolved, the Cultural Government discharged the functions of  the Cultural Council until the 
new councillors were elected (Eide:254). 
Although the LCA was strongly influenced by Rudolf Laun's views, there were also some 
important distinctions.  In Laun's draft, cultural self-government was constructed from the 
bottom to the top, that is to say from the smallest administrative units to the bigger ones.  In 
123 Estonia, on the other hand, cultural self-government was elaborated by the (central) Cultural 
Council (Aun:58).  There was, however, a considerable participation from the local level. 
Since the cultural self-government would encompass the members of a certain minority on the 
whole territory of  Estonia, some Estonian politicians namely feared that a strong 
centralisation would be to the detriment of  the cultural life of specific local groups of  that 
minority.  The Estonian representatives Tonisson and laakson had proposed an extensive 
decentralisation to tackle this problem.  The General Affairs Commission elaborated a 
compromise (Kraus:204-205).  While the system of  personal autonomy remained the basis of 
the cultural self-government, the interests of local groups were better protected.  First, the 
elections to the Cultural Council were held in territorial constituencies (articles 23-24 of  the 
law).  By this, the Cultural Council was converted into an assembly of  local representatives 
(Angelus:27) and a tie was forged between the centre and the local groups.  Second, local 
boards of  curators were created to settle local issues and to take local decisions. 
Thus, cultural curatoria could be created for attending to the local affairs of  the minority. 
The members of  such a Curatorium were appointed by the Cultural Council from the local 
members of  the self-government.  These were honorary members.  The functionaries of  the 
Curatorium were proposed by the president ofthe Curatorium and appointed by the Cultural 
Government.  Written accounts of  the meetings of  these curatoria had to reach the Cultural 
Government within two weeks after the meeting concerned.  The curatoria had to send their 
budget and an overview of  their activities to the Cultural Government within a certain period, 
fixed by the Cultural Council.  The Curatoria kept their own local national registers in their 
areas (Angelus:28; Eide:254). 
In areas where a certain national minority constituted a local majority, it enjoyed territorial 
self-government.  Such territorial self-government could however harm the interests of  the 
Estonians as a local minority, for example regarding their educational needs.  That is why the 
government was empowered by the law to institute a personal cultural autonomy for the 
Estonians in those areas (Kraus: 198-199 and 208).  As Theodor Veiter argues, this was no 
defence mechanism of  the Estonian state against cultural autonomy as a system but simply a 
correction of  a lacune in the system of  territorial self-government (Veiter: 114). 
124 On the competences and financial means 
Once the Cultural Council had opted for cultural self-government, the institutions of  cultural 
self-government had the right to form, administer and support the public and private 
educational institutions of  the minority concerned.  The institutions of  cultural self-
government further operated and supervised theatres, libraries, museums and other institutes, 
which preserved and promoted the culture, language and customs of  the minority concerned. 
The institutions of  cultural self-government were completely autonomous in these affairs and 
assumed full responsibility (Erler:289). 
For educational and cultural purposes, the Cultural Council had the right to issue regulations 
which had binding force upon the members of  the cultural self-government.  For the same 
purposes, the Cultural Council could impose taxes upon the members of  the cultural self-
government (Uibopuu (1996:254)).  As a legal person, the cultural self-government as an 
organisation could acquire, own and alienate property and perform any kind of  legal 
transaction.  It could sue and be sued in the courts. 
Minority education was and is of  course of central importance for the cultivation of  the group 
identity.  It was the pillar of  the cultural self-government.  In the schools, the minority 
language was taught.  Through the system of  minority education, the pupils were familiarised 
with the minority culture, values and history.  Already in 1919, there were special minority 
sections in the Estonian Ministry of  Education.  The directors of  these sections were 
appointed by the government upon recommendation of  the minorities (Veiter:113). 
The main purpose of  cultural self-government was the support and extension of  a minority 
educational system.  This was for example reflected in the distribution of  the funds by the 
Estonian government to the German minority: approximately 80 per cent of  the subsidies 
went to the German educational system (Hasselblatt C (1996:54-55); Hasselblatt C (1996:44-
45)).  All the educational institutions in the mother tongue of  the minority were integrated in 
the cultural self-government.  They were transferred from the administration of  the districts 
and the state to the administration of  the cultural self-government.  For the members of  the 
minority concerned, the school administration of  the towns and districts was replaced by the 
administration of  the cultural self-government.  The unitary organisation and management of 
the minority schools was the main asset of  the cultural self-government.  For example, before 
the establishment of  the German cultural self-government, all German schools fell under the 
125 different municipalities which often pursued different policies regarding certain important 
matters.  The cultural self-government pursued the same policy towards all the German 
schools and could resolve all matters with global solution.  It could create new schools or 
move away old ones, where they were not longer necessary (Angelus: 13).  The school 
inspectors and the school councils of  the cultural self-government had the same legal 
authority and the same legal position vis-a.-vis the Ministry of  Education as the school 
inspectors and councils of  the organisations oflocal self-government (Kraus:203; 
Angelus:25). 
Another important distinction with Laun's draft as well as with the original legislative 
proposal was that the law did not contain provisions on social welfare.  This was foreseen in a 
later (special) legislation. 
The cultural self-government had five sources of  income.  The Estonian government provided 
subsidies for elementary and secondary education and expenditures.  The state and the local 
self-governments further supported the cultural development of  the minorities.  The 
expenditures for compulsory elementary education were paid exclusively by the state and 
local self-governments.  Subsidies for secondary schools were proportional to the number of 
their students.  Cultural self-government also included the right to draw the financial means 
for cultural purposes from the common public funds which were equally distributed among 
the entire population (Eide:255).  The Cultural Council could also impose public taxes upon 
the members of  the cultural self-government and accept gifts, collections, donations and 
endowments.  (article 6).  These 'cultural taxes' were calculated on the basis of  the general 
income tax.  More specifically, the taxpayers, belonging to the cultural self-government, were 
taxed on the basis of  the general income tax that they had paid the previous year (Angelus:26-
27).  The determination and levy of  the cultural taxes had to be requested at the Ministry of 
Finance and Education.  The Estonian government had to agree with the request (Kraus: 194). 
The issue of  domestic sovereignty 
The basic assumption of  the Estonian legislator was that only a nation itself is aware of  its 
cultural needs and the way to fulfil them (Kraus: 199).  The Estonian state carefully left room 
for every 'strong' (culturally conscious) minority to organise and maintain its own culture. 
126 The Estonians went out from the central premise that the state is not the same thing as the 
nation (Hampden Jackson (1941: 163)).  The Estonian approach towards the minorities 
question was a differentiation between state and nation on a functional basis (Kirch 
(1995: 12)).  The inherent nature of  cultural self-government in interwar Estonia is that the 
Estonian state indeed attempted to separate culture and politics.  To achieve this purpose, the 
state delegated its decision-making power in cultural and educational questions to special 
institutions of  a certain nation (Gerber (1927 :50-51 )).  After this delegation, the cultural self-
government became responsible for the organisation of  the cultural and educational questions 
(Guttmann (1931: 19)).  But  by establishing cultural self-government, the Estonian state did 
not renounce its ultimate legal authority in cultural and educational questions.  It remained the 
highest authority of  the members of  the cultural self-government (Veiter:78).  As Paul 
Schiemann notes, there was only one sovereign power on the territory of  the state and the 
Volksgemeinschaft had to recognised the precedence of  the state, also in its 'own areas' 
(Schiemann:35). 
Since cultural self-government was a kind of  self-government, it was by definition subjected 
to the control of  the state.  The law carefully fixed the boundaries of cultural self-government. 
The cultural self-governments were only entitled to fulfil the cultural needs of  their national 
group.  In case they exceeded their competences, the state had the right to dissolve the 
Cultural Council and to organise new elections (Angelus: 15).  Both the start and termination 
of  the activities ofthe cultural self-government required a decision from the government.  The 
levying of  public taxes, the elaboration of  a public school system, the electoral regulations for 
the first Cultural Council all required governmental approval.  The Estonian government was 
represented in the committee for the elections of  the Cultural Council (the candidate for the 
chairmanship of  this committee had to approved by the government).  It also fixed, on request 
of  this election committee, the total number of  the members of  the Cultural Council.  The law 
also explicitly subjected the minorities to a duty of  loyalty.  The state could suspend decisions 
from the Cultural Council, provided that it brought the case before the highest administrative 
court, which could then decide after a contradictory procedure (Hasselblatt W (1948:35)). 
The final aim of  this policy was to win the loyalty from all minorities towards the Estonian 
state, to unite all citizens in their common affairs, and to create a home country for all citizens 
(Kirch: 12).  In this regard, Eugen Maddison observes that Estonia was not a real nation state 
but a state in which all residing nations were united in the ''people of  Estonia" (Maddison 
(1928:416)). 
127 The German and Jewish cultural self-government 
Only six weeks after the enactment of  the law, on 11  April 1925, the German deputies and the 
German People's Secretary informed the Estonians about the desire of  the German minority to 
establish a cultural self-government.  At the end of  May 1925, an electoral register was 
established.  When this register was closed, it encompassed 97 per cent of  all the Germans, 
counted in the census of 1922.  The participation in the elections of 3-5 October 1925 was 67 
per cent.  At its opening session on 1 November 1925, the German Cultural Council 
unanimously decided to establish a cultural self-government.  It also fixed the general 
framework of  the internal organisation of  the cultural self-government (these provisional 
regulations were replaced by the definitive regulations of 17-18 March and 16 May 1929). 
On 4 November 1925, the Estonian government decreed the opening of  the cultural self-
government.  At its first regular session of 8 November 1925, the Cultural Council appointed 
the members of  the Cultural Government.  The Cultural Government consisted of  a president, 
a vice-president and four members.  Vice-president of  the Verband deutscher Vereine in 
Estland, Harry Koch, was appointed as president. 
The German Cultural Council consisted of  41  members.  From its members, the Council put 
together five specialised committees: a General Affairs Committee, a Committee of  Finance, 
a Committee for Legal Affairs, an Education Committee and a Committee for the National 
Register. 
The Cultural Government consisted of  the National Register Office, the Office for Culture, 
the Education Office and the Finance Office and a Committee for Sports and Youth 
(Maddison (1930:31); Hasselblatt C (1996:44)). 
While the National Register Office had to complete the national register, the Finance Office 
was given the task of settling all financial questions.  More specifically, it had to prepare the 
budget of  the cultural self-government and elaborate a tax regulation.  This regulation was 
approved at the second session of  the first Cultural Council in March 1926 (Mintz (1927: 130-
131). 
The Office of  Culture was competent for all other cultural issues.  It was divided into three 
subsections: the section for higher education, the section for general education issues and the 
section for scientific organisations and museums.  The latter had to organise the co-operation 
128 between German scientific organisations, elaborate an inventory and maintain and develop its 
collections, libraries and museums (Mintz: 130). 
The Education Office was the most important office of  the cultural self-government.  It was in 
charge of  the administration of  the German-speaking educational system.  Next to the head of 
the office, the Education Office consisted of  the Schulrat, the secretary and the pedagogical 
Bildungskonseil. 
In general, the objectives were a unified school system (encompassing both the private and 
public schools), free elementary education, education in the mother tongue for each Gelman 
child, a more efficient use ofthe means given by local authorities, the support of  public 
schools with cheaper tuition fees and the increased salaries for teachers.  On 25 and 26 March 
1928, President Koch announced that these objectives were almost completely met 
(Erler:293). 
By 1930, the German cultural self-government had compiled a register of 13,998 Germans.  It 
had taken over the management of  about a quarter of  the 25 German-language schools which 
catered for 3,456 pupils.  Steps were taken to implement a standard curriculum throughout 
German schools (Housden (2004:233)). 
Why did the German minority have such an interest in cultural autonomy? 
As Martyn Housden observes, there were several factors like the fear of  persecution, 
relatively low numbers and a geographical distribution which made it impossible for them to 
control local administrations in the provinces.  The most important element was, however, 
that cultural autonomy strongly related to the historical experiences and to the elite sense of 
identity of  the Baltic Germans in Estonia (Housden (2005:234)).  Werner Hasselblatt, whom 
is depicted by some as the father of  the law, regarded cultural autonomy as a means for 
preserving distinctive historical experiences of  the Baltic German community, which he saw 
as superior to the native population.  Cultural autonomy worked in any case with 
disproportionate effectiveness for the German minority (Housden (2004:238-239 and 243-
244; also: Garleff(1983:113-132)). 
129 From the spring of 1925, the Jewish minority also tried to obtain cultural autonomy.  The 
request was formulated on 19 October 1925 and the elections to the Cultural Council were 
held in May 1926.  The election participation was 71  per cent.  On 6 June 1926, the Jewish 
Cultural Council unanimously decided to establish cultural autonomy.  The Estonian 
government took note of  this decision on 16 June 1926. 
In its first regular session on 20 June 1926, the Jewish Cultural Council appointed the 
members of  the Cultural Govemment and endorsed the regulations of  the cultural self-
government.  On 17 October 1926, an Office for Culture, a National Register Office, an 
Education Office and an Economy Office were established within the Cultural Government 
(Maddison (1930:33)).  Yiddish was the administrative language while Yiddish and Hebrew 
were the languages in the Jewish schools. 
Only the Germans and the Jews, both living in scattered settlements, decided to establish a 
cultural self-government.  The traditional argument goes that for the Swedes, settling in 
compact form, and the Russians, who were less conscious of  identity, the possibilities of 
general communal self-government sufficed.  In districts where minorities made up 50 per 
cent or more of  the population, the Constitution namely provided for state-funded education 
in the language of  the minority concemed.  In different municipal government, these groups 
constituted a majority and a cultural self-government would bring them no added value 
(Maddison (1930:34); Brunner: 137; Alenius (2003)).  David Smith and Rein Ruutsoo suggest 
also other explanations like the inability of  the Russians to organise and their weak cultural 
organisation (Smith D J (2001 :9-10); Ruutsoo (1995:563-564)). 
The Russian theorist Mikhail Kurchinskii strongly pleaded for cultural self-government.  As a 
member ofthe centre-right Russian National Union, Kurchinskii was elected in 1926 to the 
Riigikogu where he headed the Russian faction.  In 1927, Kurchinskii was one of  the first 
Russian delegates to attend the Congress of  European Minorities (Smith D J (1999:458)).  In 
his view, only a cultural self-government could provide an adequate guarantee of  the national 
rights and the cultural development of  the Russian minority.  He argued that under the 
existing system of  municipal schooling, the Russians only had a limited autonomy in terms of 
staff selection and the content and development of  the curriculum (Smith D J (1999:461). 
With regard to the difficult material circumstances of  the Russians and the huge sum (320,000 
kroons) spent annually by the German Cultural Council, Kurchinskii noted that 65 per cent of 
130 the Germans' expenditure came from the state and local government subsidies, and only 
75,000 kroons from the community itself.  He argued that 91,000 Russians could easily 
collect the same sum as  18,000 Germans.  Moreover, the territorially dispersed German 
minority was obliged to maintain more primary and secondary schools than the Russians. 
With regard to the rural poverty among the Russians, Kurchinskii suggested that cultural 
autonomy taxes be raised on a progressive basis.  The (wealthier) towns would bear a 
proportionately larger share of  the cost (Smith D J (1999:462)). 
Evolution of  the cultural self-government 
At the European Minorities Congress of 1931, the Estonians Eugen Maddison (Maddison held 
an important civil service post in the Ministry of  Internal Affairs) and the President of  the 
Estonian Socialist Party, Mihkel Martna, explained that the system of  cultural autonomy had 
led to a better co-operation and understanding between the Estonian nation and the minorities. 
The earlier objections proved to be unfounded (Grundmann:350-351; Garleff (1990:101)). 
The integrative function of  cultural autonomy was appreciated by the Estonians.  Cultural 
self-government also exempted the state from the extensive duty to develop an educational 
system for the minorities (Garleff (1994:499)).  According to Simon Dubnow and Jacob 
Robinson, the autonomy in Estonia was "the most consistent one" (Lapidoth (1997:222)). 
The Constitution of 1933 left the provisions of  Constitution of 1920 regarding the 
fundamental rights and freedoms unchanged.  Whereas the Constitution of 1920 was a 
'radical democratic' Constitution, the Constitution of 1933 already contained some features of 
an authoritarian regime.  More and more Estonian politicians warned that cultural autonomy 
amounted to "a state within a state".  The Estonian government announced the reform of 
cultural self-government in order to prevent 'alien bodies' in the Estonian state (Aun:70-71). 
The decree of  the Riigivanem of  29 October 1934 restricted the freedom of choice of  national 
origin.  It stipulated that each person, who personally or whose father or grandfather (on 
father's line) had been listed in municipality on the country, was of  Estonian origin, unless he 
or she could prove to belong to another nation (Angelus:21-22; Hasselblatt C (1996:70); Aun: 
71). 
131 The administrative reform of 1934 limited the rights of  all self-governments, including those 
of  the cultural self-government.  The language law of  October 1934 and the language 
regulation of 3 January 1935 aimed at Estonianisation.  On the other hand, minority languages 
were not removed.  On the contrary, the right to use a minority language was explicitly 
permitted (Hasselblatt C (1996:69)). 
While the Constitution of 1920 had stated that every Estonian citizen had the right to choose 
his or her national origin, the Constitution of 1937 stipulated that every Estonian citizen only 
had the right to preserve his or her national origin.  This restriction of  the freedom of  choice 
of  national origin was not contested.  The Germans feared for example that too many 
Estonians would enrol in their national register in order to visit the schools of  the German 
cultural self-government (Hasselblatt C (1996:67)).  The right to receive education in the 
mother tongue was not guaranteed in the Constitution anymore, but would be regulated by 
law.  Also the right of  Estonian citizens of  German, Swedish or Russian origin to 
communicate with the administration in their mother tongue was abolished.  On the other 
hand, minority citizens retained a constitutional right to establish institutions of  self-
government.  In these localities where they constituted a majority, they could continue to use 
their mother tongue in relation to the local governments (Hasselblatt C (1996:67-68)). 
After the introduction of  the system of  proportional representation, only the larger, compact 
Russian minority was able to send representatives to the First Chamber.  The Constitution of 
1937 however granted the German and Jewish cultural self-governments a common seat in the 
Second Chamber of  the Estonian parliament (Veiter: 116; Hasselblatt C (1996:68)).  Helmuth 
Weiss, the vice-president of  the German cultural self-government, was the first common 
representative.  In 1937, the state president unilaterally appointed the Jewish representative 
Gutkin, after the German and Jewish minorities failed to reach an agreement on a common 
representation (Garleff (1990: 1  02-1 03)). 
Apart from the restriction of  the freedom of nationality choice, the cultural self-governments 
and the national-personal principle continued to exist in authoritarian Estonia.  The concept of 
cultural autonomy remained anchored in Estonian public law.  Evidently, the basic principles 
were weakened (Aun:70-72; Veiter:116). 
132 The practical operation of personal autonomy in Latvia 
The school autonomy in Latvia 
The organisation of  school autonomy in Latvia 
The basic principle of  the legislation was the principle of  general, free and compulsory 
education in ones' native language.  The children of  each nation were entitled to education in 
their mother tongue.  The school-aged children (6-16) (article 33 LEI), belonging to a 
minority, had a right to be taught in the language of  their family (article 39 LEI prescribed 
compulsory education in the language of  the family; in all the compulsory schools, instruction 
had to be given in the pupil's family language).  The family language was the language, as 
declared by the parents, at the registration of  the child (subjective criterion) and in which the 
child could express her or his thoughts (objective criterion) (article 40 LEI).  The law foresaw 
neither a control of  the communication by the parents of  the family language nor on the 
expression possibilities of  the child.  Because it was not possible the challenge the parents' 
communication, they autonomously decided over the instruction language and the subsequent 
integration of  their child into a certain minority group.  This was all the more important 
because there was no nationality register in Latvia (Laserson (1931 :413); Mintz: 112). 
The right to be taught in one's own language, on the one hand, implied that a minority had the 
right to demand instruction in its own language from the state.  On the other hand, it meant 
that a minority was entitled to organise its own educational system (Brandenburg: 17-18).  The 
Latvian legislation provided both opportunities. 
The state and local authorities had to establish for each nation the number of  compulsory 
schools necessary for the education of  the children of  that nation.  Minorities were entitled to 
require the establishment of  a separate class if  at least thirty pupils of  a certain minority were 
enrolled (article 41  LEI; according to Engelmann, this was intended for the children, living in 
the country (Engelmann:21)).  To safeguard this right, the law provided for a representative of 
each minority on the school board (article 58 LEI).  A group of  pupils, which was too small in 
number (less than 30) to demand a particular minority class, could enjoy private education in 
its own language or go to a school with another education language (article 41  LEI). 
133 Furthermore, each minority was entitled to establish its own school for its school-aged 
children.  According to article 3 of  the LSA, legal entities and natural persons of  a minority 
could establish and maintain schools, in which instruction was provided in the mother tongue 
of  the minority concerned.  When a minority wanted to organise compulsory education, it 
needed permission from the Latvian Education minister.  According to article 2 of  the LEI, 
also legal entities and natural persons were entitled to set up educational institutions provided 
they received permission from the Education minister.  Read together with article 3 of  the 
LSA, this provision also encompassed minority groups. 
The programmes of  the minority schools had to be on the same level as those of  the Latvian 
schools (article 4 and 14 of  the LSA).  The Latvian language, history and geography were an 
obligatory part of  the curriculum of  the minority schools (Engelmann:22).  In principle, the 
minorities autonomously composed their education programme but this programme needed 
approval from the Education minister.  The minorities were entitled to choose their own 
teachers.  To assure proper educational standards, the law required that these teachers 
received the same pedagogical and scientific training as Latvian teachers. 
The LSA instituted an autonomous educational system for the minorities.  It guaranteed the 
minorities school autonomy. 
The whole school system of  a minority was directed and administered by one of  the special 
minorities sections of  the Minorities Department established within the Ministry of  Education 
(article 6, first sentence LSA).  The Minorities Department of  the Ministry of  education 
consisted of  a Russian, German, Jewish, Polish and White Russian section, each 
administering their respective school system.  These sections could be considered as "small 
education ministries" (Laserson:41 0).  The section was headed by a director of  education who 
fell directly under and was only answerable to the Education minister (article 6, second 
sentence LSA).  The director of  education represented his minority group in all cultural 
questions and could participate in an advisory capacity in the sessions of  the Council of 
Ministers whenever cultural questions were discussed (article 7 LSA). 
Awaiting the foreseen statutory representation of  the minorities, the director of  education was 
appointed by the Council of  Ministers upon recommendation of  the parliamentary 
representatives of  the minority (article 8 LSA).  Also the other functionaries of  the minorities 
section were appointed by the Education minister (Brandenburg: 19) upon recommendation of 
the minority (article 9 LSA). 
134 Although he was put forward by the minority, the director of  education was not answerable to 
the minority.  He was a civil servant who was only answerable to the Latvian state. He was 
appointed and dismissed by way of  a decision of  the Council of  Ministers (Brandenburg: 18). 
In case of  a motion of  no-confidence, the Council of  Ministers was only obliged to give an 
official reason for the appointment.  It could not be forced to dismiss the director 
(Brandenburg: 18-19). 
Each minorities section had a Council of Schools, consisting of  the director of  education, the 
leading officials of  the subdivisions, three representatives from the teaching staff and three 
minority representatives (article 10 LSA).  This Council was convened by the director 
whenever necessary and in any case four times a year.  It also convened upon request of  four 
of  its members (article 11  LSA).  According to the law, the Council of  Schools could only 
advise on the opening, restructuring and closing of  schools, as well as on the employment and 
dismissal of  officials and teachers.  It could make proposals and demand their discussion 
(article 13 LSA).  The Council advised on the base of  the proposals of  the director (article 12 
LSA).  The law did not determine which institution actually decided.  By way of  two 
ministerial circulars of  respectively 11  February 1922 and 15 September 1923 - on the 
initiative of  the Baltic Germans (Engelmann:34) - the Council of Schools acquired the right of 
decision.  Such ministerial decisions, however, did not provide the minorities with the 
necessary legal security.  Such circulars could namely be abolished by later ministerial 
decisions without a parliamentary debate, let alone decision. 
The individual schools were run by school conferences, consisting of  the school director, a 
School Council and a Pedagogic Council (article 15 LSA together with 28-31  LEI).  Next to 
the general administrative tasks, the school conference could recommend the appointment of 
teachers.  The teacher was then appointed by the Education minister or the municipal school 
administration. 
The Latvian state delegated its right of supervision to the inspectors of  the obligatory schools. 
By way of  a decision of  the Education minister of  28 May 1927, the school administrations 
acquired the right to appoint their own inspectors.  By this, the control right by the general 
state inspectors was limited to a control on the obligatory instruction of  the Latvian language 
(Veiter: 132). 
135 Financial provisions 
There was a fundamental distinction between the compulsory and the other schools. 
Since the compulsory schools taught the obligatory minimum programme required in Latvia, 
they were supported by the Latvian state to a maximum (Engelmann:21).  Specifically with 
regard to the minorities, the state and municipal institutions were legally obliged to support 
those compulsory schools of  which the establishment was required by the law (article 41 
LEI).  They were also subsidised to a maximum.  The compulsory schools which were 
established by a minority without the imperative need in the sense of  the law, had to be 
supported by the minority itself (Brandenburg:21). 
The programme of  other schools went beyond the obligatory minimum curriculum.  For that 
reason, these schools were not subsidised to a maximum.  The state and the municipalities 
were obliged to support minority schools commensurate with their share in the state 
population (article 2 LSA). 
The issue of  domestic sovereignty 
Moritz Mintz and Max Laserson argued that the minorities in Latvia constituted public 
corporations.  In their view, the minorities were legal entities, enjoying a collective right to 
have their own school system.  In a recent publication, also Ruth Lapidoth terms these 
minorities as 'collective entities', having the right to have their own schools (Lapidoth:95). 
Mintz stressed that the law spoke of the "schools of  minorities" and argued that an 
autonomous school system with its own institutions presupposed a minority constituted as a 
legal corporation.  In his view, this was explicitly confirmed by the law itself, which foresaw 
a "statutory representation of  the national minorities" (Mintz:l13).  Laserson qualified the 
national minority as a subject, enjoying the right to have national autonomy.  Like Mintz, he 
referred to the legal terminology (Schulen der Minderheitennationalitaten).  The school 
system belonged to the minorities as 'entities of  public law' being part of  the Latvian state 
nation.  The whole organisation of  the school system was a reflection of  the minority group as 
such.  Only as an entity of  public law could the minority be considered as an organised 
component ofthe Latvian state nation in the sense of  the Political Platform.  In Laserson's 
view, the institutions ofthe school autonomy were not educational institutions but institutions 
of  the minority itself (Laserson:410-412). 
136 This thesis was rejected by other authors. 
Both Engelmann and Brandenburg argued that the minorities in Latvia were not corporations 
of  public law because they had never acquired such legal personality.  The aim of  the 
proposals of  minority representatives was exactly to convert minorities into corporations of 
public law.  Engelmann described the minorities in Latvia as "sociological collectivities". 
Both lawyers weakened Mintz' argument that the parliamentary representatives were in fact 
minority institutions.  In their view, each member of  the Saeima was in the first place 
representative of  the "whole people".  Engelmann further indicated that the later article 14 of 
the Constitution explicitly enacted the representation of  the "whole nation" by each member 
of  the Parliament (Engelmann: 16; Brandenburg: 19). 
Theodor Veiter qualified the role of  the parliamentary representatives of  minority parties in 
the system of  school autonomy even as a violation of  constitutional law.  This could namely 
lead to a politicisation of  the objectives of  the nations (Veiter:133-134).  Contrary to Estonia, 
the minorities in Latvia could not constitute themselves into public corporations to which the 
state then delegated competences.  By way of  their parliamentary representatives, the minority 
groups only made recommendations for certain appointments.  The minorities only 
participated in the administration of  the state education.  They were not subjects of  school 
autonomy.  The only subjects of  school autonomy were the administrations ofthe school 
system, namely the director of  education and the different civil servants.  The statutes of  the 
Ministry of  education of 1929 explicitly provided for each minority a school administration 
(article 22 of  the statutes of  the Education ministry provided a school administration for the 
Russian, Jewish, Polish and Belorussian minority).  Veiter underlined that the director of 
education and his civil servants were not institutions of  an autonomous organisation but pure 
institutions of  the state.  The law did not transfer competences.  The school administrations 
only implemented the agenda and the tasks of  the Education ministry (Veiter:130 and 133). 
The school autonomy for the minorities in Latvia was indeed not a full autonomy.  Werner 
Hasselblatt perfectly summarises the whole system as "the division of  the state administration 
in national-cultural departments or sections" (Hasselblatt W (1948:34)).  In this regard, 
Michael Garleff observes that the 'school autonomy' in Latvia was administered by a special 
department within the Education ministry.  It was not directed by a public corporation (Garleff 
(1990:98); also: Veiter: 130-134). 
137 Much more than the public corporations in Estonia, the school administrations of  the 
minorities in Latvia depended on the ever changing general political situation and 
governments.  In right-wing governments, the German minority and the Jewish 
representatives of  the 'Agudat Israel' were able to influence the school administration.  In left-
wing governments, the Zionists and radical Russians gained the upper hand (Garleff 
(1990:98».  Samuel Friedman notes that on one occasion, there was a serious conflict 
between the Jewish minority and the officials of  the Jewish department.  The officials 
intended to russify the Jewish schools, while the Jewish minority itself stressed that the 
Jewish pupils had to be instructed in Hebrew or Yiddish.  In case of  a possible conflict 
between the minorities and the government, it was possible, in his view, that a minority 
department was composed of  people loyal to the government (Friedman: 166). 
Cultural autonomy in Latvia 
Important to note is that contrary to the Estonian Constitution, the Latvian Constitution did 
not contain an 'autonomy guarantee'. 
The Latvian rump constitution of 15 February 1922 
On 17 and 18 April 1920, elections to the Constitutional Convention were held.  In the 
balloting, in which nearly 85 per cent ofthe electorate took part, 24 political parties and voter 
groups fielded candidates.  152 delegates were chosen.  Most votes went to the Social 
Democratic Workers Party (52 seats) and the Latvian Agrarian Union (26 seats).  Several 
political parties representing the largest minorities (Germans, Jews and Russians) gained at 
least one seat in the Convention (Zile (1999:312». 
The Constitutional Convention opened on 1 May 1920 with a three-prolonged mandate: to act 
on urgent legislative bills, to work out a comprehensive agrarian reform, and to debate and 
adopt a constitution. 
Before turning to its principal task, the Convention issued a brief Declaration governing the 
State of  Latvia on 27 May 1920.  On 1 June 1920, it passed a set of  provisional regulations on 
the structure of  the Latvian state.  The declaration consisted of  two short sentences:  "1. 
138 Latvia is an independent Republic based on the principles of  a democratic country.  2.  The 
sovereign power of  the Latvian State belongs to the Latvian people. ".  The evident purpose of 
this declaration was merely to reinforce the 18 November 1918 proclamation which had been 
backed by a gathering less representative than the Constitutional Convention (Zile 
(1999:313».  The provisional regulations restated the principles announced in the Political 
Platform in greater detail (Graham (1928:694-695». 
The Convention chose a twenty-six-member Constitutional Committee.  This Committee 
divided itself into two subcommittees, one to work on the state structure (Part One), the other 
on individual rights and freedoms (Part two). 
With the help of  the Social Democrats, Paul Schiemann and other minority representatives 
managed to enshrine two 'minority articles' in the draft ofthe Constitution (Garleff 
(1990:92».  On 7 February 1922, the Constitutional Committee approved the two articles. 
Article 115 guaranteed persons belonging to minorities the right to use their own language 
and foresaw a future legislation regarding the use of  languages in the state institutions and the 
judiciary.  Article 116 stated that minorities could establish their own public corporations to 
handle their national and cultural affairs.  A special law would determine the entitled subjects 
and regulate the institutional structure and competences of  that corporation (Mintz: 11 0).  As 
Gert Engelmann notes, these articles provided the basis for a cultural autonomy, modelled on 
that of  Estonia (Engelmann: 16). 
The final text of  the whole Part Two, containing the individual rights and freedoms and the 
two 'minority articles', was however rejected in a third reading on 5 April 1922 because of  the 
abstention of  the Social Democrats and the representatives of Latgale.  These political groups 
did not reject the autonomy for minorities but were opposed to other parts of  the chapter.  The 
Social Democrats did not want to accept limitations on the right to strike, while the Catholic 
representatives of  Latgale fulminated against the separation between church and state.  The 
latter also strove for territorial autonomy for Latgale (Silde (1990:65». 
On the one hand, the Latvian Constitution (Graham (1928:338-343 and 695-705); also: Zile 
(1999:314-316»  vested the sovereign power of  the Latvian state in "the people" (article 2: 
"The sovereign power of  the Latvian State shall be vested in the people. ").  Sovereign was not 
the 'Latvian nation', 'the ethnic Latvian people' but the whole population of  Latvia, the whole 
state nation including the minorities (Von Stryck-Helmet (1928:53».  The Constitution placed 
139 persons belonging to minorities on an equal footing with the members of  the majority nation 
(article 82:  "All citizens shall be equal before the law and the Courts of  Justice. ").  Minority 
members had the same civil and political rights as the Latvians.  In this way, they could 
actively participate in the public life of  the Latvian state (Engelmann: 17). 
On the other hand, it did not contain a list of  individual rights and freedoms like the Estonian 
Constitution and also no guarantee that the promise of  autonomy would be held.  This is why 
Paul Schiemann termed the Latvian Constitution as a 'rump constitution' (Hiden (2004:84); 
Dribins:291 ). 
The attempts to establish cultural autonomy 
After the rejection of  the Jewish draft by minister Kaspersons, the discussion regarding 
cultural autonomy had been postponed to the spring of 1921. 
By June 1921, the Committee of  German Balt parties had formed an 'autonomy commission' 
which elaborated some legislative proposals.  This commission contacted German minorities 
in other countries and other minorities in Latvia.  In particular, the co-operation with the 
Baltic Germans in Estonia and the discussions with the Jewish representatives (above all 
Mintz) proved to be fruitful. 
Only the first draft strove for a general minority autonomy.· On 8 June 1921, this proposal 
was converted into a particular bill specifically relating to the German community in Latvia. 
On Schiemann's explicit advice, the draft excluded minority social welfare needs (except 
where state or municipal provision was poor) in order not to offend the Latvians (Hiden 
(2004:83)).  The German minority did not want to act together with the other minorities; it 
wanted to maintain a free hand in the development of  the bill and in the choice of  options. 
However, the Germans internally disagreed over the exact content of  the proposal.  The 
Progressive Party (Fortschrittliche Parte  i) and the Manufacturers' Association 
(Fabrikantenverein) rejected the foreseen obligatory taxes.  They feared for a flight of  capital, 
resulting in a demographic decline of  the German minority.  The Progressive Party also 
considered the obligatory national register as a restriction of  the free will.  But finally, it sided 
with the other German parties to avoid a fragmentation of  the German minority.  On 25 March 
1922, Paul Schiemann submitted the bill to President Caskste, requesting the consideration of 
the draft by the Constituent Assembly. 
140 The German attempts to push through the bill failed.  Because of  both internal and external 
reasons, the second draft was postponed until the end of 1923.  On the one hand, the 
minorities only had a weak influence on the then Latvian government.  On the other hand, the 
Baltic Germans wanted to await the reulst of  the negotiations in Geneva regarding the Latvian 
minority declaration.  After the approval of  the declaration in September 1923, the Germans 
hoped for more concessions, all the more so because five minority representatives were 
members of  the then coalition government.  On 15 September 1923, the German faction 
proposed in the Public Law Commission the 'Legislative project concerning the national 
cultural autonomy fo the German national community and the use of  the German language in 
Latvia' (Hiden (2004:100».  According to Schiemann and the Baltic German faction, each 
minority had to be granted its own autonomy law in order to develop autonomously its 
individual and unique culture. 
Also the other minorities submitted bills.  These drafts were modelled on the German bill to 
ensure that the Baltic Germans received no preferential treatment (Hiden (2004: 1  03». 
Because of  the particular confessional, cultural and ecclesiastical interests and features of  the 
Russian and Jewish minority (Mintz: 116; Erler:296), these bills differed from each other on 
some issues.  The drafts had in general a similar structure.  The first chapter treated the 
organisation of  the minority, the second regulated the school system and the third pertained to 
the use of  the minority language. 
In the German bill, all the Latvian citizens of  German origin were obligatory members of  the 
German community, which was a public corporation.  An indication in the identification card 
determined who belonged to the German minority.  Initially, the Estonian system of  a national 
register was foreseen (Veiter:223).  An individual had a free choice of nationality and this 
indication could thus be changed.  The actual subject and most important institution of  the 
autonomy was the Nationalrat.  This was the central organ, consisting of  58 members.  It 
assembled at least once a year in Riga.  The 12 Bezirksriite had legal personality.  Both 
institutions were composed by way of general elections. 
The German bill provided that the German minority would autonomously administer its 
cultural affairs, school system and welfare.  It foresaw only a limited financial autonomy. 
Eventually, self-taxation was dropped.  The sources of  income consisted of government 
subsidies, fund-raising and the management of  own funds.  Further, the draft summed up a 
few individual language rights like the free use of  language in private and public life. 
141 Actually, the chief objective of  the draft was the legal anchoring of  the different existing 
regulations.  The institutions of  the German school system would thus further exist as 
institutions within the Latvian Education ministry.  Evidently, this moderated the officially 
pursued aim of  the draft, namely cultural autonomy (Veiter:224; Erler:297; Plettner:97). 
The internal opposition within the German camp increased.  Both the left (Rigasche 
Nachrichten) and the right (under leadership of  Professor Sokolowski) opposed the obligatory 
national register and the taxation right.  According to Professor Sokolowski, autonomy would 
erect a 'dividing wall' between Latvians and Germans (Hiden (2004:101)). 
This in tum strengthened the argument of  the Latvian opponants of  the lew that German 
autonomy would create a 'state within a state'.  Schiemann dropped the national register and 
the right of  taxation and agreed not to consider the Nationalrat as a public corporation.  On 19 
February 1925, the transformed bill was unanimously adopted by the Public Law commission 
(Hiden (2004:102)). 
The bill however met strong resistance in the Education commission.  The leader of  the 
Latvian nationalists, Skalbe, started a sharp debate which was continued in the public sphere. 
In the turbulent months of  March and April 1925, Karl Keller offered his dismissal as head of 
the German school administration which he withdrew afterwards.  On 28 April 1925, Paul 
Schiemann announced before the Seniorenkonvent the withdrawal of  the bill because of  the 
"demagogic environment".  The German faction hoped for its adoption by the following 
parliament. 
Karl Keller indicated some official reasons for the withdrawal of  the bill.  First, it was 
necessary to collect and evaluate first some practical experiences of  the Deutsch-Baltische 
Arbeitszentrale.  Second, he argued that the most important cultural interests were already 
protected by the existing institutions of school autonomy.  Third, Keller explained that the 
Education commission had been charged with the elaboration of a general education law.  The 
Baltic Germans would first await the impact of  this law on the school autonomy. 
Schiemann did not end his fight for autonomy and pleaded for a general minorities law.  This 
was resisted by Baron Fircks and Karl Keller who emphasised the historical position of  the 
Baltic Germans.  They did not want to be put on the same par as the Russians and the Jews. 
142 Fircks argued that an implementation of  cultural autonomy was no longer necesssary, given 
the school legislation, the Herder-Institut and the future Education law. 
It was only in 1930 that Baron Fircks agreed with a skeleton law, modelled on the Estonian 
example.  The pressing financial situation namely required an obligatory taxation.  f:Iowever, 
the German group remained divided on the question whether a general law or a special law 
had to be framed. 
The unofficial Baltic German Cultural authority in Latvia 
Although a formal full cultural autonomy was never introduced in Latvia, there was an 
unofficial Baltic German Cultural authority. 
The administration of  the German school system already started its activities from 1 January 
1920, first under Dr. Karl Keller, then under Wolfgang Wachtsmuth.  The statutes of  the 
Education ministry provided that the administration "treated all the educational and cultural 
matters of  its people and ensured the education and the schools" (Von Hehn (1982: 11 )).  The 
administration was supported by the Teachers' Union, directed by Friedrich von Samson. 
This institution reformed the whole of  the educational programme for Baltic German schools, 
and made up any deficit in the funds provided by the Latvian state or the local authorities 
(Von Rauch (1976:144)). 
In 1923, this association merged with all the other Baltic German cultural associations in 
Latvia to form the Centre for Baltic German Work (Zentrale deutsch-baltischer Arbeit) (Von 
Rauch (1976:144)).  This organisation was formally a department of  the Committee of 
German Balt parties.  Its purpose was to co-ordinate the activities of  all its member 
associations and institutions (Von Hehn: 12).  The Centre was established as a result of  the 
failure to integrate minority rights in the Constitution (the articles 115 and 116), and proved 
all the more necessary when the bill on autonomy was rejected (Brandenburg: 14).  In 1926, 
the Centre introduced a system of  voluntary taxation (Selbstbesteuerung), whereby all Baltic 
Germans living in Latvia were asked to contribute a regular monthly tithe of  between 0.5 and 
3 per cent oftheir income (Von Rauch (1976:144)).  This system of  voluntary taxation 
replaced the earlier system of  half-yearly fund-raising for educational and social purposes.  In 
the workshops and pharmacies, subscription lists were laid.  Germans were visited in their 
143 homes to give a certain amount.  Evidently, this system could not compensate the rising 
expenditures.  The Centre was never able to work with a fixed budget because the receipts 
depended upon the good will of  the donors (Boettcher (1928:546)). 
In the system of self-taxation, every working German assessed his financial contribution on 
the basis of  the directives of  the Taxation Committee (Selbstbesteuerungskommission).  There 
was no tax-free income but the family composition and needs were taken into account. 
According to Wilhelm von Rudiger, self-taxation was the "litmus test" to see wheth~r 
someone really wanted to belong to the German community (Von Hehn:13). 
The Centre was fundamentally reorganised.  From an umbrella organisation of  institutions, it 
became "an organisation of  tax-payers".  All persons who joined the system of  voluntary 
taxation, were united in work communities (Arbeitsgemeinschaften), of  which the umbrella 
organisation was the Centre for Baltic German Work.  The ultimate aim was to unite all 
Germans in one organisation.  For this reason, the Centre was transformed into the Baltic 
German National Community (die deutsch-baltische Volksgemeinschaft) in 1928.  This 
organisation was a completely representative body which was built up from local work 
communities.  They sent their representatives to an elective diet (Delegiertentag), which met 
twice a year in Riga.  The elective diet then chose an executive organ (Hauptvorstand) which 
met at least once a month.  The German Members of  Parliament were by definition members 
of  this executive organ. 
Gradually, a custom arose according to which the German faction in the Saeima submitted its 
recommendation for the appointment of  the director of  education to the Delegiertentag.  By 
this, the outside world would know that the German minority, the Volksgemeinschaft, was a 
very knit organisation, consisting of  all the Germans (Brandenburg: 15). 
In 1930, the Volksgemeinschaft established special offices (Amtern) for different areas, 
namely the Cultural Office (Amtfiir Kulturhilfe), the Welfare Office (das Fiirsorgeamt), the 
Youth Office (das Jugendamt), the Country Office (das Landamt) and the Office for 
Employment Advice (Berufsberatungsamt) (Brandenburg: 14; Von Hehn:13). 
Georg Von Rauch noted that although the German minority was not constituted as a public 
corporation, the private Baltic German National Community fulfilled the same functions as 
the Baltic German cultural authorities in Estonia (Von Rauch (1976:144)). 
144 Evolution of  the school and cultural autonomy 
When the law was adopted, not all sides were satisfied with it.  The Social Democrats 
considered that school autonomy alone would not solve the minority problem and pleaded for 
a special law on national-cultural autonomy.  On the other hand, the Right felt that the 
minorities had been given too many rights and privileges.  They only welcomed the.fact that 
the funds for the minority schools would be distributed according to the proportion of 
inhabitants, rather than the number of children, of  a certain national group.  The minorities 
welcomed the law.  For example, the Jewish activist Mikhaeli declared:  "This law,  unique 
and unprecedented at the time, was an outstanding achievement by Latvian statesmen who, at 
the historical moment of  setting up their state, succeeded in rising above the ancient quarrels 
between nationalities and ingrained hatreds of  Russia and Germany, and surmounted the 
fears expressed in many quarters about the danger of  cultural autonomy to Latvian 
sovereignty." (Saleniece and Kuznetsovs (1998:243)).  The system of school autonomy was 
first attacked by a decree of  Education minister Gailits.  He proposed to eliminate the 
minorities' inspectorate, relegate minority education chiefs to lower salary grades, and enforce 
the use of  Latvian in the conduct of  all school administration.  After a fight by Schiemann and 
others, a compromise was reached in late March 1923.  Private assurances were given to the 
German fraction that Latvian inspectors would only gather information, and not issue 
directives.  This arrangement permitted German inspectors to continue in a semi-official 
capacity, no longer as civil servants but as 'school councillors' of  the Baltic German Parent's 
Association.  The inception of  a new Meierovics administration on 26 June 1923, and Latvia's 
preparations to sign a minority declaration only brought marginal improvement in the 
bargaining position of  the minorities.  Only after Meierovics' own precarious cabinet was 
replaced by one under Voldemar Zamuels in January 1924 could be Russian and Jewish 
representatives in the new government secure a firm agreement not to enforce the decree 
(Hiden (2004:90-91)). 
Nine years after the law had been passed, the leader of  the German minority Schiemann 
wrote: "unlike the majority of  new states, Latvia has recognised the need to develop the 
culture of  its national minorities, passing a law (  ... )  which gave us the right to organise our 
own education".  The representatives of  the Polish, Russian, Belarussian and Jewish 
minorities agreed (Saleniece and Kuznetsovs (1998:242-243)). 
145 As from December 1931, the Latvian government, under leadership of  the Social Democrat 
Skujeniek, tried to cut back the school administrations of  the minorities.  The Latvian 
Education minister Kenins strove for the integration of  the minority schools in the general 
Latvian school administration.  Furthermore, he aimed at the removal of  the minority 
inspectors (Kressner:54-55).  Kenins unilaterally revised the curriculum in the Baltic German 
schools and reduced their grants.  Eventually, this educational policy was repudiated by a 
majority of Latvian politicians and this led to an overthrow of  the Skujenieks administration 
in February 1933 (Von Rauch (1974: 145); Garleff (1990:99)).  In the last months before the 
coup d'etat of 1934, the German representatives in the Education commission tried to extract 
the school administrations of  the minorities from the Latvian state apparatus and transform 
them into public corporations, modelled on the Estonian example (Garleff (1990: 1  02)). 
After the coup d'etat in May 1934, the autonomous school administrations of  the minorities 
were disbanded.  Also the language laws, administrative restrictions and introduction of 
Latvian programmes strongly harmed the minorities and their educational institutions.  Since 
the legislative institutions no longer existed, they could no longer rely on their parliamentary 
representatives.  The cultural needs of  the German minority were henceforth ensured by the 
'Volksgemeinschaft'.  The president of  that organisation was defacto recognised by the 
Latvian leaders as the representative of  the German community (Garleff (1990: 102)), 
What did the successful implementation of  cultural autonomy in Estonia and Latvia actually 
prove?  By the end of  the 1920s, the Nationalities Congress, as well as statements by the likes 
of  Martna, implied that fears of  a state within a state had been unfounded, and that this system 
had led to a more integrated state community.  The experience of  the 1930s would tend to go 
against this view.  However, one has to look at the unfavourable international situation and 
the fact that the factors disruptive to Baltic democracy and statehood came from outside rather 
than from within.  For most residents of  the Baltic countries, both titular and non-titular, the 
experience of  the 1930s would be deemed far preferable to what ensued after 1940, and the 
inter-war period correspondingly remained a key coordinate when it came to constructing new 
states after 1991. 
146 PART TWO:  FROM USSR  TO  EU:  NEW MINORITIES ON THE 
INTERNATIONAL  CHESSBOARD 
In 1940-41 and again from 1944 the Baltic states were absorbed into the USSR and in 
practical terms were transformed into Soviet republics.  Among other things, the period 1940-
1991  saw a dramatic change in the demographic profile of  these republics, as historically 
rooted minority groups such as the Germans and Jews all but disappeared, and the Russian-
speaking share of  the population - especially in Estonia and Latvia - grew exponentially as a 
result of  large-scale inward migration.  In the case of  Estonia and Latvia this prompted 
existential fears amongst the titular nationality.  The national movements that later emerged in 
these republics during the 1980s therefore regarded the restoration of  nation-statehood not 
merely as a question of sovereignty, but as a question of securing the long-term survival of 
titular language and culture.  The 1980s independence movements were buoyed by collective 
memories of  inter-war independence as well as by memories of  the forcible incorporation of 
1940.  Their guiding principle became the concept oflegal continuity, which held that the 
1940 incorporation was illegal under intemationallaw and that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
therefore remained de jure independent states throughout the period 1940-1991.  The USA 
and most of  the states of  the European Union upheld this principle, and in the autumn of 1991 
they simply restored diplomatic links with the Baltic states rather than granting recognition to 
new, post-Soviet states. 
This legal continuity concept carried profound implications for the subsequent development 
of  these countries.  Geopolitically (and legally) speaking it ensured that the Baltics were not 
categorised as former Soviet republics, but rather bracketed with the likes of  Poland and 
Hungary as part of  a Central and East European grouping deemed eligible for eventual 
membership of  the EU (in a way that, say, Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova were not).  In terms 
of  domestic sovereignty, the legal continuity principle carried profound implications for the 
large Russian-speaking populations in Estonia and Latvia.  Here, the legal restoration of 
independence gave further impetus to those more radically-minded political forces who 
viewed state and nation-building through the prism of  decolonisation.  These insisted that if 
Soviet-era immigrants and their descendents were to be entitled to any citizenship rights at all, 
this could only be done on the basis of  a process of  naturalisation requiring applicants to 
demonstrate knowledge of  the Estonian or Latvian language.  If the entire Russian-speaking 
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argued, they would use this influence to press for continued close economic and political links 
with Russia and the CIS, and would insiste that Russian be made a second official state 
language, thereby perpetuating the bi-lingual state order of  the Soviet period and the threat to 
Estonian and Latvian which this entailed.  Depictions of  the Russian-speaking population as a 
'fifth column' appeared all the more plausible at a time when former units of  the Soviet Army 
- now under the control of  Russia - still remained stationed on the territory of  the three Baltic 
states. 
The subsequent decision by Estonia and Latvia to apply the legal continuity principle to the 
sphere of  citizenship and give automatic citizenship rights only to citizens of  the inter-war 
republics and their descendents resulted in the disenfranchisement - at least temporarily - of 
much of  the Russian-speaking population living in these states.  This approach met with a 
furious response from neighbouring Russia and has elicited a high degree of  attention - not to 
say controversy - amongst academics and political observers in the West.  Chapter five 
examines the approach to state and nation-building adopted by the three states and, in 
particular, evaluates the systems created in Estonia and Latvia.  It argues that the impetus 
towards legal restorationism was counterbalanced by recognition of  post-Soviet realities, 
meaning that the states created fell far short of  the ideals propagated by more radically-
minded nationalists.  Accomodation of  the realities bequeathed by Soviet rule was necessary 
in order to ensure social stability and continued economic development in Estonia and Latvia, 
yet it was also essential for realising the two countries' primary long-term foreign policy goal 
of  securing integration with international organisations, most notably the EU and NATO.  As 
will be discussed in Chapter Six, these organisations may have endorsed the principle of legal 
continuity, but considerations of  promoting economic and political stability in the region 
meant that they were not about to sanction either calls for the physical decolonisation of 
Estonia and Latvia or for the permanent political marginalisation of  up to one third of  the 
population. 
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The disappearance of the old minorities 
A secret protocol to the Molotov-Von Ribbentrop Pact of23 August 1939, actually the very 
essence of  the non-agression treaty between Nazi-Germany and the USSR, assigned Estonia, 
Finland and Latvia to the Soviet sphere.  A supplementary protocol to the agreement, signed 
on 28 September 1939, also assigned Lithuania to the Soviet sphere (Smith D J (2002a:23 and 
31)).  On the same day, Molotov and Von Ribbentrop also signed a secret protocol regarding 
German emigration from territories within the Soviet sphere of  influence. 
In October 1939, the Third Reich called for all Germans living in the Soviet sphere of  Eastem 
Europe to relocate to Germany.  Tens of  thousands of  Germans left the Baltic states 
(Adamson:2;  Latvian Institute:8; Van Den Heuvel (1986:69)). 
After they had been forced by Stalin to sign mutual assistance pacts, the three Baltic countries 
were occupied by the Soviet Union in June 1940.  The Soviet system was rapidly imposed on 
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  Their earlier state structures were dismantled.  The Soviets 
especially targeted persons belonging to the political, economic and cultural elites of  the three 
countries. 
In the period between July 1940 and June 1941, tens of  thousands of  Estonians, Latvians and 
Lithuanians were murdered by the Soviets or deported to Siberia (Smith D J (2002a:34); 
Pabriks and Purs (2002:27); Jubulis (2001 :45); Van Den Heuvel (1986:84); Estonia Today, 
April 2004).  Most of  the remaining Germans fled the Baltic states. 
The launch of  operation 'Barbarossa' on 21  June 1941  and the subsequent Nazi occupation of 
the Baltic states set the stage for the mass murder of  the Jews in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
(Smith D J (2002a:35); Lane (2002:55 and 58); Lithuania. Facts and figures (1999: 1  08)). 
With the retreating German army in 1944, between 70,000 and 80,000 Estonians emigrated to 
the West.  Estimates of  wartime losses in Estonia stand at 25 per cent or 282,000 people, 
either dead, fled abroad or deported.  It is estimated that Estonia lost 18 per cent of  its 
population between 1939 and 1944 (Smith D J (2002a:xxi)).  Estonia lost in any case most of 
its 'old' minority citizens.  The coastal Swedes (some 7,500) escaped to Sweden in 1943-1944 
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whom 77 per cent, or 1,467,000 were Latvians.  By 1945 Latvia had lost an estimated 600,000 
people or 30 per cent of its population (Dreifelds (1996: 143-144 and 146)).  Fearful of Soviet 
repression, 120,000 Latvians fled the country in the final stages of  the war (Pabriks and 
Purs:31-32). 
At the time of  the second and definitive incorporation of  the Baltic states into the Soviet 
Union, minorities constituted about 10 per cent of  the total population of  these countries 
(Mezs, Bunkse and Rasa (1994:12)). 
Just before the final occupation by the Red Army, Estonia was a very homogenous country 
where Estonian-speakers constituted 97.3 per cent of  a total population of  no more than 
800,000 (Vetik (1993:273)).  The population of  Estonia was 93 per cent ethnically Estonian 
(Smith D J (2002a:38)).  Latvians constituted 83 per cent of  a population of  some 1  ;300,000. 
The emergence of new minorities 
As a result of  the definitive incorporation of  the Baltic countries in the Soviet Union, the 
ethnic structure of  especially Estonia and Latvia was altered dramatically. 
Immediately after the reoccupation by the Red Army, arrests and executions resumed. 
In the period between 1945 and 1959, some 19,000 Estonians were executed.  Between 25-29 
March 1949 approximately 21,000 Estonians and 42,133 Latvians were deported.  In 1948 
and 1949, about 200,000 persons were deported from the Baltic states (Budryte (2005:42)). 
According to Mezs, Bunkse and Rasa, altogether some 119,000 people were deported in the 
Baltic countries in March 1949, mostly farmers and their families (Mezs, Bunkse arid 
Rasa: 12). 
It is estimated that in Lithuania the mass deportations alone between 1944 and 1949 totalled 
some 350,000 people.  This figure does not include the tens ofthousands who were deported 
from Lithuanian prisons after secret trials.  In late 1944, there were around 30,000 deportees, 
in August/September 1945, an estimated 60,000; in February 1946, perhaps 40,000; in late 
1947, 70,000; in March 1949,40,000 and in the summer of 1949, another 40,000.  Altogether, 
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Soviet Union (Lane:62). 
Together with the decrease of  the native population, the number of  ethnic Russians and 
Russian-speakers rose dramatically.  The influx of  Russian and Russian-speaking immigrants 
had several causes.  The massive immigration was intended to establish Soviet control, to 
rebuild the economies of  the Baltic states and to start a massive industrialisation (Gray 
(1996:77».  Many immigrants were industrial workers, sent in to start the forced large-scale 
industrialisation or to rebuild existing devastated industries.  Many of  them replaced the 
native people killed earlier by the Soviets and the Nazis.  An extensive industrial development 
created workplaces and would at the same time tie these countries to the Soviet economy. 
Next to the massive industrialisation in general, the reconstruction and expansion of  Estonian 
oil shale mines and power stations was needed to supply the Leningrad areas with electricity, 
oil shale gas and articles of  basic consumption.  Other large groups were the apparatchiks. 
They would Sovietise civilian government and the military and build and staff the new 
military bases.  The Soviets namely encountered difficulties in finding loyal cadres to fill 
positions in the administrative apparatus.  Therefore, they massively positioned trustworthy 
cadres from elsewhere in the Soviet Union.  Many of  the cadres sent to Estonia and Latvia 
were ethnic Estonians and Latvians who had grown up in the Soviet Union and only spoke 
Russian (Jubulis:46).  In general, Moscow's policy was to mix nations in order to strengthen 
control over the peripheral regions. 
Already by 1950, the percentage of  Estonians in Estonia had dropped from a pre-war 92 per 
cent to 76 per cent.  The situation in Latvia was even more threatening to the native 
population.  The percentage of  Latvians in Latvia dropped from about 83 per cent in 1945 to 
only 60 per cent in 1953 (Gray:78).  At least 200,000 Russians and persons of  other 
nationalities immigrated into Latvia from 1944 to 1953.  More than 213,000 non-Estonians 
came to Estonia in the period 1945 to 1953.  From 1944 to 1959, at least 150,000 Russian 
speakers immigrated to Lithuania (Budryte:43). 
Between 1959 and 1970, the number of  Russians, Ukranians and Belorussians in Latvia rose 
sharply with 32 per cent, compared with a growth of  3 per cent for the Latvians.  Thereafter, 
the three Slavic peoples grew more slowly, namely with 17 per cent between 1970 and 1979 
and with 11.8 per cent between 1979 and 1989.  However, the Latvians grew with only 0.2 
per cent in the former period and 3.3 per cent in the latter, hence their proportion in the 
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accounted for 41.9 per cent of  the total population, compared with 10.2 per cent in 1935. 
Latvians, by contrast, constituted only 52 per cent (1,387,800) of  a population of  2,666,600 
(Dreifelds: 146-147). 
In 1970, the number of  non-Estonians was 430,000; in 1979 it was 520,000.  During the 
Soviet occupation, the number of  non-Estonians increased 26-fold, namely from 23,000 to 
602,000.  At the same time, the number of  Estonians decreased from about 1,000,000 in 1940 
to 965,000 (61.3 per cent) in 1989 (Vetik:273-274). 
On the other hand, the population structure of  Lithuania was not fundamentally altered. 
The Soviet authorities tried to break the massive resistance of  the Lithuanian peasants and the 
strong military resistance movement (Brotherhood of  the forest) by way of  a total war and 
massive deportations.  But in proportion to the total population, immigration was much larger 
in Estonia and Latvia than in Lithuania.  Lithuania had always been a predominantly agrarian 
economy.  Compared to Estonia and Latvia (oil shale, metal manufacture), it had a less 
developed existing industrial base.  Again in contrast to protestant Estonia and Latvia, 
catholic Lithuania had a high birth rate.  After the war, there was a relatively low level of 
investment.  The resistance war and the consequential slow rate of  economic growth ensured 
that immigration would not fill the gap, left by the population losses.  The relatively high rate 
of  natural increase fulfilled this function (Lane:73-74).  There was also another important 
difference.  Lithuanians joined the Communist Party in much greater numbers than the more 
reluctant Estonians and Latvians.  In 1945,31.8 per cent of  the party members in Lithuania 
consisted of  Lithuanians, in 195955.7 per cent and in 1973 69.1  per cent.  In the late 1980s 
Latvians still accounted for only 39 per cent of  the membership of  the Latvian communist 
party.  In 1952,56 per cent ofthe members and candidate members of  the Central Committee 
of  the Lithuanian Communist Party were Lithuanian and in 1971  even 78 per cent.  Similar 
shifts occured in the Lithuanian Politbureau (Van Den Heuvel (1986: 11 0)).  Many 
Lithuanians understood that joining the communist party would help to protect their national 
identity and foster their national interests.  In this regard, the popular Lithuanian communist 
leader Antanas Snieckus played a crucial role.  Because of  their influence in the cummunist 
party, the Lithuanians were able to ward off most of  the industrialisation and the subsequent 
immigration (Mezs, Bunkse and Rasa: 13).  Also important to note is that industry in Lithuania 
was decentralised, in the sense that there was a sufficient pool of  local workers in most 
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(1998:363)). 
The result of  this was that at the end of  the Soviet occupation, ethnic Lithuanians constituted 
80 per cent of  the total population of Lithuania.  On the other hand, the composition of  the 
minority population had been changed radically.  The Jews (1989: 0.34 per cent) and 
Germans (1989: 0.06 per cent) had been replaced by large Slavic groups.  The Russians had 
become the largest minority in Lithuania with 8.5 per cent in 1989 (figures in: Lithuanian 
society).  The growth of  the Polish minority with 3 per cent (7 per cent of  the total population 
in 1989) is due to the integration of  the Vilna region in 1940, which before had belonged to 
Poland (Brunner (1996:41)). 
The massive immigration of  Russians and Russian-speakers not only altered the population 
structure of  these countries but also led to the replacement of  the native languages by the 
Russian language in several functional domains (Rannut (1994: 198)).  As Ozolins observes, 
Russian became a majorised minority language - a minority language in terms of  numbers, but 
with the power of a majority language - whereas the Baltic languages became minorised 
majority languages.  The immigrants treated the Baltic countries as an extension of  the 
Russian cultural environment.  They expected and demanded that the native people spoke to 
them in Russian.  Russian-speaking workers or officials could work using Russian alone. 
This meant that the natives needed to be able to speak Russian in order to work with the 
Russian speakers or receive services from them.  The obligation to become bilingual was thus 
solely on the shoulders of  the native population, while Russian-speakers could cont~nue to be 
monolingual.  This is termed as a situation or process of  asymmetrical bilingualism (Ozolins 
(1999:10)). 
The restorationist principle 
Graham Smith (Smith G (1996:132)) and Nils Muiznieks (Muiznieks (1997:379)) argue that 
the historical memory of  the former 20 years of  independent statehood and the rejection of  the 
myth of  voluntary incorporation into the Soviet Union constituted the most powerful resource 
for the nationalists. They wanted to restore their 'historic homeland'.  So, when at Christmas 
eve in 1989, the People's Congress of  the USSR rejected the secret protocol of  the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact, declaring it illegal and invalid from the moment of  its signature 
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Soviet parliament officially recognised their right to reclaim their interwar independence 
(Lauristin and Vihalemm (1997:87)).  Kristina Spohr Readman, however, claims that there 
was no direct link made between the pact and the forced annexation of  the Baltic states. 
Moscow disconnected the two issues and refused the right of  the Baltic republics to reclaim 
their lost independence (Spohr Readman (2004:22)). 
In any case, in line with the foregoing, the thesis of  state continuity was put forwar~ by 
Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia in their declarations of  independence on respectively 11  March 
1990, 30 March and 4 May 1990.  In these declarations, the countries claimed to be identical 
to the states that had existed on their territory until 1940.  The Resolution on the State Status 
of  Estonia announced that the existence of  the Republic of  Estonia de iure was never 
suspended because its territory had been illegally occupied since 1940.  The Declaration on 
the Renewal of  the Independence of  the Republic of  Latvia announced that the authority of 
the 1922 Constitution was reintroduced in the entire territory of  Latvia.  The Act on the 
Restoration of  the Lithuanian State pronounced that the Lithuanian government took full 
control over its territory once more in the history of  the state.  Contrary to the Estonian and 
Latvian declaration, it included no transitional period during which independence would be 
negotiated with the Soviet Union (Koskenniemi and Lehto (1992:191)).  During the coup 
d'etat attempt in the USSR in August 1991, the parliaments of  Estonia and Latvia, following 
Lithuania, declared that their interwar independence had been restored.  In its Resolution on 
the national independence of  Estonia, the Estonian Supreme Council reaffirmed the legal 
continuity of  the Estonian Republic as a subj ect of  international law and called for the 
restoration of  pre-1940 diplomatic links on this basis.  The Constitutional Law on the 
Republic of  Latvia's status as a state of  21  August 1991  provided that Latvia is an 
independent, democratic republic in which "sovereign power belongs to the people of  Latvia 
and its sovereign status is determined by the Republic of  Latvia Constitution of  15 February 
1922" (Ziemele (1998:252-253)).  Restorationism was thus the basis of state-building in the 
Baltic states.  After they had freed themselves from illegal Soviet rule, the three nations 
reclaimed their 'historical political homeland'. 
Richard Visek criticises this thesis as a 'legal fiction'.  In his view, the Baltic states had lost 
the traditional criteria used to determine statehood: a permanent population, a defined 
territory, a government and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.  Most 
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therefore argues that the independence of  Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is not a restoration of 
sovereignty to existing states but the succession from the USSR of  new successor states 
(Visek (1997:327-329)).  Also Martti Koskenniemi and Marja Lehto emphasise that the thesis 
of  continuity is a legal fiction in the 'Baltic case' (Koskenniemi and Lehto: 197). 
On the other hand, Lauri Malksoo argues that according to public international law, a state 
can temporarily continue to exist both in the cases of  occupatio bellica and occupatio quasi-
bellica, notwithstanding the annexation accomplished by the occupant.  Crucial in deciding 
the 'Baltic case' is the fact that in the years following the adoption of  the Kellog-Briand Pact, 
the annexation of  a conquered territory became illegal under international law.  The Soviet 
annexation lacked any legal basis (in detail: Meissner (1956); Meissner (1998)), and did not 
therefore add any further legal title to the occupying power, or per se cause the extinction of 
the Baltic states.  These states continued to exist on the basis of  the principle ex injuria ius 
non oritur (Malksoo (2000:307-308)). 
EC, CoE and the restoration of Baltic statehood 
Most of  the Western European countries had always considered the annexation of  the Baltic 
states into the Soviet Union as illegal and thus never recognised it (Klabbers and others (2000: 
48,50 and 52); Yakemtchouk (1991:267-274)).  For example, on 28 January 1987, the 
Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) of  the Council of  Europe (CoE) stated that the incorporation 
of  the three Baltic states into the Soviet Union continued to be a manifest violation of  the 
rights of  peoples to self-determination and underlined that this illegal incorporation had never 
been recognised by the great majority of  European states and by numerous other countries of 
the international community (Doc. 5567, Resolution of28 January 1987).  In 1979, the 
European Parliament (EP) voiced support for demands that the Baltic case be examined 
within the committee for decolonisation of  the United Nations (Smith D J (2003:4)).  As 
Malksoo observes, this policy of  non-recognition was very important.  In borderline cases of 
occupatio quasi-bellica when the occupant is capable of  establishing its power for a 
considerable time, and indeed even annexes the conquered territory, the reaction of  the 
international community is indeed crucial:  "The final approval of  the legal concept of 
restoration of  the independence that followed 51 years of  non-recognition policy (that was 
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become effective in legal practice. " (Malksoo:313-314). 
In spite of  this non-recognition policy, the Western countries reacted very cautiously - were 
even averse to - the independence declarations of  the Baltic states.  They were namely 
reluctant to undermine the position of Gorbachev.  The letter of26 July 1990 from the French 
president Franyois Mitterrand and the German chancellor Helmuth Kohl to the Lithuanian 
president, asking him to suspend the independence declaration of  his country, perfectly 
illustrates this attitude (Kherad (1992:859-860)).  This attitude made the Baltic states fear that 
"the long-standing support of  the West for legal continuity would be compromised and their 
fate categorised as an internal affair of  the Soviet Union" (Smith D J (2002:157)). 
After the bloody events of  early 1991, however, the balance between Gorbachev and the 
Baltic states increasingly leaned towards the latter.  After the August coup and in line with 
their former non-recognition policy of  the Soviet occupation of  the Baltic states, the European 
Community (EC) and its member states accepted the Baltic thesis of  legal continuity.  On 27 
August 1991, the foreign ministers of  the EC member states issued an extraordinary 
declaration, warmly welcoming the restoration of sovereignty and independence of  the Baltic 
states which they had lost in 1940 ("The Community and its member states warmly welcomed 
the restoration of  the sovereignty and independence of  the Baltic states which they had lost in 
1940.  .  ..  It is now time,  after more than jifty years, that those states resume their rightful 
place among the nations of  Europe.) (Bull. EC 7-811991, 1.4.23; European Foreign Policy 
Bulletin Database, Nr. 911251).  On 30 August 1991, also the Committee of  Ministers of  the 
CoE welcomed "the restoration of  the sovereignty and independence of  Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania which will enable these states, after more thanjifty years, to resume their rightful 
place in the democratic nations of  Europe" (Declaration (91) 5).  Subsequently, most of  the 
Western countries resumed diplomatic relations with the Baltic states, which they considered 
to have been restrained during occupation (Ziemele:252; Klabbers:96). 
The decision of  the EU-member states was of  course facilitated by the fact that Russia had 
immediately accepted the Estonian and Latvian declarations of  independence.  Ukraine 
followed suit on 26 August 1991.  Important to note is that Russia and Ukraine were non-
recognised entities and still part of  the Soviet Union which refused to recognise the· 
independence of  the Baltic states.  Thus, the acts of  Russia and Ukraine played a very 
important role.  The Estonian international lawyer and former Estonian foreign minister, Rein 
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recognition of  these countries because at that time Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were still not 
in control of  their territories and the Soviet Union had still not recognised their independence. 
Even on 27 August 1991, at the session of  the Supreme Soviet of  the USSR Gorbachev 
insisted that republics which wanted to secede from the USSR, had to do so in accordance 
with the Soviet Law on secession passed in 1990.  The Soviet Union only recognised the 
Baltic states on 6 September 1991  after many countries had recognised them.  In Mtillerson's 
view, the acts of  the EU and its member states were therefore no simple acts of  declaration of 
fact but instead contributed to the achievement of independence (Mtillerson (1994:120-121)). 
Important to note is that the acceptance by the Ee member states of  the restoration thesis on 
the basis of state continuity neatly fitted into the then international political situation.  As 
Roland Rich observes, it was important in August 1991 to distinguish the Baltic states from 
other former Soviet republics which were also claiming independence:  "In Western capitals 
around the world there was concern not to give green light to the forces calling for the 
dismemberment of  the USSR because of  fears over instability in a nuclear armed 
superpower." (Rich (1993)).  Political opportunity was indeed a determining factor in giving 
the Baltic states a special treatment that could not be invoked by other countries still 
belonging to the USSR (Verhoeven (1993:13)). 
The declaration of27 August 1991  had far-reaching legal consequences.  Through it, the Ee 
and its member states formally agreed with the thesis of  the Baltic states that they did not 
constitute successor states to the former USSR and would therefore be free of  such rights and 
obligations that would be consequential upon succession (Shaw (1997:678)).  In the field of 
citizenship, the acceptance of  the restoration thesis by the Ee member states implied that" the 
West implictly gave the green light to exclusionary policies vis-a-vis Soviet-era settlers" 
(Smith D J (2001: 17); Smith D J (1997); in the same sense: Heidenhain (2004:331)). 
Restoration of the political community 
Because the Baltic nations restored their 'historic homelands', also the membership ofthese 
homelands or 'communities of  fate' was restored, a membership which is limited to the 
residents of  pre-1940 Estonia and Latvia and their descendants (Smith G (1998 :96); 
157 Budryte:8).  As the late Estonian president Lennart Meri explained, the memories of  past 
wrongs and yearnings for restitution became constitutive elements of  political community 
building (Budryte:69). 
On 15 October 1991, the Latvian Parliament adopted the Resolution on the Renewal of  the 
Republic of  Latvia Citizens' Rights and Fundamental Principles of  Natural  is  at  ion.  This 
resolution stated that "the aggregate body of  Republic of  Latvia citizens, in accordance with 
the Republic of  Latvia 'Law on Citizenship' of  August 23,  1919, continues to exist.".  With this 
resolution, two-thirds of  the population of  Latvia qualified for immediate citizenship, while 
one third (approximately 700,000) had to await the law setting the naturalisation procedure. 
Soviet immigrants were considered as foreigners or stateless persons, who could acquire 
Latvian citizenship only by fulfilling the designated conditions for naturalisation.  The general 
guidelines for naturalisation required sixteen years' residence, a knowledge of  and loyalty to 
the Latvian Constitution, plus proficiency in the Latvian language on a conversational level. 
With a few changes, these guidelines were incorporated into a new citizenship which was 
passed on the first reading in November the same year.  This law however did not a~quire 
legal force because it was not adopted in a second and third reading (Kolstoe (1995:124)). 
Only those who were members of  the interwar-state and their descendants had the right to 
participate in the first elections of  the restored state.  As a result ofthis, only 64 per cent of 
the resident population was eligible to participate in the elections of  5-6 June 1993 (Gelazis 
(2004:228)). 
By Decree of  the Supreme Soviet of  the Republic of  Estonia, the Law on Citizenship of 1938 
in the version of 16 June 1940, was put into force on 26 February 1992.  Like the Latvian 
resolution, this law applied the principle of  ius sanguinis.  Only citizens of 1940 Estonia and 
their direct descendants who wanted to become Estonian citizens had to go through a process 
of  naturalisation.  They had to comply with the prerequisite of  a two-year residence, be living 
in the country for a further waiting period of  one year after filing their application, give proof 
of  knowledge of  Estonian language, swear an oath of  allegiance to the Estonian Constitution 
and have no reason for exclusion (e.g. as members of  the armed forces of  foreign states, 
former staff of  the Soviet security bodies) (Brunner (1996:42-43).  It was simultaneously 
decreed that the period when proof of  residence became a requirement should begin on 30 
March 1990, with the consequence that the earliest moment of  naturalisation was 1 April 
1993.  Consequently, Soviet immigrants were excluded from voting on the constitutional 
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almost 40 per cent of  the population of  voting age and almost one third of  the population of 
Estonia. 
These decisions were perfectly in line with international public law.  Ziemele explains that 
from a legal point of  view, citizenship has a direct relationship to statehood (Ziemele 
(1997:32)).  Under public international law, if  a state continues its international legal 
personality, its citizenship continues along with it.  A state is under no obligation to withdraw 
its citizenship in those situations of  transfer of  a territory which are inconsistent with 
international law.  An automatic conferral of citizenship on the population of  Estonia and 
Latvia in consequence of  the annexation in 1940 would have been unlawful under 
international public law (Ziemele (1998:256-257)). 
From a political and psychological point of  view, one can argue that in liberal nation states, 
nationhood is shaped by shared political experience and that a nation derives its rights and its 
power from the memory of  a previous independence.  The independence movements in the 
Baltic states equated the Soviet past with evil because of  the repressions, deportations and 
russification.  Therefore, it was impossible in their view to 'derive rights' from this past. 
Consequently, the only 'usable' past that was left for these nations was the experience of 
independent statehood in 1918-1940.  The prewar citizens and descendants had a close 
connection with this past, contrary to most of  the post-war immigrants.  The latter were, 
therefore, excluded from this restored political community (Budryte:71). 
But this is also the very reason why Estonia and Latvia cannot be accused of  attempting to 
create a mono-ethnic nation-state.  The whole political community (and their descendants), 
irrespective of  ethnicity, language or culture, of  the 'historic state' was namely restored.  In 
Estonia, automatic citizenship was granted to some 80,000 ethnic Russians (Smith D J 
(1998:303)).  In Latvia, nearly 375,000 non-Latvians, including 278,000 Russians 08 % of  all 
Russians) were included in the initial body of  citizens.  Further, the absolute majority of  some 
ethnic groups, such as Poles (62 %) and Gypsies (90 %) were granted automatic citizenship 
(Jubulis: 11 0). 
The post-war settlers and their descendants had and have to go through a process of 
naturalisation.  This is justified through the so-called 'Baltic loyalty argument'.  Post-war 
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political rights.  The naturalisation process is a means of  judging whether these settlers want 
to break with their Soviet past (Smith D (1998:304)).  In this regard, Seraina Gilly (correctly) 
argues that the acceptance of  a state by the majority of  its citizens is the most important basis 
of  the stability of  that state and its national and cultural identity (Gilly (1995:607)).  The 
citizenship law is not only legitimate from a historical and legal point of  view, but also 
necessary for the stability and tranquility of  these states.  For example, on 3 March 1991, only 
25.5 per cent of  the (participating) people in Narva voted for the restoration of  Estonian 
statehood, against an average of78 per cent (Gilly:610).  Also Jennifer Jackson Preece argues 
that Estonia and Latvia had good reason to fear that granting automatic citizenship to their 
substantial Russian minorities would compromise their independence:  "Granting citizenship 
to an ethnic Russian community that was relocated to the Baltic states by Stalin in order to 
ensure Soviet political control and who received privileges during the Soviet era would be a 
threat to the national identities and independence of  these states. " (Jackson Preece (1998b)). 
It was indeed put forward that settlers might use automatic citizenship and political rights to 
press for the maintenance of  close political and economic ties between Estonia and Russia, at 
a time when Soviet troops were still stationed in Estonia (Latvia).  The political 
representatives of  the settlers would then also argue for the establishment of  Russian as the 
second official language before the Estonian or Latvian language had even been fully restored 
to predominance (Smith D (1998:299)).  In this line, the Latvian Supreme Council stated in 
1991 that "only people who identified with the independent state of  Latvia and its democratic 
form of  government could be offered citizenship.  Thus the requirements for naturalised 
citizenship reflected this logic by encouraging potential citizens to become integrated into 
Latvia through residence, acquiring basis Lavian proficiency, aquiring basic knowledge of 
Latvia's constitution, renouncing competing citizenship, and taking a loyalty oath" (Sprudzs 
(2001: 147)). 
In the literature, it is frequently argued that the Lithuanians adopted a relatively liberal policy 
on naturalisingSoviet-era immigrants because they felt that they could accomodate a sizable 
proportion of  non-Lithuanians (around 20 per cent), without sacrificing their sovereignty or 
native language and culture (Gelazis:228).  Even before its declaration of  independence from 
the USSR on 11  March 1990, Lithuania adopted its first citizenship law on 3 November 1989. 
According to this law, the citizens of  inter-war Lithuania as well as their descendants 
constituted the body of citizens.  However, also a so-called 'zero-option' was introduced.  This 
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the USSR armed forces and security service) were free to acquire citizenship within a period 
of  two years, irrespective to ethnic origin, language or religion.  Nor were there any other 
requirements than a permanent place of  employment of  another constant legal source of 
support.  It is estimated that about 90 per cent of  the permanent residents opted for citizenship 
during this period (Council of  Europe, Doc. 6787: 11). 
According to Jubulis, this view of  a liberal Lithuanian citizenship policy totally ignores the 
political context surrounding the passage of  the Lithuanian law.  It was a citizenship law 
which was passed by the communist government, and which pertained essentially to 
citizenship in the Lithuanian Soviet Republic, not the independent republic of  Lithuania. 
Therefore, the more inclusive approach should not be interpreted as a sign that the Lithuanian 
nationalists were more 'civic' as opposed to 'ethnic' nationalists, but rather as a sign that the 
Lithuanian communists were more nationalistic than the communist governments in Estonia 
or Lativa in 1989.  What mattered in Lithuania in 1989, was not the content of  the citizenship 
law but the very fact of  instituting an autonomous citizenship.  Citizenship functioned as an 
anticipatory emblem of sovereignty.  Since even this move was rejected in Moscow, it is very 
doubtful that Lithuania could have passed a more exclusive law in 1989.  Furthermore, 
Lithuania could not afford to take a strict line on the issue of  legal continuity because it would 
have meant giving up territory, including the capital city of  Vilnius, which was not part of 
Lithuania in 1940.  Thus, there were several other factors at work besides ethnicity, which 
contributed to a different approach to the citizenship question in Lithuania, as compared to 
Latvia and Estonia.  The demographic dimension made it easier for the Lithuanians to accept 
this approach in citizenship, but it did not cause them to choose a more inclusive policy 
(Jubulis:llO-111). 
The law of  3 November 1989 was replaced by the Citizenship Law of  5 December 1991  as the 
two-year period had expired.  The persons who obtained citizenship under the first law, were 
included in the body of  citizens as defined in the new law.  The 1991  law entitled all citizens 
and permanent residents of Lithuania before 15 June 1940 and their descendants to become 
citizens of  the newly independent state.  It also laid down the criteria for naturalisation of  new 
citizens.  Applicants must pass a written and oral examination of  the Lithuanian language and 
the basic provisions of  the Constitution, and must have lived in Lithuania for at least ten 
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(Gelazis:227). 
Next to the citizenship laws, the Baltic states also enacted language laws in order to return to 
the situation which had existed before the Soviet occupation.  After the respective core nation 
language was again made the official language and the Russian language was put in an 
subordinate position in 1988-1989, further language laws in Latvia (May 1992) and in Estonia 
(June 1993 and March 1995) completed the process of  de-Russification by stipulating that 
anyone applying for employment in public or private sector organisations needs to prove a 
command of  the state language (Smith G (1998: 1  03)).  Again under international public law, 
governements can take measures to correct a former repressive language policy or to protect 
the language of  the native population (De Varennes (1996: 99 and 246)). 
By depriving the Russian settler communities of  particular political rights and through state 
language policies, the Estonians and Latvians secured an institutionally superior position and 
status for themselves in the political legislature, education, the law courts and in the public 
administration.  In Ruus' words, "the core institutions of  the state - the executive, the 
legislature and the judiciary - are insulated  from minority influence"  (Ruus (2002:31 )). 
The question in the next pages is whether these states granted the large Russian-speaking 
population certain collective rights in the cultural and other spheres. 
Cultural autonomy and other issues of domestic sovereignty in Estonia 
The Russian-speaking schools 
Despite the laws designed to restore the primacy of  Estonian in public life, non-titular 
nationalities did enjoy continued collective rights relating to the practice of  their culture. 
These included first of  all the retention of  the network of  Russian-language primary and 
secondary schools inherited from the Soviet era. 
Without going into detail, it is indeed important to note that publicly-funded education in the 
Russian language continued to be available from kinder-garten through secondary schools, as 
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by Russian-speakers is set to diminish beginning in 2007.  The 1997 Law on Basic and 
Secondary Schools established that all secondary schools would become 'Estonian language 
institutions', and that the "transition to instruction in Estonian shall be started in state and 
municipal upper secondary schools not later than in the academic year 200712008".  An 
amendment of  April 2000, however, allows for schools wherein 60 per cent of  the curriculum 
is taught through Estonian to be considered 'Estonian language institutions'.  Schools would 
have flexibility as regards the remaining 40 per cent of  their curriculum.  Thus, in practice, 
from 2007 all secondary level schools would be Estonian language institutions, but some may 
still offer up to 40 per cent instruction in other languages.  This will apply even in areas where 
Russian speakers form the great majority of  residents.  Instruction in the mother tongue of 
minorities remains in force in primary schools (RFE/RL Newsline, 5 April 2000).  In March 
2002, the Riigikogu passed a new amendment, according to which full-time Russian language 
education could continue beyond 2007 where the population so wishes.  The deadline for 
switching at least 60 per cent of  the curriculum of  upper-secondary schools into the Estonian 
language is maintained as the rule but exceptions can be granted. 
Russian as second working language of  local government 
Next to this network of  Russian-speaking schools, Russian is allowed as a second working 
language of  local government in those areas where Russian-speakers constitute the majority 
of  the population.  In those areas, Russian-speakers have the right to receive answers from 
state and local government authorities and their officials in their native language (article 51 
(2) of  the Constitution), and authorities may also use Russian for internal communication 
(article 52 (2) of  the Constitution).  By this, the Estonian state has tolerated a 'virtual cultural 
autonomy' in the ethnic enclave of  Northeastern Estonia and has extended a high degree of 
self-governance to local communities.  In Budryte's view, this 'ethnic separation' is one of  the 
main reasons why Estonia has managed to maintain a functioning political community 
(Budryte:9). 
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In Estonia tens of  ethnic minority groups joined the movement for independence.  By January 
1988 a cultural society of  Jews in Estonia was founded, and a few weeks later it was followed 
by a Swedish cultural society.  After six months there were already fifteen ethnic cultural 
associations.  In September 1988 the first ethnic minority forum was held, during which 
complete support for the restitution of  Estonia's independence was expressed, along with 
wishes to preserve the identity and culture of all ethnic groups.  On the same occasion a 
permanent body was elected to represent the political, social and cultural interests of  ethnic 
minorities, the Association of  Peoples in Estonia.  In 1989, this association proposed the 
Supreme Soviet Commission for Ethnic Affairs to form a work group that would draft a new 
law to update the cultural autonomy law of 1925.  Considering the drastic changes which had 
occured in population and community, the act of 1925 had become obsolete.  The new law 
was prepared successfully and in a relatively short time by the work group that consisted 
mostly of  representatives from the Assocation of  Peoples in Estonia.  On 12 June 1993, the 
act was presented to parliament, and it was passed on 26 October of  the same year. 
The right to obtain cultural autonomy and to form institutions of  cultural self-government is 
given to the same ethnic groups which this right was given by the law of 1925, and to any 
other minority totalling more than three thousand persons.  The law grants non-citzens the 
right to participate in cultural autonomy activities, although they may not vote or be elected 
for the leading organs.  An ethnic minority group which is entitled to cultural autonomy can, 
by direct and uniform elections with a secret vote, elected its own Cultural Council, which 
constitutes the highest organ of  authority.  The Cultural Council of  an ethnic minority can 
form regional cultural boards, appoint cultural deputies and found ethnic cultural institutions, 
schools, social and health care establishments and so on.  The cultural autonomy institutions 
own property and are liable for their financial obligations.  Resources originate from specific 
allocations, partly from the state budget, partly from local budgets, as well as from 
membership fees and donations from enterprises, organisations and private persons.  The 
resources are used to provide education in the mother tongue, and funds for scholarships and 
awards for promoting ethnic culture (Estonian Institute, The Cultural Autonomy of  Ethnic 
Minorities in Estonia). 
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concept of legal continuity and the restorationist model (Smith D J (1998:303); in the same 
sense: Graudin (1997: 105)).  The law of 1993 is, however, not a copy of  the 1925 law.  For 
example, experts of  the Council of  Europe criticised the draft because, in their view, the 
institutions come closer to private associations than to public bodies at variance with the 
solution of 1925 (Geistlinger (1995: 1  09)).  Aarne Veedla, emphasises that the law of 1993 
does not permit to establish primary  education institutions or schools.  A cultural self-
government can only establish so-called private Sunday schools, which are financed by the 
state.  These Sunday schools are regulated by the Hobby School Act.  If  a minority establishes 
cultural autonomy, it falls under the regulations for Sunday schools (Interview with Aarne 
Veedla, 8 February 2005).  Mr. Veedla claims that Russians are not interested in cultural 
autonomy because they already have much more rights than cultural autonomy.  Russian-
language schools are much bigger than the tiny cultural autonomy with its Sunday schools. 
Until 2005, no minority in Estonia fully implemented the LCA.  Many members of  the 
territorially concentrated Russian minority find that their cultural and educational needs are 
satisfied by the general state and communal institutions. 
The Presidential Roundtable on minorities 
A completely other mechanism is the Presidential Roundtable on minorities (PRM).  It was 
established in response to the dangerous political situation which emerged in Estonia in the 
summer of 1993.  In view of local elections in October 1993, political leaders of  the Northeast 
of  Estonia, being non-citizens, were barred from running for office.  Russians or Russian-
speakers make up about 80 per cent of  the population of  the region.  Mayors of  Narva and 
Silamae threatened to establish a parallel local government.  They proclaimed a referendum 
for local autonomy, immediately declared illegal by the Estonian government.  In order to 
enable between Estonians and Russian-speakers, the President of  Estonia, Lennart Meri, 
established a round table in July 1993. 
Its first declaration concerned the planned 'referendum' in Narva and Silamae.  The PRM 
recommended the postponement of  this event until the Supreme Court had reached ~ decision 
on the constitutionality of  it.  Furthermore, the PRM appealed to the Estonian authorities not 
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activities of  the Estonian government and parliament.  At its third session on 12 August 1993, 
the PRM discussed the first draft of  the LCA. 
In terms of  domestic sovereignty, the PRM is a purely advisory body.  It is a standing 
conference of  representatives of  ethnic minorities and stateless persons residing in Estonia 
and of  political parties.  Its goal is to promote stability, dialogue and mutual understanding 
between the different population groups (Preamble of  the statute of  the PRM of9 September 
1993).  Initially the PRM was comprised of5 members of  the Riigikogu, 5 members of  the 
Representative Assembly, which units the Russian-speaking population, and 5 representatives 
of  the Union of  National Minorities.  It elaborates recommendations and proposals for the 
solution of  socio-economic, cultural and legal problems of  aliens and stateless persons, the 
assistance to persons applying for citizenship, for assistance in the learning of  Estonian and 
the preservation of  national culture and languages of  minority people (article 7 of  the statute). 
The PRM adopts decisions, either by majority voting on procedural questions (article 15 of 
the statute), or by consensus.  The CSCE welcomed the establishment of  the PRM.  On the 
other hand, this organisation criticised its composition and suggested that its 
recommendations put forward to competent state organs, since "  ... the Round Table has been 
devised to ventilate the needs of  a larger segment of  the population that has no representation 
in the main legislative organ of  the State - the Parliament" (Uibopuu (1994a:61)). 
The PRM played an important role in the resolution of  the 1993 crisis.  During the next years, 
the PRM tried to develop this achievement.  It elaborated additional recommendations 
concerning more specific issues and invited observers and experts from different ethnic and 
social groups of society to attend its meeting.  Members of  the Riigikogu who were also 
members of  the PRM, established a direct link with the parliament.  Ministers, including the 
prime minister, were frequently invited to the sessions and could get direct information about 
minority opinions and suggestions.  Finally, it reached out to the political powers of  Estonia 
(parties, officials and municipalities) (Semjonov (2002: 148)). 
Gradually, the PRM however began to face problems, which might be considered as typical 
for advisory bodies.  By definition it can not solve a problem.  Suspicions became widespread 
that the PRM only serves a decorative function.  According to Aleksei Semjonov, Estonian 
officials cite at international fora the PRM as a model of  a succesful mechanism for the 
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remains underused.  In his view, both government and parliament accept the PRM's 
recommendations only occasionally.  More frequently they have taken decisions in direct 
contradiction with the recommendations of  the PRM: the (second) Law on Citizenship that 
tightened the naturalisation procedure, the law on ratification of  the Framework Convention 
on Minority Protection (only citizens are recognised as members of  minorities), amendments 
to the Law on Secondary Education (the end of  Russian-language education was postponed 
but not abolished), the amendments to the Aliens Law (no extension of  rights, only cosmetic 
changes), the amendment of  the Citizenship Law in 1998 (children's right to citizenship was 
slightly extended but in a much lesser degree than the Convention of  the Rights of  the Child 
demands).  Gradually, less parliamentarians and ministers fully participated in the discussions 
of  the PRM.  Semjonov claims that the government has set aside the PRM in the elaboration 
of  the integration policy.  No member of  the PRM was invited to participate in the elaboration 
of  the document 'The bases of  Estonia's integration policy' (Semjonov (1998)).  Vello Pettai, 
professor of  political sciences at the University of  Tartu, whom I interviewed in Tallinn, 
recognises this and admits that it would have been better to have involved the PRM.  On the 
other hand, he stresses that the PRM has always been a purely consultative body, which has 
never been intended as a parallel institution.  In his view, the PRM is much more important 
for smaller minorities.  He believes that the present Estonian president is not very interested. 
Even Lennart Meri's interest was nominal.  Much depends on who is running the institution 
(Interview with Professor Vello Pettai, 8 February 2005, Tallinn). 
Cultural autonomy and other issues of domestic sovereignty in Latvia 
The Russian-speaking schools 
Apart from Latvian-language public schools, ethnic minorities in Latvia can receive state 
sponsored primary and secondary education in their native language.  Russian, Polish, 
Ukranian, Estonian, Lithuanian and Jewish public schools exist in Latvia.  In 1998 a new law 
on education was passed.  The aim of  it is to reform the segregated school system iriherited 
from the Soviet times and faster the integration process.  This is to be achieved by improving 
the Latvian language teaching in the public minority schools where previously all curriculums 
were taught only in the respective minority languages.  In September 2004, the gradual 
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education system are the high school pupils starting from the 1  Oth grade in the public minority 
schools.  Primary minority schools will continue to provide education in minority languages. 
For the high school pupils instead of  3 study subjects that they used to learn in Latvian 
besides the main curriculum taught in their native language, now 5 study subjects are taught 
in Latvian. 
The Law on the Unrestricted Development and Right to Cultural Autonomy of  Latvia's 
Nationalities and Ethnic Groups 
Although the official purpose ofthe Law on the Unrestricted Development and Right to 
Cultural Autonomy of  Latvia's Nationalities and Ethnic Groups, adopted by the Latvian 
Supreme Soviet on 18 March 1991, was to guarantee all nationalities and ethnic groups"  the 
right to cultural autonomy and self-administration of  their culture", the actual text of  this law 
only provides certain individual rights and certain rights of  minority associations in the 
private area.  Remarkably is that the stipulations of  this law systematically use the terms 
'permanent residents', 'nationalities' and 'ethnic groups' (articles 1,2,3,5,8,9,10 and 11  of 
the law).  Under 'national groups', the architects of  the law understand groups which have 
their own statehood outside Latvia, such as, for instance, the Ukranians, while the term 'ethnic 
group' refers to those who have no statehood anywhere, such as, for instance, the Roma. 
In the fall of 1993, the Saeima faction of  the 'Fatherland and Freedom Party' proposed an 
amended version of  the law.  In this version, the right to cultural autonomy would only be 
granted to Latvian citizens.  However, this amendment was rejected by the parliamentarian 
majority (Antane and Tsilevich (1999:76)). 
All Latvia's permanent  residents have the right to observe their own national traditions, to use 
their national symbols and to commemorate their national holidays (article 8).  Latvia 
guarantees its permanent residents the right to freely maintain contacts with their fellow 
countrymen in their historic homeland and in other countries, as well as the right to travel 
freely from and return to Latvia (article 9).  All the permanent residents of Latvia have the 
right to establish their own national societies, associations and organisations (article 5). 
Under 'national societies', one can understand co-ordinate organisations which represent the 
'national' or 'ethnic group' vis-it-vis the Latvian state, for example by way of  a central council. 
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interests of  national or ethnic groups (Graudin:108).  National societies, associations and 
organisations have the right to use the government mass media, as well as the right to form 
their own media (article 13, paragraph 1).  These cultural societies and organisations also 
have the right to engage in commercial activities and to enjoy tax privileges (article 14). 
National and ethnic groups as such have the right to develop freely their own professional and 
amateur art (article 12).  National societies have the right to develop their own educational 
institutions with their own resources (article 10, paragraph 1).  All national and ethnic groups 
have the right to participate in the activities ofthe Social Consultative Council on 
Nationalities of  the Latvian parliament and to contribute to the elaboration of  Latvian 
legislation (article 7).  Under the law, the Latvian state has several duties.  It is the 
government's responsibility to promote the activity and material provisions of  the national 
societies, organisations and associations (article 5).  The government should promote the 
creation of  material conditions for the development of  the education, language and culture of 
the nationalities and ethnic groups, living in Latvia, and allocate financial means for these 
purposes over the state budget (article 10, paragraph 1).  Beate Sybille Pfeil argues that the 
passage "should promote" entails that there is no actual duty for the state (Sybille Pfeil 
(2002:235)).  Also Carmen Schmidt emphasises that this provision does not establish any 
collective or individual right for the national and ethnic groups (Schmidt (1993 :63)). 
Thus, the law does not foresee cultural self-government, that is to say public law corporations 
which autonomously administer cultural affairs.  The Latvian state does not delegate 
educational and cultural questions to national or ethnic groups.  The law does not create any 
concrete mechanisms for the implementation of  its principles and goals (Sybille Pfeil:244; 
Schmidt (1993 :58); Schmidt (1999:358)).  In short, its significance is limited by its purely 
declarative nature. 
The Social Consultative Council on Nationalities of  the Saeima 
The Social Consultative Consultative on Nationalities (SCC) was intended to ensure the 
participation of  all the national and ethnic groups in Latvia in national and ethnic questions 
and to try to perfect the legislation in this area (nr. 1.2 of  the statute, in: Behlke: 197 -199).  It 
was supposed to channel the minority interests to the highest political level and to be a forum 
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institutions (nr. 1.4 of  the statute).  Its task was to contribute to the elaboration of  the 
legislation in national questions, submit proposals regarding cultural, educational, historic and 
language questions to the permanent committees of  the Latvian parliament and to advise all 
these committees in the forementioned questions (nr. 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 of  the statute). 
More specifically, the SCC would have the right to steer draft legislation and to submit to the 
parliament proposals regarding the establishment of  a so-called 'People's forum'. 
Furthermore, it would have been entitled to take part in the preparatory phase of  the law-
making process and to invite experts in this regard.  It would have had the right to request 
from the state and societal institutions all the necessary information to understand the draft 
legislation and other proposals (nr. 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 of  the statute). 
According to its statute, the SCC is composed of  all the nations and ethnic groups on an equal 
footing (nr. 4.1 of  the statute).  The representatives of  a national or ethnic group are. elected 
and appointed by (territorial) conferences (nr. 4.2 statute) for a maximum period of  five years. 
Each national or ethnic group has a maximum ofthree representatives. 
In practice, one half of  the SCC consists of  representatives of 'the people of  Latvia', that is to 
say the Latvian citizenry and the other half of  representatives of 'national and ethnic groups' 
(Graudin:131).  The members of  the SCC put together a presidentship, consisting of  a 
president and a substitute (nr. 5.1  statute).  The president takes part in the plenary sessions of 
the Latvian parliament where he has an advisory vote (nr. 5.5 statute). 
The stipulation in the Latvian Constitution that only 'the people of Latvia' are sovereign is not 
violated by the considerable competences of  the SCC.  Firstly, the decisions of  the SCC are 
only of  an advisory nature.  They are not binding for the Saeima or other constitutional organs 
(nr. 5.3 statute).  Carmen Schmidt correctly underlines that this organ does not have full 
power of  co-operation.  As its name already indicates, the SCC does not decide tog6ther with 
the Latvian parliament or other constitutional organs (Schmidt (1993 :62)).  Furthermore, since 
one half of  the members of  the SCC are Latvian citizens, the mere composition of  the SCC 
prevents that the will of  'the people' - in the sense of  article 2 of  the Constitution is neglected 
(Graudin: 132).  The activities ofthe SCC do not amount to an exercise of  sovereignty. 
The establishment and organisation of  the SCC was entrusted to the Committee for human 
rights and national questions of  the Latvian parliament (nr. 4.2 statute). 
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namely not agree with its composition.  They argued that the maximum of  three 
representatives - for each ethnic or national group - does not reflect the numerical weight of 
the Russian population in Latvia.  They further objected to the lack of  any decision-power of 
the SCC (Behlke: 105).  The Russian ethnic group thus boycotted the establishment of  the 
SCC, which never took up its activities. 
A President's Minority Advisory Council was established in July 1996.  It is composed of 
representatives from eleven minorities and members of  the parliamentary committee for 
human rights.  The Association of  National Cultural Societies appoints the minority 
representatives and serves as an umbrella organisation for some twenty national cultural 
societies.  This Council was supposed to meet on a regular basis (every second month) 
(Hansson (2003:71)).  But after a promising start and regular sessions in 1998, it seems that 
this forum has stopped its activities.  The present Latvian president Vaira Vike-Freiberga has 
not reactivated this institution (Schmidt (2005:38)). 
Cultural autonomy in Lithuania 
As regards cultural autonomy, it is stated in the Lithuanian Constitution that "Ethnic 
communities of  citizens shall independently administer the affairs of  their ethnic culture, 
education, organisations, charity and mutual assistance.  The State shall support ethnic 
communities." (article 45). 
Rasa Ragulskyte and Dirk Schr6ter qualify the first sentence of  article 45 as a right of  cultural 
autonomy, thereby arguing that the 'ethnic community' can legally enforce the state to perform 
(Ragulskyte and Schr6ter (2002:10)).  Andreas Graudin, on the other hand, argues that this 
stipulation does not guarantee a full cultural self-government (Graudin:58).  Also Carmen 
Schmidt (Schmidt (1993:103)) and Andreas Hollstein (Hollstein (2002:386)) argue that the 
provisions of  the Constitution of 1992 fall behind the rights and guarantees of  the Constitution 
of 1922 with regard to cultural autonomy.  Under this constitution, 'national minorities of 
citizens' had the right to administer autonomously the affairs oftheir national culture - public 
education, charity, mutual aid - and also to elect necessary bodies (my emphasis) to conduct 
these affairs (article 73 of  the Constitution of 1922).  Furthermore, these national minorities 
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the Constitution of 1922).  Contrary to article 74 of  the Constitution - which provided the 
minorities with the right to a certain share of  the budget, provided certain conditions were met 
- the Constitution of 1992 only enacts according to Carmen Schmidt a principal duty of  the 
state to promote ethnic communities. 
Also the rights enumerated in the Law on ethnic minorities of 1989 (ML) are individual and 
not group rights (Ragulskyte and Schroter: 12).  Lithuanian citizens, belonging to minorities, 
have the right to obtain aid from the state to develop their culture and education, to have 
education in their own language, to have newspapers and other publications and information 
in their native language, to profess any religion, and to perform religious or folk observances 
in their native language, to form ethnic cultural organisations, to establish contact with 
persons of  the same ethnic background abroad, to be represented in government bodies at all 
levels on the basis of  universal, equal and direct suffrage, and to hold any post in the bodies of 
state power or government, as well as in enterprises, institutions or organisations (article 2, 
second paragraph).  Cultural organisations of  ethnic minorities also have the right to establish 
educational and cultural institutions with their own money.  The state provides support for the 
organisations and institutions which serve the educational and cultural purposes of  the people 
(article 7).  On the other hand, public committees of  ethnic minorities can be established by 
and under the Seimas and the local councils.  The composition of  these committees is to be 
co-ordinated with the public organisations of  ethnic minorities.  The powers of  these 
committees are also defined by the forementioned legislative organs (article 10). 
With the adoption of  the ML in 1989, a specialised Department of  regional problems and 
national minorities was founded within the government.  Within this department, a Council of 
National Communities was established in 1995.  This Council is composed of  representatives 
of 17 national communHies, including the Roma, and is charged with co-ordinating the 
activities of  national minority communities, maintaining inter-ethnic relations in Lithuania 
and overseeing participation in the implementation of state minority policy.  The Council has 
to enable minority representatives to meet political and municipal officials in order to raise 
social, educational and other issues of  importance to their communities, and to participate in 
drafting and monitoring the implementation of  legislation (Minority Protection in Lithuania). 
In terms of  domestic sovereignty, the Council is an advisory organ and does not have any 
decision-making power (Pan (2002:257)). 
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I try to answer in the final conclusion, the attempts of  both Estonia and Latvia to reverse the 
situation which they correctly saw and see as historically unjust, in any case lead to the 
interesting question how they were able to reconcile their nationalising policies with their 
efforts to return to Europe, that is to say the 'official Europe' which was created after the 
Second World War. 
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The disaster that befell Europe during 1933-1945 meant that the entire concept of 'minority 
rights' became largely discredited in the eyes of  those institutions that underpinned the 
international community of  the post-World War Two era.  With the end of  the Cold War, the 
collapse of  communism and the demise of  Yugoslavia and the USSR, however, things 
changed, as international organisations:' like the League of  Nations before them - again 
became preoccupied with the potential for instability and violent ethnic conflict in those areas 
that had formerly been part of  the monolithic socialist bloc. 
The new minority rights agenda espoused by the CoE, the OSCE and the EU (and also 
NATO) meant that if  the Baltic states wished to join these organisations, they would be 
required to defer to their demands of  these organisations in this sphere.  In this regard, even 
the staunchest advocates of  national sovereignty in the Baltic states could hardly be 
indifferent to these external actors, which were seen as offering the only sure-fire guarantee of 
maintaining newly restored statehood in the face of  the perceived threat posed by Russia.  In 
this regard, priority was obviously given to NATO and the EU rather than the looser and more 
all-encompassing structure of  the OSCE and CoE.  Engagement with the latter organisations 
was nonetheless vital, in so far as the EU took its cue from them when devising its own 
standards and demands in the field of  minority protection. 
Within this context, the Baltic states also had to contend with Russia's efforts to retain its 
influence over them by posing as defender of  the rights of  Russian-speakers living in these 
countries.  In doing this, Russia - which itself could hardly be indifferent to maintaining 
economic ties with the West - chose to exert pressure primarily via the medium of 
international organisations, rather than meddling directly in the internal political processes of 
these countries.  Here Russia understood that the Baltics - unlike, say, Moldova or Georgia-
fell firmly within the Western sphere of  interest (cf. the remark in previous chapter about 
them falling into a different geopolitical/legal category to the other former states ofthe Soviet 
Union).  As already note in the introduction to this thesis, this means that in the case of  the 
Baltics it is apt to talk not just of  a 'triadic nexus' of  competing national claims linking the 
states, their minorities, and Russia, but of  a four-way relational nexus incorporating IGOs. 
The latter simply cannot be disregarded in any discussion of  the contemporary minority 
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between the internal and external, between issues of  Westphalian and domestic sovereignty). 
Within this overall context, this chapter traces the relationship between the Baltic states 
(especially Estonia and Latvia) and the three key organisations (EU, OSCE, CoE) outlined 
above.  It does so by examining the following issues: the securing of  initial trade and co-
operation agreements with the European Community, the important interventions by the 
OSCE and the CoE during the pivotal years of 1993-94, and the subsequent progress towards 
association agreements with the EC.  The analysis demonstrates that the external interventions 
by these bodies placed considerable limits on the pursuit of  restorationist politics in the 
countries concerned.  These interventions nonetheless remained politically controversial. 
With no firm prospect ofEU membership (the number one goal) on the horizon at this time, 
the titular political elite in both Estonia and Latvia remained reluctant to see the rapid 
naturalisation of  all their non-citizens, lest this tip the political balance towards closer 
association with Russia.  As Chapter Seven will show, it was only in 1997, when rapid EU 
accession became a definite possibility, and the Union emphasised that fulfilling long-
standing OSCE and CoE demands would be required in order to bring this about, that the two 
states began to take concrete steps to promote faster naturalisation. 
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The CoE is an intergovernmental organisation which was founded in the aftermath of  the 
Second World War.  Its statutory aim is to achieve greater unity among its members through 
common action, agreements and debates.  The Committee of  Ministers (CM) is the CoE's 
decision-making body, comprising the Foreign affairs ministers of  all the member states.  The 
Parliamentary Assembly (PACE) represents the political forces in the member states. 
The conditions for membership of  this organisation are a pluralistic democracy, the rule of 
law and respect for human rights.  The accession process begins with a request to the 
Secretary-General of  the CoE, who transmits it to the CM for consideration.  The latter 
consults the PACE, which in tum examines whether the candidate fulfils all the necessary 
requirements.  This is done by an on-the-spot-visit by parliamentary committees and also, 
since the 1990s, by fact-finding missions by eminent jurists.  The opinion adopted by the 
P  ACE then determines the invitation form of  the CM to the state to become a full member. 
Within the CoE, a Convention for the Protection of  Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (ECHR) was drawn up in 1950.  It entered into force in September 1953. 
In addition to laying down a catalogue of  civil and political rights and freedoms, this 
Convention set up a mechanism for the enforcement of  the obligations of  the contracting 
states.  Protocol Nr. 11, which came into force on 1 November 1998, replaced the earlier part-
time Court and Commission by a single full-time Court.  Complaints can be brought against 
contracting states either by other contracting states or by individuals, groups of  individuals or 
non-governmental organisations. 
While the Statute of  the CoE does not refer to minorities, the ECHR only mentions minorities 
expressly in article 14, the non-discrimination clause:  "The enjoyment of  the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any ground 
such as sex,  race,  colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. ". 
In the period between 1945-90 most cases before the Strasbourg institutions involving some 
element of  minority rights failed.  The Commission and the Court refused to protect minority 
groups because the ECHR does not speak about minority rights (Gilbert (1999:59)).  In 1973, 
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minority rights (Gilbert:55). 
After the fall of  the Soviet bloc, the CoE issued a series of  measures attempting to provide 
mechanisms to protect minority rights.  An effective measure would have been the proposed 
Protocol to the ECHR found in Recommendation 1201 of  the Parliamentary Assembly of  the 
CEo  Not only did it attempt to create a definition, but in addition to the traditional series of 
rights for the minority group, the Protocol provided in article 11:  "In the regions where they 
are in a majority the persons belonging to a national minority shall have the right to have at 
their disposal appropriate local or autonomous authorities or to have a special status 
matching the specific historical and territorial situation and in accordance with the domestic 
legislation of  the state. ".  This provision acknowledged the right of  minority groups to have 
control over their own affairs. 
This proposed Protocol was, however, rejected by the Heads of  state and government of  the 
CoE at its Vienna Summit in October 1993.  Nevertheless, Parliamentary Assembly Order 
484 still requires the Legal Affairs Committee of  the CoE to have regard to the draft Protocol 
when assessing new states for admission.  Thus, on the one hand, the CoE was not prepared to 
create legally justiciable rights for minorities throughout its member states, including an 
obligation to grant autonomy where appropriate.  On the other hand, it still requires that new 
applicants be assessed on the demands of  Recommendation 1201.  Central and East European 
states were treated as more problematic than states in Western Europe.  This is a striking 
resemblance with the policy ofthe League of  Nations (Gilbert:62). 
The one general CoE agreement on minority rights is the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of  National Minorities (FCPNM), which was adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on 10 November 1994.  It was subsequently opened for signature on 1 February 
1995 and entered into force three years later.  This Convention has been criticised for the 
absence of  a definition of  minorities, the vague character of  its provisions and, in particular, 
for its supervisory mechanism.  Under this mechanism, state parties to the Convention are 
bound to submit periodic and ad hoc reports to the Committee of  Ministers, which will 
monitor the implementation of  the provisions of  the Convention.  The Committee of  Ministers 
is assisted by an advisory committee composed of  independent experts.  The European Court 
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(Oberleitner (1999:71». 
The OSeE and minority rights 
From CSCE to OSCE 
The Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) is a newer name for the 
the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).  Its history goes back to the 
mid-1950s when the Soviet Union proposed a conference to sanctify the post-World War II 
borders within Europe.  In August 1975, a 35-country summit concluded the negotiations with 
the CSCE Final Act signed at Helsinki.  The leaders accepted Europe's post-World War II 
borders and committed themselves to a variety of  conflict-prevention measures, such as 
refraining from the actual or threatened use of  force to settle disputes.  They also pledged to 
develop economic contacts, to promote solutions to environmental and cultural concerns, and 
to respect human rights.  Supervision ofthe obligations was organised through the ".thorough 
exchange of  views on the implementation of  the Final Act" held at the follow-up meetings and 
at occasional expert meetings.  Review conferences were indeed organised every few years 
thereafter to advance the Helsinki agenda.  The CSCE developed three main functions over 
time: to facilitate the peaceful settlement of  disputes, to encourage disarmament, and, to 
implement CSBMs (Krupnick (1998:31-32».  Prior to 1990, the protection of  national 
minorities only received a low priority (Chandler (1999:62». 
The collapse of Soviet domination in Eastern Europe was, however, the catalyst for change. 
Because the CSCE's main task is to prevent conflicts and to ensure international security, 
protection of  national minorities became its main function. 
Already the CSCE Copenhagen Document of  June 1990 became a landmark in establishing 
normative standards of  minority rights protection.  Besides the traditional non-discrimination 
principles, section four of  this document marks the first reference to autonomous 
administrations (paragraph 35) and the use of  mother tongue in dealing with authorities. 
States were to protect "the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of  national 
minorities on their territory and to create conditions for the promotion of  that identity" 
(paragraph 33) including provision of  instruction in mother tongues and the use of  mother 
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it was the first endeavour to agree on an all-European standard on the status and rights of 
minorities, the Copenhagen Document lacks binding legal force (Van Den Berghe 
(2003:162)). 
The 'Charter of  Paris for a New Europe', stating that "the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and 
religious identity of  national minorities (must) be.. protected and conditions for the promotion 
of  that identity be created"  called for new structures and institutions for the CSCE. 
Both the Geneva report of 1991  and the Helsinki document of 1992 were further standard-
setting texts with regard to minorities.  The Helsinki summit resulted in the appointment of 
the important High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM).  The establishment of 
this institution was a response by the OSCE states to their inability to prevent the ethnic wars 
in Yugoslavia and the Caucasus.  It fitted perfectly into the increased emphasis which the 
OSCE states were placing on domestic and international conflict prevention and crisis 
management, and more specifically on contentious minority issues.  Accordingly, the HCNM 
is defined as an instrument of  international conflict prevention who will provide 'early 
warning' and 'early action' at the earliest possible stage with regard to those tensions involving 
national minority issues which, in his judgment, have the potential to develop into a conflict 
within the OSCE area which could affect peace, stability or relations between OSCE states.  It 
is indeed very important to note that the HCNM was not intended as a protector of  the 
individual or group rights of  persons belonging to national minorities.  His task is instead to 
identify the main causes of  a conflict and to elaborate steps to remove these causes (Zaagman 
(1999:7-8); Kroissenbrunner (1994:113-114)).  In December 1992, the post of Secretary 
General was created and a year later a Permanent Council of  member diplomats began to 
function, marking the real change of  the CSCE from mere negotiating framework to 
substantive IGO (Krupnick:34). 
In the meantime the CSCE dispatched officials to several regional trouble spots.  Some of 
these have led to permanent missions that have given persistence assistance where possible. 
Missions are generally established by the OSCE Senior Council (member foreign ministry 
political directors) with mandates tailored to the specifics of  a particular problem.  They are 
generally composed of  officials from national diplomatic corps who receive salaries from 
their home countries (Krupnick:36).  In December 1994 at the Budapest summit, members 
decided to change the organisation's name to 'OSCE'. 
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Council order action deemed appropriate by the organisation.  Another option is the 'human 
dimension': the organisation receives intergovernmental complaints and acts thereupon in 
'crisis situations'.  As with other OSCE documents, these opinions are adopted by consensus 
and thus accepted by all member states of  the EU.  Much of  the work of  the OSCE can 
therefore be said to improving state conduct through policies of standard-setting and 
assistance (Hansson (2003:67-68)).  This policy is very similar to the one adopted by the 
League of  Nations. 
Back to the past? 
While immediately after the end of  the Cold War, the OSCE was keen to pose the minority 
rights policy in universal terms and to draw a clear distinction between the OSCE approach 
and the policy of  the League of  Nations, this attempt failed.  The major Western OSCE 
powers did namely not accept international regulation and intervention in their internal affairs. 
France and Greece stated that they did not recognise the existence of  national minorities, 
arguing that all citizens had the same rights and duties regardless of  ethnicity.  Germany 
forced the exclusion of  'new' minorities, such as migrant workers, to avoid the question of  its 
treatment of  the Turkish minority.  Also Great Britain did not regard non-indigenous 
minorities, such as the Asians and African-Caribbeans as members of  a minority.  On the 
other hand, the United States insisted that 'indigenous peoples' could not be classified as a 
minority (Chandler:67).  When the HCMN was established, the United Kingdom and Turkey, 
supported by Spain, insisted that this institution could not intervene in national minority 
issues where terrorism was involved, effectively taking the Irish, Kurdish and Basque 
questions off  the international agenda.  This meant that existing national minority conflicts in 
the West were excluded while only potential conflict (in the East) became a focus of  concern. 
This reinforced the already existing perception that only minority rights in East Europe had to 
be regulated on the grounds of security concerns (Chandler:68). 
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Events in the former Soviet Union and in Eastern and Central Europe between 1989 and 1991 
also prompted the European Community (EC) to reassess its approach to international affairs. 
The EC first showed its interest in this issue in the negotiation of  Trade and Co-operation 
agreements (TCAs) with CEECs.  As early as 1989, the negotiations of  the TCA with 
Bulgaria were suspended because of  violations by the authorities of  the rights of  the Turkish 
minority.  These negotiations were only resumed after the Bulgarian government had 
produced guarantees concerning the religious and linguistic rights of  the Turks and had 
notified the Community of  the envisaged reforms (Van Den Berghe (2003:165)). 
On 17 December 1991, in the framework of  the European Political Co-operation, the member 
states of  the EC linked the recognition of  new states in Central and Eastern Europe and in the 
Soviet Union to "guarantees for the rights of  ethnic and national groups and minorities in 
accordance with the commitments subscribed to in the framework of  the CSCE" (Common 
Declaration of 17 December 1991  laying do\Vn "Guidelines on the Recognition of  New States 
in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union", Bull. EC 1991-12, 127).  As mentioned above, 
the three most important documents adopted in the context of  the CSCE by 1991  were the 
Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of  Paris for a New Europe, and the Copenhagen Document 
(VanDen Berghe: 161). 
The first co-operation agreements with Hungary and Poland only vaguely mentioned the need 
for respect for human rights in their preamble.  Even the first Europe Agreements with 
Hungary, Poland and the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic of 19 December 1991  contained 
no provision on respect for human rights in the actual agreement (Pollet (1997:292)).  This 
changed in 1991.  In a resolution of  28 December 1991, the Council of  Ministers stated that 
henceforth, human rights clauses would be inserted in the actual text of  future co-operation 
agreements (1538th Council meeting, 28 December 1991). 
In May 1992, the Council issued a new statement which mandated the inclusion of  a human 
rights clause in the agreements that the Commission was negotiating with countries that were 
CSCE members.  These clauses had to contain references to CSCE documents and to 
principles of  the market economy.  These elements were upgraded to 'essential elements' of 
the agreement and had a suspension mechanism attached (1573rd Council meeting, 11  May 
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the agreement in accordance with the rules of  the Vienna Convention of  the Law of  the 
Treaties (VCLT) (Lannon, Inglis and Haenebalcke (2001: 103)).  Article 60 of  the VCLT 
enables to suspend the whole or part of  the agreement in cases of  a 'material breach'.  The 
third paragraph of  article 60 of  the VCLT states that violation of  an essential element could 
constitute such a 'material breach'. 
The Haitian and Yugoslav experiences had confronted the Community and its member states 
with numerous political and legal problems regarding the immediate unilateral suspension of 
relations (Kuyper (1993 :413-417)).  This led the Council in its statement to request the 
Commission to act in order "to ensure that agreements to be concluded by the Community 
contain an appropriate mechanism which is operational in emergencies, including provisions 
relating to non-fulfilment of  obligations (Lannon, Inglis and Haenebalcke: 1  04).  In a lecture 
before the European Parliament, J6rg Pipk6m, legal advisor of  the European Commission, 
underlined the causality between the problematical suspension of  the agreement with 
Yugoslavia (November 1991) and the elaboration of  the essential and non-execution clauses 
in May 1992.  The coup d'etat in Moscow in August 1991  had further raised the question 
whether it would have been possible for the EC to suspend or terminate the agreement with 
the Soviet Union in case the coup had been succesful (Pipkom (1995:39-40)). 
The Trade and co-operation agreements and the Baltic clause 
The Trade and co-operation agreements 
Immediately after the Declaration of27 August 1991, the German Foreign minister, Hans-
Dietrich Genscher, and his Danish colleague, Elleman-Jensen, proposed to start negotiations 
of  European agreements with the Baltic states as soon as possible (Agence Europe, 1991, Nr. 
5553 and 5554).  However, the other EC members and the Commission considered this 
inopportune and pleaded for a more realistic approach.  TCAs were seen as a "strong political 
signal" (Agence Europe, 1991, Nr. 5562).  The TCAs with the Baltic states, signed on 11  May 
1992 (OJ 1992 L 403), followed the blueprint set by the earlier Trade, commercial and 
economic co-operation agreements with Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, 
Rumania and the Soviet Union (Sedelmeier and Wallace (1996:358) and Nuttall:85-86); 
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the EC at any time in the future.  The emphasis was put on gradualism.  The preamble stated 
that the agreements were to be considered as a step towards association agreements as soon as 
the conditions were fulfilled. 
The Baltic clause: a problematic 'sharp sword' 
The TCAs concluded with the Baltic states and Albania both contained the so-called 
'essential element clause', introduced in early 1992.  Article 1 of  the TCA with Estonia stated 
that:  "Respect for the democratic principles and human rights established by the Helsinki 
Final Act and the Charter of  Paris for a New Europe inspires the domestic and external 
policies of  the Community and Estonia and constitutes an essential element of  the present 
agreement.".  Thus, the application of  democratic principles and the respect for human rights 
was no longer an internal affair that belonged to the sovereignty of  the Baltic states but was 
made "the subject of  common interest" and ''part of  the dialogue between the parties" 
(Commission Communication Com (95)216:2).  The essential element clause spelled out the 
conditions of  article 60 (3) (b) VCL  T and was thus a proper justification for suspension or 
termination of  the TCAs in case of  grave human rights violations as well as serious breaches 
of  the democratic process (Riedel and Will (1999:729); Com (95)216:2-3). 
Together with the essential element clause, an explicit 'suspension clause' (or 'non-
compliance/non-execution clause') was introduced in the TCAs with the Baltic states.  Since 
then, this clause is known as the Baltic clause.  It allowed the Community to suspend 
immediately the application of  the agreement in whole or in part in case of  a serious breach of 
essential provisions, including of  course, in the Commission's view, serious and persistent 
human rights violations and serious interruptions of  the democratic process (Pollet:293).  For 
example, again in the TCA with Estonia, article 21  stated that:  "the parties reserve the right 
to suspend this agreement in whole or in part with immediate effect if  a serious violation 
occurs of  the essential provisions of  the present agreement".  Whereas Hoffmeister qualifies 
this clause as a "einseitiges Sanktionsinstrument" (Hoffmeister (1998: 379),  Elena Fierro 
claims that the toughness of  the Baltic clause was in direct contradiction with the 1991 
landmark resolution, advocating 'high priority' for positive measures.  According to this 
resolution, negative measures would only be taken as a last resort (Fierro (2003 :219». 
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clashed with the fundamental legal principle pacta sunt servanda and bypassed the procedures 
of article 65 VCL  T on suspension, which provide for a period of  three months before 
suspending an agreement.  Although the precise prescriptions of  article 65 are no customary 
international law, a reasonable period of  notice is certainly required if  the suspension of  a 
treaty is being announced (Riedel and Will:729; Kuyper:417 and 420).  An immediate 
suspension was also problematical from a political point of  view.  It would end all on-going 
dialogue and would weaken the ability of  the Community to apply pressure to redress the 
situation (Fierro:222). 
What was then the reason for inserting such an 'excessive', problematical clause? 
The standard view is that it was imposed on the Baltic states by the EC, which was in turn 
responding to Russia's efforts to internationalise the citizenship issue in Estonia and Latvia. 
Edwige Tucny, for example argues that the essential element clause and, even more, the 
Baltic clause were inserted in the TCAs to appease Russia.  In her view, the Baltic clause was 
not intended to be a general clause.  It was a clause, tailor-made to the situation of  the Russian 
minority in the Baltic states (Tucny (2000: 1  05». 
In reality, it appears that the clause was actually included at the request of  the Baltic states 
themselves.  According to Elena Fierro, the Baltic countries and Albania explicitly requested 
the inclusion of  such a clause:  "By the same token that Argentina had demanded the inclusion 
of  human rights references in its agreement with the Community, the Baltic states and 
Albania wished to go further.  They therefore requested the Community to include a clause 
providing that the agreement could be suspended immediately should they violate human 
rights.  The philosophy was similar to the one of  Argentina: such a clause would represent a 
guarantee to underpin their democratic process.  Suspension would be a warning that they 
were in danger of  returning to communist rule, an eventuality that they wanted to prevent. In 
sum,  they wished to affirm their commitment to human rights and the rule of  law in 
unequivocal terms." (Fierro:221).  In this regard, Andrew Moravcsik observes that 
governments tend to delegate human rights concerns for self-interested reasons; that is, to 
combat future domestic political uncertainty:  "it is thus not the most powerful or persuasive 
democracies, but weakly established democracies that favour enforceable (as opposed to 
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democratic governance against non-democratic domestic opposition" (Moravcsik (1998». 
Both the very short life of  this clause (it was only used in the TCAs with Albania, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia) and the potential legal and political problems that it could 
have raised, support Fierro's thesis.  This argumentation is also supported by Commission 
official Joris Declerck, who underlines that these clauses were mainly intended to react on 
democratic setbacks.  Human rights of  persons belonging to minorities were of  course 
covered by these provisions, but these were not the underlying reasons of  these clauses.  The 
Commission wanted to have the guarantee of  a functioning democracy with functioning 
institutions and free and fair elections.  Mr. Declerck denies any Russian pressure with regard 
to the elaboration of  these clauses (Interview with Mr. Joris Declerck, 14 January 2003, 
Brussels). 
The EP and the TeAs 
In any case, already from 1992 Russia persistently tried to internationalise the minority rights 
question.  High-level Russian officials including President Yeltsin began to accuse Estonia 
and Latvia of  human rights violations.  These charges were made in bilateral talks with 
Western leaders as well as in every international forum that the Baltic states had turned to for 
support on the troop withdrawal issue, including the United Nations, the CSCE and the 
Council of  the Baltic Sea States.  These allegations served several purposes.  First, by linking 
human rights issues and the withdrawal of  its troops, Russia sought to delay a comprehensive 
troop withdrawal.  Second, Russia simply tried to block or impede Baltic integration into 
Western Europe (Peters (1994:624-625». 
Human rights and minority issues could have affected the TCAs with the Baltic states when 
the European Parliament (EP) delayed its vote over their ratification.  While British MEP 
Gary Titley claimed that the vote on the accord with Estonia was delayed because of  concerns 
over the constitutional referendum, citizenship law, and election law, the EP Secretariat 
officials stated that the delays were due to 'purely technical' matters (Galbreath D J 
(2005:265». 
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Gary Titley, socialist MEP, indeed strongly criticised the policy of  Estonia vis-a-vis its ethnic 
minorities.  Only citizens of  the interwar republic and their descendants had been allowed to 
particpate in the referendum of  28 June 1992.  In that referendum the Estonians narrowly 
rejected (by 53 to 47 per cent) the proposal by Savisaar's Centre Party that non-citizens who 
applied for naturalisation before the elections should be allowed to vote in the presidential and 
parliamentary elections.  Because of  the residence requirements for naturalisation (three years 
from 30 May 1990) of  the Law on Citizenship of26 February 1992, applicants could only 
receive citizenship at the earliest in May 1993 and could thus not participate in the elections 
of  September 1992.  Gary Titley also referred to discriminatory practices in the privatisation 
process (Titley (1992:7-8)). 
In his report on Latvia, Gerd Lemmer of  the European People's Party accused Latvia for 
allegedly marginalising the Russian-speaking population by way of stringent citizenship 
legislation.  In Lemmer's view, the European Community should use its influence to make 
Latvia respect the Helsinki Act and the Paris Charter with regard to minority rights (Lemmer 
(1992:8)). 
In the subsequent plenary debate, Gary Titley argued that the Estonian Citizenship Law was 
discriminatory.  Its aim was to deny the Russians 'elementary civil rights' and to push them to 
leave the country.  In his view, the Estonians came close to the policy of 'ethnic cleansing' in 
Yugoslavia.  Although Titley was in favour of  the TCA with Estonia, he urged the EC to put 
pressure on Estonia to soften its citizenship law (plenary session of 18 December 1992, in: 
Handelingen van het Europees Parlement, Nr. 3-425:353-354).  Further, he told MEPs that 
even when Estonia was still under Soviet control, most of  the Russians had voted in favour of 
independence, whereas in reality only 25-40 per cent of  the non-Estonian population voted for 
independence in the consultative referendum of3 March 1991  (Smith D J (2002a:59)). 
Lenz of  the European People's Party, standing in for Lemmer, simply stated that the Helsinki 
Act and the Paris Charter contained human rights guarantees.  She argued that the EC should 
contribute to a solution which reconciled humanitarian demands with historical and political 
facts (Nr. 3-425:354).  Also Habsburg of  the European People's Party regretted Gary Titley's 
statements.  The Russians in the three Baltic states were, in his words, "no bona fide 
minority".  Their presence was a direct consequence of  the Russification policy and they 
should therefore be regarded as occupants.  Habsburg admitted that many Russians had voted 
in favour of  the independence of  the Baltic states and thus indicated that they wanted to be 
186 part of  the respective nations.  On the other hand, there were also many Russians who were 
against this independence (Nr. 3-425:355-356). 
The member of  the European Commission, Bruce Millan, observed that article 1 of  the TCA's 
included the respect for human rights, including the rights of  minorities, adding that the 
agreements could be suspended in case of  a disregard of  human rights.  On the other hand, the 
special historical situation of  these countries had to be taken into account.  The Commission 
would in any case ensure that these states would take all the necessary measures to ensure 
their internal stability and their harmonious relations with their neighbour states (my 
emphasis) (Nr. 3-425:356-357). 
In sum, although the EP approved the TCAs (A3-0363/92 (Estonia); A3-0363/92 (Lithuania) 
and A3-0359/92 (Latvia), 18 December 1992, in OJ 1992 C 211546-548), it also adopted a 
resolution by which it declared itself disturbed by the worsening interethnic tensions in the 
Baltic states.  The EP further considered that the Estonian Citizenship Law and the Latvian 
Resolution on Citizenship could aggravate the ethnic tensions and could lead to violations of 
basic minority rights as defined in the Paris Charter, if  applied in a restrictive way. 
Accordingly, it demanded that the European Commission monitor closely the future internal 
situation and to react rapidly in the framework of  the human rights clauses in the agreements 
(Resolution A3-0364/92, 18 December 1992, OJ C 211548-550; this resolution was adopted 
on the basis of  a report of  James Moorhouse, Doc. A3-0364/92). 
In that way, it responded to some extent to the Russian arguments.  However, contrary to 
Russia, the EP saw no reason to suspend the departure of  the Russian troops. 
On the contrary, after an EP delegation had visited Latvia in April 1993, concluding that there 
was no evidence ''for the recent accusations by Russian President Boris Yeltsin and other 
Russian leaders of  massive and grave violations of  human rights in Latvia", the EP requested 
in a resolution of  23 April 1993 from Russia to take all the necessary measures to accelerate 
the departure of  Russian troops from the territory of  the Baltic states.  With regard to the 
situation of  the Russian-speaking population, the EP considered that the Baltic states had the 
right to issue their own citizenship and immigration legislation in accordance with 
international law, the Final Act of  Helsinki and the Universal Declaration of  Human Rights. 
It underlined that the presence of  the large Russian-speaking group resulted from a deliberate 
policy of Sovietisation.  Referring to the essential elements clause of  the TCAs, it requested 
that the three countries take all the measures necessary to safeguard the non-discrimination of 
187 Russian-speaking inhabitants according to international law.  It considered that persons 
belonging to national minorities have the right to enjoy, equally and without distinction, the 
same rights as other citizens (my emphasis) and that they have the right to respect and 
protection of  their ethnic, religious and linguistic identity.  On the other hand, citizens 
belonging to national minorities have a loyalty obligation and they have to respect the 
national legislation of  the state concerned.  The EP advised that citizenship be accorded to 
those people willing to become citizens.  While the EP regretted the exclusionary effects of 
the Estonian Citizenship Law, it welcomed the debate on citizenship in Latvia, which had led 
to proposals of less exclusionary policies.  With a view to the elections of  5 and 6 June 1993, 
it demanded the Latvian authorities to ensure respect for the election law. 
Interestingly, the EP considered that the adoption of  a binding minority charter by the CSCE, 
with control guarantees and covering all member states, would contribute to the protection of 
the minority rights in the Baltic states. 
Finally, the EP condemned the advocates of a forced expulsion of  all minorities.  Any 
governmental action in that direction should automatically lead to the suspension of  all aid 
and community assistance (Resolution A3-0109/93, OJ  C 150/330-335). 
Instead of  threatening with sanctions, the EP requested the conversion of  the TCAs in 
association agreements as soon as possible. 
The resolution of  23 April 1993 was based on a report of  Ferrer of  24 March 1993. 
In the first comprehensive report of  the Committee on foreign affairs and security policy on 
the situation in the Baltic republics, the rapporteur, Ferrer, had namely defended the Estonian 
Law on Citizenship.  The Estonians had the right to preserve their identity and the language 
requirement in the law was therefore fully legitimate.  Neither the ECHR nor any other 
international treaty recognised the right to a certain citizenship as a fundamental right.  On the 
other hand, the nature of  a democratic system could be affected if  substantial parts of  the 
population are denied the right to become citizens with the accompanying right to vote in 
parliamentary elections.  In such a case, it could be doubted whether the free expression of  the 
will of  the people is sufficiently ensured.  Human rights problems could arise if  either 
citizenship is refused to residents on the ground of  their membership of  a certain mi,nority 
group, or if  criteria for admission to citizenship are so strict that a substantial part of  the 
population is in fact denied citizenship.  In any case, the naturalisation conditions of  the law 
made it, in her view, possible for many Russian-speakers to vote in the next parliamentary 
elections of  March 1995.  Ferrer considered only the group of  Russians of  the interwar period 
188 and their descendants as minorities ("Cela ne signifie pas toutefois que les Russes doivent etre 
consideres globalement comme une minorite, dans la mesure ou leur presence sur Ie sol 
estonien s 'explique par des circonstances historiques diverses. ").  The great majority of  the 
Russian-speakers were post-war settlers who had entered Estonia while this country was 
under Soviet occupation.  This was a violation of  international law, which prohibits the 
transfer of  people into occupied territories (article 49 of  the Fourth Geneva Convention). 
Ferrer considered the language and residence requirements of  the Latvian Citizenship 
Resolution too restrictive.  Therefore, she proposed to soften some naturalisation conditions in 
the future citizenship law.  On the whole, the restrictive nature of  the Latvian Citizenship 
Resolution was justified given the history of  the country and the legitimate need to protect the 
Latvian identity (A3-0109/93:14-17). 
In the subsequent plenary session of  22 April 1993, Ferrer stressed again that an evaluation of 
the human rights and minority policy of  the Baltic states had to take into account their history 
as victims of  a forced Sovietisation policy.  She underlined again that the post-war settlers and 
their descendants could not be regarded as members of  minorities in a legal sense. 
Ferrer considered that the EP could only monitor and judge whether the legal order of  the 
Baltic states was in accordance with general principles of  public international law and 
fundamental rights and freedoms of  the whole population.  It could not interfere in matters 
belonging to their national sovereignty and which were not related to fundamental rights 
(Handelingen van het Europees Parlement, 199311994, Nr. 3-430:332-333). 
While most of  the speakers reacted positively to the report of  Ferrer, Geraghty of  the non-
inscripted group disagreed with the document, considering it a justification of the, in his view, 
worsening human rights situation.  He pleaded for a strong signal, rejecting a discriminatory 
treatment of  the Russian-speakers after the departure of  the Russian troops (Nr. 3-430:334-
335). 
On a parliamentary question of  MEP Kostopoulos of  the non-inscripted whether the EPe 
would remind the Baltic countries that Community aid was conditional on the respect for the 
human rights of  persons belonging to minorities, the Council simply referred to the reports of 
the UN and the CSCE which had found no human rights violations (93/276, answer to written 
question Nr. 593/93, European Foreign Policy Bulletin Database). 
Russia's internationalisation ofthe settler's issue thus actually worked in favour of  Estonia and 
Latvia.  By this, these states were namely given the opportunity not only to show effectively 
189 the lack of  evidence of  human rights violations, but also to set out in detail and establish the 
legitimacy of  denying automatic citizenship to those who where not citizens before the 1940 
Soviet occupation of  their countries.  The Estonians and Latvians made the point that their 
states were never de iure parts of  the Soviet Union and that therefore they had the right to 
reinstate the pre-1940 citizenship laws and were under no obligation to recognise the Soviet 
citizenship of  post-1940 immigrants (Putins Peters (1994:627». 
The forementioned views and resolutions of  the EP perfectly summarise the policy of  the 
European institutions and EU-member states towards the restorationist policies of  the Baltic 
states.  Although the 'official Europe' had endorsed the principle of  legal continuity of  the 
Baltic states, it also made it clear that there were 'limits to restorationism' (Smith D J 
(1998:309»  and that the endorsement ofthe principle oflegal continuity would not serve as a 
justification for a decolonisation policy as proposed by several Estonian and Latvian 
politicians.  A leading representative of  the British Foreign Office declared that although the 
UK government regarded the Estonian Citizenship Law as a legitimate response to a peculiar 
set of  circumstances, it wanted to see the settler issue resolved as quickly as possible through 
the speedy naturalisation of  Estonia's non-citizen population (Smith D J (1997); Smith D J 
(2003:17-18». 
Debates in the European Parliament coincided broadly with two other key developments in 
the evolution of  the relationship between the Baltic states and certain IGOs, namely the 
dispatch of  OSCE missions to Estonia and Latvia, and Estonia's entry to the CoE.  These were 
followed shortly thereafter by the crisis over Estonia's Aliens law, the episode which perhaps 
does most to expose the workings of  the 'quadratic nexus' in the post-Soviet Baltic states. 
The establishment of OSCE-missions in Estonia and Latvia and the High Commissioner 
on national minorities 
The international background 
After the Baltic states had regained their independence, they were admitted as participating 
states of  the OSCE at an additional meeting of  the OSCE Council of  Ministers on 10 
190 September 1991  (Zaagman:16)).  Contrary to Albania, they were unconditionally admitted 
(Ghebali (1996:109)). 
As indicated above, already in 1992 Russia started to raise the question of  the Russian non-
citizen population in several international fora like the United Nations (UN) and the CSCE. 
In order to confront Russian allegations, Estonia and Latvia submitted their legislation to an 
examination by international institutions. 
In September 1992, Latvia invited a mission of  experts of  the UN to analyse whether its 
citizenship legislation violated human rights.  This mission visited Latvia between 27 and 30 
October 1992.  In accordance with the Moscow mechanism on the human dimension, Estonia 
invited a mission from the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) of 
the CSCE to confront its legislation with human rights principles.  This mission enrolled in 
Estonia between 2 and 5 December 1992.  Upon a request of  the Estonian government of 
October 1992, a mission from the UN visited Estonia between 7 and 11  February 1993 
(Ghebali:345).  While concluding there were no systematic human rights violations, this 
mission noted at the same time that certain regulations and administrative practices could 
discriminate against certain individuals of  the population and lead to an unfavourable climate 
for harmonious inter-ethnic relations. 
The UN-mission in Estonia stated that it had found no discrimination on the basis of  ethnic 
origin or religion.  On the other hand, it observed that the Russian-speaking communities 
were uneasy about their future and that certain members of  the Estonian community wished to 
return to the situation before 1940 without taking into account the changes which had 
occured.  The mission also concluded that the Estonian Constitution and the relevant 
legislation were in accordance with general human rights principles but underlined that the 
application of  this legislation in practice could lead to problems (Ghebali:346). 
The mission of  the ODIHR underlined that no international human rights instrument 
recognises the right to citizenship as a human right enjoyed by everyone, and also stated that 
the Constitution and other laws met international human rights standards.  On the other hand, 
the members of  the mission considered it to be in the interest of  Estonia itself to facilitate the 
integration of  a large group of  persons and to provide them with equal rights including 
citizenship.  The mission therefore recommended specific measures like a law detailing 
language requirements for the acquisition of  Estonian citizenship, significantly lower than the 
then level, exceptions that would waive all language requirements for invalids and certain 
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(1993)). 
A report on Estonia on behalf of  the Parliamentary Assembly of  the CoE also stated that 
neither the ECHR nor any other international human rights convention recognise the right to a 
certain citizenship as a human right.  Consequently, it must be left to each state to determine 
the conditions for acquiring its citizenship.  If, however, "substantial parts of  the population 
of  a country are denied the rights to become citizens, and thereby are also deniedfor instance 
the right to vote in parliamentary elections, this could affect the character of  the democratic 
system in that country. As regards the European Convention on Human Rights, the question 
could be raised whether in such a situation the elections to the legislature would sufficiently 
ensure the free expression of  the opinion of  the people, as required by article 3 of  the First 
Protocol to the Convention.  Human rights problems could arise if  citizenship was refused to 
residents on the ground of  their membership of  a certain minority group and not on the basis 
of  an examination of  each individual case ... " (Doc. AS/Ad hoc-Bur-EE (43)2: 14). 
The deployment of  OSCE missions in Estonia and Latvia 
Because Russia continued to raise the situation of  the Russian non-citizen population, the 
oseE decided to intervene in order to prevent an escalation (Ghebali:347). 
On 13 December 1992, the OSCE decided to establish a mission for an initial period of six 
months in Estonia (subsequently extended by six months periods).  This mission was 
deployed on 15 February 1993 in Tallinn and subsequently established offices in Kohtla-larve 
and Narva.  Its mandate was to promote stability, dialogue and understanding between the 
Estonian and Russian communities in Estonia.  It had to work in close co-operation with the 
authorities and maintain contact with relevant non-governmental groups.  Further, it had to 
exchange information and co-operate on relevant issues with the ODIHR and, in questions 
falling within its competence, with the High Commissioner.  It had to report regularly to the 
OSCE Permanent Council.  The mission was mandated to provide advice and assistance with 
regard to the integration of  the non-indigenous population of  Estonia (implementation of 
legislation concerning non-citizens, including questions relating to the implementation and 
192 amendment ofthe Law on aliens).  An important task of  the mission was to monitor the 
implementation of  the Estonian/Russian agreement on matters relating to social guarantees for 
military pensioners.  According to this agreement, the OSeE representative was invited to 
participate in the work of  the government commission, which makes recommendations 
concerning residence permits (Zaagman:18; Ziemele (2000:15); Kettig (2004:145-146); 
Birckenbach (2000:10-11); Lahelma (1999:19-38».  The OSCE long-term mission to Latvia 
was deployed on 19 November 1993.  It was mandated to address citizenship issues and other 
related matters and to be at the disposal of  the Latvian government and authorities such as the 
Naturalisation Board for advice on such issues.  It was also to provide information and advice 
to institutions, organisations and individuals with an interest in dialogue on these issues, 
including of  course persons belonging to minorities.  Like in Estonia, the mission was 
involved in the implementation of  the terms of  the Latvian/Russian agreement on the social 
welfare of  retired personnel and their family members (Zaagman: 19-21; Ziemele (2000: 15-
16); Kettig: 147-148; Krupnick:38), Maeder-Metcalf (1997:42». 
In short, the missions had three functions: collecting information on the ground in order to 
function as a 'political antenna', functioning as a negotiator between the parties and 
contributing to the reconstruction of  a civil society (Ghebali:352-353).  In the beginning, the 
Estonians and Latvians were not very enthusiastic about the establishment of  these missions 
in their country, which they considered in fact as a violation of  their sovereignty.  Aftef\vards, 
they realised that the mission could function as a counter-balance to Russia (Batkowski 
(2000».  Although the oseE mission in Estonia sometimes hinted at the need to liberalise 
certain provisions of  the citizenship law, it never called for a full-scale revision of  this policy. 
For example, it underlined on several occasions in 1994 its respect for Estonia's citizenship 
policy and reiterated that Estonia had been illegally occupied by the Soviet Union 
(Birkenbach (2000:9». 
The High Commissioner on national minorities 
The HCNM visited Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in January 1993.  As a result of  this visit, he 
decided that the inter-ethnic situation in Lithuania did not warrant the kind of  preventive 
diplomacy he was mandated to undertake.  The situations in Estonia and Latvia, on the other 
hand, fitted in his view into his mandate: tensions between a minority on the one hand and a 
193 majority and the state government on the other hand, and the presence of  a neighbouring kin-
state with an interest in the condition of its kinfolk on the other side of  the border causing it to 
become involved and leading to the international tensions with a potential for international 
conflict (Zaagman:23; Kettig: 149). 
On 6 April 1993, the HCNM sent a letter to the Foreign ministers of  Estonia and Latvia with a 
list of  recommendations in the field of  citizenship and language policy.  In general, the 
HCNM urged the governments of  both countries to facilitate the integration of  their non-
citizen population.  Only such policy would prevent a destabilisation of  their countries.  With 
regard to Lithuania, the HCMN noted in a letter of 5 March 1993 that the problem of 
citizenship for members of  the Russian and Polish minorities had virtually been solved and 
that the relationship between the various population groups seemed on the whole to be 
harmonious (text of  letters and recommendations, in: Dahlgren; short summary in: 
Yakemtchouk (2004:163)).  While Estonia reaffirmed its commitment to the protection of  the 
elderly and disabled, it did not refer to the HCNM's recommendation that children born in 
Estonia who would otherwise be stateless be given citizenship.  In general, the message from 
the Estonian government was that rather than discriminating against non-Estonians, its policy 
was aimed at redressing the disadvantages of  the Soviet policy of  Russification.  While 
conceding that the lack of  a Citizenship law was problematic, the Latvian government 
adressed virtually no other points found within the HCNM's recommendations.  It simply 
stated that the "conclusions and recommendations are carefully being examined by the 
respective government institutions of  Latvia" (Galbreath:244-245). 
The conflict prevention capacities of  the OSCE were seriously tested in the issue of  the Aliens 
law in Estonia. 
The question of the Aliens law in Estonia 
With regard to citizenship, the CSCE report of  September 1992 had highlighted a need for 
better defined guidelines for the language test, as well as assurances that local officials would 
not arbitrarily deny citizenship to qualified applicants.  The report of  the ODIHR mission had 
called for an easier naturalisation for elderly and disabled applicants.  The HCNM echoed 
these demands. 
194 Two months after the first CSCE report, the Estonian prime minister announced that no 
arbitrareness on language tests would be permissible (Barrington (1995)).  This was followed 
by the Law on Estonian language requirements for applicants for citizenship of  February 
1993.  This law not only listed the language skills that are required but also described the 
linguistic deficiences that would be overlooked in the examination (Shorr (1994: 16)).  On 23 
April 1993, the government issued an order outlining 'special examination guidelines' for 
older persons.  The written portion ofthe exam was waived for those born before 1 January 
1930, with only an oral examination required (Shorr: 17).  Fees for elderly and invalid 
applicants were waived.  According to Ole Kvarno, CSCE mission leader in Narva, these 
changes were made as a direct result of specific demands by the CSCE (Barrington). 
A March 1993 amendment to the Citizenship law provided that henceforth citizenship would 
be passed automatically via the maternal as well as the paternal line. 
All these changes were designed to facilitate Estonia's admission into the CoE (Pettai 
(2001:272); Barrington).  Immediately after Estonia became a member of  the Council of 
Europe, its relationship with this organisation, however, soured: 
While the Estonian Constitution allowed non-citizens to vote in local elections, it gave no 
automatic guarantee that non-citizens would be allowed to stand for office.  During the final 
visit of  Estonia's delegation to the CoE in May 1993, this organisation sought to prompt 
Estonia to grant non-citizens the right to be elected.  Just before the final debate on Estonia's 
accession, the government gave assurances that under the new law on local elections, non-
citizens would also have the right to be elected (Smith D J (1997); Smith D J (2003 :21)). 
However, five days after Estonia had been admitted to the CoE on 14 May 1993, the deputies 
from the Estonian National Independence Party broke with the government on this issue and 
the Riigikogu overturned the amendment to allow permanent residents to stand for office 
(Smith D J (2003:21-22)).  In light of  the recent changes to the citizenship changes and the 
new law on language requirements, allowing non-citizens to stand for office was a bridge too 
far for many Estonian politicians (Smith D J (1997)). 
This outcome was, however, only the beginning of  what became, in Pettai's words, "afairly 
turbulent summer for Estonian ethno-politics and Western international organisations" 
(Pettai:272). 
195 Once the hurdle of CoE membership had been taken in May 1993 with the citizenship 
legislation more or less intact, more radical elements within the ruling coalition felt the time 
was ripe for a more assertive policy vis-a-vis the Russian-speaking population (Smith D J 
(2003:22)).  In this regard, one can agree with David Shorr who observes that the summer of 
1993 was a more favourable moment for opponents of  the aliens legislation than had been the 
winter of 1991-1992 when the citizenship law was adopted.  During the winter of 1991, the 
August putsch was still a recent event.  Russian leaders in northeastern Estonia were 
discredited as a result of  their political stance during this putsch.  Furthermore, in late 1991 
and 1992, the leaders of  the Russian Federation were also occupied with the dismantling of 
the Soviet Union and the consolidation of  Russia's role as the successor state to the USSR.  In 
the summer of 1993, the Russian leaders in the Northeast had reasserted themselves as the 
champions of  a disgruntled Russian-speaking community.  Next to this, Moscow followed a 
much more confrontational stance (Shorr: 19). 
On 21  June 1993, the Riigikogu adopted the Law on Aliens.  Under this law, residents with 
Soviet or Russian passports would have to apply for new residence and work permits within 
one year.  Only temporary five-years permits were to be issued in the first instance. 
Applicants were required to have a lawful source of  income, which was only vaguely defined. 
It was, for example, unclear whether unemployment benefit would fall into this category 
(Smith D J (2002c:97)).  Those who did not apply or had their applications rejected, were 
classified as illegal immigrants and could face expulsion (Smith D J (1997); Smith D J 
(2002a:86)).  In response to this law, the Russians living in Narva and Sillamae prepared for 
local referendums on territorial autonomy.  David Smith claims that, contrary to the common 
view, these referendum proposals were not a secessionist move.  The Russian leaders were 
above all trying to capitalise on the wave of  Western criticism that had followed the adoption 
of  the Law on aliens.  Also Russia portrayed the referendum as strictly an internal affair of  the 
Estonian state.  Moscow declared that in case the population ofNarva and Sillamae would 
vote in favour of  territorial autonomy, the possibility of  a union with Russia was excluded 
(Smith D J (2002c:97-98)). 
Tensions were heightened further by the Law on education which was passed in the same 
month.  This law stipulated that all Russian-language secondary schools and higher education 
establishments were obliged to swith to teaching entirely in Estonian by the year 2000 (Smith 
D J (1997)).  On the other hand, the Russian language would be maintained in primary 
196 schools.  Also the Law on Cultural Autonomy, also adopted in June 1993, illustrated that the 
Estonian education policy was not entirely assimilative (Smith D J (1997». 
At the same time, also this law proved to be a point of  discussion between Estonia and the 
CoE.  Experts of  the Council of  Europe saw it namely as a fundamental problem of  the 
representiveness of  the institutions of  cultural self-government that stateless persons and 
citizens of  foreign states resident in Estonia could not be elected or appointed to the managing 
bodies of  these institutions.  According to them, generally implemented European norms or at 
least a European standard-setting trend require that non-citizens who have lived on the 
national territory in large numbers for a long period are entitled not only to vote but also to 
stand as candidates in elections to the bodies concerned.  They wanted the principle of 
integration take precedence over that of  exclusion with regard to participation in public affairs 
(Geistlinger (1995: 1  09».  Their opinion was sent to the Secretary General of  the CoE and to 
the President of  the State Assembly of  Estonia on 6 October 1993.  Estonia did not follow 
their recommendations. 
To return to the Aliens law, Estonian President Lennart Meri announced on 28 June 1993 that 
he would not sign the aliens law but would instead submit it to the CSCE High Commissioner 
and the CoE for comment.  A number of  concerns were raised by the CSCE High  . 
Commissioner and a special CoE-convened panel of  legal experts.  The essence of  their 
criticism was that the legal basis on which resident status was granted was not sufficiently 
clear or equitable.  The experts critised the fact that persons already resident on the territory of 
Estonia were put on the same level as persons who had not yet settled in Estonia (Munuera 
(1994:32-33); Shorr:23-24).  As a result, in the final version of  the law, adopted on 8 July 
1993 and signed into law on 12 July 1993, several sections were revised to limit the 
possibility of  abuse.  Sections that were not revised were clarified in government assurances 
on general policy and the application of  the law.  The most important of  these pledges was a 
'categorical' statement that there were no plans for the mass expulsion of  Russian residents 
(Shorr:24).  Although the OSCE could not prevent the referendums in Narva and Sillamae, 
the organisation was promised by the town leaders that they would respect a ruling by 
Estonia's Supreme Court on the legality oftheir move.  In August 1993, the Court declared 
that the referendums violated the Constitution and with that, the crisis was ended (Pettai:273). 
Simultaneously, president Meri announced the creation of  a Round Table of  non-citizens and 
minorities.  Also the Russian representative Assembly was officially recognised on 6 July 
197 1993 (Munuera:33).  The first significant agenda in the Round Table was the naturalisation of 
non-citizens in order to enable them to run for local elections in October 1993.  After some 
discussions in this newly created institution, the Estonian government encouraged the 
naturalisation of  persons who were considered as loyal to the Estonian government.  As a 
result, at the end of September 1993 in Sillamae, two-thirds of  candidates for the local 
elections were Russians, which constituted an acceptable number for the government 
(Nishimura (1999:30)). 
After the adoption of  the changes by the Estonian Parliament, the European Political Co-
operation commended Estonia for its co-operation with the European institutions and noted 
that "this political act is a clear indication of  the attachment of  Estonia to democratic 
principles and its commitment to political dialogue and compromise and non-confrontation 
with its communities and its neighbouring countries" (Statement of  9 July 1993, European 
Foreign Policy Bulletin Database, 93/302).  But although the amendments represented an 
improvement of  the law, they did not address all the concerns expressed by the experts.  Many 
changes simply brought more clarity to its provisions.  David Smith refers to the author of  the 
Aliens law, isamaa deputy, Mart Nutt, who described the changes to the draft as purely 
'cosmetic' (Smith D J (1997)).  In his detailed analysis of  the subseqent changes to the draft, 
David Shorr concludes that many suggestions of  the High Commissioner and the CoE were 
not addressed and that the situation for many Russian residents remained unclear (Shorr:24-
27). 
If the Aliens law exposed tensions between the domestic nationalist agenda of  the Estonian 
government and the goal of  international integration, such tensions appeared if  anything even 
more pronounced in the case of  Latvia, where the implementation of  a functioning 
naturalisation law - and hence CoE membership - had to wait until the start of 1995. 
The Council of  Europe and the Latvian Citizenship law 
Latvia applied to join the CoE on 13 September 1991.  Two years later, a report of  the 
European Commission of  the CoE concluded that the absence of  a citizenship law, setting out 
the conditions for the naturalisation of  non-citizens, and the absence of a legal status of  non-
198 citizens, were 'outstanding problems'.  Latvia could not become a member until these legal 
issues were solved. 
As mentioned above, in April 1993 the HCNM had made several recommendations in the 
field of  citizenship policy.  Max Van der Stoel had indicated that a rapid adoption of  a 
Citizenship law would help to give the non-Latvian population confidence and promote 
harmonious relations between Latvians and non-Latvians.  He advised that children born in 
Latvia, who would otherwise be stateless, should be awarded citizenship, and further 
suggested that there should be no delay in acquiring citizenship once all the requirements 
were met.  Language requirements should not exceed conversational levels, and people over 
60 should be exempted from the language examinations.  In response to these 
recommendations, the Latvian government stated that the lack of  citizenship legislation was 
due to the fact that there was not yet a legally elected parliament.  The Saeima to be elected in 
June 1993 would be able to enact the relevant legislation and all recommendations would then 
be presented to the Saeima (Dahlgren). 
By mid-autumn, several drafts had already appeared in the elected Latvian parliament.  The 
proposal of  the For Fatherland and Freedom Party (TB) rejected the initiation of  any 
naturalisation policy before the Russian army had fully been demobilised from the country. 
Even after the army's departure, TB's proposal foresaw only minimal expansion of  the body 
of  the citizenry beyond the renewed prewar citizenship community and direct descendants. 
TB specifically proscribed the granting of  citizenship rights to residents who had moved to 
Latvia between 1 July 1940 and 1 July 1992.  Latvia's National Independence Movement 
(LNNK) presented a draft law in early September 1993.  Contrary to TB, this party foresaw a 
natura1isation process, but its sixteen deputies also imposed stringent conditions. 
Naturalisation was to take place based on a quota principle, whereby the annual quota would 
not exceed 10 per cent of  the natural growth of citizens the previous year (Eglitis (2002:120)). 
The first governing coalition, consituted by Latvia's Way (LC) and Latvia's Farmers Union 
(LZS) offered a third draft law.  Like the previous proposals, this draft foresaw a confirmation 
of  the pre-1940 citizenry and descendants.  Like the LNNK, it called for quotas to be 
"determined (each year) by the Cabinet of  Ministers and approved by the Saeima, taking into 
consideration the demographic and economic situation in the country, in order to ensure the 
development of  Latvia as a single nation-state" (Barrington).  The proposal also stipulated 
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conversational level, swear an oath of  loyalty to the state, and have a legal source of  income. 
The proposal of  Latvia's Christian Democratic Union (KDS) entirely rejected quotas, 
suggesting that naturalisation must take place based on individual cases.  The single political 
organisation to reject the notion that the interwar citizenship community should be confirmed 
as the core ofthe post-Communist community, was the Equal Rights coalition (Eglitis:121). 
In November 1993, the Parliament voted on five drafts.  The proposal supported by the 
coalition was adopted with fifty-three out of  one hundred votes (Eglitis: 122).  After approval 
on the first reading, the law was sent to the CoE and the CSCE. 
In a letter of 10 December 1993, the HCNM criticised the system of  annual quotas, to be 
determined by the government and approved by the Saeima.  According to Van der Stoel, this 
system gave the government too much latitude in deciding how many people would become 
citizens.  Under this system, only very few would gain Latvian citizenship.  Van der Stoel 
then outlined what was to become the 'windows system'.  He was not opposed to some 
groups receiving priority access to naturalisation.  Provisions for privileged groups may, 
however, not contravene the International Convention on the elimination of  all forms of  racial 
discrimination.  Van der Stoel again stressed that otherwise stateless children should be 
awarded citizenship.  Courts should decide whether people were eligible for citizenship and 
the Latvian government should inform non-citizens of  the procedures for gaining citizenship 
(Morris (2003: 1  0-11)).  The CoE supported the provisions dealing with language knowledge, 
knowledge of  the Constitution, the oath of  loyalty, and the need for a legal source of  income, 
but also rejected the notion of  quotas.  Pressure also came from another external actor.  In late 
March 1994, a 'citizenship commission' in Russia iterated an official policy that sought to 
ensure citizenship for ethnic Russians in their post-Soviet countries of  residence (Eglitis:123). 
In March 1994, Latvia's Way opted to remove the quota system from the draft law.  Instead, 
non-citizens were to acquire eligibility for naturalisation based on their membership in 
particular categories, for example, the number of  years residents had been living in Latvia. 
The draft thus closely resembled the eventually adopted 'windows' system. 
The removal by Latvia's Way of  the quota principle from the law caused a crisis in the ruling 
coalition.  LC was eager to move the bill through as quickly as possible in order to be 
accepted into the CEo  Holding out against this push were the nationalist forces. 
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again contained quotas.  Under the law, naturalisation could begin immediately for Latvians 
returning to Latvia, people who had graduated from a Latvian high school, and those who had 
been married to a Latvian citizen for at least ten years.  Beyond that, naturalisation could 
begin from the first day of 1996 and would be open to non-citizens from sixteen to twenty 
years of  age who had been born in Latvia.  Beginning in the year 2000, the rest of  the non-
citizen population could be naturalised under a principle that foresaw an annual quota of  0, 1 ° 
per cent of  the total number of  Latvian citizens of  the previous year, a total that, according to 
the newspaper Diena, would have been about 1,976 persons per year (Eglitis:124).  This quota 
principle was based on the claim that it was essential to regulate number in order to safeguard 
the national culture and language (Smith G et al (1998: 105); Kolstoe: 125). 
The OSCE expressed disappointment that quotas had turned up again in the law.  The OSCE 
mission in Latvia began to lobby the ambassadors of  EU countries in Latvia to approach 
different factions within the Saeima to try and persuade them to drop the quota system and 
introduce the OSCE backed 'windows system' instead (Morris: 13-14).  The CoE stated that 
Latvia would not be offered membership until the restrictive quotas were dropped and Russia 
threatened to hold up Russian-Latvian economic agreements and to revoke the temporarily 
granted Most Favored Nation status extended to Latvia (Eglitis:124).  Also the EU exerted 
diplomatic pressure.  In a statement of  21  June 1994, the EU expressed its concern regarding 
the development of some aspects of  the draft citizenship law and called upon the Latvian 
authorities to implement the recommendations of  the HCNM and the CoE (Bull. ED 6-1994, 
1.3.12; Foreign Policy Bulletin Database, N° 94/190).  At their meeting in Corfu on 24-25 
June 1994, the Heads of State or Government stated that the draft citizenship law was 
incompatible with these recommendations and that it therefore had to be reconsidered (Bull. 
EU 6-1994, 1.  13; also: Yakemtchouk (1996: 16)). 
As a result of  this pressure, representatives of Latvia's Way began to speak out against quotas. 
Prime minister Valdis Birkavs, a member of  LC, stated that "with quotas, we are sending 
signals to the world that we do not want to be in Europe,  but in the CIS".  The country's 
largest newspaper 'Diena' commented as follows: "The law,  that is,  the order, under which a 
state accepts into the citizenry its noncitizens is the internal matter of  each state,  no one, 
ostensibly, denies that.  But only "ostensibly".  Because with this law ...  the Council of 
Europe links Latvia's acceptance into or rejection from the Council.  And, despite the fact 
201 that the CE is a body with a greater symbolic than practical meaning, without membership in 
that there is no possibility for membership in the European Union.".  The fear rose that Russia 
would join the CoE before Latvia and would then have the power to dictate the conditions 
under which Latvia would be admitted (lglitis: 124-125).  On the other hand, the radical 
nationalist deputies on the other hand chided 'Europe' for its "meddling in Latvia's internal 
affairs". 
After President Guntis Ulmanis had vetoed the law and had sent it back to the Saeima for 
reconsideration, the Saeima passed a new bill without the numerical quotas on 22 July 1994. 
This was done by a vote of  fifty-eight to twenty-one, with four abstentions.  The body of 
citizenry was formed by the citizens of  Latvia and their descendants prior to occupation.  The 
Law prescribed the following naturalisation requirements: residence in Latvia for five years 
(counting from 4 May 1990 or from the date of  a permanent residence permit); knowledge of 
the Latvian language, the Constitution and the history of  Latvia; a loyalty oath to the Republic 
of  Latvia and a legitimate source of  income.  Also applicants must officially renounce any 
previous citizenship (Dreifelds:98; Ziemele (1998:258-259)).  On the other hand, the 
naturalisation applications had to be submitted in accordance with the so-called 'windows 
system'.  Under this system, the majority of  non-citizens could only apply for naturalisation 
under a strict procedure which began in 1996 and should end in 2003.  Those born in Latvia 
should apply for naturalisation before those born outside the country.  In 1996, applications 
would only be accepted from persons aged 16-20, who were born in Latvia.  1997 applicants 
had to be born in Latvia too, but could be up to 25 years of age.' Applications from residents 
born outside Latvia but who were younger than thirty at the moment of  their arrival in Latvia 
would only be examined from 2002.  All the other residents would have to wait until 2003 
before sending their naturalisation applications.  The official reason was to ensure the smooth 
pace of  naturalisation and to avoid that the state institutions would be overburdened 
(Yakemtchouk (1996:16); Amswald (1998:33)). 
In a statement of  28 July 1994, the EU considered the law as a good basis for the progress in 
the integration of  ethnic minorities and development of  good inter-community relations (Bull. 
EU 7/8-1994,1.3.7; Foreign Policy Bulletin Database, N° 94/212).  On 31  January 1995, the 
CoE Parliamentary Assembly voted unanimously to admit Latvia as a member state. 
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Latvia.  The desire to join this organisation was crucial for both the passing of  the initial 
Citizenship law and the later removal of  the quota system (Morris (2003:7).  Membership of 
the CoE was regarded in its turn as a necessary step in the process of integration into the EU. 
The Free Trade Agreements and the Bulgarian clause 
The Free Trade Agreements 
This process reached a decisive phase with the conclusion of  Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). 
Immediately after the entering into force of  the TCAs, the Baltic states wanted to start 
negotiations on Europe agreements with the EC (Ozolins (1996:83)).  The Copenhagen 
European Council of  21  and 22 June 1993 however opted for FT  As, which were signed on 18 
July 1994.  While the FTA with Estonia established a free trade area between both parties for 
all industrial products from 1 January 1995 (Bull. EU 1211994, 1.3.37), the FTAs with Latvia 
(Bull. EU 1211994, 1.3.40) and Lithuania (Bull. EU 1211994, 1.3.43) submitted the free trade 
in industrial products to asymmetrical tariff reductions.  While the Community immediately 
dismantled its trade barriers, Latvia and Lithuania established a free trade area during a 
maximum period of  respectively four and six years from 1 January 1995.  The fact that no 
transitional period was stipulated in the agreement with Estonia' was a tacit recognition of 
Estonia's greater progress in economic reforms (Bungs (1998: 16)). 
The FTAs were clearly a political gesture, designed to bolster the independence of  the three 
Baltic states (Peers (1995:327-328).  Much more important than the actual content (the 
technical economic provisions) of  these agreements was namely the political context and their 
significance in view of  EU membership.  At the occasion of  the approval of  the negotiation 
mandate in February 1994, the Council had namely issued a declaration on the relationship 
with the Baltic states, in which it explicitly stated to take all necessary steps with the aim of 
negotiating and concluding Europe agreements (EAs) as soon as possible, recognising that the 
ultimate aim of  these countries was to become members of  the European Union through 
Europe agreements (my emphasis) (Bull. EU 1-211994, 1.3.40). 
Accordingly, the preamble ofthe FTAs recognised that it is the "ultimate objective" of  the 
Baltic states to accede to the EU.  In this regard, it is important to note that the negotiations on 
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January 1995).  The Essen European Council in December 1994 pushed the Commission and 
the Council to do all the necessary to sign EAs with these states in order to integrate them in 
the decided pre-accession strategy (Bull. EU 1211994, I. 13). 
The explicit statement of 7 February 1994 put an end to all speculations about a so-called 
'third way' for the Baltic states.  Although the Copenhagen European Council had already 
stated - in line with the TCAs - that EAs with the Baltic states could be concluded as soon as 
the conditions were met, the declaration of 7 February 1994 was a landmark in the 
relationship between the Baltic states and the EU. 
The Bulgarian clause 
As mentioned above, the 'Baltic clause' was very problematic both from a legal and political 
point of  view.  The Community therefore searched for a new formula.  The 'Bulgarian clause' 
proved to be acceptable.  It mirrored the relevant rules of  customary intemationallaw on the 
suspension of  agreements and uphold the principle of  consultation beforehand in an attmpt to 
reach a solution between the parties. 
This clause stated that:  "If  either Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfil an 
obligation under this agreement, it may take appropriate measures.  Before so doing,  except 
in cases of  special urgency,  it shall supply the Association Council with all relevant 
information required  for a thorough examination of  the situation with a view to seeking a 
solution acceptable to the Parties. 
In the selection of  measures, priority must be given to those which least disturb the 
functioning of  this Agreement.  These measures shall be notified immediately to the 
Association Council and shall be the subject of  consultations within the Association Council if 
the other Party so requests." (OJ 1994 L 357/2, article 119, paragraph 2 (Rumania)  L 358/3, 
article 118, paragraph 2 (Bulgaria». 
In sum, the Bulgarian clause provided a legal basis for the implementation of  restrictive 
measures in case one of  the contracting parties failed to fulfil any obligation under the 
agreement.  A violation of  the human rights clause was without doubt a material breach of  the 
204 agreement.  The Baltic clause, on the other hand, was less comprehensive: its scope of 
application was restricted to the situation of  a serious breach of  the human rights clause.  The 
Baltic clause allowed for an immediate suspension of  the agreement.  This was however the 
only answer to a breach.  The Baltic clause was thus, in the words of  Riedel and Will, a 
"sharp sword with a limited range" (Riedel and Will:728)).  The Bulgarian clause, on the 
other hand, was formulated in a more diplomatic way: it aimed first at finding a solution, 
saving suspension or non-execution for cases of special urgency (Bulterman (2001 :231); 
Pollet:292). 
In the FT  As with the Baltic states, the Baltic clause was replaced by the Bulgarian clause. 
The Baltic states and the Stability Pact 
Almost immediately after the Baltic states were accepted as negotiation partners of  a FT  A in 
February 1994, they were integrated in the Stability Pact initiative of  the EU. 
The Stability Pact 
The Stability Pact resulted from an initiative from the former French prime minister Edouard 
Balladur.  Its aim was to contribute to stability by averting tension and potential conflicts in 
Europe, fostering neighbourly relations and encouraging the CEECs to consolidate their 
borders and to resolve problems of  national minorities (Rouland, Pierre-Caps and Poumarede 
(1996:222); Nuttall (2000:260-261)). 
The Copenhagen European Council of  June 1993 endorsed the French initiative and charged 
the Council to elaborate a report.  On 11  December 1993, the Brussels European Council 
approved this report and charged the Council to adopt the Stability Pact initiative as a joint 
action (Charpentier (1995 :200)).  On 20 December 1993, the Council adopted the Joint Action 
931728/CFSP (OJ L 33911) which instituted the inaugural conference at Paris in May 1994. 
At this conference at 26-27 May 1994, negotiations of  bilateral rreaties were launched and 
two round tables were set up: one for the Baltic region and one for the CEECs.  The 
objectives of  the round tables were "the identification of  arrangements and  projects aimed at 
facilitating the achievement and the realisation of  agreements and measures for good 
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questions, cultural co-operation, including language training, economic co-operation and 
administrative training and environmental problems. 
The Stability Pact was adopted in a concluding conference in Paris in March 1995.  It 
consisted of  a declaration by which all conference participants pledged to pursue the common 
aims of  the Pact and to use peaceful mechanisms for dispute settlement (Sedelmeier and 
Wallace (1996:377)) and a list of  agreements and political declarations (Charpentier:205). 
The appendix was elaborated by the European Commission and contained so-called flanking 
measures to support several projects proposed by the participant states.  The European 
Commission then designated projects that henceforth would be financed by PHARE (Benoit-
Rohmer (1996:35)). 
At the Cannes European Council in June 1995, the EU further specified some ofthe 
accompanying measures to be taken under PHARE alongside the Stability Pact.  These 
included projects concerning transborder co-operation, issues relating to minorities, cultural 
co-operation, including language training and administrative training and enviromnental 
problems.  Only a few projects were new.  Most projects had already been started, for 
example under the PHARE Democracy Programme, and accordingly got a 'Stability Pact 
label'.  The Stability Pact thus gave several measures and projects of  PH  ARE a political 
orientation (Keukeleire (1998:378)). 
The participants of  the Paris Conference entrusted the OSCE with the further development 
and control of  the Pact (Charpentier:20 1  ). 
Also the Stability Pact can be compared with the policy of  the League of  Nations because it 
lacks general character and only deals with specific situations in some (Central and East) 
European countries.  As M.A. Martin Estebanez puts it, "economic, security and  political 
factors seem to be prevailing once more over the human rights and international law aspects 
of  the minority questions in Europe" (Van Den Berghe: 167). 
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The Baltic Round Table brought together: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, the 
Scandinavian countries, Russia, the United States and Canada, the Council of  Baltic Sea 
States, the Council of  Europe, the OSCE and was presided over by the European Union. 
In the beginning, the participation of  Russia was uncertain.  At the inaugural conference, 
Russia stated that it was not 'directly concerned' as great power.  It preferred to use the OSCE 
framework (Charpentier:202).  The Baltic states were opposed to Russian participation and 
the EU had to convince them that the involvement of  Russia was necessary.  While in the 
beginning Russia only sent an observer to the Round Table, later it participated actively (Ueta 
(1997:98». 
The Baltic Round Table focused on the Russian-speaking population in Estonia and Latvia.  It 
was mandated to "discuss general political issues of  the region" and to ''promote regional co-
operation relating, for example, to integration of  populations of  foreign origin, national 
minorities, language training, ombudsman, trans  border activities and maritime co-operation, 
and co-operation among regions of  neighbouring countries" (Council Decision 94/367/CFSP 
of 14 June 1994, OJ 1994 L 165).  During its meetings, several initiatives aiming to foster 
Russian participation, were discussed like for example the creation of  a Russian department in 
the Eurofaculty (Benoit-Rohmer (1994:572-573». 
Project proposals by Estonia and Latvia 
In the field of  cultural co-operation, Estonia proposed to raise the number of  schools in 
Northeastern Estonia for the instruction of  the Estonian language to Russian speaking students 
and measures to ameliorate the efficiency of language instruction centres, more particularly 
with a view to the preparation of  the citizenship examinations.  Further, the Estonians 
proposed to establish within the Ministry of Culture and EducatIon a strategic planning unit 
for the instruction of  Estonia as a second language. 
Latvia proposed a project to provide language training for its population of foreign origin. 
Estonia and Latvia jointly proposed to elaborate a common programme together with the 
Council of  Europe.  This programme would examine the legal position of  the non-citizenship 
population and establish a national policy of  language training. 
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about NGOs, to be organised with the assistance of  the Council of  Baltic Sea States.  To 
ensure the application of its citizenship law, Latvia proposed measures in the field of  training 
and technical assistance. 
There were several PHARE projects supporting the Stability Pact.  One PHARE project (title: 
'Language training in Estonia') in the field of  cultural co-operation aimed to improve the 
knowledge of  the Estonian language among the Russian-speaking population (Benoit-Rohmer 
(1996: 100, 102 and 109)). 
In general, the Baltic states considered that the discussions with Russia did not fundamentally 
change their delicate relationship with their superior neighbour.  Nevertheless, they fully 
acknowledged the utility of  the exercise, what resulted in a normalisation of  the Russian-
Lithuanian relations and an improvement of  the relationship between Russia and Latvia on a 
few important issues.  On the other hand, tensions between Estonia and Russia intensified 
during the discussions because of  the border problem, the Russian non-recognition of  the 
continuity of  the Estonian state since 1920 and the Citizenship law (Benoit-Rohmer (1996:36-
37)). 
The European Agreements 
The Baltic states in the pre-accession strategy 
As mentioned above, the negotiations on EAs with the Baltic states already began on 28 
November 1994, so before the FTAs entered into force on 1 January 1995. 
By stating that associated countries were able to join the EU if  they satisfied certain political 
and economic conditions, the Copenhagen European Council of  June 1993 had temled these 
agreements as the basis ofthe so-called pre-accession strategy (Maresceau (1997:9)). 
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December 1994.  It aimed at the pogressive integration of  the CEECs into the single market 
through regulatory alignment (the White Paper) and at the same time provided for policies to 
promote integration in diverse areas.  This integration was supported by PHARE, which was 
progressively converted into a financial instrument to promote the development of  the 
infrastructure and regional co-operation.  (Die Heranfuhrungsstrategie: I 0). 
Next to this economic dimension, the pre-accession strategy also comprised a political 
dimension in the form of  the structured dialogue.  The purpose of  the structured dialogue was 
to involve the associated countries progressively in the Union's work in areas of  common 
interest through joint meetings at various levels (Lippert (1997:203-204); Maresceau 
(1997:10»). 
So, when the Baltic states signed their EAs on 12 June 1995, their definitive integration into 
the EU was a fact (Bungs: 17).  Accordingly, Latvia presented its application for EU-
membership on 27 October 1995, Estonia on 24 November 1995 and Lithuania on 8 
December 1995.  To summarise (European Commission (1995)  EU Relations with the Baltic 
states:5-6; Maresceau and Montaguti (1995)), the main elements of  the EAs were: political 
dialogue, provisions regarding economic activities, rules and approximation of  laws, 
economic and industrial co-operation, environmental co-operation, educational and training 
co-operation, monetary policy co-operation, financial co-operation (continuation of  PHARE 
aid and other financial support), cultural co-operation and crime prevention co-operation. 
They also contained a new heading on co-operation in crime prevention and provisions for the 
three Baltic states to take part in framework programmes, in specific programmes and in 
projects or other schemes set up by the Community in various areas (Bull. EU 611995, 
1.4.63).  An Association Council (at ministerial level), an Association Committee (at seniors 
official level) and a Parliamentary Association Committee were, instituted. 
The human rights clause 
Like the FTAs, the EAs contained a clause on observance of  democratic principles and human 
rights and a clause enabling each party to take'  appropriate measures' if  the obligations were 
not respected. 
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"Respect for democratic principles and human rights, established by the Helsinki Final Act 
and in the Charter of  Paris for a New Europe, as well as the principles of  market economy, 
inspire the domestic and external policies of  the Parties and constitute essential elements of 
this Agreement.". 
Article 123, paragraph 2, stated: 
"If  either Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfil an obligation under this 
Agreement, it may take appropriate measures.  Before so doing,  except in cases of  special 
urgency, it shall supply the Assocation Council with all relevant information required  for a 
thorough examination of  the situation with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to the 
Parties. 
In the selection of  measures, priority must be given to those which least disturb the 
functioning of  this Agreement.  These measures shall be notified immediately to the 
Association Council and shall be the subject of  consultations within the Association Council if 
the other Party so requests.". 
Next to these standard articles, the EAs with Estonia and Latvia contained a provision 
regarding persons belonging to minorities.  Article 78, paragraph 2, namely stated that the co-
operation (in the field of education and training) would also focus on the promotion of 
language training, in particular for resident persons, belonging to minorities. 
When these EAs were discussed in the plenary session of  the EP on 14 November 1995, both 
Truscott (EA with Estonia) and Rehn (EA with Latvia) briefly referred to the minority 
question.  Truscott pointed out that obtaining Estonian citizenship can take six years and that 
it required a knowledge of  the Constitution in Estonian.  An often heard complaint of  the 
Russian speakers was that the official language examinations are arbitrary and expensive. 
Because only citizens have the right to vote, most Russian speakers (only 140,000 of  the 
400,000 non-Estonians were Estonian citizens at that time) were unable to vote in the 
parliamentary elections of  March 1995.  In case of a deterioration of  the human rights 
situation, the EU could invoke the human rights clause of  the EA (Handelingen van het 
Europees Parlement, 199511996, Nr. 4-470:70-71). 
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Ethnic Russians - a third of  the total population - constituted 38 per cent of  the citizenry (Nr. 
4-470:71-72). 
Gary Titley reiterated the need to continue to monitor closely the human rights situation of  the 
Russian minority.  With regard to the freedom of  movement of  people, problems could, in his 
view, again arise from the restrictive citizenship laws.  While Estonian and Latvian citizens 
enjoyed that freedom, non-citizens - residing for many years in these countries - were not 
allowed to move to EU-countries. 
On the other hand, other speakers underlined that the citizenship problematique could not be 
separated from the history of 50 years of  Sovietisation.  Only gradual change was possible 
(Nr. 4-470: 75 and 79). 
European institutions vis-a-vis restorationist policy in the period 1995-1997 
Very soon after their independence, the Baltic states placed EU-membership high on their 
agenda.  In the period between 1991 and 1995 they gradually strengthened their relationship 
with the EU.  Through successive agreements, they moved closer to the European orbit.  All 
these agreements contained a conditionality clause, making the respect for human rights and 
democratic principles a matter of  common interest.  This meant that Estonia and Latvia could 
not autonomously pursue their own citizenship and ethnic policy but had to abide by certain 
international obligations.  But the interest of  the EC/EU in ethnic affairs was nominal. The 
process of  rapproachment between the EC/EU and the Baltic states was mainly driven by the 
internal Russian situation and geopolitical interests.  The result of  the first Duma elections, 
with the victory of  Vladimir Zhirinovsky, was probably the main reason why the FTAs with 
the Baltic states were turned into EAs even before they came into force.  In this regard, Mr. 
Ustubs claims that if  the Baltic states would have started a relationship with the EU in the late 
nineties, the Union would use a much tougher language because it has developed a much 
better relationship with Russia (Interview with Mr. Ustubs, 16 September 2002, Brussels). 
As Ms Halliste notes, the main institutions which dealt with minority issues in the period 
1991-1997 were the CoE and the OSCE (Interview with Ms Halliste, 20 September 2002, 
Brussels).  But their direct impact on the policies of  Estonia and Latvia was minimal.  True, 
the CoE had effectively made admission within its ranks dependent on certain changes in the 
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rejected. 
Actually, in the same period 1994-1995 that the integration of  Estonia and Latvia into the EU 
was definitive, these countries strengthened their restorationist policies.  Already in 1994 the 
Latvian parliament adopted a law on local elections that limited voting and standing in local 
elections to citizens.  The international community did not react.  In 1995 the Saeima adopted 
a national election law which required candidates to have the highest level of  language 
proficiency.  If  the candidate concerned had not completed the necessary education in a 
school with Latvian as the language of  instruction, then the candidate had to submit a 
notarised document indicating the highest level of Latvian language skills.  This move barred 
many ethnic non-Latvians who were citizens from running for national office.  As a result, 
Latvia had curbed the ethnic Russian political representation on both the local and the 
national level (Kelley (2004:76-77).  In 1995 the Estonian parliament passed a new language 
law that reiterated the status of  Estonian as official state language.  It no longer obligated state 
officials to use the Russian language when interacting with Russian speakers, as the language 
law of 1989 had done.  This law was intended to strengthen the position of  the Estonian 
language after a survey had found that 83 per cent of  the residents of  Estonia claimed that 
they were fluent in Russian, while only 77 per cent claimed that they were fluent in Estonian. 
In addition, the Citizenship law was made even stricter in January 1995.  The residency 
requirement for those who had entered Estonia after 1992 was changed from two to five 
years, the requirement to know the Constitution and Citizenship law was spelled out, and the 
language requirements were tightened.  References from the HCNM to his letter of  6 April 
1993 were ignored (Budryte:73; Kelley (2004:105). 
Despite the argumentation from the HCNM that the changes concerned failed to correspond to 
international agreements, the Riigikogu changed in 1996 the local election law, including 
language profiency requirements (Kelley (2004:98). 
Between 1995 and 1997 the HCNM again sent letters with recommendations to the Latvian 
authorities.  More specifically, in his letters of October 1996 and May 1997 to Latvian 
Foreign minister Birkavs, the HCNM recommended a reduction ofthe naturalisation fees, the 
simplification of  the tests required of  new citizens, and, above all, the granting of  citizenship 
to stateless children and the abolition of  the naturalisation windows.  In his answers, Birkavs 
was evasive and defensive on the main recommendations.  He pointed to political difficulties, 
defended Latvian practice as compatible with international law, and declared that a change in 
the law had to be decided by the Saeima, and not by the government (Schimmelfennig, 
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(2003: 14-15)).  A clear indication of  the Latvian position was that in February 1997 the 
Saeima rejected a proposal to amend the citizenship law to automatically naturalise the 
twenty-five thousand Poles living in Latvia without Latvian citizenship.  The following month 
the parliament rejected a proposal to end the windows system and grant citizenship to 
Latvian-born children of  permanent residents and spouses of Latvian citizens after five years 
of  marriage (Kelley (2004:90).  With regard to citizenship also the efforts of  the HCNM in 
Estonia had no result.  After a change of government, the HCNM again visited Estonia in 
April 1997, reiterating his old recommendation to grant Estonian citizenship to otherwise 
stateless children.  However, he faced fervent opposition.  A 1997 poll had shown that 44 per 
cent of  ethnic Estonians agreed that only those whose families were Estonian citizens before 
1940 had the right to Estonian citizenship, and 62 per cent said they held that view very 
strongly.  Following these results, the new prime minister, Mart Siimann said that his 
government would not change the principles of  the citizenship law (Kelley (2003: 4 and 28-
29)). 
The OSCE's impact was thus minimal.  The Estonian and Latvian government responded only 
to minor parts of  the OSCE recommendations.  In this regard, Judith Kelley makes a 
distinction between normative pressure and conditionality.  Normative pressure occurs when 
an institution advises a government on the direction a policy should take, offering no reward 
other than the approbation of  the institution.  Conditionality, on the other hand, involves 
explicitly linking the change advocated to an incentive, like membership of  an institution 
(Kelley (2004:3).  The OSCE never used membership conditionality as a mechanism for 
influence.  Since the OSCE texts are not legally binding and since the OSCE only used 
normative pressure, Estonia and Latvia paid little attention to the recommendations of  the 
HCNM, whom they also depicted sometimes as Russian-friendly.  Policy-makers in these 
countries also (correctly) calculated that few consequences would result from not fo'llowing 
the advice of  the HCNM.  In ethnic issues, the EU remained in general silent in the period 
1991-1997.  It mainly concentrated on deepening economic co-operation with those countries. 
This changed dramatically in 1997. 
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OSCE. 
The European Commission opinions of July 1997 and the Luxembourg European 
Council of December 1997 
The Madrid European Council of  December 1995 shifted the focus from association and pre-
accession towards enlargement, by pointing out a timetable and the modalities of  the process 
of  enlargement.  For the first time, an indicative date was set to open accession negotiations 
with the CEECs (alongside Cyprus and Malta), namely six months after the end of  the IOC 
(which lasted from 29 March 1996 until 18 June 1996) (De la Serre (1998: 12-13)).  The 
Summit agreed to ask the Commission to prepare its opinions (avis) on the candidates "as 
soon as possible" after the conclusion of  the Intergovernmental Conference (lOC) due to start 
in 1996 (Bull. EU 1211995, I.25). 
On 15 July 1997 the Commission published its opinion on enlargement and other reform 
topics in a document with the title 'Agenda 2000'.  The three volumes covered four main 
areas: the Commission's opinions concerning the candidates' ability to fulfil the Copenhagen 
criteria, a framework enlargement strategy, an impact study and a proposed new financial 
perspective. 
On the one hand, the Commission considered that both Estonia and Latvia possessed stable 
institutions guaranteeing political stability, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human 
rights.  On the other hand, both states were required "to take measures to accelerate 
naturalisation procedures to enable the Russian-speaking non-citizens to become better 
integrated into (their) society".  The Commission also insisted that Estonia and Latvia "must 
consider ways to make it easier for stateless children" born on their territory "to become 
naturalised', with a view to the application of  the European Convention on Nationality 
concluded in the framework of  the Council of  Europe.  In addition, Latvia was urged "to 
pursue its efforts to ensure general equality of  treatment for non-citizens and minorities, in 
particular for access to professions and  participation in the democratic process".  An 
additional criticism related to the high enrolment fees for language examinations (European 
Commission (1997)).  The Commission was especially critical of  the windows system of  the 
214 1994 Citizenship Law of  Latvia.  It noted that this system "has not served to grant Latvian 
nationality to very many people, a fact which suggests that a large proportion of  the country's 
population may remainforeignersfor a long time".  In its view, the "systemfor age brackets, 
initially devised as a way of  preventing the administration from being overwhelmed by ajlood 
of  applications, has had an inhibiting effect.  Given this  'shortage' of  applications for 
naturalisation, such a system no longer appears warranted." (European Commission (1997)). 
With regard to Estonia, the Commission observed that under the new naturalisation procedure 
of  the Citizenship law of  April 1995, the number of  naturalisations per year had fallen and 
that at that rate "a large percentage of  Estonia's population will continue to remain foreign or 
stateless for a long time" (European Commission (1997)). 
As Bruno De Witte notes, the Commission adopted in its reports" a definition of  minorities 
which includes all the communities residing in these countries, without distinguishing whether 
their members were nationals of  the country or not" (De Witte (2000:6)).  Next to the 
acquisition of  citizenship, also the rights of  Russian speakers with respect to freedom of 
movement, political participation and access to public posts, access to courts, freedom of 
information and the educational system (Brandtner and Rosas (1998)).  With this approach, 
the Commission did not intend to elaborate a new, broader theoretical concept of  minority. 
Rather, like the OSCE High Commissioner, it employed a pragmatic political approach in 
order to ensure both internal and international stability (Pentassuglia (2001:21)). 
Just as the earlier gradual integration of  Estonia and Latvia into the European security 
architecture (period 1991-1997) had been driven by (geo  )political considerations, the 
European Union's policy with regard to the Russian settlers was also aimed primarily at 
ensuring both internal and international stability.  Estonia and Latvia were henceforth 
potential EU-members.  Priit Jarve, Christian Wellmann and Rein Miillerson note that the 
citizenship policy of  both countries had led to the emergence of  a significant percentage of 
Russian citizens in these countries (by the beginning of 1998 almost 100,000 residents of 
Estonia had become citizens of  foreign states, mostly of  Russia), many of  whom would 
normally have chosen Estonian or Latvian citizenship.  Since Russia has a lawful interest in 
the fate of  its citizens in Estonia and Latvia, this is a potentially destabilising factor and a 
security risk.  Second, large numbers of  non-citizens rendered the cohesion of  the Estonian 
and Latvian societies problematical (Priit and Wellmann, (1999:9); Miillerson (1998:17-18)). 
Stringent language requirements in both the public and private sector would exclude many 
Russian-speakers from the labour market and would create an additional source of  tension. 
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disappointment in Latvia.  According to the Latvians, the 'rejection' by the European 
Commission was the result of  Russian pressure (Bayou (2000:70». 
The statements in the Commission's opinions exercised a strong influence on the decision-
makers in Estonia and Latvia, since membership of  the EU had been declared the most 
important foreign policy goal of  these states (Birzniece (1999:42).  Furthermore, the 
Commission undoubtedly provided human rights' and integration activists in Estonia and 
Latvia with valuable arguments since it was considered politically more efficient to rely on 
the EU standards than those of  the United Nations, the OSCE, or the Council of  Europe 
(Birzniece: 10). 
In a memorandum on Agenda 2000 of  22 August 1997 (RFE/RL N  ewsline, 25 August 1997), 
the Latvian government considered the Commission's opinion as "generally positive and 
mainly unbiased, with a strategic significance to promote Latvian integration in the EU'.  On 
the other hand, it referred to "several inaccuracies, misinterpreted  facts and biased 
interpretations contained in the Commission Opinion" (Memorandum (1997:3».  The Latvian 
government still intended to convince the European Council of  Luxembourg to start accession 
negotiations with Latvia.  A few practical actions in the short term - taking into account the 
Commission's opinion - were proposed.  With regard to the political criteria, the government 
admitted that "the further development of  the naturalisation process is prerequisite for the 
shaping of  an integrated society".  Therefore, it agreed to apply a sliding scale to the 
naturalisation fee and further promised to make an analysis of  the reasons behind the slow rate 
of  naturalisation applications.  Also the limitations of  the rights of  non-citizens to practice 
certain professions would be examined (Memorandum:5).  On 22 July 1997, the Cabinet of 
Ministers decided to decrease the naturalisation fee for certain groups of  applicants to further 
promote naturalisation.  For other groups, including orphans, the naturalisation fee was 
abolished altogether (Morris:20). 
To satisfy the concerns expressed by the European Commission, the Estonian government 
decided in December 1997 to submit a draft law to the Riigikogu whereby all children born in 
Estonia would be granted citizenship if  their parents had lived in the country for at least five 
years (RFE/RL Newsline, 9 December 1997; Norgaard and others (1999:180); Yakemtchouk 
(2004: 165».  The EU welcomed this decision and qualified it as a "constructive step towards 
the integration of  Estonia·s non-citizens in the spirit of  the UN Convention on the rights of  the 
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European Foreign Policy Bulletin Database, Nr. 971138; RFE/RL Newsline, 16 December 
1997). 
The subsequent Luxembourg European Council of 12113 December 1997 designated the 
accession process as an inclusive process comprising all the ten CEECs.  All the candidate 
countries would participate in this process on an equal footing (Bull. EU 12-1997, 1.5 (10)). 
However, whereas all the CEECs would be involved in the enlargement process, the summit 
also decided, in accordance with the Commission's opinion, to begin accession negotiations 
in individual bilateral intergovernmental conferences only with the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia (together with Cyprus).  At the same time, Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia would be prepared for these negotiations and could in time 
proceed to that stage (1.5  (27)). 
The decision of  the summit to start negotiations only with Estonia was based on a 
combination of  external and internal factors.  First of  all, most EU member states 
preferred to initiate enlargement negotiations only with a limited group.  The decision of  the 
Union to include at least one of  the Baltic states would signal that they were not automatically 
excluded because of  their geographical situation and their former status as Soviet Republics. 
The inclusion of  Estonia reflected the concern of  the EU for regional stability.  In the words 
of  Mike, Estonia would function as flagship for EU good practice and influence in the Baltic 
region, should its progress lead to early membership:  "Thus, for instance, the treatment of  the 
Russian minority in Estonia can only be enhanced by the tutelage of  the Union,  as progress 
towards membership depends,  in part, upon the application of  minority rights.  Latvian 
treatment of  its Russian minority might be anticipated to follow such good  practice." (Mike 
(1999:61)).  The specific choice of  Estonia was mainly based on the value attached by the EU 
to economic development and administrative reform.  According to the European 
Commission, only Estonia appeared as a functioning market economy able to make the 
progress necessary to cope with the competitive pressures and market forces within the Union 
in the medium term (Schimme1fennig (2001 :181)).  The Commission further indicated that 
Estonia had made more progress in administrative reforms than Latvia and Lithuania, and was 
thus better prepared for adopting the acquis.  Obviously, Latvia was excluded from the first 
round of  accession negotiations as the only country to receive a negative evaluation on both 
economic and political (citizenship policies, treatment of  non-citizens) criteria.  Lithuania had 
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Lithuania, ( ...  ), seems to indicate that afunctioning market economy and the ability to adapt 
to the acquis were perceived as more important by the European Commission than the 
question of  citizenship policies.  The most likely explanation of  this position is the experience 
that it is more difficult to change economic institutions than the political rules of  the game. " 
(Norgaard: 173).  One must, however, add that also with regard to citizenship and minority 
policy, Estonia received a better evaluation than Latvia.  The Commission not only strongly 
criticised the Latvian 'window system' but also urged Latvia to pursue a policy of  equal 
treatment of  ethnic minorities.  According to Henderson, trends in the development of  the 
minority policies of  the candidate countries were very important for the Commission. 
Deficiencies in the treatment of  minorities in Slovakia were one of  the reasons why the 
Commission negatively evaluated the state of  Slovakian democracy in its July 1997 opinion. 
The Meciar government of Slovakia accused the Commission of 'lack of  objectivity' because 
it had 'praised' Rumania, where minority rights were no better than Slovakia, and decided 
that there were 'no great problems' in Estonia, where basic minority rights, in the Slovakian 
view, could be regarded as inferior to those in Slovakia because nearly a quarter of  the 
population lacked citizenship.  Henderson observes that - although this was never explicitly 
stated by the Commission - what really worried the EU were the negative trends in 
developments.  The Romanian and Estonian governments were striving to ameliorate the 
position of  their ethnic minorities, while under Meciar, minority rights were slowly being 
eroded (Henderson (1999: 170-171)).  Whereas attempts to amend the Latvian Citizenship law 
were blocked, the Riigikogu passed on 1 July 1997 important amendments to the Aliens law. 
Aliens who had applied for a temporary residence permit before 12 July 1995, were eligible to 
request permanent residency.  The opposition 'Pro Patria Union' was opposed to these 
amendments because they would "dilute Estonia's strict citizenship and aliens policy" 
(RFE/RL Newsline, 2 July 1997). 
The system of the Accession Partnerships 
The identified shortcomings in the Commission's opinions were formalised as objectives in 
the Accession Partnerships (APs), which would function as the main instrument of  the 
reinforced pre-accession strategy.  The APs brought together all the initiatives for assisting 
the candidates in a single framework.  The aim of  the APs was to launch national programmes 
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which included the priorities for preparing for accession according to the specific situation in 
each state, in view ofthe political and economic criteria and the obligations inherent in being 
a member state of  the EU.  In addition, each AP included the financial resources, in particular 
PHARE, to assist each applicant in its implementation of  the priorities laid down inthe pre-
accession period.  The short-time priorities and intermediate objectives were based directly on 
the Commission's opinion and varied from one country to another.  The short-term priorities 
had to be fully achieved in 1998 or at least have reached an advanced stage by the end of  that 
year.  The achievement of  the medium-term priorities could take a number of  years. 
The APs were used as the basis for pre-accession aid, through the reorientated PHARE and 
for the National Programmes for the Adoption of  the Acquis (NPAA).  On the basis of  its AP, 
each candidate country had to draw up a NP  AA which had to set out a time table for 
achieving the priorities and intermediate objectives.  The NP AA would also indicate the 
necessary staff and financial resources to achieve the priorities.  The NP AAs were thus 
complementary to the APs.  The reorientated PHARE-Programme focused its financial 
assistance on the adoption of  the Community acquis and in particular on the priorities 
identified in the AP and in the NP  AA.  Each year, the Commission signed a Financing 
Memorandum with the applicant country by which that country undertook to meet a number 
of  the priorities identified in its AP and the Commission to contribute financially to their 
realisation.  Programming of  Community financial assistance took into account the priorities 
and the time table of  the NPAA (European Commission (1998)  Accession Partnerships, 
MEMO/98). 
The APs were conditional upon compliance with the requirement of  respect for democratic 
principles and human rights.  Article  4 of  the Council regulation N° 622/98 which established 
in principle the APs (OJ 1998 L 85) stated that:  "Where an element that is essential for 
continuing to grant pre-accession assistance is lacking,  in particular when the commitments 
in the Europe Agreement are not respected and/or progress towards fulfilment of  the 
Copenhagen criteria is insufficient, the Council, acting by qualified majority on a proposal 
from the Commission, may take appropriate steps with regard to any pre-accession assistance 
granted to an applicant state.".  This Regulation de Jacto introduced a 'human rights clause' 
into PHARE assistance to the applicant countries, since PHARE is the main instrument for 
Community assistance to these countries in the framework of  the APs.  In case of  substantial 
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conditionality clause could be used to suspend, or even terminate, co-operation with the 
partner state.  On the other hand, the clause could also serve as a basis for certain positive 
measures aimed at promoting human rights in one of  the partner countries (Brandtn~r and 
Rosas). 
In accordance with the conclusions of  the Luxembourg European Council (1.25 (29», the 
institutions of  the EAs assumed an enlarged role within the reinforced pre-accession strategy, 
in particular with regard to the monitoring of  the progress made by the applicant countries in 
the adoption and implementation of  the acquis and the AP (European Commission, European 
Union enlargement: 17;  Gaudissart (1999:20);  European Parliament, Briefing Nr. 36). 
More specifically, the relevant sections of  the AP were discussed in the appropriate 
subcommittee.  The Association Committee discussed the ovenill developments, the progress 
and problems in meeting the priorities and intermediate objectives as well as more specific 
issues referred to it by the subcommittees.  The Association Committee then reported to the 
Association Council on the implementation of  the AP.  The Commission adopted its regular 
reports on the basis of  the conclusions regarding the implementation of  the APs in the EAs. 
These reports were then translated in the APs into a more detailed list of  what needed to be 
done.  Proposals to revise the APs were put forward by the Commission to the Council at the 
same time as the regular reports.  The new APs, mirroring the findings of  the Regular reports, 
were then translated into the action plans of  the governments of  the applicant countries. 
These NPAAs then served for the discussions in the EA framework (Glaser:6). 
The Joint Parliamentary Committee was a very important framework for parliamentary 
control.  It was the only institution that brought together the European and candidate country 
parliaments, the government of  the candidate country, the Commission and the Presidency of 
the Council.  Also the chief negotiators of  both the EU and the candidate country were invited 
to the meetings.  The main asset of  the JPC framework was that the Commission and the 
European Presidency could pass messages directly into the heart of  the country concerned 
(European Parliament, Briefing Nr. 38).  The naturalisation process and the integration of 
minorities were issues that were high on the agenda of  most JPC meetings with Estonia and 
Latvia (European Parliament (2002:4». 
Dag Osuander, EP official, notes that the direct dialogue with the Estonian and Latvian law-
makers enabled the MEPs and the Commission officials to exert a strong influence on the 
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neglected since the EP has to give its assent for the accession of  the candidate countries 
(Interview with Mr. Dag Osuander, 3 February 2003, Brussels). 
The following pages examine how the ED succesfully determined Latvian and Estonian 
citizenship and language policy by way of  the system of  APs and regular reports. 
The EU and Latvian sovereignty 
The citizenship law 
The review of  the window policy and the facilitation of  naturalisation of  otherwise stateless 
children were given a central place in the 1998 AP with Latvia. (OJ 1998 L 121 :26-30). 
The need for ED membership for security reasons became very clear in March 1998 when the 
Russian government threatened to impose economic sanctions on Latvia after by some 1,000 
elderly Russian speakers in Riga against a recent increase in utility rates.  This demonstration 
was broken up by the Latvian police and caused international uproar.  Moscow accused Latvia 
of  a "blatant violation of  elementary human rights" and threatened to "demand that all 
discriminatory measures against Russian speakers be removed".  Furthermore, the Russian 
government linked its signing of  a treaty delineating the border between Latvia and Russia 
with the status of  Russian speakers living in Latvia.  According to Moscow, removal of  these 
'discriminatory measures' meant accepting the revisions to the Citizenship Law proposed by 
the OSCE (Budryte: 117). 
The ED stepped up its support of  the OSCE.  The head of  the EU delegation in Latvia said: 
"In March 1998 we really began to stress this issue of  the citizenship law.  And we came out 
and supported Van der Stoel and said that he is the bottom line. " (Kelley (2004:90). 
Meanwhile, an Integration Council was established by the Prime minister in March 1998.  It 
was endowed with the task of  elaborating a concept for the National Programme on 
Integration of  Society.  On a meeting with journalists on 18 March 1998 in Riga, Valdis 
Birkavs noted that one of  the programme's main goals was "to avoid the emergence of  a two-
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Latvia's "strategic foreign policy goal,  integration into the EU" (RFE/RL Newsline, 19 
March 1998). 
On 14 April 1998, the Co-operation Council, composed of  representatives of  the ruling 
coalitions factions, reached an agreement on proposals for amendments to the Citizenship 
law.  The ruling factions agreed that all children born after 21  August 1991 would be entitled 
to citizenship when they reached the age of 16 years and have sufficient knowledge of  the 
Latvian language.  They also upheld the paritial removal of  the 'naturalisation windows' to 
allow all children born in Latvia to be naturalised by 2001.  Also other non-citizens would be 
able to become naturalised after that date (RFE/RL Newsline, 16 April 1998). 
While a Russian Foreign ministry official on 16 April 1998 described the agreement as a "step 
in the right direction", the EU urged Latvian law-makers to quickly enact amendments into 
the citizenship law.  Noting that it had earlier raised the issue in the context of  Latvia's bid to 
join the EU, the Union considered it essential for the "government's program to match fully 
the standards established by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in this 
area,  drawing on the advice of  the OSCE's High Commissioner on National Minorities".  The 
Union underlined that it would "continue to take a close interest in the implementation of  the 
government's programme" and expressed the hope that "the Latvian Parliament will take 
early action to adopt the Government's decisions" (European Foreign Policy Bulletin 
Database, Nr. 98/050).  In early May 1998, the Latvian government approved a change to the 
citizenship legislation with regard to the children born in Latvia after 21  August 1991. 
Contrary to the proposals of  the Co-operation Council, the only restriction was that the 
parents must have been living legally in Latvia for at least five years.  The HCNM had 
namely noted that the proposal from this council to allow only children of 16 years or more to 
citizenship, was inconsistent with international standards and would provoke a negative 
response in Europe (RFE/RL Newsline, 7 May 1998).  The final decision was appreciated by 
two high officials of  the European Commission during a meeting with the Latvian Foreign 
minister on 8 May 1998 (www.mfa.gov.lv). 
Both external and internal actors pressured the Saeima to change the citizenship law.  Next to 
the European Union, the OSCE High Commissioner and Russia, also Ole Espersen, 
Commissioner of  the Council of  the Baltic Sea States (RFE/RL Newsline, 14 May 1998), and 
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amend the citizenship law.  In strong wordings, both Foreign minister Valdis Birkavs 
(RFE/RL Newsline, 2 June 1998) and President Guntis Ulmanis (RFE/RL Newsline, 4 June 
1998) put pressure on the Saeima.  In case the amendments would not be adopted, they said, 
Riga would lose not only allies in Europe and the USA but also the chance to improve 
relations with Russia. 
On 4 June 1998, the Saeima approved at a second reading the amendments of  the government 
to grant citizenship at birth to stateless children born in Latvia after 21  August 1991, and to 
abolish the window system.  On the same day, the Latvian newspaper 'Diena' published a 
letter of  2 June 1998 from British Prime minister Tony Blair urging his Latvian counterpart, 
Guntars Krast, to help ensure that Latvian law and practice "fully (conform) with the 
standards of  international society" (RFE/RL N ewsline, 5 June 1998).  In his capacity as 
President of  the European Union, Blair noted that, "bearing in mind Latvia's future 
membership of  the EU,  the EU considers it essential that this legislation should be infull 
compliance with the recommendations of  the OSCE's High Commissioner on National 
Minorities ... a delay in implementation of  the legislation, implementation of  legislation that is 
not in line with the High Commissioner on National Minorities' recommendations, would not 
be seen as a positive development by the EU' (Morris (2003 :24). 
After President Guntis Ulmanis had urged Guntars Krast to call an extraordinary 
parliamentary session to adopt the amendments in the third and ,final reading (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 9 June 1998), the EU welcomed the decision of  the parliament.  On the other hand, 
it critically noted in the statement of 9 June 1998 that the Saeima had voted not to address 
citizenship legislation under the urgent procedure.  In spite of  this, the EU expressed the hope 
that "the Saeima (would) complete work on the legislation abolishing the window system and 
granting citizenship to stateless children without delay".  Further, the Union delivered a 
message to Russia in welcoming Primakov's statement that Russia sought no more from the 
Latvian government than full implementation of  the OSCE's High Commissioner's 
recommendations (European Foreign Policy Bulletin Database, 9811 00).  After pressure from 
the President to hold an extraordinary session on the issue (RFE/RL Newsline, 18 June 1998), 
the Saeima approved on 22 June 1998 the amendments to the citizenship law in a third and 
final reading whereby citizenship was granted to all children born to non-citizens after 21 
August 1991 if  their parents would request it.  The parliament also abolished the windows-
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42). 
In its statement on the parliament's decision, the Latvian Foreign ministry declared that by 
facilitating the naturalisation procedure, Latvia had fulfilled an important criterion for EU 
membership and admitted that this had been one major incentive (my emphasis) for amending 
the citizenship law (Arnswald:34).  This was also the view of  the European Commission.  It 
commented that the amendments met the recommendations made by the OSCE and that they 
addressed "one o/the priorities in Latvia's preparations/or membership" (RFE/RL Newsline, 
23 June 1998).  In a statement of26 June 1998, the Union welcomed the decision and 
considered that it fulfilled the key elements of  the recommendations of  the HCNM in respect 
of  citizenship (European Foreign Policy Bulletin Database, 98/114). 
European pressure however had its limits.  Immediately afterwards, those amendments were 
questioned by the Fatherland and Freedom Party.  It collected the required number of 
deputies' signatures to prevent the amendments from going into force for two months 
(RFE/RL Newsline, 23 June 1998).  During that period, it sought to collect the signatures of 
10 per cent of  the voters to hold an amendment on the amended law (RFE/RL Newsline, 29 
June 1998).  At the same moment as the petition drive for the referendum began, EU 
Commissioner Hans Van den Broek warned the Latvians during a visit to Riga on 20 July 
1998 not to delay granting citizenship to non-Latvians.  "We expressed the hope with the 
government that this law will be implemented, ", Van den Broek told journalists, adding that 
"we will have a disappointment to digest" if  the referendum would block the amendments. 
Van den Broek also urged Russia to stop trying to apply economic pressure on Latvia over the 
issue (RFE/RL Newsline, 21  July 1998).  Later, the Union underlined in a statement of3 
September 1998 its respect for the democratic process in Latvia but also expressed the hope 
that "the people 0/  Latvia (would) appreciate the importance 0/  this legislation so that the law 
as submitted by the government take effect as quickly as possible".  In late August 1998, 
the Fatherland and Freedom Party was succesful in gathering 226,530 signatures, almost 
twice the required 131.000 (RFE/RL Newsline, 28 August 1998).  President Guntis Ulmanis, 
who always had supported the amendments, blamed 'the West' for the popular reaction.  He 
contended that "recommendations from the West were perceived by society as pressure" and 
that Latvians were rejecting Western meddling (Mandelbaum (2000:121)). 
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amendments to the citizenship law.  In their view, the ruling parties showed a lack of  interest 
in Latvia's fate by approving the amendments "in a hurry" and yielding to pressure from 
Russia and European organisations.  They argued that the amendments should be adopted by 
the new parliament and should be adapted to reflect Latvian interests rather than European 
requirements (RFE/RL Newsline, 23  September 1998).  In an interview with Reuters on 1 
October 1998, Latvian Prime minister Guntars Krasts said that Western pressure on Latvia to 
ease citizenship requirements for its Russian-speaking minority was a "mistake".  Such 
pressure was harmful and raised doubts about the value of  joining the EU.  By exerting 
pressure, the EU, in his view, behaved like Moscow did before Latvia quit the Soviet Union 
(RFE/RL Newsline, 2 October 1998). 
Still, on 3 October 1998, Latvian voters rejected by a vote of  53 to 45 per cent the attempt to 
block the amendments to the citizenship law.  In the simultaneous elections for the Saeima, 
the voters elected a minority government led by Vilis Kristopans of  Latvia's Way; former 
Prime minister Krasts was relegated to the post of  deputy prime minister for European 
integration (Mandelbaum: 121).  President Ulmanis congratulated the Latvians for having 
understood the importance of  the integration of  society.  By adding that the vote was a 
positive signal towards the European Union, he revealed, however, the true meaning of  the 
referendum and its result, namely EU-membership.  In this regard, Celine Bayou argues that 
rather than a real desire to integrate the Russian speaking-community, the Latvians were 
afraid to seen their chances of  EU-membership jeopardised.  Thus, in her view, the wish to 
conform to EU requirements determined the result of  the referendum (Bayou (1999:101)). 
In a statement of 5 October 1998, the European Union welcomed the decision of  the Latvian 
electorate and noted that the amendments were in full accordance with the OSCE 
requirements.  It observed that "the decision of  the Latvian electorate (took) into account the 
political priorities enumerated in the Accession Partnership" and that it was "of  marked 
relevance to Latvia's relationship with the European Union" (Press: 324 Nr.  11604/98; 
European Foreign Policy Bulletin Database). 
Also the Commission recognised in its regular report of  4 November 1998 that Latvia had 
made major progress as regards the short term priorities of  the AP relating to political criteria: 
"The successful 3 October referendum on amendments to the Citizenship Law (had)facilitated 
225 an acceleration of  the naturalisation process, notably by abolishing the  'window system' and 
granting citizenship to stateless children.".  On the other hand, referring to recommendations 
made by the OSCE, the Commission requested Latvia to further simplify the citizenship tests 
on'Latvian history and the constitution.  With regard to the integration of minorities, it 
emphasised the importance of  language training.  Although the first phase of  a Latvian 
language programme had been succesfully completed, there still remained a considerable 
shortage of  teachers of  the Latvian language (European Commission (1998: 13). 
Despite the positive developments in Latvia, the Commission made no recommendations to 
promote Latvia to the 'first wave'.  Only Estonia was regarded as a functioning market 
economy, able to cope with the competitive pressures and market forces within the Union in 
the medium term.  Although Latvia had made significant economic progress, it could not yet 
be regarded in the Commission's view as fully satisfying either criteria.  However, if  the 
momentum was maintained, negotiations could be opened before the end of 1999. 
The language law 
Budryte notes that the pressure from the European Union in the,citizenship question had three 
consequences.  First, shortly before amending the Citizenship law, the Saeima ratified a 
resolution condemning the occupation of  Latvia by the Soviet Union.  A second consequence 
was the national referendum.  The issue of  the language law was the third consequence 
(Budryte: 119-120).  After succumbing to European pressure over the citizenship issue, 
Latvian nationalists wanted to change the education and language legislation to secure the 
future of  the Latvian nation (Morris (2003 :24, referring to an interview with an EC official in 
Riga on 20 October 1998). 
The Saeima had already elaborated a language law in 1996.  The draft law stipulated that all 
documents, correspondence, and business meetings in private firms would henceforth have to 
be in Latvian.  It also stipulated that all public gatherings and demonstrations should be 
conducted only in Latvian.  The CoE and the OSCE argued that the draft violated the rights of 
private business as well as the right of  public assembly (Pettai:279).  As a result of  this 
criticism, the draft was halted before returning in 1999. 
226 Already in its 1998 Regular report, the Commission doubted whether the final text of  the draft 
Latvian Language law would correspond to international standards and OSCE 
recommendations (European Commission (1998:13-14)).  In January 1999, the HCNM said 
that the draft law on the state language, which was being prepared for its second reading in 
the Saeima, 'over-regulates' the use of foreign languages in private business.  In his view, the 
requirement that private-sector employees speak Latvian intruded in the private sphere 
(RFE/RL N ewsline, 14 January 1999). 
Notwithstanding these critical comments, the Latvian parliament passed on 18 March 1999 
the draft law in the second reading "Virtually without debate" (according to the daily 'Diena') 
(RFE/RL Newsline, 19 March 1999).  Van der Stoel again objected to the draft and warned 
that passage of  the bill in its current form might impair Riga's chances of  integration into the 
EU (RFE/RL Newsline, 19 April 1999).  Also the CoE sent expert visits and criticised the law 
in a report (Kelley:81).  Following these objections, the Latvian Prime minister Vilis 
Kristopans called for changes to the bill.  According to him, state interference in the private 
sector is only permissible if  the interests of society, such as national security, territorial 
integrity or public safety demand it (RFE/RL Newsline, 20 April 1999). 
In a subsequent meeting in Brussels, both European Commission President Jacques Santer 
and Foreign affairs Commissioner Hans Van den Broek warned the Latvian Prime minister 
that Latvia would jeopardise its case for admission, should the Saeima adopt, in their view, a 
"discriminatory law" (Bernier (2001:354)).  Santer and Van den Broek therefore urged 
Kristopans to ensure that Latvia's state language bill met international requirements (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 23 April 1999).  This warning was repeated by the Danish Foreign minister Niels 
Helveg Petersen during an official visit to Riga in early July 1999.  Petersen noted that Latvia 
had fulfilled all the requirements to begin accession negotiations but underlined that if  the 
new language law was found to violate EU regulations, it could become a barrier to these 
negotiations (RFE/RL Newsline, 7 July 1999).  The link to EU admission was thus clearly 
made. 
In spite of  this pressure, the Saeima on 8 July 1999 overwhelmingly passed the language bill 
by a vote of  73 to 16.  The new coalition's policy placed the priority of  protecting Latvia's 
language and culture above strengthening relations with the EU (Kelley (2004:82). 
227 After the legislation was passed, the EU together with other international organisations, put 
pressure on the Latvian President to send the law back to the parliament for reconsideration 
(Bernier:354).  The result was that Vaira Vike-Freiberga, elected President on 17 June 1999, 
refused to sign the law and sent it back to the parliament (RFE/RL Newsline, 15 July 1999), a 
decision which was "warmly greeted' by Van der Stoel (RFE/RL Newsline, 16 July 1999). 
The Latvian President justified her veto on the 'triangle of  requirements' that the Latvian 
language law had to fulfil.  In her view, the law had to strengthen the position ofthe Latvian 
language, without however hindering Latvian progress towards the EU or delaying the 
involvement of  foreign businesses with the Latvian economy (Herd and Lofgren (2001 :287)). 
As a result, in late August 1999, Latvia received encouraging signals from the then EU 
chairman and Finnish President, Martti Ahtisaari about its bid to start negotiations on EU 
membership.  The EU reassured Latvian policy makers that Latvia's chance of  opening 
negotiations was good, pending passage of  a favorable language law (Kelley (2004:83). 
In its Regular report of 1999, the Commission strongly criticised the language law of  July 
1999 which, in its view, did not sufficiently integrate standards of  proportionality and 
precision.  It criticised the fact that under this law, the mandatory use ofthe state language in 
the private sector was the rule and not the exception.  Further, the provisions were worded so 
broadly that they would empair the exercise of  rights and freedoms guaranteed under the 
Europe Agreement.  Furthermore, the Commission saw linguistic restrictions in other laws, 
like the Election law, and also noted several obstacles to the integration of  non-citizens in the 
economic sphere.  It concluded that although significant progress had been achieved in the 
integration process, it was necessary for Latvia to ensure that the final text of  its language law 
was compatible with international standards and the Europe Agreement (European 
Commission (1999: 16-18 and 79-81)).  In any case, the language law was considered a 
potential obstacle for opening accession negotiations. 
Following the Commision's assessment, the 1999 AP urged Latvia to "align the Language 
law with international standards and the Europe Agreement" and to "implement further 
concrete measures for the integration of  non-citizens including language training and provide 
necessary financial support" (Council Decision of 6 December 1999, in OJ L 335/29-34; 
European Commission, (1999: 4 and 7)). 
228 On 9 December 1999, as the EU leaders met in Helsinki to decide over accession negotiations 
with second wave countries, the Saeima approved the new language law by a vote of 52 to 26. 
Despite strong opposition to the demands from 'official Europe', the desire to join the EU 
prevailed (Kelley:83).  The new law regulated language use in the public sphere and in the 
private sector when the activities of  enterprises affect legitimate public interests like public 
safety, health, morals, health care, protection of  consumer and labour rights, safety in the 
workplace, or public administration supervision.  Any such regulation must be proportionate 
to the rights and interests of  the private companies.  Foreign specialists of  enterprises who 
work in Latvia can use an interpreter for their own needs; their knowledge of  Latvian is not 
examined.  A foreign language may be used at business meetings.  Only if  a participant 
requests translation in the state language, it has to be ensured.  Contracts can be concluded in 
a foreign language but a translation into the state language has to be attached.  The use or 
language is not regulated in public events organised by private organisations unless these 
events affect legitimate public interests (,State Language law' and 'Use of  language in private 
business', both on: http://www.am.gov.lv/en).  Both Vike-Freiberga and Van der Stoel 
stressed that the law fully complies with Latvia's international obligations (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 10 December 1999). 
EU Commissioner Gunther Verheugen called the passage of  the law 'positive' and also the 
CoE and the OSCE expressed their approval.  The Russian Foreign ministry, however, was 
still critical about the new law and even went as far as to ask the EU not to consider Latvia's 
membership bid (RFE/RL Newsline, 13 December 1999).  The EU, however, agreed with 
Van der Stoel and found the language law an "encouraging development for enhancing the 
process of  integration of  minorities in Latvian society" (http://ue.eu.intlNewsroom; Foreign 
Policy Bulletin Database, Nr. 99/251). 
Reviewing the state of Latvia's membership preparation in the light of  the 1999 Commission 
report, the Association Council in its meeting in February 2000 "welcomed the significant 
progress achieved in the integration of  non-citizens into the Latvian society and noted with 
satisfaction that the final text of  the Language law is now essentially in conformity with 
Latvia's international obligations and commitments" (Joint Press Release, 15 February 2000, 
on: http://ue.eu.intlNewsroom). 
229 The election law 
Tensions rose again when international organisations asked Latvia to eliminate language 
requirements for candidates willing to run in national and local elections.  The head of  the 
OSCE mission to Latvia, Peter Semneby, told parliament deputy chairman Rihard Piks that he 
expected his mission to be closed by the end of2001.  However, he warned Rihard Piks that 
the Latvian election law, setting language requirements for candidates to the parliament and 
local councils, might prove an obstacle to EU and NATO accession.  He suggested as a 
compromise, the abolition of  the state language proficiency requirement for candidates who 
had obtained Latvian citizenship after 1991, and not setting a higher proficiency standard for 
candidates than the one needed to pass the language test for naturalisation (RFE/RL Newsline, 
15 November 2001).  In response to Semneby's statements, Latvian President Vaira Vike-
Freiberga pleaded for the abolishment of  the language requirements in the Election law.  In 
her view, these requirements were undemocratic because they created an unequality between 
Latvia's citizens.  Vaira Vike-Freiberga requested experts to offer suggestions by early 
January 2002.  She would then present these suggestions to the Latvian parliament (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 7 December 2001). 
The initiatives of  the Latvian president were welcomed by both the European Union and the 
head of  the OSCE mission.  In a statement of 13 December 2001, the Union considered an 
amendment ofthe Election law in the sense proposed by the Latvian president as "a step in 
the direction of  democracy and respect for human rights" and expressed its confidence "that 
the Latvian authorities (would) be anxious to endorse it as soon as possible" 
(http://ue.eu.intlNewsroom;ForeignPolicyBulletinDatabase,Nr. 01/377). 
On 18 December 2001, the Permanent Council of  the OSCE decided to end its nine-year 
existence in Latvia.  In his report to the Council, Semneby noted Latvia's achievements in 
building a democratic and integrated community, citing the smooth naturalisation process, the 
succesful implementation of  the national programme for Latvian-language teaching, the 
establishment of  the Public Integration Fund, and the improved performance by the National 
Human Rights Office.  Praising the recent initiative ofVike-Freiberga, he recommended the 
closing of  the mission.  Russia, on the other hand, still opposed the closing of  the mission, 
claiming that the Russian speakers were still not suitably protected from discrimination 
(RFE/RL Newsline, 19 December 2001). 
230 Returning from a visit to the United States, Vike-Freiberga put additional pressure on her 
countrymen, saying that the US's favourable attitude toward Latvia's future membership in 
NATO could change if  the country did not lift language requirements for candidates to the 
parliament and local councils (RFE/RL Newsline, 13 February 2002).  In a speech before the 
Latvian parliament, NATO-Secretary-General, Lord George Roberton, said that also Russia 
would have a say in determining which countries could join the alliance.  In that regard, he 
urged Latvia to abolish the language requirements to the parliament and local councils 
(RFE/RL Newsline, 22 February 2002).  Following these developments, the Latvian Prime 
minister Andris Berzins assured the US Ambassador to NATO, Richard Bums, on 26 
February 2002 that the laws concerned would be amended before the NATO Summit in 
November 2002.  On the same day, the British Defense secretary, Geoffrey Hoon, told Vike 
Freiberga that amendments to the election law are a matter of  Latvia's internal affairs, but that 
it was nevertheless very important to NATO that Latvia complied with requirements for 
democratic countries (RFE/RL Newsline, 27 February 2002). 
After the European Court of  Human Rights had ruled on 10 April 2002 that Latvia violated 
the ECHR in forbidding Ingrida Podkolzina from participating in the parliamentary elections 
in 1998, owing to her alleged inadequate knowledge of  the Latvian language (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 10 April 2002), the Saeima amended the Parliamentary Election Law on 9 May 
2002, abolishing the requirement that candidates must have the highest level of  Latvian-
language proficiency.  The HCNM and the US government immediately welcomed the 
amendments (RFE/RL Newsline, 10 May 2002). 
Latvian as the parliament's working language 
Before deleting the language proficiency requirement in the election law, the Latvian 
parliament approved on 30 April 2002 amendments to the constitution, strengthening the 
status of  Latvian as the state language.  The amendments stipulate that the parliament's 
working language is Latvian and that each person has the right to ask questions and to receive 
answers from state institutions in the Latvian language.  Further they obliged members of  the 
parliament to swear an oath before taking their posts (RFE/RL Newsline, 2 May 2002). 
231 Evidently, these constitutional amendments were regarded as 'compensatory' legislation 
guaranteeing the use of  the Latvian language in parliament and in local government.  MP 
Dzintars Kudums articulated the resistance of  many Latvian politicians to the many 
subsequent changes:  "In the beginning, we amended the Citizenship Law,  then the Language 
Law, and now the Election Law.  All we have left is to make Russian a state language.  Will 
this be the next step?"  (Budryte:122). 
This step was indeed proposed on 20 March 2002 by OSCE ODHIR Director, Gerard 
Stoudmann.  Stoudmann's suggestions created an outrage.  Foreign minister Berzins strongly 
criticised Stoudmann's remarks and argued that two state languages would pave the way for a 
state of  two communities, thereby reversing the integration process.  Berzins also observed 
that the suggestion came as a complete surprise since neither NATO nor the EU had ever 
proposed two state languages.  On the same day, the Saeima passed by a vote of79 to 16 the 
first reading of amendments to the constitution, strengthening the status of  Latvian as the state 
language (RFE/RL Newsline, 21  March 2002). 
The EU agreed with the Latvian Foreign minister.  Already on the following day, the EU 
Presidency issued a statement, declaring that Latvia alone has the right to determine its state 
language.  Also the new OSCE High Commissioner, RolfEkeus, said the EU did not expect 
Latvia to change or supplement legal norms that stipulate Latvian as the state language 
(RFE/RL Newsline, 22 March 2002). 
The EU and Estonian sovereignty 
Citizenship policy 
The amendments, submitted by the government in December 1997 in response to the 
Commission's opinion, however, twice failed to pass in 1998.  The domestic opposition 
strongly opposed the government's draft.  For example, Pro Patria, one of  the leading 
opposition groups, declared the amendment contradictory to the principle of  restoration of  the 
Estonian state.  As the EU negotiations were about to start in March 1998, however, the 
government introduced its draft and the bill passed in the first reading (Kelley (2004: 1  07». 
232 Keeping up the pressure, the EU noted in the 1998 AP the short-term objective of  "measures 
to facilitate the naturalisation process and to better integrate non-citizens including stateless 
children".  Also the EU-Estonian JPC urged progress.  Because domestic opposition still 
hindered progress, the Commission used its first regular report of  November 1998 to push for 
change again.  The report noted that "it is regrettable that the Parliament has not adopted 
amendments to the Citizenship law to allow stateless children to become citizens" (European 
Commission (1998).  The following day, EU's Commissioner for external affairs, Hans Van 
den Broek, met with Estonian President Lennart Meri.  OSCE HCNM staff also went to 
Tallinn to try to persuade the amendments' opponents.  This time, the combined OSCE and 
EU efforts moved things along (Kelley (2003:30)). 
Just before the Vienna Summit, Estonia made the changes requested by the Commission.  On 
8 December 1998, the Riigikogu passed the necessary amendments to the citizenship law that 
facilitated the granting of citizenship to stateless children.  Stateless children under 15 who 
were born after 26 February 1992 (when the country's 1938 citizenship law was reinstated) 
became eligible for citizenship.  The children's parents must apply on their behalf, must be 
stateless themselves and must have lived in Estonia for at least five years.  Those opposed to 
the bill had argued in favour of  applicants having to pass a language proficiency test (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 9 December 1998; European Parliament, Briefing Nr. 42). 
On the following day, the EU welcomed the passage of  amendments and noted that the 
decision of  the Riigikogu was fully in accordance with the political priorities enumerated in 
the AP (European Foreign Policy Bulletin Database, Nr. 98/371). 
The desire to join the EU was determinant in adopting the amendments.  The head of  the 
human rights department in the Estonian ministry of  foreign affairs said that while Estonian 
politicians disagreed with the recommendations from abroad, they eventually had to give in: 
"About the stateless children issue we arguedfor a long time about how to interpret this ... 
Anyway,  Van Der Stoel visited Estonia again and reopened this issue ...  Many governments 
and the EU started to back him up.  The EU was our first priority and this was well 
understood by EU Foreign Affairs Commissioner Hans Van Den Broek, and Van Der Stoel 
who obviously talked together.  We had lots of  contact and meetings with ambassadors of  the 
EU countries." (Kelley (2004: 1  08)).  Many MPs had held reservations about such intense 
outside intervention and admitted that their vote was crucially affected by Estonia's need to 
233 get into the EU.  Tune Kelam, the chairman of  the committee in charge of  bringing Estonian 
laws in compliance with EU standards, argued that even though the Estonian government 
supported the amendment concerned, "we (Estonia and international institutions) must make it 
absolutely clear where the end (to these amendments) will be.  This should be the last demand 
for Estonia or any Baltic state." (Budryte:82). 
The language and election law 
It was, however, not the last demand from the 'official Europe' to Estonia in order to be 
allowed into the EU. 
On 15 December 1998, the Riigikogu adopted amendments to the Parliamentary and Local 
Elections Law.  These amendments required candidates for parliamentary and local elections 
to have a sufficient knowledge of  Estonian to take part in the work of  those bodies and to 
understand the content of legislative acts  (RFE/RL Newsline, 16 December 1998).  Although 
Estonian authorities claimed that these amendments did not discriminate against non-Estonian 
speakers, they were strongly criticised by Russia and the OSCE.  According to Russian 
Foreign ministry spokesman, Vladimir Rakhamin, the amendments were a move aimed at 
forcing ethnic minorities out of  the country's political life (RFE/RL Newsline, 23 December 
1998).  The HCNM said that it is up to voters to decide whether: to elect someone who did not 
speak the official language.  Van der Stoel rejected suggestions by some Estonian officials 
that his criticism was prompted by Russian objections (RFE/RL Newsline, 30 December 1998 
and 11  January 1999). 
Concurrent with the changes to the election law, the Estonians also restarted efforts to tighten 
the language law.  On  9 February 1999, the Riigikogu amended the 1995 Language law, 
requiring linguistic proficiency - at a level established by the government - for all public 
servants, private sector employees, nongovernmental organisations, and even self-employed 
entrepreneurs (RFE/RL Newsline, 10 February 1999; also: 'Minority Protection in Estonia'). 
These amendments met considerable resistance from the Russian-speakers.  The Russian 
Party in Estonia appealed to President Meri not to promulgate the amendments, while the 
United People's Party urged the EU and the OSCE to pressure Estonia to revoke the 
legislation (RFE/RL Newsline, 15 February 1999).  On 18-19 February 1999, four members 
234 of  the presidential roundtable on national minorities resigned.  In their view, the Riigikogu 
ignored the Roundtable's views in the issue of  the election and language laws (RFE/RL 
Newsline, 22 February 1999). 
After the EU-Estonia Association Council had stated in April 1999 that it would "continue to 
follow closely developments in relation to the regulation of  the use of  the Estonian language" 
(Joint press release, 27 April 1999, on: http://ue.eu.int/Newsroorn), the head of  the 
Commission's mission to Latvia, Gunter Weiss, expressed a clear warning to the Estonian 
lawmakers in July 1999, saying the restrictions encoded in the Estonian language law might 
create foreign policy problems for the country.  In his view, Estonia ignored EU 
recommendations at a time when it was already holding membership talks (Herd and 
Lofgren:285).  Meanwhile, also the HCNM had written a letter to Estonian foreign minister 
Toomas Hendrik lIves and had visited Estonia in June 1999. 
In a compromise under the pressure to publish some regulations, Estonia did effectively adopt 
language legislation on the public sector in August 1999, according to which, for example, 
teachers in public schools, including minority establishments, must demonstrate a 
'intermediate' level of  proficiency in Estonian.  The 'intermediate level' requires oral and 
limited written proficiency in Estonian; the 'highest level' requires oral and written 
proficiency in Estonian (,Minority Protection in Estonia', 2001).  Employees in the public 
administration were required to have a minimum level of  Estonian language ability, 
proportional to the public interest of  the post.  This includes for example nurses, police and 
prison officials (European Commission (2001 :23)).  An Estonian delegation went to Brussels 
shortly thereafter to discuss the regulations on the private sector.  It was then agreed that some 
modifications would be made and that the regulations would again be sent to the EU for 
comment.  In this period, one Estonian official said:  "There has been fierce consultation 
between us and the EU and the law and the regulations.  Just last week we had a meeting on 
the upcoming progress report - which will come out October 13 this year.  The new report 
will most certainly touch on the language issue.  (oo.)  Just today, we sent the regulations on 
the private sector to the EU  We have followed all Van Der Stoel recommendations on the 
law.  We worked closely with him in drafting the regulations/decree.  We discussed every 
single word with him." (Kelley (2004:101)). 
235 In the regular report of 6 October 1999, the Commission indeed claimed in very strong words 
that the Language Law restricted access of  non-Estonian speakers in political and economic 
life and therefore should be amended.  Important to note is that the Commission's criticism of 
the law was mainly based on its concern that the language requirements would impose 
limitations to EU citizens to practice business in Estonia.  In line with the concern expressed 
by the EP (Briefing Nr. 8), the Commission argued that Estonia'possibly violated its 
obligations under the Europe Agreement, in particular, in the fields of  free movement of 
persons, right of  establishment, supply of services, capital movements and award of  public 
contracts.  The provisions ofthe language law were likely to have a negative impact on the 
establishment and operation of Community companies and of self-employed Community 
nationals in Estonia.  In addition, the law could constitute a restriction to entry into and 
temporary presence in Estonian territory of Community citizens (European Commission 
(1999: 14-15).  This indicates that the Commission was not seeking to alter fundamentally the 
policies of  the Estonian state regarding minorities.  The Commission did not seek a binational 
state, in which the Russian language would be an official language.  Its interest was mainly 
economical.  Based on the findings and recommendations of  the Commission, the 1999 AP 
identified the necessity for Estonia to "align the language legislation with international 
standards and the Europe Agreement" as a short-term priority (Council Decision of  6 
December 1999, OJ L 335/35-40;  European Commission (Accession Partnership 1999:4). 
At a conference on 'Estonia and the EU' held in Tallinn on 5 November 1999, the Finnish 
President Martti Ahtisaari, who then held the rotating presidency of  the EU, reaffirmed the 
importance of  Estonia aligning its language law with international and EU standards 
(Bernier:354). 
The EU recommendations resulted in a lively policy debate in Estonia.  In October 1999, 
Prime minister Mart Laar objected to the Commission's view and noted that the government 
had no plans to send a new amendment to the parliament.  Mart Nutt, a member of  the 
parliament's European affairs committee and one of  the authors of  the Language law, argued 
that the issue of  the language law was not a legal issue but a political one.  In his view, there 
were no common norms in the European Union regulating the use of  language.  He further 
noted that the Union blindly repeated the OSCE recommendations without trying to 
understand the heart of  the problem.  The Estonian Foreign ministry, however, brushed aside 
these objections.  It stated that the prospect of  Estonian EU integration was anything but clear 
and that Estonia had to loosen its language law in order to join the EU (Herd and 
236 LOfgren:285-286).  In a speech on 'Euro-integration' delivered to the members of  the 
Riigikogu on 19 January 2000, Foreign minister Ilves referred to the EU's 1999 AP with 
Estonia and argued that changes to the language legislation were "among those initial tasks to 
be fulfilled during the year 2000" if  Estonia was to keep its position in the competition over 
EU accession (http://www.vm.ee/eng/pressre  I  eases/  speeches/2 000). 
Work to modify the legislation to meet the EU demands proceeded, with the result that 
already the subsequent EU-Estonia Accession Council on 14 February 2000 "expressed (its) 
confidence that the necessary legislative changes (would) be made so that the linguistic 
framework (complied) with international requirements,  including the Europe Agreement" 
(Press release of 14 February 2000).  Also the Joint EU-Estonia Parliamentary Committee 
discussed the language issue.  One of  the two chairmen, MEP Per Stenmarck, stated that, on 
the one hand, Estonia's language law needed to be adjusted to meet EU norms and to allow 
equal competition for all businesses based in the EU.  On the other hand, he stressed that the 
law was generally sound and that the EU fully understood that Estonian is the sole official 
language of  the country (RFE/RL Newsline, 29 March 2000).  In this meeting, also Carlsson, 
Rapporteur of  the EP's Foreign affairs committee on Estonia's application for membership of 
the EU, emphasised the necessity for new members to satisfy the high standards on human 
rights issues.  In her view, the Estonian language law did not meet the OSCE requirements 
and should therefore be amended (PE 287.267). 
In response to the Commission's 1999 Regular report and the subsequent 1999 AP, the 
Riigikogu removed the controversial provisions of  the language law on 14 June 2000.  Under 
the new law, the compulsory use of  Estonian in the private sphere had to be clearly justified 
on the grounds of  a specific public interest, such as public security, public order, public 
health, health protection, consumer protection and safety at work.  At the same time the 
Estonian parliament also eased the naturalisation process for disabled applicants, removing 
both linguistic requirements and knowledge of  the Estonian Constitution (RFE/RL Newsline, 
15 June 2000). 
The Commission immediately welcomed the new language law and noted that Estonia had 
followed the recommendations made in the regular report and in the AP (Commission Press 
Room, 16 June 2000, IP/00/626, on: http://www.europa.eu.intirapid/start).  In a statement of 
19 June 2000, also the European Presidency welcomed the amendments and agreed with the 
237 HCNM that the law largely complied with international standards (RFE/RL Newsline, 24 
August 2000).  It further welcomed the State integration programme for the years 2000-2007 
(http://ue.eu.intlNewsroom;EuropeanForeignPolicyBulletinpatabase,Nr. 00/135).  About 
two months before the Commission issued its yearly report, also the EP welcomed the 
amended language law and the forthcoming adoption by the Riigikogu ofthe State integration 
programme (A5-023 8/2000). 
In its 2000 regular report, the Commission welcomed, on the one hand, the amendments of 
the Citizenship law which had lifted the language and civic test requirements for disabled 
people and concluded that overall, Estonia had fulfilled the oseE recommendations in the 
area of  citizenship and naturalisation.  Estonia had also made considerable progress in the 
field of language policy.  In sum, the short-term priorities of  the AP had been met to a large 
extent.  On the other hand, the Commission regretted that under the Parliamentary and Local 
Elections law, language requirements for candidates to parliamentary and local elections 
remained.  These requirements affected, in the Commission's view, the right of  non-Estonian 
speakers to choose their candidates, in particular at local level (European Commission (2000: 
20,89 and 91». 
There remained indeed the issue of  the language profiency requirements for candidates to 
parliament and local governments. 
In an interview with the daily 'Postimees' on 29 October 2001, Ambassador Hertrampfnoted 
that Estonia had harmonised its citizenship, aliens and language laws, as well as legal acts 
associated with education and language examinations, with European norms.  The OSCE 
mission's mandate could therefore end on 31  December 2001.  On the other hand, she 
emphasised that the issue of  the Estonian-language requirement for candidates to parliament 
and local governments had still not been solved.  Ms Hertrampf welcomed the recent raising 
of  this issue in the Riigikogu, noting that "these language requirements are not in conformity 
with the UN principles, which define political and civil rights"., She stressed however that no 
one challenges the right of  Estonia to have a monolingual parliament (RFE/RL Newsline, 30 
October 2001).  The EU fully supported the demands from the OSCE ambassador, 
underlining that a closure of  the OSCE mission was conditional on the fulfilment of  all the 
OSCE guidelines:  "the Laws on local and national elections need to be brought into line with 
agreed international standards" (RFE/RL Newsline, 28 June 2001). 
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laws in its 2001 regular report (European Commission (2001 :22-23)), the Riigikogu amended 
on 21 November 2001 the Parliament Election Act and the Local Councils Election Act, 
abolishing the language requirement for candidates to the parliament and local councils 
(RFE/RL Newsline, 26 November 2001).  In response to these developments, the Permanent 
Council of  the OSCE decided on 13 December 2001 not to extend the mandate of its mission 
to Estonia, thus ending its nine-year existence on 31  December 2001.  Prime minister Mart 
Laar underlined that the mission's departure marked the end of  an era in the country's history 
and brought Estonia into the family of  normally functioning democracies (RFE/RL Newsline, 
14 December 2001). 
Estonian as the working language of  parliament and all state councils 
Like the Latvians, the Estonians adopted legislation to compens,ate for the abolition of  the 
language proficiency requirements in the election laws.  When the Riigikogu discussed and 
passed the first reading of  the amendments ofthe election laws on 7 November 2001 
(RFE/RL Newsline, 17 October 2001), Foreign minister Ilves spoke in favour of  it, arguing 
that it would help convince the OSCE to end its 10-year mission to Estonia.  Complaints by 
the opposition Centre Party that the bill would endanger the position of  Estonian as the state 
language were countered by noting that the Pro Patria faction had submitted bills that would 
officially establish Estonian as the working language of  parliament and all state councils 
(RFE/RL Newsline, 8 November 2001).  On 20 November and 4 December 2001, the 
Estonian parliament passed bills making Estonian respectively the working language of  the 
Riigikogu and of  the local councils (RFE/RL Newsline, 21  November and 5 December 2001). 
The Copenhagen European Council of 12-13 December 2002 
The Copenhagen European Council of 12-13 December 2002 solemnly concluded the 
accession negotiations with all the candidate countries and looked forward to welcoming 
these states as members from 1 May 2004.  Thus, Estonia and Latvia had managed to return to 
Europe.  To achieve this purpose, they had adapted their restorationist policies to certain 
external demands in the field oflanguage and citizenship policy.  But in general, the European 
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to certain specific issues and the EU fully agreed with the policy of  linguistic integration.  It 
did not demand from these states to install a binational order, whereby Russian would de iure 
be the second official language or whereby Russian-speakers would get territorial autonomy 
in Northeastern Estonia. 
This was for example clear in the issue of  the reform of  the education system.  In its 2002 
regular report on Estonia, the Commission considered, on the one hand, the amendment of 
March 2002 to the Basic School and Gymnasium Act (full-time Russian language education 
can continue beyond 2007 in municipally-owned gymnasiums where the population so 
wishes) as a strengthening of  the rights of  Russian-speakers.  On the other hand, it found it 
essential for Russian-speakers to have a good command of  the Estonian language in order to 
have equal access to the Estonian labour market.  In this regard, the Commission referred to a 
resolution from the Committee of  ministers of  the CoE of 13 June 2002.  This resolution 
stated that a policy aiming at an increased knowledge of  Estonian had to be coupled with 
instruction for minorities in their own language (European Commission (2002:30)).  When 
Latvia reformed its education system, increasing the number of  classes taught in Latvian at 
state-run Russian high schools, this decision prompted numerous protests by Russia, 
resistance from Latvia's non-governmental organisations and politicians supporting the rights 
of  Russian speakers, along with mass demonstrations.  The EU, the OSCE and the CoE, 
however, expressed strong support for the decision of  the Latvian government to pursue the 
reform, admitting that Latvia's laws on language and education were in line with the standards 
outlined by the OSCE and the CoE (Budryte:124).  As Budryte notes, the process ofEU 
accession actually strengthened the ability of  these nations to 'nationalise' because the EU 
actively supported the language training programs in these countries and strengthened their 
administrative capacity in general (Budryte: 86 and 91). 
Important to note is that the Commission did not make the final admission of  Latvia into the 
ED's ranks dependent on ratification of  the CoE FCNM, something also several EU member 
states like Belgium, France and Greece have not done yet.  Even in May 2004 the Saeima 
refused to ratify the FCNM, despite continued urging by international organisations. 
President Vaira Vike-Freiberga has suggested that ratification is a non-urgent matter and 
maintains that adequate protection of  minorities exists under current legislation.  Foreign 
minister Artis Pabriks similarly argued in 2004 that ratification would only divide Latvian 
society further.  Ina Druviete, head of  the Saeima human rights and public affairs committee 
believes that ratification can only occur if  there are no further unjustified protests against the 
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there will never be a retreat from Latvian as the sole state language (Morris (2005:258)).  This 
can be seen as a respect for Latvia's domestic sovereignty in the broad sense of  the word. 
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To return to the introduction and the research objective of  the thesis: how did the 
representatives of  the Baltic states construct their sovereign statehood in two completely 
different eras?  More specifically, how did they organise their public authority structures? 
How did they regulate the relationship between the state and the constituent national groups? 
On the other hand, what kind of  relationship did they forge with the principal international 
European institutions?  And what implications did this relationship have for their Westphalian 
sovereignty? 
As indicated in the first chapter, in the aftermath of  the First World War there were both 
international and internal factors which shaped the subsequent process of  state-building and 
the organisation and the views of  the representatives of  these states on domestic sovereignty. 
More specifically, the ideas of  the Austro Marxists Karl Renner and Otto Bauer on cultural 
identity, cultural autonomy and the relationship between nation and state spread throughout 
the Russian Empire and began to dominate the thinking of all kinds of  nationalist and 
revolutionary movements, including the Baltic national movements. 
In Renner's view, nations were to be constituted as public law corporations on the basis of  a 
nationality register in which individuals freely declared their affiliation.  Those nations were 
then represented at the state level in separate national councils which had the power to 
legislate in cultural and educational affairs and to tax their co-nationals.  The state retained its 
supremacy in economic and social affairs and in the field of  internal and external security. 
The arrival of  these ideas has to be seen against the background of  an already long-standing 
corporate-style autonomy for the ruling German elite living in the western borderlands of  the 
Russian Empire. The concept of  cultural autonomy was also very familiar to the Lithuanians. 
In the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569-1795), the Jewish community enjoyed an 
unique and far-reaching cultural autonomy.  Jewish activity in virtually every field was 
regulated by rules and norms, created by their own special judicial system.  The Council of 
Lithuania operated as the central institution of  Jewish self-government, collecting all kinds of 
taxes, protecting the individual rights of  Jews against non-Jews and monitoring the behaviour 
of  Jews in practically all areas. 
While Estonian and Latvian public life was dominated by the Gennan language, the ruling 
elite of  Lithuania was entirely Polonised.  In the nineteenth century, the Estonian, Latvian and 
Lithuanian national movements, therefore, primarily aimed at the protection of  the indigenous 
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self-government, next to social and cultural reforms.  The outbreak ofthe First World War 
and the Russian revolutions of  March and October 1917 were a catalyst but it was not until 
the Bolsheviks seized power in Russia and a German occupation was unavoidable that the 
Estonians and Latvians declared themselves independent.  In the light of  the history of 
oppression of  their people, the political leaders of  Estonia and Latvia adopted a remarkable 
liberal approach towards the minorities in their state. 
After the Estonian provisional government had promised the minorities cultural autonomy in 
the founding document of  the new state, this principle was also enacted in the Constitution of 
1920.  Evidently, there were both internal and external tactical political reasons for this 
approach.  The Estonian state needed indeed the support from all minorities and was still 
striving for membership of  the League of  Nations.  However, more fundamentally was that 
many Estonians genuinely believed that the equality of  nationalities was one of  the 
cornerstones of  the new international order.  As a small people, the Estonians knew that the 
only future for their country was a peaceful and democratic one.  After the necessary land 
reform had secured the predominance of  the Estonian nation, the Estonians compensated the 
German minority. 
Also the so-called political platform, issued by the provisional Latvian government, promised 
the different national groups to guarantee their cultural rights by way of  fundamental laws. 
The Baltic German National Committee, however, asked for special privileges for the German 
minority and rejected the principle of  proportional representation.  Many Baltic Germans 
simply refused to accept a state, controlled by the majority nation.  This view was, however, 
not supported by all Germans.  Paul Schiemann tried to persuade the Baltic German 
community to fully acknowledge Latvian control of  the new state.  On the other hand, he tried 
to make the Latvians adopt cultural autonomy as a tool to reorganise the new state in a 
fundamental way.  Also for Schiemann, this implied that minorities could constitute 
themselves as public law corporations.  In Schiemann's view, a state, in general, had to 
become 'anational' and had to restrict itself to the general administration and to economic and 
security questions.  Cultural and educational questions were an exclusive affair of  the national 
communities, including the majority nation.  Even in the beginning of] 919, the Baltic 
Germans strove for the establishment of  a binational republic.  This was also the objective of 
military putchists who drove the Ulmanis government from power in April 1919 but who 
were military defeated in June 1919.  Although further military victories against the German-
Russian army of  Bermondt-Avalov in October and November 1919 strengthened Latvian 
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Evidently, reactions from the outside world played a very important role for the new 
vulnerable state which actively strove for the membership of  the League of  Nations.  On the 
other hand, the very enactment of  the wide-ranging school autonomy for minorities against a 
background of continuous conflict with the Baltic Germans clearly indicated that the Latvians 
wanted a peaceful multinational future for their country.  Just like the Estonians, the Latvians 
indeed believed the equality of  nationalities to be one of  the cornerstones of  the new 
international order, embodied by the League, and that furthermore only a multi-ethnic 
solution would guarantee their state's viability.  This again illustrated the interplay between 
Westphalian and domestic sovereignty. 
Lithuanian politics was different.  In their struggle with Poland over the eastern borderlands, 
the Lithuanians needed the support and loyalty of  the Jewish and Belarussian minorities.  That 
is why they promised these groups autonomy.  Also the Paris Declaration of  5 August 1919, 
submitted at the Paris Peace Conference, with its detailed and far-reaching proposals 
regarding autonomy, was purely instrumental and only meant to strengthen the external 
position of  the country.  In 1919-1920 Lithuania, a kind of  de facto personal autonomy, based 
on the historical Jewish self-government, developed.  Like in the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, Jewish autonomy was constructed from the bottom to the top.  The basic 
entity was the local, territorially based kehilla.  These kehilla were public agencies with the 
power to impose taxes, and issue by-laws in matters of  religion, education and welfare.  They 
could also register births, marriages and divorces.  The Community Council was their 
decision-making body.  Every Jewish community sent a representative to the Assembly of 
Jewish Councils, the supreme body of  Jewish autonomy.  This Assembly elected the National 
Council, the actual representative body of  the Jewish community.  The Ministry without 
portfolio for Jewish affairs had to defend the Jewish interests within the government and to 
function as a kind between the Jewish community and the Lithuanian government.  Since it 
was a part of  the government, it was not part of  the system of  Jewish national autonomy. 
It became, however, immediately clear that the equality of  nationalities was certainly not the 
leading principle of  the new international order and that this order was in fact a continuation 
of  old politics.  The League of  Nations as embodiment of  this so-called new order, was not 
even the beginnings of  a system of  international government.  Instead it was an association of 
sovereign independent states, dominated by the victorious Great Powers.  Attempts to insert 
minority protection clauses in the League's Covenant were blocked by the same powers which 
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stability and tranquility of  the newly established states in Eastern Europe and the international 
peace, the Great Powers imposed on these states minority treaties, the provisions of  which 
would be guaranteed by the Council as executive organ of  the League.  The League's minority 
protection system thus only had a political aim and had nothing to do with considerations of 
humanitarian nature. 
This imposition of  treaties was considered by the states concerned as a violation of  their 
Westphalian sovereignty and was, therefore, strongly rejected.  The heart of  the matter was 
indeed that the international protection system of  the League constituted an institutionalisation 
of  inequality between East and West.  Different scholars justify this policy by referring to the 
'special quality', the so-called backwardness of  Eastern Europe.  Already the very liberal 
policy of  the three Baltic states towards their minorities, however, contradicts this reasoning. 
This institutionalisation of  inequality constituted in any case the very fault of  the minority 
protection system.  Whereas the treaties were deliberately aimed at a specific region, their 
guarantor was an universal organisation, based upon the principles of sovereignty and equality 
of  its member states. 
Contrary to the initial different 'Baltic' documents and laws, provisions concerning personal or 
cultural autonomy were very rare exceptions in the treaties.  These international instruments 
mainly contained stipulations with regard to acquisition of  citizenship, equal civil and 
political rights, equality before the law, use of language and establishment of  schools and 
institutions.  The reason was that the treaties were drafted by representatives of  the western 
majority nations which only took the western minorities as their model.  Most western 
minorities in 1919 were economically, socially and politically less advanced than the 
majorities and willingly adopted the language of  the majorities.  For these people, it sufficed 
that their language was tolerated in their private life and that their children received their first 
instrution in their mother tongue.  They certainly did not strive for a differentiated national 
existence next to the majority nation.  More fundamentally, the western treaty drafters went 
out from an unitary, indivisible state nation.  For them, a single national culture had to prevail 
in each state.  They opposed cultural autonomy as construction of  public law because this 
would allow, in their view, minorities to become a state within a state.  In their view on 
domestic sovereignty, no external rival like a national community next to the one legitimate 
authority ofthe state was allowed to exist.  The state had to retain exclusive control over all 
its citizens. 
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in 1921.  As condition for their entrance, the Great Powers insisted that also these countries 
sign international instruments for the protection of  minorities.  The negotiation of  the 
Lithuanian minority declaration showed again the lack of  support from the Great Powers for 
the construction of  personal autonomy.  Lithuania very rapidly signed a declaration, 
completely modelled on the Polish minority treaty, because of  political tactical reasons. 
Estonia and Latvia, on the other hand, refused to sign such a declaration which they regarded 
as a violation of  their Westphalian sovereignty.  In general, the representatives of  both states 
emphasised that their own national policies were more liberal than what the treaties 
prescribed.  Minority protection was, in their view, a national internal affair.  There were only 
some imposed treaties but no genuine international minority protection instruments.  In line 
with this, Estonia and Latvia only agreed to accept minority obligations which were binding 
for every member state.  This was again underlined by the Latvian representative Walters 
when he launched a campaign for generalisation of  minority rights in the League's Assembly. 
Pusta and Walters argued that an unilateral imposition of  minority clauses would make of 
their countries half-sovereign states, while the full sovereignty and equality of  all states was 
one of  the pillars of  the League.  The proposed declaration violated, in their view, their 
constitutional law and would place an external actor next to their own people.  A further 
strong argument was that their states were not born out of  the peace and minority treaties and 
that they had already been recognised unconditionally.  Estonia and Latvia, therefore, wanted 
the Council to consider the protection of  minorities as an entirely internal national matter and 
formalise this by way of a declaration as the Council had done before with Finland. 
In the end, a compromise was reached in terms of Westphalian sovereignty.  On the one hand, 
the Estonian and Latvian minority declaration stressed the sovereignty of  these states.  These 
'independence declarations', as they were called by Ziemele, did neither contain an explicit 
international guarantee nor concrete minority obligations.  The Permanent Court of 
International Justice could only give an advisory opinion.  On the other hand, Estonia and 
Latvia were obliged to respect the general principles laid down in the treaties and minorities 
could petition the League to try to enforce their rights. 
The reference to their Westphalian sovereignty was also one of  the main arguments that the 
Baltic governments used before the League in response to the requests for financial 
compensation, made by the Baltic Barons in their petitions against the land reform acts.  As 
explained above, these reforms constituted a genuine social and national revolution.  Before 
the League, Estonia and Latvia defended with success that the land reforms were necessary to 
246 ensure their domestic stability and tranquility and to counter communist influence.  Land 
reform was an integral part of social-economic policy which belonged to the exclusive 
competence of  a state.  Their states were perfectly entitled to pursue these policies, even if 
this meant that certain national groups were affected more than others.  Minorities were able 
to use internal judicial means to challenge acts of  a government:  An intervention by the 
League in such an internal judicial procedure would constitute a manifest violation of  their 
sovereignty.  The League entirely accepted these arguments and the petitions were rejected. 
The case of  the petition against the Latvian government of 1925 very clearly illustrated the 
very nature of  the League's minority protection system.  The League was no supranational 
organisation but an association of sovereign states.  Since the League could never take a 
decision against the will of  the government concerned, the minority protection procedure was 
one of  negotiation between the Council and the government, aimed at finding a mutually 
satisfactory solution.  This was even more the case in issues related to agrarian reform.  The 
League's system was especially created to ensure domestic stability.  Agrarian reform was 
crucial for the economic and social consolidation of  many countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe and that is why the League never intervened. 
Whereas the Estonian and Latvian governments primarily based themselves on their 
sovereignty to ward off an intervention by the League in their agrarian reform, the 
Lithuanians rejected the minority protection system as such.  Both with regard to several 
minority petitions and in the matter of  the reform of  the minority protection system in 1929, 
Lithuania articulated a thesis of  absolute Westphalian sovereignty.  An acceptance of  the 
Lithuanian views in these different matters would have meant an even greater predominance 
of  the states in the minority protection system vis-a.-vis the Council. 
Already before, Lithuania refused to place its minority declaration under the international 
guarantee of  the League.  The refusal of  the Lithuanian government to ratify the declaration 
and to make it part of  its internal law was a further illustration of  its absolute view on 
sovereignty. 
The external position of  Lithuania vis-a.-vis the League perfectly reflected the radically 
deteriorating internal situation.  The first signs were hopeful for the Jewish population.  The 
Lithuanian government promised to implement a far-reaching autonomy along the same lines 
as the historical autonomy in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.  The different institutions 
of  this de facto Jewish autonomy were however never legally recognised.  After the change of 
the international and internal political situation, they were easily disbanded. 
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implementation of  autonomy.  The Lithuanians believed that the Jews would help them in 
acquiring Vilnius and Memel and in attracting Belarussians to a multinational Lithuania. 
They had much less need of  the Jews in the relatively homogenous Lithuania which actually 
emerged.  It also became clear that the Jews were not a significant factor in acquiring Vilnius. 
The Jews, on the other hand, took far too seriously the assurances made by Lithuanian 
politicians.  In general, the Lithuanian minority policy indeed failed because the Memel and 
Vilnius question poisoned the internal political development of  the country.  The radical 
nationalist forces were strengthened whereby the social and political balance of  the country 
was undermined.  Also important to note is that Jewish autonomy was promised during the 
time of  the Taryba, when it had been dominated by the Nationalists and Populists.  The 
Nationalists' ideology contained elements of sociocratic concepts, while the Populists had 
strong liberal tendencies and were favourable towards national minorities.  The Christian 
Democrats became firmly established in the Seimas after the elections to the Constituent 
Assembly.  They saw the Jewish social factor as an obstacle to creating a modem Lithuania. 
Next to these factors, there was also no consensus on the institution of  autonomy within the 
Jewish community itself.  Many Jews were dissatisfied with taxation or attacked the 
autonomous institutions as excessively party-dominated. 
In terms of  domestic sovereignty, the internal situation in Estonia developed radically 
different.  The founding documents and the Constitution of 1920 were of  course the perfect 
basis for the German minority to try to obtain full cultural autonomy.  At the same time as 
Estonia tried to enter into the League, the first German proposals to establish cultural self-
government were submitted.  Nevertheless, the Germans faced an uphill struggle.  Many 
Estonians namely feared that cultural autonomy would create 'a state within a state'.  The 
negotiations between Estonia and the Council over the minority declaration were also not a 
supportive factor.  On the contrary, the Estonian adversaries of  the cultural autonomy law 
continuously emphasised that the international developments clearly showed that minority 
rights were not an issue for the League of  Nations and the Great Powers, let alone that the 
establishment of  cultural autonomy was a condition to enter the League.  This again 
demonstrates the interplay between Westphalian and domestic sovereignty.  The decisive 
factor for the adoption of  the bill was the agreement between the German minority and the 
most important adversaries that autonomy would only relate to cultural affairs and could not 
be used as a political vehicle.  The cultural autonomy law indeed attempted to separate culture 
and politics.  The Estonian state delegated its decision-making power in cultural and 
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did not renounce its ultimate legal authority in these questions.  It remained the highest 
authority of  the members of  the cultural self-government and also controlled this institution. 
Cultural autonomy proved to be a success and its integrative function was appreciated by the 
Estonians.  Only when the Estonian system became authoritarian, cultural autonomy came 
under pressure.  It was abolished after foreign powers overran Estonia. 
The school autonomy for the minorities in Latvia, on the other hand, was not a full autonomy. 
School autonomy was administered by the Latvian ministry of  education and not directed by a 
public corporation.  The Latvians did not institute a clear separation between culture and 
politics.  Compared with the public corporations in Estonia, the school administrations of  the 
minorities in Latvia depended much more on the continuously changing political situation. 
The essence is that the Latvian state never delegated decision-making power to minorities. 
Minorities could not constitute themselves as public corporations.  Even if it is true that the 
Baltic German National Community practically fulfilled the same functions as the cultural 
self-governments in Estonia, this private organisation could ne~er be equated with these 
public corporations.  This became painfully clear when only a few months before the coup 
d'etat in 1934, the German minority tried to constitute itself as a public corporation.  It was 
namely fully aware that it had to remove its so-called autonomous school administration from 
the increasingly dangerous 'political environment'. 
True, the relative homogeneity of  Estonia implied that it could afford to be generous towards 
its minorities.  But there many other reasons.  As shown above, because of  several factors, the 
relationship between the majority nation and the most influential minority was much more 
difficult in Latvia than in Estonia.  Also important to note is that already in December 1919 
the Latvian state had granted school autonomy to its minorities.  Ironically, this very early 
introduction was actually one of  the obstacles for a later full cultural autonomy.  Members of 
the Baltic German community argued that cultural autonomy was no longer necessary 
because of  the acquired school autonomy.  But, as stressed above, this school autonomy was 
not a full cultural autonomy.  The Baltic German community c~ntinuously disagreed over the 
content of  cultural autonomy.  Even its official bill of 1924 did not aim for full cultural 
autonomy, modelled on the system in Estonia.  Contrary to Estonia, cultural autonomy also 
never had a constitutional basis in Latvia. 
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countries, as historically rooted minority groups such as the Germans and Jews practically 
disappeared, and the Russian-speaking population grew exponentially as a result of large-
scale inward migration,  When regaining independence, the Estonians and Latvians had 
almost become minorities in their own states.  The massive immigration of  Russians and 
Russian speakers not only altered the demographic profile of  these countries but also led to 
the replacement of  the native languages by the Russian language in several functional 
domains.  The replacement of  relatively small but historically rooted and culturally very 
conscious German and Jewish minority groups by large groups of  Russian-speaking 
immigrants, consisting of  workers, party officials, military is of  course fundamental in the 
whole discussion over domestic sovereignty. 
Together with the restoration of  their 'historic homeland' in 1991, the Baltic nations also 
restored the membership of  these homeland, a membership limited to the residents of  pre-
1940 Estonia and Latvia and their descendants.  Post-war settlers had to go through a process 
of  natural  is  at  ion to test their loyalty.  The restoration of  the political community and the 
accompanying rejection of  automatic citizenship were acceptable and legitimate, both from a 
legal and political point of  view.  Just like the land reforms in the 1920s had dramatically 
reversed the existing order, the Estonians and Latvians secured in the beginning of  the 1990s 
an institutionally superior position for themselves through the citizenship and language laws. 
The next question was then whether they would organise their internal state structure in a way 
as to provide Russian-speakers with certain institutions or collective rights. 
In Estonia, the cultural autonomy law of 1925 was formally reintroduced by the law of 1993. 
Apart from the question whether this law is really relevant to the needs of  the territorially 
compact Russian-speaking population of  the north-east, the law itself appears to be a pale 
imitation of  its famous predecessor.  Experts point out, first, that the institutions concerned 
look more like private bodies, at variance with the 1925 law, second, that a cultural self-
government can only establish so-called Sunday Schools, and tl)ird, that Russians are not 
interested in the limited cultural autonomy of  the sunday schools because their needs are 
already fulfilled by the Russian-language schools.  This is an interesting analogy with the 
interwar period, when many leading members of  the German minority in Latvia were not 
interested in full cultural autonomy because they were of  the opinion that their cultural needs 
were already fulfilled by the school autonomy.  The Presidential Roundtable on minorities is 
an institution, established in response to the 1993 crisis and designed to enable a regular 
dialogue between Estonians and Russian-speakers.  In terms of  domestic sovereignty, the 
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position of  the roundtable vis-a-vis the Estonian state has been illustrated at several occasions 
when the state took decisions running against its recommendations.  In Latvia, a law of 18 
March 1991  guarantees all 'nationalities' and 'ethnic groups' the right to cultural autonomy and 
self-administration of  their own culture.  This law, however, only provides certain individual 
rights and certain rights of  minority associations in the private area.  It certainly does not 
foresee public law corporations which administer autonomously their own affairs.  The Social 
Consultative Council on Nationalities of  the Saeima was never established and the activities 
of  its successor, the President's Advisory Minority Council, have stopped.  Like the Estonian 
roundtable, both organs are only advisory organs whose decisions are not binding for the 
Saeima or other constitutional organs.  Also the concept of  cultural autonomy in Lithuania 
falls behind the rights and guarantees of  the earlier Constitution of 1922.  The Council of 
National Communities has a similar task as the forementioned Estonian and Latvian bodies. 
Also the Council is an advisory organ which does not have any decision-making power. 
In sum, the three Baltic countries have put much more emphasis on linguistic integration than 
on collective rights.  In line with Mark lubulis, one can argue that through their citizenship 
and language laws, Estonia and Latvia have adopted a form of cultural nationalism.  Central 
goal of  their nationalising policies is to reverse the asymmetrical bilingualism and to create a 
native cultural environment within their own states.  Estonia's and Latvia's cultural 
nationalism makes inclusion into the political community dependent upon integration into the 
culture of  the majority nation.  That these states did not adopt a policy of  ethnic nationalism is 
also illustrated by the continued access of  Russian-speakers in both countries to state-financed 
Russian schools.  From a material point of  view, this can be seen as a defacto cultural 
autonomy, certainly in Estonia where the Russian language was also constitutionally retained 
both as internal working language and external communication language for the local 
governments in northeastern Estonia. 
Although the Estonian and Latvian citizenship laws were not ethnically based, their actual 
effect was that a very large part of  their population was deprived of  political rights.  Next to 
this, these laws and other policies were adopted within a context where leading politicians and 
decision makers openly pleaded for a repatriation of  most Russian-speakers.  This was clearly 
a bridge too far for the Western European countries, fearful of  both the domestic stability and 
tranquility ofthese states and the international peace.  Although the 'official Europe' had 
endorsed the legal continuity principle, it made it also clear that any radical decolonisation 
25] policy would be unacceptable and would create an obstacle for 'returning to Europe', an aim 
formulated very early by all Baltic politicians.  The collapse of  communist rule in Eastern 
Europe with the accompanying rise of  nationalism and ethnic tensions led to a growing 
interest of  European institutions in minority rights.  The CoE and the OSCE were the 
institutions most actively involved in the monitoring of  the ethnic situation in Estonia and 
Latvia.  Analogous to the interwar period and the policy of  the League of  Nations, early 
efforts to install a minority rights regime binding for all members of  the organisations 
concerned, failed because of  the resistance from leading Western European states.  The 
depiction of  Central and Eastern Europe as 'problematic' and the exclusive concentration on 
Central and Eastern Europe was also a characteristic of  the EU's Stability Pact.  Russian 
efforts to internationalise the settlers issue and to block the integration process of  the Baltic 
countries into Europe backfired.  International human rights institutions not only denied 
human rights violations but also confirmed their respect for the concept of  legal continuity. 
Neither the crisis round the Aliens law in Estonia nor the issue of  the Latvian Citizenship law 
led to a major modification ofthe restorationist policies of  Estonia and Latvia.  As a result of 
the human rights clauses in the TCAs, FT  As and EAs, ethnic policy theoretically was no 
longer an internal affair of  the Baltic states.  But just like the minority declarations in the 
interwar period, this constituted only a formal violation of  their Westphalian sovereignty. 
Estonia and Latvia actually strengthened their restorationist policies in the period 1995-1997. 
The HCNM put normative pressure on the two states but his recommendations were 
disregarded.  The process of  integration into the 'official Europe' was mainly driven by the 
internal Russian situation and geopolitical considerations. 
Starting from the Commission's opinions in July 1997, normative pressure by the HCNM 
combined with the EU's policy of conditionality produced results.  As neighbour states of 
Russia, Estonia and Latvia were also potential member states of  the EU.  Because the EU has 
a strong interest in the domestic stability and tranquility of  these states and in the prevention 
of  international conflict, citizenship and language policies had to be closely monitored and 
corrected if necessary.  The EU's policy constituted a clear violation of  the Westphalian 
sovereignty of  Estonia and Latvia.  These countries adopted the requested changes in their 
legislation concerned which they would never have done without the EU's pressure.  This 
interventions did, however, not entail a fundamental change to their domestic sovereignty. 
The amendments in the citizenship laws shifted the political balance in favour of  the non-
252 titular population.  The EU did however not strive for a change of  the unitary nation-state 
vision at the heart of  the state-building projects of Estonia and Latvia. 
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291 ANNEX 
Lithuanian minority declaration (JO (1922:586-588); League of  Nations (1927:34-35)) 
Article 1 
The stipulations of  this Declaration are recognised as fundamental laws of Lithuania and no 
law, regulation, or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall 
any law, regulation or official action now or in the future, prevail over them. 
Article 2 
Full and complete protection of  life and liberty will be assured to all inhabitants of  Lithuania, 
without distinction of  birth, nationality, language, race or religion. 
All inhabitants of  Lithuania will be entitled to the free exercise, whether public or private, of 
any creed, religion or belief, whose practices are not inconsistent with public order or public 
morals. 
Article 3 
The Lithuanian Government shall advise the Council of  the League of  Nations of  all 
constitutional or legislative stipulations regarding the conditions necessary to the acquisition 
of  the status of  Lithuanian nationals. 
All persons born in the territory of  the Lithuanian State, subsequent to the date of  the present 
Declaration, who cannot claim another nationality by birth, shall be recognised as Lithuanian 
nationals. 
Article 4 
All Lithuanian nationals shall be equal before the law, and shall enjoy the same civil and 
political rights without distinction as to race, language or religion. 
Differences of  religion, creed or confession will not prejudice any Lithuanian national in 
matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as for instance, admission to 
public employments, functions and honours, or the exercise of  professions or industries.  No 
restriction will be imposed on the free use by any Lithuanian national of  any language in 
292 private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the press or in publications of  any kind, or at 
public meetings. 
Notwithstanding any establishment of  an official language, adequate facilities will be given to 
Lithuanian nationals of  non-Lithuanian speech for the use of  their language, either orally or in 
writing before the Courts. 
Article 5 
Lithuanian nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities will enjoy the 
same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Lithuanian nationals.  In particular 
they shall have an equal right to maintain, manage and control at their own expense, or to 
establish in the future, charitable, religious and social institutions, schools and other 
educational establishments, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their 
religion freely therein. 
Article 6 
Provision will be made in the public educational system in towns or in districts in which are 
resident a considerable proportion of Lithuanian nationals whose mother tongue is not the 
Lithuanian language, for adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools 
instruction shall be given to the children of  such nationals through the medium of  their own 
language; it being understood that this provision does not prevent the teaching of  the 
Lithuanian language being made obligatory in the said schools. 
In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of  Lithuanian nationals 
belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, these minorities will be assured an 
equitable share in the enj oyment and application of  sums which may be provided out of  public 
funds under the State, municipal or other budgets, for educational, religious or charitable 
purposes. 
Article 7 
Educational Committees appointed locally by the Jewish communities of  Lithuania will, 
subject to the general control of  the State, provide for the distribution of  the proportional 
share of  public funds allocated to Jewish schools in accordance with Article 6, and for the 
organisation and management of  these schools. 
The provisions of  Article 6 concerning the use of languages in schools shall apply to these 
schools. 
293 Article 8 
Jews shall not be compelled to perform any acts which constitutes a violation of  their 
Sabbath, nor shall they be placed under any disability by reason of  their refusal to attend 
courts of law or to perform any legal business on their Sabbath.  This provision, however, 
shall not exempt Jews from such obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Lithuanian 
citizens for the necessary purposes of  military service, national defence or the preservation of 
public order. 
Lithuania declares her intention to refrain from ordering or permitting elections, whether 
general or local, to be held on a Saturday, nor will registration for electoral or other purposes 
be compelled to be performed on a Saturday. 
Article 9 
The stipulations in the foregoing Articles of  this Declaration, so far as they affect the persons 
belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities, are declared to constitute obligations of 
international concern, and will be placed under the guarantee of  the League of  Nations.  No 
modification will be made in them without the assent of  a majority of  the Council of  the 
League of  Nations. 
Any member of  the Council of  the League of  Nations shall have the right to bring to the 
attention of  the Council any infraction or danger of  infraction, of  any of  these stipulations, and 
the Council may thereupon take such action and give such direction as it may deem proper 
and effective in the circumstances. 
Any difference of  opinion as to questions of law or fact arising out of  these Articles between 
the Lithuanian government and any Power, a Member of  the Council of  the League of 
Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of  an international character under Article 14 of  the 
Covenant of  the League of  Nations.  Any dispute shall, if  the other party thereto demands, be 
referred to the Permanent Court ofInternational Justice.  The decision of  the Permanent Court 
shall be final and shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of  the 
Covenant. 
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